S. RAVINDRA BHAT, J. ( 1 ) THE writ petitioner claims a direction to quash the decision dated 31st january, 1989, of the Delhi Development Authority (hereafter referred to as "dda") turning down his request for an alternative plot. A further, consequential direction by way of mandamus to allot one acre at the rate prevailing in 1977 or alternatively an area of 2000 square meters has also been sought. ( 2 ) THE facts are few and largely admitted. The DDA had, apparently, in 1969-70, formulated a scheme for the allotment of industrial plots to those who were likely to be displaced on account of their carrying out non-conforming activities. The petitioner's premises are located at the Nicolson Road where it has been carrying on certain industrial activities of re-conditioning motor parts. The petitioner applied for a plot under the scheme. It is an admitted case of the parties that an amount of Rs. 20,400/- was also deposited along with the application. On 1. 2. 1977, the DDA intimated the petitioner about allotment of industrial plot in Okhla. The area and the location of the plot was however not mentioned. The amount at that state was Rs. 2,33,193. 80. The demand letter dated 1. 2. 1977 required deposit of the amount within one month. The petitioner apparently deposited a sum of Rs. 1,06,600/- on 2. 3. 1977. Thereafter, it kept representing to the DDA for allotment of the promised plot. ( 3 ) AT that time apparently there were some deliberations within the DDA as to the size of the plot. Although, the previous understanding was that one acre plot would be allotted to industrial concerns like the petitioner, the DDA had to re-think on the issue due to the restrictions imposed by provisions of the Urban land Ceiling and Regulation Act, 1976 which was been brought into force in the interregnum. Ultimately, on 2nd February, 1988, the DDA wrote to the petitioner informing it that the allotment would be effected by bifurcating plot No. B-20 at Okhla Industrial Area Phase-I, (to the extent of 2000 square meters) at the then prevailing current market rate. This had approval of the Land Advisory approval Committee of DDA. The minutes of the Committee's deliberations have been produced during the course of the hearing by counsel for the respondent. ( 4 ) ON 31. 1. This had approval of the Land Advisory approval Committee of DDA. The minutes of the Committee's deliberations have been produced during the course of the hearing by counsel for the respondent. ( 4 ) ON 31. 1. 1989, the DDA issued the impugned letter rejecting the petitioner's request for allotment. This was founded principally on two reasons, namely, that 50% of the demanded amount was not deposited within the time and perhaps importantly that the service industry which the petitioner was engaging was permitted as per the Mix Lands Provisions Use brought into force in Delhi. It was felt by the Land Advisory Committee that in these changed circumstances, no useful purpose would be served in shifting the industry from the existing premises. ( 5 ) THE petitioner had approached this Court in these writ proceedings in the year 1990 when the Court had by order dated 19. 2. 1991 recorded that the question to be decided was whether the petitioner is liable to pay for the plot of 2000 square meter at the current rate or at the rate when the original allotment was made. It was further recorded that in the event the petitioner was found liable to pay the rate when the allotment was made (1977) in all probability the full price would have been paid. ( 6 ) THE stand of the DDA is that the rationale for the allotment made in the first place was the imminent shifting of many industries including the petitioner's industrial concern on account of non-conforming user. It is claimed that with change in the provisions of the Master Plan, were eventually notified in 1990-91 when the Mixed Land Use provisions came into force, the very basis of the scheme ceased. The petitioner and other similarly situated industries were in fact not required to shift out. ( 7 ) IT has also been averred by the DDA that even on the facts, no right vested or accrued, inhered in the petitioner nor was a binding between the petitioner which were capable to enforce any legal proceedings. In these circumstances, the petitioner's claim for relief has been resisted by the DDA. ( 8 ) MR. V. K. Makhija, learned senior counsel submitted that the DDA accepted the amounts as far back in 1977 on the basis of then existing prices. In these circumstances, the petitioner's claim for relief has been resisted by the DDA. ( 8 ) MR. V. K. Makhija, learned senior counsel submitted that the DDA accepted the amounts as far back in 1977 on the basis of then existing prices. Although, the amount was deposited slightly late, the delay was not of such a magnitude as divest the petitioner of his right, having regard to the fact that the DDA took 12 long years to process the case. Learned counsel relies upon the decision of the Supreme Court in Union of India and Ors. vs. Godfrey Philips India Ltd. , air 1986 SC 806 for the proposition that in such cases the principle of promissory estopped applies to a public authority like the DDA which would be bound down by its promise and required to conform to the representation held out by it. It was contended having in the first place indicated that the existing premises were not kept for use of industrial purposes and having formulated a scheme, induced the petitioner to apply under it and even accepted the amounts, the DDA could not later turn around and state that the basis of the scheme was no longer viable on account of subsequent developments. ( 9 ) LEARNED counsel further submitted that the rationale of the DDA was incorrect, as the use of premises as service industry had not changed in the year 1989 and that even then the petitioner was not entitled to carry on industrial activity. It was submitted that the Court has to examine the claim in the light of the law which prevailed as on the date of the cause of the action, namely, on 31. 1. 1989. ( 10 ) MS. Sangeeta Chandra, learned counsel for the respondent submitted with reference to the record that the basis of the scheme was rehabilitation of industrial units and concerns which had to shift out. If those fundamental aspects were to be kept in mind, the circumstances that the petitioner did not shift out and has even till date, continued with the establishment, shows that there was no need for allotment of an alternative plot. ( 11 ) LEARNED counsel relied upon the judgment of this Court in M/s. Golden Hosiery mills vs. Delhi Development Authority and Ors. ( 11 ) LEARNED counsel relied upon the judgment of this Court in M/s. Golden Hosiery mills vs. Delhi Development Authority and Ors. , 1994 (29) DRJ 36 which was affirmed by the Division Bench in Golcha Hosiery Mills vs. Delhi Development authority and Anr. , 63 (1996) DLT 9 (DB ). She also relied on the judgment of a learned single Judge in CWP 1372/1988 i. e. Smt. Gopa Wanti vs. DDA. Ms. Chandra submitted that in all these cases the self-same scheme for rehabilitation/allotment of industrial concerns which required industries/units to shift out, related to activities in the vicinity of the petitioner's premises at Nicolson Road. ( 12 ) LEARNED counsel further submitted that the petitioner cannot claim infringement of any right much less a vested right. The circumstances of this case disclose that there was in fact no concluded contract which could have impelled the petitioner to approach the Court, in the event of a breach of such contract. Learned counsel further submitted that inherent in the process of the planning is a certain latest dynamism which would assimilate within itself the subsequent developments having regard to the needs of the city. In these circumstances, the Master Plan 2001 having coming into force in 1990, the premises like those of the petitioner were perceived as a falling within permissible areas and the activity was permitted. She relied upon the proceedings of the Land Advisory Committee which stated that such activities would be permitted. It was also submitted that Smt. Gopa Wanti's case had dealt with the issue and noticed clause 10 of the Master Plan which enabled the continuation of such industrial activities. In these circumstances, there was no occasion for the petitioner to have complained of any legal injury. ( 13 ) BEFORE proceeding further, it would be necessary to extract the relevant portion of the agenda item of the Land Advisory Committee's deliberations which led to the issuance of the impugned order dated 31. 1. 1989. The same are part of the minutes of the meeting held on 17. 11. 1988 at Agenda Item No. 3 and they read as follows:"agenda Item No. 3. Allotment of industrial plot to M/s. Punjab Motor Workshop in Okhla Indl. Area. M/s. Punjab Motor Workshop was offered a plot measuring 4840 sq. yds. in Okhla indl. Area Phase-I. A demand for Rs. 2,33,103. 11. 1988 at Agenda Item No. 3 and they read as follows:"agenda Item No. 3. Allotment of industrial plot to M/s. Punjab Motor Workshop in Okhla Indl. Area. M/s. Punjab Motor Workshop was offered a plot measuring 4840 sq. yds. in Okhla indl. Area Phase-I. A demand for Rs. 2,33,103. 80 was raised against the unit which paid only 50% of the premium. However, no specific plot was allotted to the unit. In the meantime, ULCR Act came into force and the LAAC decided vide its Res. dated 10. 10. 80 that in no case industrial plots to be allotted by the dda should exceed 2000 sq. mtr. In order to bring the area of the plot within the prescribed limit, plot No. B-20 was sub-divided into B-20 and B-20/1 and the matter was placed before the committee to consider the case. In the previous meeting of the LAAC, the case was placed before it and it was decided to allot plot to this unit measuring 2000 sq. mtr. at the current market rates. The unit agitated on both the issues and stated that they should be allotted plot measuring 4840 sq. mtr. and that too on pre-determined rates. This request was placed before the LAAC. However, the case was rejected by the committee due to the following reasons:-1. Since 50% of the payment had not been made by the unit, hence the contract entered into by the unit with DDA is not deemed to be complete and hence the unit does not seem to have any lien for indl. plot. 2. It was observed by the committee that the unit was a tenant and has been perceived during the shifting programme of industries that in such cases the units not leave the old site even after allotment is made to them. DDA was unable to vacate the old site from most of the units under the shifting programme of industries. It was also felt by the committee that this unit would also not vacate the old premises if given allotment. 3. The committee went through the application of the unit and it was seen that the unit was holding 1000 sq-yds at the old site. The committee felt that there is no reason for allotment of more land to the unit as requested by him. 4. 3. The committee went through the application of the unit and it was seen that the unit was holding 1000 sq-yds at the old site. The committee felt that there is no reason for allotment of more land to the unit as requested by him. 4. the request of the unit was also rejected because it was a service industry and since mixed land use has been brought into vague in Delhi, hence it was felt by the committee that no use will be served in shifting the industry from its present premises. " ( 14 ) THERE is no dispute about the fact that the petitioner had paid Rs. 1,31,000/- by 1977. The DDA's case is there was belated payment, however, the delay is only for one day. Under these circumstances, the only question which arises is whether the view taken by the Land Advisory Committee is tenable and justified. ( 15 ) THE decisions in Golcha Hosiery Mills and Smt. Gopa Wanti, in my opinion, give a pointer to the correct position. In Golcha Hosiery Mills, a learned single Judge had examined the entire scheme of allotment and which is not in line with provisions of the Delhi Development Authority Allotment of Nazul Land rules 1981. In addition, it was held that there is no inherent vested right for allotment of an alternative plot. The Division Bench upheld the said view, in the context of the very same scheme which is sought to be enforced in these proceedings. The Division Bench further held as follows:"11. When, therefore, the DDA is not insisting on the appellant shifting from the place where the appellant is having his business, one cannot understand how the appellant can claim as in the case of persons sought to be compulsorily uprooted Alternative land is a matter of rehabilitation. Such a question can arise only if the DDA wants that the appellant's business cannot be conducted in this zone and he should move out. Such is not the demand of the DDA now. 12. Learned counsel appearing for the appellant could not satisfy the Court as to how the appellant was eligible for allotment of the industrial plot. The question of allotting the plot at any place would, as already stated, arise only if the appellant is eligible for the allotment. Such is not the demand of the DDA now. 12. Learned counsel appearing for the appellant could not satisfy the Court as to how the appellant was eligible for allotment of the industrial plot. The question of allotting the plot at any place would, as already stated, arise only if the appellant is eligible for the allotment. It is abundantly clear that the appellant wants somehow to get an alternative industrial plot to which he is not entitled because the value of the alternative industrial plot to which he is not entitled because the value of the alternative industrial plot has appreciated a lot. Any allotment to an ineligible person would be against the policy and manifestly illegal. The respondent cannot permit any such unjust enrichment on public expense. " ( 16 ) IN Gopa Wanti's case, the Court was concerned with a somewhat similar situation where the alternative industrial plot sought to be allotted was subsequently withdrawn and the applicant petitioner had deposited an amount of rs. 1000/- in 1970. The ground cited by the DDA in declining the allotment was that the industry was not considered to be hazardous in the modified perspective plan 2001 where the Mix Land concept was introduced. There too, the decision was taken in 1988 even before the coming into force of the new Master plan. This Court had held that concept of land development is dynamic in nature and changes which take place from time to time have to be considered and at some stage even a plot which is allocated for one purpose may justifiably and legitimately be withdrawn. The Court also subsequently observed that there was no impediment in the petitioner to continue carrying on business in the existing location. In these circumstances, the court declined relief. ( 17 ) IN the present case, the Committee clearly mentioned that the request of the petitioner was rejected because a service industry was permissible in the mix lands use provisions being brought into force in Delhi. ( 18 ) I am of the opinion that the respondent's action in not proceeding to allot or in rejecting the petitioner's application for allotment of an alternative plot in these circumstances cannot be faulted as arbitrary. ( 18 ) I am of the opinion that the respondent's action in not proceeding to allot or in rejecting the petitioner's application for allotment of an alternative plot in these circumstances cannot be faulted as arbitrary. As far as the issue of promissory estoppel is concerned although there is some ground of hardship because the petitioner had deposited a substantial amount and the same was lying with the respondent for almost 12 years, that by itself cannot change the decision. The view which ultimately prevailed with the DDA in all such cases was not to grant alternative allotment of plots since the Master Plan had permitted the activity in the premises. The petitioner's case is no different. As far as the issue of the petitioner having suffered by depositing the amount is concerned, that cannot be such an overwhelming consideration as to reflect on the final decision. The only issue therefore would be as to what ought to be the proper order to suitably restitute the petitioner. ( 19 ) ADMITTEDLY, the DDA was in possession of the petitioner's amount for about 12 years. The petitioner had deposited a total amount of Rs. 1,31,000/- as on 2. 3. 1977. The final decision to refusing the allotment was made on 31. 1. 1989. Twelve years is far too long a period for any authority to come to a final decision. In these circumstances, I am of the opinion that the DDA ought to refund the amount within four weeks with 12% compound interest for the said period i. e. 1. 4. 1977 till 31. 1. 1989. The principal along with the interest shall be paid to the petitioner within six weeks from today. The writ petition is accordingly disposed off. Rule made absolute in the above terms.