JUDGMENT By the Court—The appellant-writ petitioner is aggrieved only by the last sentence of the order dated 23.5.2006 passed by the Hon’ble Single Judge substantially allowing the appellant’s writ petition. The said last sentence reads as follows : “Till the date of the decision, the petitioner will remain under suspension”. 2. The appellant is the suspended Principal of the college in question and the private respondents are the managing committee. 3. The Hon. Single Judge quashed the approval of the D.I. given under Section 16-G (7) of the U.P. Intermediate Education Act, 1921 inter alia on the basis that no opportunity of hearing was afforded to the appellant. The second reason given by his Lordship was that the approval order was wholly without any reasons appearing from it. 4. Several charges of defalcation of money have been levelled by the management; those have all been denied by the Principal. The writ Court, in any event, does not to enter into any facts in any ordinary circumstances. There is nothing extraordinary here. 5. The said sub-section clearly provides that unless the approval of the D.I. comes within 60 days from the date of suspension, such suspension shall not remain in force. 6. As such, upon his Lordship quashing the order of the D.I., it became non est ; directions have been given for reconsideration also; the approval of the D.I. having become non est, there remained no approval on record to support the decision of the managing committee to suspend the Principal. The suspension thus fell into abeyance by operation of law as contained in the statute in the said sub-section. 7. The impugned sentence in the order is a direction contrary to the statute. As such, it is not possible to sustain or support it. 8. It is true that his Lordship could have worded the order differently, keeping the approval of the D.I. valid for same purpose, i.e. for the purpose of keeping the suspension alive for the interim period and could have invalidated it for some other purpose, i.e. for the purpose of enabling the D.I. to consider the matter once again and to replace the first bad order by the second good order given after hearing; but his Lordship did not do so. The facts were all before his Lordship. The facts were all before his Lordship. If his Lordship felt that the allegations made by the Committee of Management and the answer given by the Principal required the peculiar double course indicated above, then his Lordship would certainly have done so. 9. However, the order as worded, reads in one strain up to the last sentence but one, and the very last sentence, which is the only impugned one, plays a completely different note. With the greatest of respect, the statute and its express words do not permit the same. The appeal is therefore allowed. The last sentence is struck out from the impugned judgment and order. The rest of the order is affirmed. 10. Our order and observations will not, in any manner, prejudice the D.I. in the matter of taking his fresh decision. The order is also without prejudice to the rights and contentions of the parties in subsequent proceedings. Appeal Allowed. ———