Shree Krishna Ginning Factory v. Andhra Bank & Others
2006-01-27
M.KARPAGAVINAYAGAM
body2006
DigiLaw.ai
Judgment :- (Appeal against the judgment and decree dated 18.12.2003 made in A.S.No.148 of 2001 on the file of I Additional District Judge, Coimbatore, as against the judgment and decree dated 13.06.2001 made in O.S.No.2977 of 1996 on the file of II Additional District Munsif, Coimbatore.) Appellant is the plaintiff. It filed a suit in O.S.No.747 of 1990 on the file of Sub-Court, Coimbatore, for declaration of its title to the suit properties and, consequently, to hold the attachment and Court auction sale effected in E.P.No.95 of 1978 in O.S.No.403 of 1974 as void and for other consequential reliefs mentioned in the plaint. The said suit was subsequently transferred to the District Munsif Court, Coimbatore, and renumbered as O.S.No.2977 of 1996. The suit was dismissed. Hence, the appellant filed an appeal in A.S.No.148 of 2001 on the file of I Additional District Court, Coimbatore, and the said appeal was also dismissed. Hence, this Second Appeal. 2. The case of the appellant/plaintiff is as follows: "(i) The suit properties were acquired by purchase on 22.11.1975 by P. Somasundaram Chettiar under a registered sale document. Somasundaram Chettiar had an adopted son by name P.S.Sathappa Chettiar. Somasundaram Chettiar created 1/8th interest in favour of SRMS Meenakshi Achi, the sister of P.S. Sathappa Chettiar, and also in favour of P.S.Sathappa Chettiar. Shree Krishna Ginning Factory and the property in the schedule belong to a partnership firm. (ii) After the demise of P. Somasundaram Chettiar, P.S. Sathappa Chettiar and SRMS Meenakshi Achi became the partners of the partnership firm. In the year 1949, the partnership firm was reconstituted by transfer of Sathappa Chettiar's interest in favour of Somasundaram Mills Private Limited. (iii) In the year 1977, Smt.SRMS Meenakshi Achi retired from the partnership and relinquished her share in favour of her daughter Smt.Meenakshi Achi. Thus, the suit property has always been that of the plaintiff firm of Shree Krishna Ginning Factory. The right, title and possession have been vested only with them for the last several years. In the meantime, the first defendant bank filed a suit against P.S.S. Somasundaram Chettiar in O.S.No.403 of 1974 for realisation of the sums, due to it. In the said suit, the suit property was sought to be attached and the same was decreed. Thereafter, the suit property was brought to sale in auction. The third defendant M.Shanmugam Chettiar was the auction purchaser.
In the said suit, the suit property was sought to be attached and the same was decreed. Thereafter, the suit property was brought to sale in auction. The third defendant M.Shanmugam Chettiar was the auction purchaser. He filed a petition in E.P.No.95 of 1978 in O.S.No.403 of 1974. On coming to know of this, the plaintiff intervened and filed a claim application. The executing Court dismissed the said application and the matter was taken up on appeal in C.M.A.No.550 of 1981 before the High Court and the same was also dismissed, giving a right to the plaintiff to institute a separate suit. (iv) Accordingly, the plaintiff filed the present suit for setting aside the order of attachment effected in E.P.No.95 of 1978 in O.S.No.403 of 1974 and to declare the consequent Court auction sale in favour of third defendant as illegal and for releasing the suit property from attachment, after upholding his right, title and interest in the suit property." 3. According to the first defendant/Bank, the property belongs to second defendant. The suit in O.S.No.403 of 1974 was contested by the second defendant. However, the suit was, ultimately, decreed in favour of the Bank. In pursuance of the order by the executing Court, the suit properties were brought to sale and the third defendant became the auction purchaser. The second defendant, having failed in his attempts to stall the auction sale, made the plaintiff to file the suit, by making a false claim. 4. On the basis of the above pleadings, various issues were framed. On analysing the evidence, adduced by both the parties, the trial Court dismissed the suit as devoid of merits, which was confirmed by the appellate Court as well. 5. Challenging the concurrent judgments, Mr. S.V. Jayaraman, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the appellant, would strenuously contend that both the Courts below have dismissed the suit on the ground that the suit was not maintainable for want of territorial jurisdiction and, having rendered the said finding, both the Courts below ought not to have gone into the merits of the case and rejected the plaintiff's case. According to him, once the Court holds that it has no jurisdiction, it is proper for it to return the plaint for re-presentation to the proper Court and it should not dispose of the matter on merits. 6.
According to him, once the Court holds that it has no jurisdiction, it is proper for it to return the plaint for re-presentation to the proper Court and it should not dispose of the matter on merits. 6. The main question, raised by the learned Senior Counsel as substantial question of law, is as follows: "On the face of the finding that the Court has no territorial jurisdiction to entertain the suit, are the Courts below correct and justified in going into the merits of the case and deciding against the plaintiff” 7. Though several grounds have been raised in the Second Appeal, the learned Senior Counsel would elaborately argue that both the Courts below have committed a grave illegality in having allowed the trial to go on and gone through the entire case on merits. 8. I have heard the learned Senior Counsel for the appellant at length and also the learned counsel for the respondents. 9. Even at the threshold, it shall be stated that it is the consistent case of the plaintiff that the trial Court has got jurisdiction to entertain the suit and to try the same since the suit is not only for declaration of the properties, which are situated at Tiruppur, but also for a declaration that the decree passed in the suit filed by the bank and the attachment order passed in the application filed by the auction purchaser on the suit property was by the Court at Coimbatore and, as such, the Coimbatore Court has got jurisdiction. 10. As a matter of fact, an objection was raised by the defendants in the written statement that the suit was not maintainable as the properties are situated at Tiruppur, but the defendants did not pursue the said point, in the light of the stand taken by the plaintiff that Coimbatore Court has got jurisdiction, since the main relief sought for by the plaintiff was that the decree passed by the Coimbatore Court is invalid and also to set aside the attachment order passed by the executing Court at Coimbatore. 11. Thus, it is clear that the plaintiff had allowed the entire trial to go on, requesting the Court to consider the suit on merits.
11. Thus, it is clear that the plaintiff had allowed the entire trial to go on, requesting the Court to consider the suit on merits. Of course, the trial Court considered the said point and held against the plaintiff, but, even then, the plaintiff did not accept the said verdict with reference to the said point and contested the matter before the appellate Court, by taking a stand that the suit was maintainable, in the light of the other main relief in respect of attachment order passed by the Coimbatore Court in the suit filed by the bank. 12. In this context, it would be worthwhile to refer to the decisions of this Court rendered in AIR 1975 MADRAS 103 (M/s.Nanak Chand Shadurain v The Tinnelvely-Tuticorin Electric Co.Ltd., Calcutta) and AIR 1980 MADRAS 114 (Abdul Rahiman Rowther v. Komalathammal). The gist of the observations made by this Court in AIR 1975 MADRAS 103 is as follows: "A litigant is expected ordinarily to be aware of his legal rights as Ignorantia juris is nemimem excusat. Such knowledge and awareness includes his right to press for a decision on his objection as to the place of suing which is obviously a contractual right and seek for a trial of the cause by the agreed competent Court. He should be alert as to press for such a decision at the appropriate time before the forum in which, according to him, the lis has been wrongly instituted and thus avoid prejudice on all sides to all parties. If he does not, he cannot at the appellate stage approbate and reprobate and attempt to reopen a rather closed issue and avoid the aiming of the general verdict on merits. It is this essential feature in such a subject matter that is brought out in the second part of Section 21 Civil P.C., which lays down as a requirement in law that unless there has been a consequent failure of justice, a litigant should not be encouraged to raise the objection as to the place of suing at the appellate or revisional stage, since such objection, though taken in the court of first instance, was not pressed to its normal end.
In fact, the guidelines in Section 21 make it imperative that such an objection has to be raised at the earliest possible opportunity and in all cases where issues are settled at or before such settlement. A hesitant attempt, no doubt, was made in the Court below as issues 1,2 and 3 have been so expressly framed. In spite of it, the plaintiff was not diligent to pursue the issues in the appropriate manner and in a manner known to law, but suffered ultimately a judgment against him. In these circumstances, it cannot be said that there has been a consequent failure of justice within the meaning of the last parenthetical clause in S.21. Civil P.C." The same proposition has been reiterated in AIR 1980 MADRAS 114. 13. Thus, it is clear that the above observation would squarely apply to the facts of the present case, as there is no material to show that there has been a consequent failure of justice, especially when it is the consistent case of the plaintiff/appellant herein that one of the main reliefs is with reference to the decree and attachment order passed by the Court at Coimbatore. Therefore, no question of law much less substantial question of law arises for consideration in this appeal. 14. Second Appeal is dismissed. No costs. Consequently, the connected C.M.P.No.4230 of 2005 is also dismissed.