JUDGMENT D. D. SINHA, J. :- Heard Shri Parchure, learned Counsel for the· petitioner, Mrs. Jog, learned Assistant Government Pleader for the respondent Nos. 1 and 2, Shri Mishra, learned Counsel for the respondent No.3, Shri Kaptan, learned Counsel for the respondent No.4, Shri Dharmadhikari, learned Counsel for the respondent No.5, Shri Manohar, learned Senior Counsel with Shri Bhangde, learned Senior Counsel for the respondent No.6, and Shri Kulkarni, learned Counsel for the intervener. 2. The petition is directed against the notification dated 30-1-2003 issued by the State Government whereby user of the land in question is changed from park to commercial. 3. The learned Counsel for the respondents, particularly Shri Manohar, learned Senior Counsel for the respondent No.6, submitted that the present petition suffers from grave delay and laches. It was contended that on 30-5-2002, the Nagpur Improvement Trust (hereinafter referred to as the NIT for the sake of brevity) published notification under section 37 of the Maharashtra Regional and Town Planning Act, 1966 (hereinafter referred to as the 'MRTP Act' for the sake of brevity) in the official gazette and invited objections from the public to the proposed change of user. On 5-6-2002, the NIT published notice in the daily newspaper 'Tarun Bharat' inviting objections from the public to the proposed change of user. It was submitted that though public at large including petitioner was aware about the said notification and public notice, neither petitioner nor any member of the public raised any objection either to the notification or public notice except Maharashtra State Electricity Board. The NIT submitted its report and proposal to the State Government and the State Government after completing the statutory procedure issued the impugned notification dated 30-1-2003 under section 37(2) of the MRTP Act. It was further contended that on 5-4-2003, the respondent No. 5 issued public notice inviting tenders for sale of land in question. Even at that time, the petitioner did not raise any objection pursuant to the said public notice either before the respondent No. 5 or before the State Government. The tender of the respondent No.6 was accepted by the respondent No.5 Corporation on 20-6-2003. The respondent No.6 paid the entire tender amount of Rs.12.81 crores by 19-9-2003 to the respondent No.5. Even at that time, the petitioner did not raise any objection pursuant to the said public notice either before the respondent No. 5 or before the State Government. The tender of the respondent No.6 was accepted by the respondent No.5 Corporation on 20-6-2003. The respondent No.6 paid the entire tender amount of Rs.12.81 crores by 19-9-2003 to the respondent No.5. It was submitted that possession of land in question was delivered to the respondent No. 6 on 19-3-2004 and the petitioner for the first time approached this Court by filing present petition on 6-5-2004. It was contended that due to reason of delay in approaching the Court, the parties altered their position resulting in creation of third party rights and, therefore, present public interest litigation may be dismissed on the ground of delay and laches. It was also argued by the learned Senior Counsel for the respondent No.6 that sacrosanct jurisdiction of public interest litigation should be invoked very sparingly and in favour of vigilant litigant and not for the persons, who invoke this jurisdiction for the sake of serving their private ends. In the instant case, huge amount of Rs.12.81 crores was paid by the respondent No. 6 by 19-9-2003 to the respondent No. 5 Corporation and because of the present public interest litigation, entire work of the project, which respondent No. 6 wanted to execute, is delayed, which has further resulted in enormous escalation in cost of work, apart from losing interest on amount of Rs.12.81 crores since 19-9-2003. It was submitted that in the backdrop of the above referred undisputed facts, it is evident that petitioner in spite of being well aware, about change of user of land in question as notified by the State Government vide impugned notification and tender notice issued by the respondent No.5, did not raise any objection and approached this Court at such a belated stage when third party rights have been created, with the sole object to delay execution of the project of respondent No.6 and, therefore, petition suffers from delay and laches and same is liable to be dismissed on this ground. 4. Shri Manohar, learned Senior Counsel for the respondent No.6, also contended that petitioner is an unregistered Association and is not a legal entity and, therefore, is incompetent to file the present petition. 4. Shri Manohar, learned Senior Counsel for the respondent No.6, also contended that petitioner is an unregistered Association and is not a legal entity and, therefore, is incompetent to file the present petition. It was submitted that the petitioner Association has no credentials and is not propagating any public cause. On the other hand, by invoking jurisdiction of this Court at such a belated, stage, public cause is defeated since the land in question was sold by the respondent No.5 for the purpose of making payment of dues of ex-employees of the Empress Mill. It was also argued by the learned Senior Counsel for the respondent No.6 that the amount of Rs.12.81 crores paid by the respondent No. p to the respondent No.5 has already been disbursed to the ex-employees of the Empress Mill towards their wages. It was submitted that transaction of sale of land in question was entered into by the respondent No. 5 not only as per legal procedure applicable in this regard, but also for the purpose of making payment of dues of the ex-employees of the Empress Mill. It was, therefore, contended that the petition does not involve any public cause or interest, on the other hand, public cause is suffered at the hands of the petitioner. Therefore, petition is liable to be dismissed on this ground as well as on the ground of delay and laches. In order to substantiate the contentions, reliance is placed on the decision of the Apex Court in Bombay Dyeing and Mfg. Co. Ltd. vs. Bombay Environmental Action Group and others, (2006) 3 SCC 434. 5. Shri Parchure, learned Counsel for the petitioner, submitted that the members of the petitioner Association are not much educated persons and merely because they failed to raise objection to the notification dated 30-5-2002 and public notice dated 5-6-2002 issued by the NIT as well as tender notice dated 54-2003 issued by the respondent No.5, that does not legitimize the impugned notification dated 30-1-2003 nor validates sale of land in question by the respondent No. 5 to respondent No.6. It was contended that if the NIT, at the relevant time, was not the Planning Authority under the MRTP Act in view of notification dated 27-2-2002 issued by the State Government, the State Government could not issue the impugned notification on the basis of proceedings initiated by the NIT under section 37(1) of the MRTP Act for change of user of land in question and, therefore, even if there is some delay caused in invoking jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 by the petitioner, looking to the public cause involved in the present petition, same is not fatal. 6. Shri Parchure, learned Counsel for the petitioner, challenged the impugned notification dated 30-1-2003 issued by the State Government under section 37(2) of the MRTP Act on the following grounds: i) The respondent No.3 NIT initiated proceedings under section 37 of the MRTP Act under the orders of the State Government and notification inviting objection and subsequent gazette notifications were published by the respondent No.3 on 5-6-2002 and 31-5-2002 respectively. However, change of user of land in question has been notified by the State Government vide impugned notification dated 30-1-2003. Since vide notification dated 27-2-2002 jurisdiction of the respondent No.3 NIT was restricted to seven schemes stipulated therein and respondent No. 3 was permitted to act as a Planning Authority in respect of those seven schemes only and the land in question was not the part and parcel of any of those seven schemes and is located beyond the area of land covered by those seven schemes, the respondent No. 3 NIT could not act as a Planning Authority under section 2(15) of the MRTP Act to initiate proceedings under section 37 of the MRTP Act. Consequently, impugned notification dated 30-12003 permitting change of user of land in question cannot be sustained in law since proceedings for change of user under section 37 of the MRTP Act were initiated by the respondent No. 3 NIT, which, at the relevant time, was not the Planning Authority. ii) The impugned notification is also challenged by the petitioner on the ground that even if it is presumed for the sake of argument that the proceedings initiated under section 37 of the MRTP Act were valid, section 37 permits only such modifications in the development plan, which do not change character of the development plan. ii) The impugned notification is also challenged by the petitioner on the ground that even if it is presumed for the sake of argument that the proceedings initiated under section 37 of the MRTP Act were valid, section 37 permits only such modifications in the development plan, which do not change character of the development plan. In the instant case, the land in question was reserved for park in the final development plan and by the proposed change, vide impugned notification dated 30-1-2003, user of land is changed to commercial, which changes the character of the development plan and, therefore, such change of user is impermissible under the provisions of section 37 of the MRTP Act and hence, the impugned notification is bad in law. iii) The third ground on which impugned notification is challenged by the petitioner is that as per the impugned notification, the land in question is reserved for commercial purpose, however, respondent No.6 proposes to use the land in question for residential purpose. 7. The learned Counsel for the respective respondents, particularly Shri Manohar, learned Senior Counsel for the respondent No.6, contended that vide notification dated 6-10-1967 issued by the State Government, NIT was permitted to function as a Planning Authority for the city of Nagpur. However, in supersession of notification dated 6-10-1967, the State Government issued another notification dated 27-7-2002 whereby Nagpur Municipal Corporation was permitted to exercise power of Planning Authority under MRTP Act in the entire area under its jurisdiction except the area covered by seven schemes mentioned in the said notification, for which respondent No. 3 NIT was continued to exercise power of Planning Authority under the MRTP Act. It was submitted that revised development plan came in force on 10-9-2001 and State Government on 10-9-2001 itself issued an order under section 37(1) of the MRTP Act and directed the NIT to initiate proceedings for modification of development plan for change of user of the land in question. The NIT initiated the said proceedings much before notification dated 27-2-2002 was issued by the State Government aqd, therefore, the said proceedings were saved, even though notification dated 27-2-2002 was issued by the State Government in supersession of notification dated 6-10-1967. Consequently, impugned notification dated 30-12003 issued by the State Government is valid and sustainable in law. The NIT initiated the said proceedings much before notification dated 27-2-2002 was issued by the State Government aqd, therefore, the said proceedings were saved, even though notification dated 27-2-2002 was issued by the State Government in supersession of notification dated 6-10-1967. Consequently, impugned notification dated 30-12003 issued by the State Government is valid and sustainable in law. In order to substantiate the contentions, reliance is placed by the learned Senior Counsel on the decision of the Apex Court in State of Orissa and others vs. Titaghur Paper Mills Company Limited and another, 1985 (Supp) SCC 280. 8. It was further contended by learned Senior Counsel Shri Manohar that section 21 of the Bombay General Clauses Act, 1904 spells out that power to issue notification also includes power to rescind notification. However, while rescinding or repealing the notification, unless contrary intention appears from the text of notification itself, all actions or proceedings, which have already commenced pursuant to the earlier notification would survive. It was submitted that section 21 clearly postulates that repeal/rescission should be prospective unless by specific words, it is made retrospective. It was argued that in the instant case, the notification dated 27-2-2002 is, therefore, prospective in nature and actions or proceedings initiated pursuant to the earlier notification dated 6-101967 by the respondent No.3 NIT under section 37 of the MRTP Act are saved. Consequently, the impugned notification dated 30-1-2003 is sustainable in law. 9. Learned Senior Counsel Shri Manohar further contended that the proceedings initiated by the respondent No.3 NIT as a Planning Authority for change of user under section 37 of the MRTP Act does not amount to change of character of the development plan of city of Nagpur and it only changes the user of land in question from park to commercial and, therefore, the proceedings initiated by the respondent No.3 NIT under section 37 of the MRTP Act for change of user of land in question are perfectly legal and valid. In order to substantiate the contentions, reliance is placed by the learned Senior Counsel on the decision of this Court in M. A. Panshikar vs. State of Maharashtra, through its Urban Development Department and another, 2002 (5) Bom. C.R. 318. 10. In order to substantiate the contentions, reliance is placed by the learned Senior Counsel on the decision of this Court in M. A. Panshikar vs. State of Maharashtra, through its Urban Development Department and another, 2002 (5) Bom. C.R. 318. 10. Learned Senior Counsel Shri Manohar made a categorical statement that the land in question purchased by the respondent No. 6 shall be put to use only for the commercial purpose for which it is reserved in the revised development plan after effecting change of user. 11. We have given anxious thought to the various contentions canvassed by the learned Counsel for the parties, perused the relevant provisions of the MRTP Act and also considered the law laid down by the Apex Court in the judgments cited and relied on by the learned Counsel for the respective parties. At the outset, we propose to deal with the issue of delay and laches. 12. It is well settled that one who sleeps over his rights and does not approach the Court within a reasonable time, the Court should be very slow in showing indulgence at the belated stage and if in the meanwhile the parties have altered their positions and third party rights are created, the Court should avoid to show indulgence. Similarly, just because petition is termed as a public interest litigation, it does not mean that ordinary principles applicable to the litigation will not apply. The doctrine of delay and laches is very much applicable to the petitions, which are filed in public interest. We cannot turn the nelson's eye to the third party interest created on account of delay and should not serve the cause of a person, who is not vigilant of his rights. In the instant case, in view of the above referred facts, it is evident that the petitioner had the knowledge of notifications and public notices issued by the respondents and could have approached the Court in time. However, for the reasons best known to the petitioner, the petitioner did not approach this Court immediately after publication of notification and notice and, therefore, third party interests are created on account of delay. While considering the aspect of delay and laches, underlying equitable principles cannot be ignored. However, for the reasons best known to the petitioner, the petitioner did not approach this Court immediately after publication of notification and notice and, therefore, third party interests are created on account of delay. While considering the aspect of delay and laches, underlying equitable principles cannot be ignored. In the instant case, the petitioner has not given any reason whatsoever as to why petitioner did not approach this Court immediately after publication of notifications and notices by the respondents except that the members of the petitioner Association are not much educated. The reason given by the petitioner, in our view, is hopelessly inadequate to justify the delay caused in invoking extra-ordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. The Apex Court in para (341) of its judgment in the case of Bombay Dyeing and Mft. Co. Ltd. (cited supra), has observed thus : "Delay and laches on the part of the writ petitioners indisputably have a role to play in the matter of grant of reliefs in a writ petition. This Court in a large number of decisions has categorically laid down that where by reason of delay and/or laches on the part of the writ petitioners the parties altered their positions and/or third-party interests have been created, public interest litigations may be summarily dismissed. Delay although may not be the sole ground for dismissing a public interest litigation in some cases and thus, each case must be considered having regard to the facts and circumstances obtaining therein, the underlying equitable principles cannot be ignored. As regards applicability of the said principles, public interest litigations are no exceptions. We have hereto before noticed the scope and object of public interest litigation. Delay of such a nature in some cases is considered to be of vital importance. " Similarly, the Apex Court in para (345) has observed thus: "However, we do not intend to lay down a law that delay or laches alone should be the sole ground for throwing out a public interest litigation irrespective of the merit of the matter or the stage thereof. Keeping in view the magnitude of public interest, the Court may consider the desirability to relax the rigours of the accepted norms. We do not accept the explanation in this regard sought to be offered by the writ petitioners. Keeping in view the magnitude of public interest, the Court may consider the desirability to relax the rigours of the accepted norms. We do not accept the explanation in this regard sought to be offered by the writ petitioners. We have no doubt in our mind that the writ petitioners are guilty of serious delay and laches on their part." . In view of the above referred observations of the Apex Court and in the context of the facts and circumstances of the present case, though we are of the view that petition suffers from delay and laches, however, in view of peculiar- facts and circumstances of the present case as well as nature of issue involved, we propose to record our findings even on the merits of the matter. 13. In the instant case, the facts, which have given rise to the controversy in issue and are not in dispute, are as follows: a) On 8-12-2000, the respondent No.5 Corporation requested the State Government to change user of the land in question for commercial purpose in order to generate additional funds for the purpose of running the then existing mill and for its renovation. (b) On 10-9-2001, the State Government issued order under section 37(1) of the MRTP Act and directed the respondent No.3 NIT to initiate proceedings under section 37 for modification of the development plan for change of user of the land in question, which was reserved for the Maharashtra State Electricity Board and park into commercial. At that time, the respondent No.3 NIT was the Planning Authority for the city of Nagpur as per notification dated 6-10-1967 issued by the State Government in exercise of its power under section 2(15) of the MRTP Act. (c) The State Government in exercise of power conferred upon it under section 2(15) of the MRTP Act and in superssession of notification dated 6-101967, issued notification· dated 27-2-2002 permitting Nagpur Municipal Corporation to exercise power of the Planning Authority under the MRTP Act in the entire area under its jurisdiction except the areas covered by the seven schemes mentioned in the notification for which NIT was permitted to exercise power of the Planning Authority under the MRTP Act. (d) On 30-5-2002, the NIT published notification under section 37(1) of the MRTP Act inviting objections from public at large in respect of proposed change of user of the land in question. (d) On 30-5-2002, the NIT published notification under section 37(1) of the MRTP Act inviting objections from public at large in respect of proposed change of user of the land in question. (e) On 5-6-2002, the NIT published notice in the daily newspaper 'Tarun Bharat' inviting objections from the public to the proposed change of user. In response to the aforesaid notification, which was published in the official gazette and public notice in the daily newspaper, only one objection was received from the Maharashtra State Electricity Board. (f) On 14-11-2002, the NIT submitted its report and proposal to the State Government. On 30-1-2003, the State Government after consultation with Director of Town Planning, sanctioned the change of user only in respect of land in question, which was reserved for park to commercial purpose and maintained the reservation for Maharashtra State Electricity Board and issued notification under section 37(2) of the MRTP Act, which is impugned in the present petition. (g) On 5-4-2003, the respondent No. 5 Corporation by issuing public notice invited tenders for sale of land in question. (h) On 19-4-2003, respondent No.6 submitted tender for purchase of land in question for Rs.12.81 crores. The said offer was accepted by the respondent No.5 on 20-6-2003. (i) The respondent No.6 during the period from 19-4-2003 to 19.9.2003 made full payment of Rs.12.81 crores to the respondent No.5 Corporation. On 19-3-2004, the respondent No. 5 Corporation delivered possession of land in question to the respondent No.6. The respondent No.6 thereafter has constructed compound wall on the land in question. (j) On 1-10-2004, the respondent No.5 Corporation executed registered Sale Deed of land in question in favour of the respondent No.6. On 6-5-2004, the present petition has been filed. Initially there was no challenge raised in the petition to the notification dated 30-1-2003. On 20-9-2004, petitioner was permitted to amend the petition and prayer clause (a-I) was added whereby notification dated 30-1-2003 issued by the State Government came to be challenged for the first time and respondent No. 5 Corporation was permitted to be joined as a party respondent in the petition. On 10-12-2004, respondent No.6 was permitted to be joined as a party respondent in the present petition. 14. On 10-12-2004, respondent No.6 was permitted to be joined as a party respondent in the present petition. 14. In the instant case, it is necessary to consider as to whether respondent No.3 NIT, which had initiated proceedings under section 37 of the MRTP Act for change of user of land in question at the relevant time was the Planning Authority permitted by the State Government to exercise jurisdiction and power of the Planning Authority under section 2(15) of the MRTP Act. It is not in dispute that vide notification dated 6-10-1967 issued by the Urban Development, Public Health and Housing Department, respondent No. 3 NIT was permitted to exercise jurisdiction and power as a Local/Planning Authority under the provisions of the MRTP Act for the entire area under its jurisdiction. The revised development plan of the city of Nagpur came into force on 10-9-2001 and on the same day, i.e. 10-9-2001, in view of request made by the respondent No.5 Corporation to the State Government for change of user of land in question, issued orders under section 37(1) of the MRTP Act and directed respondent No. 3 NIT to initiate proceedings under section 37 for modification of the development plan to change the user of the land in question from park to commercial. It is, therefore, evident that on 10-9-2001, when the respondent No. 3 NIT initiated proceedings under section 37 of the MRTP Act for change of user, respondent No.3 NIT undoubtedly was the Local/Planning Authority for the city of Nagpur and was legally competent to initiate proceedings for modification in view of direction given by the State Government vide order dated 10-9- 2001. 15. The State Government in exercise of power conferred upon it by section 2(15) of 'the MRTP Act issued notification dated 27-2-2002 in supersession of earlier notification dated 6-10-1967 and permitted Nagpur Municipal Corporation to exercise powers of the Planning Authority under the provisions of the MRTP Act in respect of entire area under its jurisdiction except the area covered by the seven schemes mentioned in the said notification for which respondent No. 3 NIT was permitted to exercise powers of the Planning Authority under the provisions of the MRTP Act. It is no doubt true that from 27-2-2002, jurisdiction of the respondent No.3 NIT as a Planning Authority was restricted only in respect of seven schemes mentioned in the said notification. It is no doubt true that from 27-2-2002, jurisdiction of the respondent No.3 NIT as a Planning Authority was restricted only in respect of seven schemes mentioned in the said notification. However, question which falls for our consideration is "Whether proceedings for modification initiated by the NIT on 10-9-2001 when it was a Planning Authority in view of notification dated 6-10-1967 would stand repealed or would be rendered invalid in view of notification dated 27-2-2002, which was issued by the State Government in supersession of notification dated 6-10-1967 1" 16. In order to consider this aspect, it will be appropriate to refer to the relevant observations made by the Apex Court in paras (65) and (66) of its judgment in the case of State of Orissa and others (cited supra), which read thus: "65. Yet another contention raised by the contesting respondents with respect to the impugned provisions was that the two notifications dated December 29, 1977, having been made in 'supersession' of all previous notifications issued on the subject, the effect was to wipe out all tax liability which had accrued under the notifications dated May 23, 1977. The High Court held that to hold that the liability was so wiped out would amount to giving a retrospective effect to the notification dated December 29, 1977 and as the Legislature had not conferred upon the State Government, the power to issue notifications having retrospective effect, to so hold would be to render the said notification void. The High Court referred to a number of decisions on the question of the power to make subordinate legislation having retrospective effect. 66 In the notifications dated December 29, 1977, the word 'supersession' is used in the same sense as the word 'repeal' or rather the words "repeal and replacement", The Shorter Oxford English Dictionary, third edition, at page 2084, defines the word 'supersession' as meaning "The action of superseding or condition of being superseded". Some of the meanings given to the word 'supersede' on the same page in that dictionary which are relevant for our purpose are "to put a stop to; to render superfluous or unnecessary; to make of no effect; to annul; to take the place of (something set aside or abandoned); to succeed to the place occupied by; to supply the place of a thing". Webster's Third New International Dictionary at page 2296 defines the word 'supersession' as "the state of being superseded : removal and replacement". Thus, by using in the notifications dated December 29, 1977, the expression "in supersession of all previous notifications" all that was done was to repeal and replace the previous notifications by new notifications. By repealing and replacing the previous notifications by other notifications, the result was not to wipe out any liability accrued under the previous notifications. If this contention of the respondents were to be accepted, the result would be startling. It would mean, for example, that when a notification has been issued under section 5(1) prescribing a rate of tax and that notification is later superseded by another notification further enhancing the rate of tax, all tax liability under the earlier notification is wiped out and no tax can be collected by the State Government in respect of any transactions effected during the period when the earlier notification was in force." 17. The above referred observations made by the Apex Court demonstrate that the contention, which was raised before the Apex Court was that the two notifications dated 29-12-1977 having been made in supersession of all previous notifications issued on the subject resulted in wiping out the tax liability, which had accrued under notification dated 23-5-1977. The Apex Court concluded the issue by recording the following finding: "Thus, by using in the notifications dated December 29, 1977, the expression "in supersession of all previous notifications" all that was done was to repeal and replace the previous notifications by new notifications. By repealing and replacing the previous notifications by other notifications, the result was not to wipe out any liability accrued under the previous notifications." 18. While applying the principle enumerated in the above referred decision of the Apex Court to the facts of the present case, it is evident that the proceedings initiated on 10-9-2001 under section 37 of the MRTP Act by the respondent No.3 NIT, which at the relevant time, was permitted to exercise jurisdiction as a Planning Authority by the State Government vide notification dated 6-10-1967, did not get either wiped out or rendered invalid merely because the State Government at the later stage issued another notification dated 27-22002 in supersession of notification dated 6-10-1967. The contentions canvassed by the learned Counsel for the petitioner in this regard, in our view, are misconceived and cannot be sustained in law. 19. Similarly, in order to consider the effect of supersession, regard must be had to the provisions of section 7(c) of the Bombay General Clauses Act, 1904. Section 7(c) of the said Act stipulates that where this Act or any Bombay Act or Maharashtra Act made after the commencement of this Act, repeals any enactment hitherto made or hereafter to be made, then unless a different intention appears, the repeal shall not affect any right, privilege, obligation or liability acquired, accrued or incurred under any enactment so repealed. The observations of the Apex Court in para (16) of its judgment in Kazi Lhendup Dorji vs. Central Bureau of Investigation and others, 1994 Supp (2) SCC 116 are relevant in this regard, which read thus: "Coming to the contention urged by Shri Jethmalani on merits it may be mentioned that section 21 of the General Clauses Act does not confer a power to issue an order having retrospective operation. (See Strawboard Manufacturing Co. Ltd. vs. Gutta Mill Workers' Union (SCR at pp44748). Therefore, even if we proceed on the basis that section 21 of the General Clauses Act is applicable to an order passed under section 6 of the Act, an order revoking an order giving consent under section 6 of the Act can have only prospective operation and would not affect matters in which action has been initiated prior to the issuance of the order of revocation. The impugned notification dated 7-1-1987, has to be construed in this light. If thus construed, it would mean that investigation which was commenced by CBI prior to withdrawal of consent under the impugned notification dated 7-1-1987, had to be completed and it was not affected by the said withdrawal of consent. In other words, the CBI was competent to complete the investigation in the cases registered by it against respondent 4 and other persons and submit the report under section 173 Criminal Procedure Code in the competent Court. On that view of the matter, it is not necessary to go into the question whether the provisions of section 21 of the General Clauses Act can be invoked in relation to consent given under section 6 of the Act." 20. On that view of the matter, it is not necessary to go into the question whether the provisions of section 21 of the General Clauses Act can be invoked in relation to consent given under section 6 of the Act." 20. While applying the law laid down by the Apex Court to the facts of this case, it is evident that though the State Government has issued notification dated 27-2-2002 in supersession of notification dated 6-10-1967, however, in view of provisions of section 7(c) of the Bombay General Clauses Act, 1904, the notification dated 27-2-2002 can only be prospective in nature and would not affect the actions/proceedings initiated prior to issuance of notification dated 272-2002 particularly because the text of the said notification does not indicate that it operates retrospectively. In the circumstances, in our considered view, the proceedings initiated by the respondent No.3 for modification under section 37 of the MRTP Act prior to notification dated 27-2-2002 issued by the State Government were saved and, therefore, were valid in law. Consequently, the impugned notification dated 30-1-2003 issued by the State Government can safely be held to be valid and sustainable in law. Hence, we answer the question in negative. 21. Insofar as contention of Shri Parchure, learned Counsel for the petitioner, that the proceedings initiated by the respondent No.3 for modification under section 37(1) of the MRTP Act even if presumed to be valid, still the impugned notification permitting change of user in respect of land in question amounts to change in character of the development plan, which is not permissible under section 37(1) of the MRTP Act, is concerned, it is necessary to refer to the law laid down by this Court in the case of M. A. Panshikar (cited supra). The observations in para (47) of the judgment, which are relevant for the controversy in this regard, read thus: "47. The words "minor modification" in the marginal note were substituted by the word "modification" in the marginal note of section 37 by Maharashtra Act No. 39 of 1994. The section refers to modification of any part or proposal made in a final development plan, which is of such nature that it will not change the character of such development plan. The modification proposed by the Planning Authority, if it does not change the character of -the development plan, has to be published and objections invited. The section refers to modification of any part or proposal made in a final development plan, which is of such nature that it will not change the character of such development plan. The modification proposed by the Planning Authority, if it does not change the character of -the development plan, has to be published and objections invited. Thereafter, the procedure laid down in the section has to be followed before it is sent for the Government's sanction. On a mere reading of section 37, it is quite clear that what is not permitted under the aforesaid section is a modification in the final development plan of a nature which will change the character of the development plan. It is, therefore, not relevant to consider as to whether the modification is of a substantial nature as enumerated in section 22-A of the Act. What is relevant is to consider whether the modification would change the character of the development plan. Learned Advocate General and Counsel for the interveners are, in our view, right in submitting that the question as to whether the sanctioned modification amounted to a modification of a substantial nature, is wholly irrelevant while considering a modification sought to be made under section 37 of the MRTP Act. The sole question, therefore, which arises for consideration is whether the modification proposed and sanctioned brings about a change in the character of the development plan? In our view, the modification is not such as would bring about a change in the character of the development plan. The modification of the Development Control Regulations as sanctioned by the State Government is applicable only to cases of re-construction/re-development undertaken by the Corporation of the owners of the existing authorised buildings destroyed by fire, collapsed, demolished, etc. It is not as if there is a general increase in F.S.I. and any builder or developer can raise a structure with F.S.I. : 3. It is only in the cases specified where such increased F.S.I. is permissible. The modification giving benefit of increased F.S.I. is, therefore, limited in its application only to those re-construction/re-development proposals specified in the Resolution and is not meant to give benefit of increased F.S.I. to all development proposals which may be submitted hereafter. It is only in the cases specified where such increased F.S.I. is permissible. The modification giving benefit of increased F.S.I. is, therefore, limited in its application only to those re-construction/re-development proposals specified in the Resolution and is not meant to give benefit of increased F.S.I. to all development proposals which may be submitted hereafter. Since the benefit of increased F.S.I. will be available only to a very few structures, it cannot be said that the grant of additional F.S.I. limited to only such structures changes the character of the plan. In fact, a Division Bench of this Court in Writ Petition No. 693 of 1991, etc. decided on 16th April,1991 took the view that such a modification was not even a substantial modification under Section 22-A of the MRTP Act." 22. In the instant case, proceedings were initiated for change of user only in respect of land in question as specified in the development plan and the State Government by the impugned notification dated 30-1-2003 permitted such change of user, which is restricted only to the land in question and, therefore, it does not amount to changing the character of the whole development plan. What is prohibited as per provisions of section 37 of the MRTP Act is modification in the development plan of nature, which will change the character of the development plan as a whole and not modification, which is limited in its application. In the instant case, proceedings for modification under section 37 of the MRTP Act were initiated regarding change of user in respect of land in question only and since proceedings were valid and as per procedure applicable, the State Government issued the impugned notification dated 30-1-2003 permitting change of user only in respect of land in question and, therefore, in our considered view, as well as in view of law laid down by this Court, the said modification does not amount to changing the character of whole development plan of the city of Nagpur. The contentions canvassed by the learned Counsel for the petitioner in this regard are devoid of substance and are rejected. 23. In the instant case, Shri Manohar, learned Senior Counsel for the respondent No.6, has made a categorical statement before this Court that the land in question shall be used only for the purpose for which it is reserved in view of impugned notification. 23. In the instant case, Shri Manohar, learned Senior Counsel for the respondent No.6, has made a categorical statement before this Court that the land in question shall be used only for the purpose for which it is reserved in view of impugned notification. There is no evidence - documentary or otherwise placed before us by the petitioner to show that the land in question is being used or likely to be used for the purpose other than the purpose for which it is reserved. In absence thereof, it is not possible for us to hold that the land in question will not be used by the respondent No.6 for the purpose for which it is reserved. The contention canvassed by the learned Counsel for the petitioner in this regard is, therefore, without any basis and cannot be accepted. 24. For the reasons stated hereinabove, the petition suffers from lack of merits and is misconceived and devoid of substance and hence, the same is dismissed with costs. Interim order stands vacated. Petition dismissed.