JUDGMENT Hon’ble Dharam Veer Sharma, J.—The instant appeal has been preferred against the judgment and order dated 12.5.2006, passed by the learned Single Judge in writ petition No. 2324(M/S) of 2006. 2. Initially the writ petition was filed with following reliefs : (a) To issue a writ, order or direction in the nature of certiorari quashing the impugned Notification dated 2.5.2006 issued by the opposite party No. 3, the true copy of which is contained as Annexure 1 to the writ petition. (b) To issue a writ, order or direction in the nature of certiorari quashing the impugned election notice dated 26.4.2006 issued by the opposite party No. 3, the true copy of which is contained as Annexure 2 to the writ petition. (c) To issue a writ, order or direction in the nature of quashing the impugned order dated 22.8.2005 passed by the opposite party No.2, the true copy of which is contained as Annexure No.3 to the writ petition. (d) To issue a writ, order or direction in the nature of mandamus commanding the opposite parties not to hold the election of the Committee of Management of the Societies of the colleges so mentioned in Table No.1 of the writ petition pursuant to the impugned order dated 22.8.2005 passed by the opposite party No.2. (e) To award the cost of this petition in favour of the petitioner. The appeal has been preferred against the following impugned order : “The petitioners have challenged the order dated 22.8.2005. Elections as scheduled earlier shall take place tomorrow and cannot be stayed at this belated stage. The objections with regard to electoral College have been rejected by the Director by means of order dated 20.4.2006. The petitioners are, however at liberty to challenge the said order. The hearing of the writ petition has taken place for two days. Both the parties have put their arguments at length. The prayer of the petitioners to postpone the election on the ground of the Electoral College as not constituted properly, cannot be considered at this stage in view of the Division Bench decision of this Court in the case of Basant Prasad Srivastava and others v. State of U.P. and others, (1993). 2 UPLBEC 1333. The record has also been produced by the learned Standing Counsel. 2 UPLBEC 1333. The record has also been produced by the learned Standing Counsel. The learned Standing Counsel has also placed on record, the order of the Director as aforesaid rejecting the petitioners’ objections with regard to the voter-list. The out-come of the election will give right to the petitioners to proceed in accordance with law. Further hearing will continue.“ 3. It is relevant to mention brief facts of the case. It is alleged that the impugned order dated 12.5.2006 was passed in violation of the principles of natural justice. It is further urged that learned Single Judge has failed to consider that the Director of Education while passing the order dated 22.8.2005 exceeded the domain of jurisdiction entrusted to him by this Court vide order dated 17.10.2000 passed in writ petition No. 2395 of 2000. The order suffers from perversities. It is further urged that 17 educational institutions were recognised by the District Inspector of Schools on 7.3.2000 and the election was not challenged in any of the case. 4. A Preliminary objection has been raised from the side of the respondents that special appeal is not maintainable for the reasons that the order impugned is interlocutory in nature. It does not contain traits and trappings of finality and not decide the controversy causing serious injustice to the party concerned. In other words, it does not decide the matter affecting valuable rights of the parties. Consequently, from any angle the impugned order cannot be treated as judgment. 5. Learned Counsel for the respondents has placed reliance over Shah Babulal Khimji v. Jayaben and another, AIR 1981 SC 1786 Paragraphs 106, 115 and 119 are relevant are reproduced as below : “106. Thus, the only point which emerges from this decision is that whenever a trial Judge decides a controversy which affects valuable rights of one of the parties, it must be treated to be a judgment within the meaning of the Letters Patent. 115. Thus, in other words every interlocutory order cannot be regarded as a judgment but only those orders would be judgments which decide matters of moment or affect vital and valuable rights of the parties and which work serious injustice to the party concerned. 115. Thus, in other words every interlocutory order cannot be regarded as a judgment but only those orders would be judgments which decide matters of moment or affect vital and valuable rights of the parties and which work serious injustice to the party concerned. Similarly, orders passed by the trial Judge deciding question of admissibility or relevancy of a document also cannot be treated as judgments because the grievance on this score can be corrected by the appellate Court in appeal against the final judgment. 119. Apart, from the tests laid down by Sir White, C.J., the following considerations must prevail with the Court : (1) That the trial Judge being a senior Court with vast experience of various branches of law occupying a very high status should be trusted to pass discretionary or interlocutory orders with due regard to the well settled principles of civil justice. Thus, any discretion exercised or routine orders passed by the trial Judge in the course of the suit which may cause some inconvenience or, to some extent, prejudice one party or the other cannot be treated as a judgment otherwise the appellate Court (Division Bench) will be flooded with appeals from all kinds of orders passed by the trial Judge. The Courts must give sufficient allowance to the trial Judge and raise a presumption that any discretionary order which he passes must be presumed to be correct unless it is ex facie legally erroneous or causes grave and substantial injustice. (2) That the interlocutory order in order to be a judgment must contain the traits and trappings of finality either when the order decides the questions in controversy in an ancillary proceeding or in the suit itself or in a part of the proceedings. (3) The tests laid down by Sir White, C.J. as also by Sit Couch, C.J. as modified by later decisions of the Calcutta High Court itself which have been dealt with by us elaborately should be borne in mind.” 6. Thus on the strength of the aforesaid judgment, it has been urged that the special appeal is not maintainable against the interlocutory order and the appellants if so desire, may apply for the vacation of the order or for modification of the order. Thus on the strength of the aforesaid judgment, it has been urged that the special appeal is not maintainable against the interlocutory order and the appellants if so desire, may apply for the vacation of the order or for modification of the order. It has further been urged that in the matter of election the outcome of the election will also give right to the appellants to proceed in accordance with law. Accordingly, the controversy is not such in which any presumption can be drawn that valuable right of the appellants have been affected or in this ancillary matter, the controversy has been decided finally causing injustice to him. 7. On behalf of the appellants it has been urged that special appeal is maintainable and the order comes within the ambit of judgment. Learned Counsel for the appellants has relied over Shah Babulal Khimji v. Jayaben and another, AIR 1981 SC 1786 . The appellants claim that paragraph 130 provides that the impugned order should be treated as decree. For convenience it is reproduced as below : “130. A learned single Judge dealing with the said application of the appellant on the original side of the Bombay High Court dismissed the said application. Against the order of the learned single Judge, the appellant preferred an appeal to the High Court of Bombay, A preliminary objection has been raised before the appellate Court as to the maintainability of the appeal on the ground that no appeal lay from the order of the learned single Judge on the original side of the High Court, as the order could not be considered to be a judgment’ within the meaning of Cl.15 of the Letters Patent and the appeal was incompetent and not maintainable. The appellate Court from reasons recorded in the judgment upheld the said preliminary objection, holding that the order under appeal was not a judgment and no appeal would lie from the said order and the appeal, therefore was incompetent and not maintainable. Against the order of the Division Bench of the Bombay High Court, the appellant has preferred this appeal by special leave granted by this Court.” 8. The learned Counsel has further relied over, State of U.P. and another v. Dr. Vijay Anand Maharaj, AIR 1963, SC 946. Paragraph 4 of the judgment is reproduced as below : “4. Against the order of the Division Bench of the Bombay High Court, the appellant has preferred this appeal by special leave granted by this Court.” 8. The learned Counsel has further relied over, State of U.P. and another v. Dr. Vijay Anand Maharaj, AIR 1963, SC 946. Paragraph 4 of the judgment is reproduced as below : “4. The first question is whether an appeal lay against the order of Mehrotra J., rejecting the application for review filed by the appellants to a Division Bench of the High Court, Chapter VIII R.5 of the Rules of Court provides for an appeal against an order of a single Judge. Under that rule a special appeal against an order of a single judge of the Court can be maintained only if that order amounts to a “judgment”. That rule gives effect to Cl. 10 of the Letters Patent for the High Court of Allahabad, which gives a right of appeal against a judgement of a single Judge subject to the conditions mentioned therein. The said Cl. 10 corresponds to Cl. 15 of the Letters Patent for the High Courts of Calcutta, Bombay and Madras. The scope of the expression ‘’judgment” came under the judicial scrutiny of the various High Courts : there is a cleavage of opinion on that question. We shall briefly notice the leading decisions of the various High Courts on the subject. Couch, CJ., in Justices of the Peace for Calcutta v. Oriental Gas Co., 8 Beng ER 433 at p. 45 2 defines the word “judgment” in Cl. 15 of the Letters Patent thus : “We think ‘judgment’ in clause 15 means a decision which affects the merits of the question between the parties by determining some right or liability. It may be either final, or preliminary or interlocutory, the difference between them being that a final judgment determines the whole cause or suit and a preliminary or interlocutory judgment determines only a part of it, leaving other matters to be determines.“ The same High Court in Hadjee Ismail v. Hadjee Mohommed, 13 Beng LR 91 at p. 101 held that an appeal lay under the said clause from an order refusing to set aside an order granting leave to sue to the plaintiff under Cl. 12 of the Letters Patent. 12 of the Letters Patent. Therein Couch, C.J., observed : “It is not a mere formal order, or an order merely regulating the procedure in the suit, but one that has the effect of giving a jurisdiction to the Court it otherwise would not have. And it may fairly be said to the right to sue in a particular Court, and to compel the defendants who are not within its jurisdiction to come in and defend the suit, or if they do not, to make them liable to have a decree passed against them in their absence.“ The Bombay High Court followed the Calcutta view. The leading judgment of the Madras High Court is that in Tuljaram v. Alagappa, ILR 35 Additional 1 at pp. 7,15, where it was held that an order of a single Judge in the Original Side refusing to frame an issue asked for by one of the parties is not a judgment’ within the meaning of Cl. 15 of the Letters Patent. White, C.J., laid down the following tests: “The test seems to me to be not what is the forms of the adjudication, but what is its effect in the suit or proceeding in which it is made. It effect, whatever its form may be, and whatever be the nature of the application on which it is made, is to put an end to the suit or proceeding so far as the Court before which the suit or proceeding is pending is concerned, or its effect, it is not complied with, is to put an end to the suit or proceeding, think the adjudication is a judgment’ within the meaning of the clause. “Referring to the decisions of the Calcutta High Court the learned Chief Justice proceeded to state : “On the other hand I am not prepared to say as was held in 8 Beng LR 433 and in Sonbai v. Ahmedbhai Habibhai, 9 Bom HCR 398, it must be a decision which affects the merits by determining some right or liability. “Referring to the decisions of the Calcutta High Court the learned Chief Justice proceeded to state : “On the other hand I am not prepared to say as was held in 8 Beng LR 433 and in Sonbai v. Ahmedbhai Habibhai, 9 Bom HCR 398, it must be a decision which affects the merits by determining some right or liability. I think the decision may be a judgment for the purposes of the section though it does not affect the merits of the suit or proceeding and does not determine any question of right raised in the suit or proceeding.“ Krishnaswami Ayyar, J, observed much to the same effect : “I would only stop here to remark that a decision which determines the cause or proceeding so far as the particular Court is concerned, though it refused to adjudge the merits, must also be deemed to be a judgment : for otherwise the rejection of plaint for defect of form or insufficiency of a Court fee or a return of it for want of jurisdiction would be outside the definition of the learned Chief Justice which could hardly have been his meaning. I may also observe that the “part” which is determined may be a part of the claim separable from the rest or a determination of liability generally though the actual measure of liability may be a matter of account. The Lahore High Court generally followed the view expressed by the Madras High Court. The Allahabad High Court in Muhammad Naim Ullah Khan v. Ihsan-Ullah Khan, ILR 14 All. 226, expressed the view that an order which is not appealable under Order 43 Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure is not appealable under cl.10 of the Letters Patent. This view has been followed by a Division Bench of the same High Court in Trimal Singh v. Kanhaiya Singh, ILR 45 All. 535 : (AIR 1923 All 356). But the said decisions do not attempt to lay down a definition of the expression “judgment” in the Letters Patent. The Nagpur High Court in Manohar v. Baliram, ILR 1952 Nag 471 : (AIR 1952 Nag 357) (FB), by a majority, after considering the case-law on the subject, laid down the following definition. 535 : (AIR 1923 All 356). But the said decisions do not attempt to lay down a definition of the expression “judgment” in the Letters Patent. The Nagpur High Court in Manohar v. Baliram, ILR 1952 Nag 471 : (AIR 1952 Nag 357) (FB), by a majority, after considering the case-law on the subject, laid down the following definition. Hidayatullah, J., who delivered the leading judgment, laid down the test at p.522 (of lLR Nag) : (at p. 376 of AIR) thus : “A judgment means a decision in an action whether final, preliminary, or interlocutory which decides either wholly or partially, but conclusively in so far as the Court is concerned, the controversy which is the subject of the action. It does not include a decision which is on a matter of procedure, nor one which is ancillary to the action even though it may either imperil the ultimate decision or tend to make it effective. The decision need not be immediately executable per se but if left untouched must result inevitably without anything further, save the determination of consequential details, in a decree or decretal order, that is to say, an executive document directing something to be done or not to be done in relation to the facts of the controversy. The decision may itself order that thing to be done or not to be done or it may leave that over till after the ascertainment of some details but it must not be interlocutory having for its purpose the ascertainment of some matters or details prior to the determination of the whole or any part of the controversy.“ The foregoing brief analysis of the judgments shows that the definition given by the Madras High Court is wider than that given by the Calcutta and Nagpur High Courts. It is not necessary in this case to attempt to reconcile the said decisions or to give a definition of our own, for on the facts of the present case the order of Mehrotra, J., would be a judgment within the meaning of the narrower definition of that expression. Further the appellant has relied on [1993] 2 UPLBEC. Page 1325, State of U.P. and others v. Km. Renu Tiwari and others. For convenience paragraphs 4, 5, 6, 7 and 8 are reproduced as below : “4. Further the appellant has relied on [1993] 2 UPLBEC. Page 1325, State of U.P. and others v. Km. Renu Tiwari and others. For convenience paragraphs 4, 5, 6, 7 and 8 are reproduced as below : “4. After referring to certain decisions of their Lordships of the Supreme Court, the learned Single Judge has observed that the doctrine of equal pay for equal work cannot be disregard on the ground that employment of respondents is temporary while that of the regularly appointed lecturers is permanent. With this observation direction has been issued as follows : The petitionershall also be paid salary in the grade of Rs. 2200-4000 per month with effect from 1-10-1992 and they shall also be entitled to other benefits which are available to the regularly appointed lecturers and can get salary and allowances for the period of any vacation for which regular lecturers are paid their salary. Maternity or medical leave facilities shall also be given to the petitioners so long as they hold the posts. 5. The submission of the learned Counsel for the appellants is that by the order under appeal substantial part of the controversy involved in the writ petition itself stands settled and this is not permissible at the stage of the disposal of the application for interim relief. It is pointed out that in the event of dismissal of the writ petition, it may not be possible for the appellant to obtain restitution from the respondent lecturers. 6. A preliminary objection has been raised on behalf of the respondent-lecturers against the maintainability of the appeal. It is submitted that an appeal under Chapter VIII, Rule 5 of the Rules of Court, 1952, for short Rules, lies only against “Judgment” which means final order in a case and since the order under appeal is not a final order, the appeal is not maintainable. In support of the submission, reliance has been placed on the judgment of a Division Bench of this Court dated 9th September, 1992 in Special Appeal No. 418 of 1992, Narsingh Arya v. Jaswant Singh and another. 7. Rule 5 of Chapter Vlll of the Rules reads as under : "5. In support of the submission, reliance has been placed on the judgment of a Division Bench of this Court dated 9th September, 1992 in Special Appeal No. 418 of 1992, Narsingh Arya v. Jaswant Singh and another. 7. Rule 5 of Chapter Vlll of the Rules reads as under : "5. “Special appeal—An appeal shall lie to the Court from a judgment (not being a judgment passed in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction in respect of a decree or order made by a Court subject to the superintendence of the Court and not being an order made in the exercise of revisional jurisdiction or in the exercise of its power of superintendence or in the exercise of criminal jurisdiction (or in the exercise of jurisdiction conferred by Article 226 or Article 227 of the Constitution in respect of any judgment, order or award : (a) of a tribunal Court or Statutory arbitrator made or purported to be made in the exercise or purported exercise of jurisdiction under any Uttar Pradesh Act or under any Central Act, with respect to any of the matters enumerated in the State List or the Concurrent List in the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution, or (b) of the Government or any Officer or authority, made or purported to be made in the exercise or purported exercise of appellate or revisional jurisdiction under any such act of one Judge).“ Under the above provision appeal lies against “judgment”. This leads us to explore the connotation of the term “Judgment”. The matter is covered by authorities and we may examine them. 8. In Shital Din and others v. Anant Ram, 1933 ALJ 127 a Full Bench of this Court has observed at page 130 as follows : This was an appeal under Clause 10 of the Letters Patent dated 17.3.1866 creating the High Court of Allahabad. The appeal was directed against the judgment of a learned Single Judge of the High Court remanding the case to the lower appellate Court under Order XII Rule 23 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 for short Code. Maintainability of the appeal was challenged on the ground that the remand order did not amount to decree. The remand order was passed by a learned Single Judge exercising appellate jurisdiction. Clause 10 of the Letters Patent provided appeal. Maintainability of the appeal was challenged on the ground that the remand order did not amount to decree. The remand order was passed by a learned Single Judge exercising appellate jurisdiction. Clause 10 of the Letters Patent provided appeal. Inter alia, against the judgment of one Judge made in exercise of appellate jurisdiction by a Court subject to the superintendence of the High Court. With the observation extracted hereinabove the plea of non-maintainability of the appeal was negatived. This judgment is authority for the proposition that an order which effectually disposes of the matter brought before the Court amounts to a “judgment”. 9. On the strength of the aforesaid rulings, it has been contended that the refusal to give interim relief causes a serious prejudice to the appellants. It has further been contended that the learned Single Judge failed to appreciate the import and purport to grant interim relief. Obviously, the interim order was granted by the Court keeping in view of three prime factors whether irreparable loss is going to be caused to the person approaching the Court, if interim relief is not granted; secondly the refusal of grant of interim relief would involve greater injustice than the grant of it would involve, thirdly that if interim relief is not granted then whether the party against whom the interim relief is granted cannot be compensated at a later stage. 10. It is urged that in the case in hand all the three situations are present, as such, refusal to give interim relief by the Court has caused irreparable loss to the appellants. It has further been urged that if the learned Single Judge would have been pleased to pass an interim relief then no such harm was going to be caused any of the party. It has further contended that refusal of interim relief had caused a serious hardship accordingly, the special appeal is maintainable. 11. We have heard the rival submissions of the parties and perused the record. 12. It appears from the impugned order that the learned Single Judge provided that the order dated 22.8.2005 passed by the Director rejecting the representation could be challenged in the proceedings. The prayer of the appellants to postpone the election was not found feasible. 13. 11. We have heard the rival submissions of the parties and perused the record. 12. It appears from the impugned order that the learned Single Judge provided that the order dated 22.8.2005 passed by the Director rejecting the representation could be challenged in the proceedings. The prayer of the appellants to postpone the election was not found feasible. 13. It is contended on behalf of the respondents that the interim relief could not be granted to appellants for the reasons that it would amount to be deciding the objection. The voter list was finalized in accordance with law and objections were invited by the competent authority and the same were disposed of in rightful discharge of duties which does not cause any prejudice to the appellants. However, it is also not open for the Court to stop the process of election or to issue any direction to add the names of voter and delete the names of voter. 14. It has further been contended that in view of the Constitution Bench Judgment of the Hon’ble; Apex Court in Mohinder Singh Gill and another v. Chief Election Commission, AIR 1978 SC 851 . The Court generally does not interfere in the process of election and accordingly the process of election was not rightly interfered by the learned Single Judge. 15. After considering the rival submissions of the parties, it appears that the impugned order does not suffer from any of the infirmities as referred by the learned Counsel for the appellants. Learned Single Judge should have been approached for modification of the order instead of filing any appeal against the same. The impugned order ex-facie is not legally erroneous by causing grave substantial injustice. It also does not take away vital and valuable rights. Consequently, no appeal can be filed against the discretionary order, which have no traits and trappings of finality. It is apparent from the impugned order that further hearing of the matter is going on and the election was not stayed. 16. We find that the result of the election will remain subject to the decision of the writ petition. Accordingly, the objection of the appellants that it would cause serious hardship or comparatively greater hardship could not be made out on the face of it. 17. 16. We find that the result of the election will remain subject to the decision of the writ petition. Accordingly, the objection of the appellants that it would cause serious hardship or comparatively greater hardship could not be made out on the face of it. 17. In view of the forgoing reasons, we are of the view that the matter is squarely covered by the decision of Hon’ble apex Court in AIR 1981 SC 1786 , Shah Babulal Khimji v. Jayaben and another, which has already been referred to above. The impugned order does not cause any injury to the appellants in view of the decision in Mohinder Singh Gill’s case, accordingly respondents objections are sustained. 18. Thus the remedy availed under Rule 5 Chapter VIII of Allahabad High Court Rules, 1952 by the appellants is misconceived and is not maintainable. 19. Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed at the admission stage itself. Appeal Dismissed. ———