Judgment 1. In this Regular Second Appeal, directed against judgment and decree dated 30.1.1980 passed by the then learned Senior Sub judge with enhanced Appellate Powers, Chandigarh, the facts beyond controversy are as under: the plaintiff- respondent was initially appointed, as a Beldar in the office of Executive Engineer, Horticulture Division No.1, chandigarh on 8.3.1969. He continued to function against that appointment till 18.9.1976 and, then, his services were terminated. In the proceedings before the Conciliation Officer, a compromise was effectuated on 15.2.1977 and, in pursuance thereof, the plaintiff- respondent was appointed afresh on probation for a period of six months. Respondent joined duty, in pursuance of the agreement aforesaid, on 19.2.1977. His services were terminated by appellant No.2 by passing the following order (Ex. P.1), which is reproduced as under for facility of reference:- "the services of Shri Raghu Raj son of Shri Jagroop beldar are terminated with immediate effect as his work and conduct during the period of probation has been found unsatisfactory. " 2. The plea raised by the plaintiff- respondent to the effect that the impugned order stigmatized him and was as a measure of punishment did not find favour of the learned trial Judge who recorded a finding that the impugned termination was valid, it being in accordance with the terms and conditions of the appointment order itself. 3. In first appeal, the learned First Appellate Court reversed the finding by holding that the impugned order stigmatized the plaintiffrespondent and it could not have been passed without affording an opportunity of hearing to the employee. The learned First Appellate court further observed that the appointing authority ought to have watched the work and conduct of the plaintiff- respondent for the complete probation period before being able to form an opinion about the quality of functioning and that the impugned order having been passed mid-way the probation period was invalid as it had been passed in an ex parte manner. The defendants- appellants are in appeal before this Court against the view taken by the learned First Appellate Court. 4. In this R. S. A. , the following substantial question of law was framed by this Court:- "whether the impugned order, though, passed during the period r. S. A. No.2473 of 1980 [3] of probation and in accordance with the terms and conditions of appointment order, stigmatized the plaintiff-respondent?" 5. I have heard Ms. 4. In this R. S. A. , the following substantial question of law was framed by this Court:- "whether the impugned order, though, passed during the period r. S. A. No.2473 of 1980 [3] of probation and in accordance with the terms and conditions of appointment order, stigmatized the plaintiff-respondent?" 5. I have heard Ms. Alka Sarin, learned counsel for the respondent and carefully perused the record. None turned up on behalf of the appellants to address the arguments. 6. I find myself in complete agreement with the view taken by the learned First Appellate Court. Though the terms and conditions of the appointment order did indeed authorise the employer to terminate the services of the plaintiff- respondent if his work and conduct was found to be unsatisfactory during the period of probation, there can be equally no manner of doubt that the mention of the functioning of the plaintiffrespondent having been found unsatisfactory stigmatized him. All that the competent authority could have done was to dispense with the services of the plaintiff- respondent. If the order terminating the services was innocuous, the plaintiff- respondent could not have found any fault with it. 7. However, the impugned order being categorical on the unsatisfactory performance of the plaintiff- respondent is clearly a case of attaching stigma. Concededly, no opportunity of hearing had been afforded to the plaintiff- respondent before the impugned order came to be passed. Though there is no warrant for the proposition that the termination order could not be passed before the completion of the probation period, the inescapable inference in the circumstances of the case is that the impugned order deserves to be invalidated. For these reasons and also for the reasons recorded by the learned First Appellate Court, the impugned termination being stigmatic in character is held to be invalid. 8. In the light of the aforesaid discussion, this R. S. A. shall stand dismissed with costs. The judgment and decree dated 30.1.1980 passed by the learned Senior Sub Judge with Enhanced Appellate Powers, chandigarh shall stand affirmed.