Judgment :- On 23-2-2006, when the matter came up in the petition list, I heard the learned counsel for the petitioner and dictated judgment allowing the writ petition. However, thereafter on that day itself, counsel for the 1st respondent-union requested that he also may be heard before finalizing the judgment. Accordingly, I posted the case again on 1-3-2006 and after hearing both sides, in view of the arguments advanced by the counsel for the 1st respondent which merit acceptance, I have decided to recall the earlier judgment and pass the following judgment. 2. Petitioner in this case is the management in I.D.No.6/2005 before the Central government Industrial Tribunal-Labour Court, Ernakulam. The issue referred for adjudication is; “whether the punishment of reduction of basic pay by one state imposed on Shri. K. Hashim for alleged misconduct by the Federal Bank Limited is justified? If not, what relief is the workman entitled to.” The punishment imposed by the management on the workman concerned was the punishment of reduction of basic pay by one stage. The Labour court by Ext.P13 award, which is impugned in this writ petition, found that the workman was guilty of some fault on his part, which is the delay in reaching the State Bank of Travancore and executing the work entrusted to him and that he was also negligent in returning to Federal Bank on time. Thereafter, the Labour Court interfered with the punishment and substituted the punishment of reduction of basic pay by one stage for six months without cumulative effect. The petitioner is challenging Ext.P13 award on the ground that since the punishment imposed on the workman is not one of discharge or dismissal, the Labour Court has no jurisdiction to interfere with the punishment under Section 11A. 3. I have heard both sides in details. 4. I have no doubt regarding the proposition that the Labour Court does not have jurisdiction to interfere with the punishment imposed on a workman under Section 11A of the Industrial Disputes Act except in cases of dismissal or discharge, which proposition is settled by binding judicial precedents. Therefore, the writ petition has to be allowed to that extent. But the matter does not end there because of the contention raised by the 1st respondent, which is the union espousing the cause of the workman involved. 5. Therefore, the writ petition has to be allowed to that extent. But the matter does not end there because of the contention raised by the 1st respondent, which is the union espousing the cause of the workman involved. 5. The contention of the 1st respondent is that the issue referred for adjudication is the justifiability of the punishment imposed by the management on the workman concerned for the misconduct proved. Justifiability has to be decided on the basis of the competency of the management to impose such a punishment on the workman for the particular misconduct. If the management is not competent to impose the punishment which it has imposed on the workman under law for the misconduct proved, then the Labour Court has certainly jurisdiction to interfere with that punishment on the ground that the punishment imposed is not justifiable since the law prohibits imposition of such punishment. The argument of the 1st respondent proceeds on the following basis. According to the petitioner, the misconduct alleged against the workman and found against him is that of negligence only. There is no finding that the misconduct found against the workman is gross negligence or negligence involving or likely to involve the Bank in serious loss. The procedure for disciplinary action on employees of Banks including the punishment which can be imposed on an employee is governed by the bipartite settlements between the banks and their workmen. All such bipartite settlements have been codified and the copies of the same have been supplied to me. Counsel for the workman submits that the bipartite settlement enumerates gross misconducts and minor misconducts. The punishment which can be imposed for gross misconducts and minor misconducts are separately provided for. Counsel for the 1st respondent submits that neglect of work and negligence in performing duties, which alone has been found against he workman, is a minor misconduct for which the maximum punishment which can be impose on the workman is stoppage of increment for a period not longer than six months as per the bipartite settlement. He would further submit that bringing down the scale of pay to a lower stage is a punishment imposable only for gross misconduct. Going by the enumerated gross misconducts only gross negligence or negligence involving or likely to involve the Bank in serious loss are gross misconducts. He would further submit that bringing down the scale of pay to a lower stage is a punishment imposable only for gross misconduct. Going by the enumerated gross misconducts only gross negligence or negligence involving or likely to involve the Bank in serious loss are gross misconducts. In so far as there is no finding either by the Enquiry Officer or by the Labour Court to the effect that the workman has been found guilty of gross misconduct, the punishment imposed on the workman is not justifiable, because for a minor misconduct, the maximum punishment imposable on the workman is stoppage of increment for a period not longer than six months. He would further submit that even if stoppage of increment is imposed on the workman going by the bipartite settlement, stoppage of increment with cumulative effect can be imposed only for a gross misconduct. On the above arguments, counsel for the 1st respondent would submit that in so far as the Labour court has not addressed itself to this specific issue which has been specifically raised by the 1st respondent in has claim statement as evidenced by Ext.P13 award itself, the matter requires reconsideration by the Labour Court by directing it to address itself to this specific question. 6. I have heard both counsel in detail and find that there is merit in the contention of the 1st respondent-Union. I find from paragraph 2 of Ext.P13 award wherein the averments in the claim statement are reproduced, the Union had specifically averred as follows: “The evidence on record is insufficient to substantiate the charges leveled against the workman. The allegation raised against the workman amounts to minor misconduct only and as per the bipartite settlement the punishment ordered cannot be mulcted on the workman.” In the bipartite settlement up to date, copy of which has been produced by the counsel for the workman before me, in paragraph 5(j), it is provided as follows: “5. By the expression “gross misconduct” shall be meant any of the following acts and omissions on the part of an employee. Xxx xx xx (j) Doing any act prejudicial to the interest of the bank or gross negligence or negligence involving or likely to involve the bank in serious loss.” Under paragraph 6(e) and (f) which enumerates the punishment which can be imposed for gross misconduct, it is provided as follows: “6. Xxx xx xx (j) Doing any act prejudicial to the interest of the bank or gross negligence or negligence involving or likely to involve the bank in serious loss.” Under paragraph 6(e) and (f) which enumerates the punishment which can be imposed for gross misconduct, it is provided as follows: “6. An employee found guilty of gross misconduct may: xx xx xx (e) be brought down to lower stage in the scale of pay up to a maximum of two stages; or (f) have his increment/s stopped with or without cumulative effect; or ………………” xx xx xx Paragraph 7 which enumerates the minor misconducts at clause (c), I find the following entry; “7. By the expression “minor misconduct” shall be meant any of the following acts and omissions on the part of an employee: xxxx x x xxx (c) neglect of work, negligence in performing duties.” Going by the above provisions, it is clear that the punishment of reduction of basic pay by one stage comes within clause 6(e) which is a punishment for a major misconduct. In order to impose this punishment on the workman concerned, there should have been a finding that he negligence found against the workman is gross negligence or negligence involving or likely to involve the bank in serious loss. No such specific finding has been entered into by the labour Court. Further, sub-clause (f) of clause 6 states that stoppage of increment with cumulative effect is also a punishment for gross misconduct. Clause 7 (C) puts neglect of work and negligence in performing duties as minor misconduct for which the maximum punishment imposable is under clause 8 (c) which is stoppage of increment for a period of not longer than six months. Since the words “with or without cumulative effect” do not find a place in Clause 8 (c) as in clause 6(f) normal inference is that the same can only be without cumulative effect. 7. The petitioner-management would contend that in an industrial dispute regarding imposition of punishment other than discharge or dismissal after enquiry, the issues which a Labour court could consider are whether the enquiry was proper and valid and whether there was victimization. The adequacy of punishment is not a mater which the Labour Court could consider since Section 11A was not applicable in such cases. The adequacy of punishment is not a mater which the Labour Court could consider since Section 11A was not applicable in such cases. Acceptance of such an argument would mean that the management could with impunity violate the terms of a binding settlement regarding the maximum punishment which the management could have imposed on the workman. I am of opinion that de hors the powers under Section 11A, in an industrial dispute regarding punishments other than discharge or dismissal, the Labour Court or Industrial Tribunal does have the power to examine whether the management has violated the terms of a binding settlement while imposing punishment and if the Labour Court or Industrial Tribunal finds so, it can certainly interfere with the punishment to make it in line wit the punishment as imposable as per the terms of the settlement. This cannot be regarded as an exercise of powers under Section 11A, but is only in exercise of the powers of adjudication of dispute itself de hors Section 11A. 8. After going through the impugned award, I am satisfied that the Labour court has not addressed itself to this specific issues which are necessary to come to a finding as to whether the punishment imposed on the workman is justifiable or not, which is the specific issue referred for adjudication to the Labour Court. In the above circumstances, it is only appropriate that the Labour Court reconsiders the matter in the light of the observations herein before contained. Accordingly, I set aside Ext.P13 award and remand the matter to the Labour Court for fresh consideration in accordance with law and the observations made in this judgement.