ANIL KUMAR, J. ( 1 ) THE petitioner has sought writ in the nature of mandamus directing the respondents to admit petitioner in MCA course in IIT, Roorkee on the basis of his merits in the Joint Admission Test, 2006. ( 2 ) THE petitioner contended that he has been illegally denied admission in IIT, roorkee in MCA course despite his holding 14th rank in general category in All india Joint Admission Test. The petitioner complained that IIT, Roorkee, second respondent intimated him that he did not qualify eligibility condition in terms of senate resolution of IIT, Roorkee which is as under: "the candidates may be admitted provisionally on the basis of their results upto pre-final year in which the percentage of marks or CGPA should not be less than 60% mark or CGPA of 6. 75 on a 10-point scale at the qualifying degree level; but for SC/st candidates, this percentage is 55% or 6. 25 of CGPA on a 10-point scale. The percentage of marks will be considered on the basis of aggregate awarded for the qualifying degree. " ( 3 ) THE petitioner contended that brochure for Joint Admission Test to post graduate studies was published and circulated by respondent No. 1 along with the application form. A Joint Admission Test (JAM) is conducted for admission to msc. and Post B. Sc. programmes at IIT. The information brochure under the heading Joint Information stipulated that the candidates who have appeared in the final, examination of their qualifying degree could also apply for provisional admission. The relevant Clauses 2 (c) and 2 (g) are as under: "2 (c) The candidates who have either appeared or are due to appear in the final examination of their qualifying degree in 2006 are eligible to appear in the test and on qualifying JAM 2006, can apply for provisional admission on the basis of their results up to pre-final year subject to the condition that (i) All parts of their final examination shall be over by the date of registration, and (ii) They shall produce the proof of having passed the qualifying degree with required eligibility as specified by the admitting institute in the form of the final result on or before September 30, 2006. 2 (g) The admitting institute has the right to cancel, at any stage, the admission of a candidate who is found admitted to a course to which he/she is not entitled, being unqualified or ineligible in accordance with the ordinances and regulations in force. " ( 4 ) THE eligibility requirement for admission to IIT, Roorkee was at least 60% aggregate marks. The relevant Clause 5 is as under: "at least 60% aggregate marks or CGPA of 6. 75 on a 10-point scale for general category candidates (55% marks or 6. 25 CGPA for SC/st candidates) in the qualifying degree. " ( 5 ) THE information brochure provides instruction for filling the OMR application form. The relevant Clause 13 for giving the percentage upto pre-final year is as under: "item No. 13: Percentage of Marks/cgpa write in the box the percentage of aggregate marks or CGPA upto two decimal places, obtained in the qualifying examination or upto pre-final year, if appearing in qualifying examination in 2006, as the case may be. Darken the bubbles accordingly. " ( 6 ) THE petitioner was doing his B. Sc (Hons) Computer Application from aligarh Muslim University and his examinations both written and viva-voce were over by 18th May, 2006. However, the last date for receiving the application for jam, 2006 was 6th January, 2006. The examination was conducted on 26th March, 2006 and the result of the Joint Admission Test, 2006 was declared on 24th April, 2006. ( 7 ) THE petitioner's rank in Joint Admission Test, 2006 was 14th and consequently he was sent a form for admission where petitioner declared his percentage for B. Sc (Hons) Part-I as 48. 8% and for B. Sc (Hons) Part-II as 69. 4%. The aggregate percentage of the petitioner for B. Sc (Hons) Part-I and Part-II was 59. 1%. Consequently, the petitioner was not given admission and the petitioner came to know about it when the admission result was put on website of I1t, Delhi on 22nd May, 2006. ( 8 ) THE petitioner represented on 24th May, 2006. In the meantime the petitioner's examination for B. Sc (Hons) Computer Application which was also over by 18th May, 2006 was declared and he was issued a certificate dated 30th may, 2006 and mark-sheet for B. Sc (Hons) Computer Application where he secured 999 marks out of 1500 marks. ( 8 ) THE petitioner represented on 24th May, 2006. In the meantime the petitioner's examination for B. Sc (Hons) Computer Application which was also over by 18th May, 2006 was declared and he was issued a certificate dated 30th may, 2006 and mark-sheet for B. Sc (Hons) Computer Application where he secured 999 marks out of 1500 marks. ( 9 ) ACCORDING to the petitioner the last date for admission was 9th June, 2006 and the petitioner had made a representation that the eligibility as stipulated under clause 5 of the information brochure was 60% marks in the qualifying degree and, therefore, on the basis of his percentage upto pre final year, Part-I and Part-II of the b. Sc (Hons) Computer Application which was 59. 1% admission could not be declined to the petitioner. ( 10 ) THE petitioner impugned the action of the respondents in not granting him admission on the ground that eligibility requirement is 60% marks in the qualifying degree and consequently on the basis of instructions for filling the OMR application form which stipulates as to what percentage has to be given in the admission form, the admission cannot be declined inasmuch as the requirement for provisional admission is that all parts of the final examination should be over by the date of registration and the candidate must produce the proof of having passed the qualifying degree with required eligibility as specified by the admitting institute in the form of the final result on or before 30th September, 2006. According to the petitioner the senate decision which was not communicated to the petitioner nor it was incorporated in the information brochure, the eligibility prescribed under the brochure could not be modified on the basis of senate decision and, therefore, the decision to decline him admission is contrary to law and is not sustainable. ( 11 ) PER contra the respondent No. 1 which conducted the Joint Entrance examination contended that the information brochure for JAM, 2006 clearly stipulated that the candidate was required to secure not less than 60% in aggregate in the qualifying degree or not less than 60% in aggregate upto per final years of their qualifying degree in case the candidate had not received his final year result. The petitioner was expected to know the aggregate marks upto pre final year by computing the marks of first year and second year of the graduation course. The petitioner though being fully conscious that he did not fulfill the stipulation did not mention in the form of admission the result upto pre-final year. Despite the categorical stipulation in the information brochure (item No. 13 of instructions for filling the OMR giving the percentage upto pre-final year) the petitioner deliberately gave the percentage of second year B. Sc. (Hons) being 69. 4%. The aggregate percentage of the petitioner up to pre-final year was 59. 3% only. ( 12 ) ACCORDING to the respondent No. 1 the result had been declared on 24th april, 2006 and the last date for submission of admission forms with the complete result was 11 th May, 2006 and till then the petitioner had not obtained the final year result of his graduation course and as per Item 13 of instructions for filling the OMR application form he had to fulfil the condition of securing 60% marks upto pre-final year, first and second year of the graduation course. Since the petitioner did not obtain 60% marks till the date of admission, the petitioner was intimated by communication dated 31 st May, 2006 that he could not be admitted on provisional basis as his aggregate percentage of marks upto pre-final year was less than 60%. ( 13 ) THE respondent No. 1 also contended that for MCA programme in IIT, roorkee, no seat is now available in the general category. The respondent No. 1 also contended that the criterion for 60% upto pre-final year has been applied uniformly in cases of all candidates whose result for the degree had not come by the date the application forms were filled, and such candidates have been rejected on the basis that they did not secure minimum marks of 60% upto pre-final year. The illustration of candidate namely Saurabh Wadhawan was given who had a rank of 8 in the Joint Admission Test in the merit list but on the same ground he was disqualified. According to the respondent the criterion has been applied uniformly and large number of candidates were declined admission on that ground. The illustration of candidate namely Saurabh Wadhawan was given who had a rank of 8 in the Joint Admission Test in the merit list but on the same ground he was disqualified. According to the respondent the criterion has been applied uniformly and large number of candidates were declined admission on that ground. A copy giving the details of a number of candidates who have been declined admissions was annexed as Annexure R-1 at Page 86 of the paperbook. According to Annexure r-1 in M. Sc. Biotechnology 3 candidates were denied admission on the ground that their percentage was less than 60%, 85 candidates were denied admission in m. Sc. Chemistry; 44 candidates were denied admission in M. Sc. Applied Geology, m. Tech. Applied Geology and M. Tech. Geophysics; 30 candidates were denied admission on this ground in M. Sc Applied Mathematics and M. Sc. Industrial maths and Informatics; 5 candidates were declined admission in MCA and 54 candidates were declined admission in Physics. ( 14 ) THE respondent No. 1 also relied on a judgment of Supreme Court in krishna Priya Ganguly v. University of Lucknow, (1984) 1 SCC 307 to contend that the rule framed by the admission committee must be taken into consideration and if an academic body fixes a particular criterion for admission, then the admission should be made by such criterion only. ( 15 ) RESPONDENT No. 2 have also filed a counter affidavit refuting the pleas and contentions raised by the petitioner similar to what has been contended on behalf of respondent No. 1, Indian Institute of Technology, Delhi which conducted the joint Entrance Examination, 2006. ( 16 ) THE petitioner filed a rejoinder affidavit refuting the pleas and averments made by the respondents. Regarding disclosing the percentage of marks of second year B. Sc. (Hons) Computer Application only in the admission form for Joint entrance Examination it was contended that it was not deliberate and an inadvertent mistake for which the petitioner gave apology. ( 16 ) THE petitioner filed a rejoinder affidavit refuting the pleas and averments made by the respondents. Regarding disclosing the percentage of marks of second year B. Sc. (Hons) Computer Application only in the admission form for Joint entrance Examination it was contended that it was not deliberate and an inadvertent mistake for which the petitioner gave apology. According to the petitioner by the conjoint reading of Clauses 2 (c) and 5 of the Information Brochure it was clear that the provisional admission could be procured on the basis of the pre-final year subject to two conditions and, therefore, Clause 2 (c) dealt with the provisional admission and not the eligibility which was provided only in Clause 5 and, therefore, the allegation that the petitioner deliberately withheld his first year marks with a view to appear in the entrance test is not correct. The percentage upto pre final year was not the eligibility criterion, was also sought to be contended by the petitioner on the ground that though there was a column for date of birth in the admission form but there is no age restriction. The petitioner also relied on the interim order passed by this Court on 26. 6. 2006 that if all seats have not been filled up then one seat be kept reserved for the petitioner in the course of MCA until further orders. The petitioner contended that it is reliably learnt that four seats are available as four students of MCA did not choose to get admission or after completion of their admission they did not choose to pursue their studies further. The petitioner gave the categorical particulars of one such student namely Ms. Swati Kaushik who has got admission in MCA course in Delhi University and consequently the petitioner contended that he is entitled to be accommodated in one of the four seats. ( 17 ) I have heard the learned Counsel for the parties in great detail. The learned counsel, Mr. Chandershekhar relied on IX (1998) SLT 573= (1999) 1 SCC 126 , nishant Puri v. State of H. P. and Others; VI (2004) SLT 285; Dolly Chhanda v. Chairman JEE and Others; and AIR 1995 Delhi 268, Dr. ( 17 ) I have heard the learned Counsel for the parties in great detail. The learned counsel, Mr. Chandershekhar relied on IX (1998) SLT 573= (1999) 1 SCC 126 , nishant Puri v. State of H. P. and Others; VI (2004) SLT 285; Dolly Chhanda v. Chairman JEE and Others; and AIR 1995 Delhi 268, Dr. Sanjeev Dadhwal v. All India Institute of Medical Sciences to contend that the eligibility prescribed as 60% in the degree course could not be modified on the basis of instructions given for filling the form. ( 18 ) THE learned Counsel, Mr. Maninder Singh on behalf of the respondents has relied on AIR 1966 SC 707 ; Principal Patna College v. Kalyan Srinivas raman, AIR 1984 SC 186 ; Krishna Priya Ganguly v. University of Lucknow and others, AIR 1984 SC 873 ; Javid Rasool Bhat and Others v. State of Jammu and kashmir and Others, AIR 1985 SC 567 ; Jawaharlal Nehru University Students union v. Jawaharlal Nehru University and Another, V (1998) SLT 68=ii (1998) clt 114 (SC)= (1998) 5 SCC 377 ; CBSE and Another v. P. Sunil Kumar and others, VI (2001) SLT 193=jt 2001 (7) SC 103; Medical Council of India v. Sarang and Others, VI (2001) SLT 433=jt 2001 (7) SC 472; Thapar Institute of engineering and Technology and Another v. Gagandeep Sharma and Another, air 1999 Karnataka 438; Mr. P. Siva Naga Raju v. Bangalore University and others, 2003 IV AD (Delhi) 473; Shampa Tikait and Others v. Jamia Millia islamia and Others, 124 (2005) DLT 166; Ajay Kumar Ramineni v. Indian institute of Technology, Delhi and Another and a decision dated 7th December, 2005 in LPA No. 2033/2005 in Ajay Kumar Ramineni v. IIT Delhi and Another to contend that the Court should not device and enforce its own criterion pertaining to admission as the decision must be left to the concerned academic body. ( 19 ) FROM the perusal of the application form of the petitioner for the Joint admission Test to M. Sc. , 2006 (JAM 2006) what is apparent is that in column 13 stipulating percentage of marks/cgpa, the percentage given is 69. 40. This is the percentage of the petitioner for second year B. Sc. ( 19 ) FROM the perusal of the application form of the petitioner for the Joint admission Test to M. Sc. , 2006 (JAM 2006) what is apparent is that in column 13 stipulating percentage of marks/cgpa, the percentage given is 69. 40. This is the percentage of the petitioner for second year B. Sc. According to the eligibility criterion as stipulated in information brochure under the column 'instructions for filling the OMR application form', Item 13 the candidate had to give marks upto pre final year. This could not be construed as giving the percentage of the second year only. The petitioner did not take into consideration his percentage for Part -. The candidate did not give his percentage of Part-I for B. Sc. (Hons) which was only 48. 8%. Had the petitioner given his percentage for Part-I and Part-II which he ought to have done as the information brochure contemplated percentage 'upto pre-final year' then his percentage would have been 59. 1 % making the petitioner ineligible to appear in the examination. It appears that the petitioner deliberately did not give his percentage upto second year and only gave the percentage of marks of second year. ( 20 ) THE contention of the petitioner that Clause 2 (c) deals with the provisional admission and does not deal with eligibility for appearing in the Joint Admission test, 2006, therefore, does not seem to be correct. Even Clause 2 (c) contemplates that the provisional admission shall be on the basis of the result upto pre-final year which will mean percentage upto second year examination. Though Clause 2 (c) which contemplates provisional admission subject to final examination being over by the date of registration and the candidate producing the proof of having passed the qualifying degree on or before 30. 9. 2006, it could not mean that ultimately the admission was to be given on the basis of 60% aggregate marks in the qualifying degree only. Reading Clause 2 (c) and Clause 5, eligibility requirement for admission and Item 13 of instructions for filling the OMR application form would mean that the candidates who had to be given provisional admission was required to get 60% marks in the qualifying degree but such a candidate was also required to score 60% marks even upto pre-final year so as to be eligible for admission to mca course. The contention of the petitioner that the percentage upto pre-final year was only an ancillary information and for admission to the post graduate course only 60% marks in the qualifying degree was required shall not be correct in the circumstances. ( 21 ) THE contention of the learned Counsel for the petitioner that the percentage upto pre-final year was only ancillary information and admission to the post graduate course at IIT, Roorkee was solely dependent on the candidate obtaining minimum 60% marks in the qualifying degree, may not be correct in the facts and circumstances. Since there was no age restriction for appearing in the examination the date of birth could be termed as ancillary information but the same yardstick cannot be applied as far as the percentage upto pre-final year of the qualifying degree is concerned. It is apparent that the petitioner also knew that the percentage upto pre-final year will be relevant for admission to the postgraduate course in IIT, roorkee and, therefore, he deliberately gave his percentage of second year of qualifying degree and not upto pre-final year of the qualifying degree. The petitioner knew that had he given his percentage upto pre-final year of the qualifying degree which was less than 60% he would become ineligible and, therefore, he gave the percentage of second year only to show that he is eligible. ( 22 ) THE respondents have given the details of the students who have not been considered for admission to different courses on account of not scoring 60% marks upto pre-final year of the qualifying degree in Annexure R-1 at Page 86 of the paperbook. Though the Senate resolution was not categorically incorporated in the prospectus (information brochure), however, the existence of that cannot be denied. The petitioner has given one interpretation of the rules which includes the clause of General information, eligibility criterion and instructions for filling the omr application form not taking into consideration the Senate resolution whereas the respondents have interpreted eligibility criterion along with the clause of general information and the clause in instructions for filling the OMR application and has applied uniformly to all the candidates thereby not admitting the candidates who had secured less than 60% marks upto pre-final year of the qualifying degree course. There cannot be a dispute that it is a matter for decision of the academic body and since the respondents have applied the rule in a bona fide manner to all the students equally it will not be appropriate for this Court to interfere with the internal working of the respondents concerned especially regarding admission to higher education in the field of post graduate courses. ( 23 ) IN Principal, Patna College (supra) the Apex Court had held that the High court should normally be very slow to interfere under Article 226 of the Constitution as the matters falling within the jurisdiction of educational authorities should normally be left to their decision. It was held that if the regulation is capable of two constructions it would generally not be expedient for the Court to reverse a decision of the educational authorities on the ground that the construction placed by such authorities is less reasonable within the alternative construction which is canvassed by the petitioner before this Court. In this case, the candidate had not fulfilled the regulations as he had not attended the adequate number of practical and his practical record was also not satisfactory. If the shortage of attendance could be condoned, the candidate was eligible to appear in the examination. The Apex Court had held that requirement of 75% attendance had to be construed after taking into consideration the tutorials and practicals disjunctively and not conjunctively and had led emphasis to the tutorials and practical work done by the candidate in addition to attending lectures. The relevant observation of the Apex Court in principal, Patna College v. Kalyan Srinivas Raman, (1966) 1 SCR 974 , is as under: it is hardly necessary to emphasise that in dealing with matters relating to orders passed by authorities of educational institutions under Article 226 of the Constitution, the High Court should normally be very slow to pass ex parte ad interim orders, because matters falling within the jurisdiction of the educational authorities should normally be left to their decision, and the High Court should interfere with them only when it thinks it must do so in the interests of justice. Even on the merits, we think we ought to point out that where the question involved is one of interpreting a regulation framed by the Academic Council of a University, the High Court should ordinarily be reluctant to issue a writ of certiorari where it is plain that the regulation in question is capable of two constructions, and it would generally not be expedient for the High Court to reverse a decision of the educational authorities on the ground that the construction placed by the said authorities on the relevant regulation appears to the High Court less reasonable than the alternative construction which it is pleased to accept. The limits of the High Court's jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari are well recognised and it is, on the whole, desirable that the requirements prescribed by judicial decisions in the exercise of writ jurisdiction in dealing with such matters should be carefully borne in mind. ( 24 ) IN Krishna Priya Ganguly (supra), there was a conflict in circular passed by the Government and the rules framed by the Medical Council of India. The government order contemplated admission to MD and MS courses purely on merit and on the basis of marks obtained by the candidate in the MBBS examination whereas MCI rules contemplated one year housemanship/diploma preferably in the same subject prior to admission to PG course. On challenge being made to the admission to the medical courses the provisional admission was given. In this context, it was held that whenever a writ petition is filed provisional admission could not be given as a matter of course on the petition being admitted unless the court is fully satisfied that the petitioner has a cast iron case which is bound to succeed or the error is so gross or apparent that no other conclusion is possible. In order, however, to test this fact even a short notice may be given to explore as to what other side has to say and thereafter if the Court is satisfied that there is strong prima facie case and the matter needs thorough examination, provisional admission may be given. The Supreme Court held: "the High Court could not have given a go-bye to the rules framed by admission Committee. The Supreme Court held: "the High Court could not have given a go-bye to the rules framed by admission Committee. It was a matter for decision of the academic body and since the academic bodies had applied the rules in a bona fide manner to all the students equally there was no justification whatsoever on the part of the High Court to interfere with internal working of an academic institution concerned with imparting higher education in the field of post graduate course in medicine. " ( 25 ) THE Apex Court in Javid Rasool Bhat (supra) had held that Court's duty lies in preventing arbitrariness and denial of equal opportunity and in the very nature of things it would not be within the province or within the competence of the court to venture in such exclusive matters which are to be left to the expertise of medicine academicians interested in the quality and integrity of medical education. In this petition, the entire selection process for admission to first year MBBS course was challenged on the ground that viva voce was conducted just to dilute the high merit of the candidates and it was contended that general written test should have been conducted by the respondents. The writ petitions were, however, dismissed by the Court. ( 26 ) JAWAHARLAL Nehru University Students' Union had challenged the eligibility of the students for admission to post graduate study who had done (10+2+2) course as arbitrary as the admission to post graduate study courses was confined only to graduates who had undergone (10+2+3) years course of study. The Apex court had observed that in academic matters, it is not proper to tinker with educational policies. It was thus held that the admission policy of Jawaharlal Nehru university granting admission to the graduates who had undergone (10+2+3 years) course of study cannot be termed arbitrary and had a perfectly rational basis and there is good reason and sufficient justification for the policy and consequently the writ petition was dismissed. ( 27 ) REGARDING provisional admission granted to the students and subsequently regularizing the same by taking a sympathetic view of the matter and thus admitting the students to the medical colleges, was held to be clear transgression of the provisions of the University. ( 27 ) REGARDING provisional admission granted to the students and subsequently regularizing the same by taking a sympathetic view of the matter and thus admitting the students to the medical colleges, was held to be clear transgression of the provisions of the University. The Supreme Court had held in CBSE and another (supra) that the Court cannot by its fiat direct the University to disobey the statute to which it owes its existence and the regulations made by the University itself as that would be destructive of the rule of law. Relying on State of Tamil Nadu v. Saint Joseph Teachers Training Institute, (1991) 3 SCC 87 , it was held that the direction of admitting students of unauthorized educational institution?and permitting them to appear at the examination has been looked at with disfavour and the students of unrecognized institution who are not legally entitled to appear at the examination conducted by educational department of the Government could not be allowed to sit at the examination and the High Court committed an error in granting permission to such students who appeared at the public examination. ( 28 ) IN the matter of academic standards, Court should not normally interfere in interpreting the rules and such matters should be left to the experts in the field was held by the Supreme Court in the matter of Medical Council of India v. Sarang and Others (supra ). In this matter, the regulation 6 (5) was interpreted by the High court which contemplated that a candidate must submit an affidavit stating that he will pursue 18 months of prescribed study before appearing at second professional bachelor of Medicine and Bachelor of Surgery (MBBS) examination at the transferee college. The High Court had interpreted the regulation to mean that the candidate should have completed 18th Months of study in both colleges,. e. , original college and transferee college. ( 29 ) IN Thapar Institute of Engineering and Technology and Anr. (supra), the dispute was whether a student who had taken advantage of un-amended regulation could be allowed to take advantage of the amended regulation when the amended regulation did not provide for a repeat examination. In this context, the Supreme court had held that the Court should normally not interfere with prescribed standards and especially when they are intended to improve the academic standards in their respective institutions. In this context, the Supreme court had held that the Court should normally not interfere with prescribed standards and especially when they are intended to improve the academic standards in their respective institutions. It was held that the scope of judicial review in such matters should be very limited. ( 30 ) A Single Judge of Karnataka High Court in P. Shiva Naga Raju (supra) had held that admission to Master of Computer Application is governed by the regulations framed therein and not on the basis of rules framed by other Universities. In this case candidate who was required to obtain 50% marks in all subjects including language for admission to MCA did not possess the requisite percentage though he possessed B. Com. degree and for award of B. Com. degree the marks obtained by the candidate in subject Indian Heritage and Culture were not taken into consideration while awarding the degree. It was held that even if an alternative view is possible to be taken by the Court exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, it cannot do so and reliance was placed on Principal, patna College v. Kalyan Srinivas Raman, AIR 1966 SC 707 , by the learned Single judge. ( 31 ) ANOTHER Single Judge of this Court in Shampa Tikait and Ors. (supra) had held that even if various interpretations were possible, the High Court should ordinarily be reluctant to issue a writ and it would not be expedient for the High court to reverse a decision of the education authorities on the ground that the construction placed by the said authorities on the relevant regulations appears to be less reasonable than the alternative construction which is placed by the Court. ( 32 ) DEALING with criteria and rules framed by the Admission Committee in ajay Kumar Remineni (supra), this Court had held that the Court cannot ignore the rules framed by the Admission Committee nor can it devise and enforce its own criterion pertaining to admission as these decisions must be left to the concerned academic body. In an appeal against the order of the single Judge in Ajay Kumar remineni, the Division Bench had reiterated that in academic/education matters, courts should be reluctant to interfere and if two interpretations of a regulation framed by an academic body are possible, the Court should accept the interpretation given by the said academic body. In an appeal against the order of the single Judge in Ajay Kumar remineni, the Division Bench had reiterated that in academic/education matters, courts should be reluctant to interfere and if two interpretations of a regulation framed by an academic body are possible, the Court should accept the interpretation given by the said academic body. In this case, the Indian Institute of technology had not taken into consideration the credits given to the candidates during summer course and Court had declined to interfere with the decision of institute. ( 33 ) THE cases relied on by the petitioner are distinguishable and do not support the pleas and contentions of the petitioner. In Dolly Chhanda it was held while applying for any course of study, a candidate must possess the eligibility qualification on the last date fixed for such purpose either in admission brochure or in application form, as the case may be, unless there is an express provision to the contrary. In this corrected certificate was produced by the candidate at the time of second Counselling and therefore denying admission on that ground was held to be unjust and illegal. The candidate possessed the qualification but certificate was not produced on the date of first Counselling whereas in the case of petitioner, he did not possess the requisite qualification on the date of admission. e. 60% marks up to pre-final examination of the qualifying degree course. In Nisant Puri (supra) it was held that the interpretation given to the eligibility by the candidate was held to be contrary to the object of eligibility clause of prospectus which intended to give preference to bona fide local students over others. Similarly in Dr. Sanjeev Dadhwal (supra) a Division Bench of this Court had held that the refusal of admission on disability not mentioned in the prospectus would be arbitrary. However, in the case of petitioner, his contention is that only Clause 5 (c) be construed for eligibility whereas the respondents rely on other clauses also in the prospectus and on conjoint reading of various clauses has held that the petitioner was required to have 60% marks upto pre final year of the degree course. However, in the case of petitioner, his contention is that only Clause 5 (c) be construed for eligibility whereas the respondents rely on other clauses also in the prospectus and on conjoint reading of various clauses has held that the petitioner was required to have 60% marks upto pre final year of the degree course. ( 34 ) IN the totality of facts and circumstances and considering the various judgments and orders of various Courts as discussed hereinabove it will not be appropriate for this Court to give an interpretation as has been canvassed by the learned Counsel for the petitioner that for admission the percentage of qualifying degree only had to be taken into consideration and not the percentage upto pre-final year of qualifying degree as on the date of consideration of the admission to the post graduate course the result of the petitioner for final year qualifying degree had not been declared. Taking sympathetic view of the matter in the case of petitioner shall not be judicious to a number of students who have been declined admissions and whose candidature have been rejected as they did not score 60% marks upto pre final year of qualifying examination. In (1979) 1 SCC 572 , State of Kerala v. T. P. Roshana, it was held by the Supreme Court that the benefit should be granted to even those persons who have not approached the Court as in admission matters yardstick is the academic excellence and not litigative persistence. The Apex Court had held: 39. After all, the Court system belongs to the people and must promote constructive justice; and all institutions, including the Governments and universities, likewise belong to the people. This commitment is the whetstone for doing justice in the wider context of social good. The universities, as we gather from Counsel representing all the parties, may not find it difficult to accommodate 30 students more, apportioned among the four medical colleges of the State. This addition is compelled by the critical condition set out above. This need will not survive this academic year and, in that sense, no long-term trauma for academic standards will be inflicted by each of the colleges accommodating a few more students for their courses this year. After all, not much time has passed since the teaching session began. Compared to their existing strength, the additions are negligible. This need will not survive this academic year and, in that sense, no long-term trauma for academic standards will be inflicted by each of the colleges accommodating a few more students for their courses this year. After all, not much time has passed since the teaching session began. Compared to their existing strength, the additions are negligible. The Medical Council of India, through the learned additional Solicitor-General, has expressed that it has no objection to this proposal for a minuscule addition confined to this academic year. We see no ground for either University to plead inability to help the cause of justice. The insistence on standards, measured by marks, is not being relaxed, so much so the quality other admission of the additional students does not suffer. A marginal strain in the matter of teaching and perhaps extra burden in regard to the practicals may have to be endured. We are, therefore, sure that the Universities, the colleges concerned, the teaching community and the alumni themselves will appreciate the goal and cooperate in the success of the direction we make. 42. The selection of these 30 students will not be confined to those who have moved this Court or the High Court by way of writ proceedings or appeal. The measure is academic excellence, not litigative persistence. It will be thrown open to the first 30, strictly according to merit measured by marks secured. The apportionment as between graduates and pre-degree students and the application of the communal reservation will apply to these 30 to be selected. The Selection Committee will make its decision on or before January 31, 1979. The Universities concerned will convey their approval to the Government for the necessary addition to the student strength in obedience to the direction of this Court on or before january 27, 1979. ( 35 ) CONSEQUENTLY, the contention of the petitioner is not acceptable that relying only on Clause 5 of the Eligibility criterion the requirement for admission is 60% marks in the qualifying degree only and in case of the students who had been granted admission provisionally, such candidates were not liable to have 60% marks upto pre-final year of the qualifying degree course. ( 36 ) BY an interim order dated 26. 6. ( 36 ) BY an interim order dated 26. 6. 2006 the respondents were directed to keep on seat reserved for the petitioner in the course of MCA if all the seats had not been filled. The respondents have categorically asserted in their counter affidavit that the admission of the requisite seats for MCA programme in IIT, Roorkee has already been filled and there is no seat available in the general category to which the petitioner can be admitted. Though the petitioner has refuted this on the basis of the information alleged to have been received by him from reliable sources, however, such an averment by the petitioner cannot be relied on. In any case the availability of the seat is not material as it has been held that the petitioner was not eligible for admission to MCA course as he did not have 60% marks upto pre-final year in the qualifying degree course. ( 37 ) IN the totality of the facts and circumstances the rule is discharged and it is held that the petitioner is not eligible for admission to MCA course in 1it, roorkee and, therefore, the respondents have rightly rejected his candidature for admission to such course. The writ petition is, therefore, dismissed. Writ Petition dismissed.