Judgment :- V. Dhanapalan, J. 1. The above Writ Appeal has been directed against the order of a learned single Judge of this Court made in W.P. No. 18219 of 2004 in and by which the learned single Judge has allowed the Writ Petition holding that the petitioner is entitled to a compensation of Rs.3 lakhs in addition to a sum of Rs.50,000 paid already. 2. For the sake of convenience, the parties are referred to in the manner as they were arrayed in the Writ Petition. 3. It is the case of the petitioner that she is the wife of one Sekar who was killed in the police firing on 12.7.1993 at about 7:15 p.m. within the limits of Mecheri Police Station, Salem District. According to her, her husband was running a tailor shop near the police station in Dharmapuri main Road, Mecheri, Salem District and was earning Rs.3,000 per mensem. He was the only bread winner of the family consisting of the petitioner, his mother and two children. It is her specific case that her husband was killed by indiscriminate firing by the police without resorting to any procedure contemplated and due to the police excess. In such circumstances, she has approached this Court by filing a Writ Petition seeking a direction to the respondents 1 to 3 to pay Rs.3 lakhs towards compensation for the death of her husband. 4. The above said claim has been resisted by the respondents by filing a counter stating that on 12.7.1993, at about 1:30 p.m., one person by name Kannan was murdered in which one Allimuthu was suspected to be an accused and therefore, there was a demand for the arrest of the said Allimuthu by a group of persons numbering 1000 who assembled in front of Meclieri Police Station on the same day at about 5:30 p.m. The said persons who had assembled there were having cycle chain, crow-bar stones and bricks in their hands and shouted slogans against the police and conducted a dharna in front of the police station to arrest the said Allimuthu. In that situation, the Deputy Superintendent of Police, Mettur (DSP) and the Revenue Divisional Officer, Mettur (RDO) accompanied by other revenue officials, pacified the group of persons and assured them that the said Allimuthu, will be arrested. In that situation, the Deputy Superintendent of Police, Mettur (DSP) and the Revenue Divisional Officer, Mettur (RDO) accompanied by other revenue officials, pacified the group of persons and assured them that the said Allimuthu, will be arrested. At that time, the situation was aggravated by a gathering of more crowd numbering 2000 persons who continued their unlawful activities till 7.30 p.m. by causing trouble to the public and the traffic was also obstructed by them by putting stones and other materials in the road. The entire traffic and movement of public were paralysed in the main trunk road to Bavani Town to Dharmapuri Town. The attempt made by the RDO and DSP to pacify the crowd proved futile and the mob started attacking the police personnel and caused damage to the public property in the police station and also attempted to damage the jeep belonging to the police department. The police personnel protected the Revenue Divisional Officer and took him inside the police station and closed the door. In view of the lesser number of police personnel available in the police station, the mob was warned and even then, the mob did not stop its violent activities and started throwing soda bottles and damaged the motor cycle belonging to one of the police officers. Therefore, the RDO ordered police firing. 5. According to the respondents, the deceased was one of the members of the unlawful assembly and he was killed in the police firing and the said firing was ordered only to save the lives of the police personnel and the revenue authorities including the RDO from the hands of the unlawful gathering and by way of self defence. It is also the case of the respondents that there were only very few police personnel available at the time of occurrence and there was no possibility of dispersing the high crowd of 2000 by lathi charge who indulged in vandalism and hence, the firing order was given. In short, the respondents defended the police firing and contended that the petitioner is not entitled to the compensation as claimed by her in the Writ Petition. 6. In short, the respondents defended the police firing and contended that the petitioner is not entitled to the compensation as claimed by her in the Writ Petition. 6. The learned single Judge, on consideration of the pleadings and the averments made by the petitioner and the contentions raised by the respondents in their counter and after giving due consideration to the submissions made by the counsel on either side, allowed the Writ Petition by awarding a compensation of Rs.3 lakhs besides a sum of Rs.50,000 granted already as exgratia. Aggrieved by this order of the learned single Judge, the State and its officers have filed the present appeal. 7. Heard Mr. P. Wilson, learned Special Government Pleader, appearing for the appellants and Mr. S. Ayyathurai, learned counsel for the respondent herein. 8. The learned Special Government Pleader, in his submissions, has strenuously contended that: (a) the learned single Judge has not considered the fact that RDO had to order police firing only to save the lives of the police officials and revenue officials and also the properties belonging to the Government as there was no sufficient police force available to order lathi charge before police firing was ordered; (b) the learned single Judge ought to have considered the facts that the deceased also was a member of the unlawful assembly and the death occurred due to the circumstances that beyond control; (c) the Writ Petition ought to have been dismissed since the question of tortuous liability can be gone into only in a Civil Suit before the Civil Court which is the competent authority but the petitioner has approached the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India which will not generally go into the question of claims arising out of tort and vicarious liability, etc. which are questions of facts; (d) since the Government had already paid an exgratia compensation of Rs.50,000 to the petitioner, she ought to have approached the Civil Court for further compensation after proving the negligence on the part of the police and revenue authorities which caused the death of her husband and (e) the learned single Judge ought to have given liberty to the petitioner to approach the Civil Court for her relief instead of allowing the Writ Petition. 9. Per contra, Mr. 9. Per contra, Mr. S. Ayyathurai, learned counsel for the respondent/ petitioner has contended that: (a) the decision of the learned single Judge has been well-founded based on the rulings of the Supreme Court and various High Courts in matters of this kind where there was police excess without following the procedure contemplated before police firing on a mob which includes lives of several persons; (b) the police firing was indiscriminate without even proper warming and following the procedure under police standing orders; (c) even in the grounds of appeal, it the appellants' case that police firing was ordered only to save the lives of the police and revenue officials and also the properties belonging to the Government and as there was no sufficient police force available to order lathi charge before police firing was ordered. 10. The learned counsel for the respondent/petitioner, after taking us through the impugned order, has pointed out that the conclusion of the learned single Judge in not accepting the explanation offered by the respondents that there was no sufficient police force to order lathi charge before police firing, is based on the rulings of the Supreme Court and hence, the appeal has to be dismissed. In support of his case, the learned counsel for the respondent/petitioner has relied oh two decisions, namely a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Saheli v. The Commissioner of Police, Delhi, AIR 1990 SC 512, and a Division Bench judgment of the Delhi High Court in the case of P.V. Kapoor & another v. Union of India & another, 1992 Cri.L.J.128. 11. We have carefully considered the rival submissions made by the learned counsel on either side and the points for consideration in this appeal are whether the Writ Petitioner is entitled to the compensation and if so, whether the quantum awarded by the learned single Judge is justified. 12. Before proceeding to consider the above points, it would be proper for us to analyze the relevant provisions contained in the police standing orders which are extracted hereunder: Dispersal of Unlawful Assemblies: 703. (1)(a) It is the bounden duty of the Police to prevent cognizable offences as per Section 149, Cr.P.C., which is as follows: "Every Police Officer may interpose for the purpose of preventing and shall to the best of his ability, prevent, the commission of any cognizable offence". (1)(a) It is the bounden duty of the Police to prevent cognizable offences as per Section 149, Cr.P.C., which is as follows: "Every Police Officer may interpose for the purpose of preventing and shall to the best of his ability, prevent, the commission of any cognizable offence". (b) The police draws its authority to declare and disperse unlawful assemblies from Section 129, Cr.P.C., which is as follows: “.......... If, upon being so commanded, any such assembly does not disperse, or if, without being so commanded, it conducts itself in such a manner as to show a determination not to disperse, any Executive Magistrate or Police Officer referred to in Sub-Section (1), may proceed to disperse such assembly by force, and may require assistance of any male person, not being an officer or member of the armed forces and acting as such, for the purpose of dispersing such assembly or that they may be punished according to law." 2(j) Officers commanding police parties will on every occasion when employed in the suppression of a riot of enforcement of the law, ensure that the fullest warning is given to the mob in a clear and distinct manner before any order is given to use tear gas or lathi/cane or fired arms and to use most effectful means to explain before hand to the people opposed to them, in the event of the police party ordered to fire that the fire will be effective. 2(k) If any or all these methods fail to disperse the mob and if in his opinion, nothing short of firing can disperse the mob, the Executive Magistrate will order fire to be opened. Again, the manner in which firing is to be directed against the mob, type of ammunition to be used and the method of firing are the individual responsibilities of the senior-most Police Officer. 13. In support of his case that on any event, the petitioner can claim only a compensation of Rs.50,000, the learned Special Government Pleader has relied on G.O. No. 874, Public (Law & Order-B) Department dated 8.8.1996 and G.O. Ms. No.833, Public (Law & Order-B) Department dated 22.5.1998, the relevant portions of which are extracted as under: G.O. Ms. No. 874 dated 8.8.1996. No.833, Public (Law & Order-B) Department dated 22.5.1998, the relevant portions of which are extracted as under: G.O. Ms. No. 874 dated 8.8.1996. In the Government Order first read above, orders were issued fixing norms for provision of financial assistance to the victims of all communities including Scheduled Castes/Scheduled Tribes and Minorities affected in Communal/Caste clashes. In the above Government Order, the following categories were not included: 1. Death due to police firing. 2. Death due to police torture. 3. Rape victims by police. The Government further in the letter second read above directed that the Hon'ble Chief Minister based on the above facts and circumstances of each case of victims of violence, death/rape in custody, police firing, etc. Or based on Court's directions or on suggestions of bodies like National Human Rights Commission in such cases shall have the discretion to award exgratia in any quantum exceptional to the norms prescribed in the Government Order first read above. 3. Even though norms have been prescribed in the Government Order mentioned in Para 1 above for Payment of exgratia amounts from the Chief Minister's Public Relief Fund to the victims of communal/caste clashes, etc. practically no uniformity was followed with higher amounts being paid on case to case basis. In order to have uniformity in granting the financial assistance to the victims of caste/communal incidents, police firing, torture/death in police custody, rape, etc. the Government have examined the whole issue and have decided to enhance the norms fixed in the Government Order first read above for the following categories as noted against each: S.No. Nature of Loss Quantum of Relief 1 a. Death in caste/communal clashes Rs.50,000 b. Death due to police torture Rs.50,000 c. Death due to police firing Rs.50,000 d. Rape by police Rs.50,000 2 Permanent incapacitation Rs.50,000 3 Major injuries Rs. 10,000 4 Partial incapacitation Rs. 10,000 5 Minor injuries Rs. 5,000 G.O. Ms. No.833 dated 22.5.1998: In the G.O. first cited above, orders were issued for the payment of compensation of Rs.10,000 each to the families of those who were killed in communal/caste clashes. This compensation was enhanced to Rs.50,000 in the G.O. second read above, which was further enhanced to Rs.1 lakh in the G.O. 4th read above. 5,000 G.O. Ms. No.833 dated 22.5.1998: In the G.O. first cited above, orders were issued for the payment of compensation of Rs.10,000 each to the families of those who were killed in communal/caste clashes. This compensation was enhanced to Rs.50,000 in the G.O. second read above, which was further enhanced to Rs.1 lakh in the G.O. 4th read above. The Delhi High Court, while disposing of a Writ Petition for the grant of enhanced compensation to the victims of riots in 1984 that followed the assassination of former Prime Minister of India, Tmt. Indira Gandhi, ordered a compensation of Rs.2 lakhs with accumulated interest be given. The National Commission for Minorities, in its letter third read above, has recommended that the judgment of the Delhi High Court should be followed uniformly in all cases of victims of communal riots whenever in point of time and wherever in the country, they may have occurred for payment of compensation. 2. The Government, after careful consideration of the above, recommendations of the National Commission for Minorities, have decided to enhance the compensation norms prescribed in the G.O. fourth read above to Rs.2 lakhs in cases of deaths in communal and caste clashes with retrospective effect from 01.01.1997. The Collectors of the Districts are accordingly requested to arrange to provide additional amounts of compensation as per the above decision of the Government to the families of the victims of communal and caste clashes who were already paid compensation as prescribed in the Government Orders second and fourth read above. 14. From a reading of the above, it is not in dispute that: (a) the Government of Tamil Nadu has taken a decision to extend the benefit of compensation to the victims of police firing, in other words, compensation to the families of the deceased who died due to the indiscriminate police firing; and (b) the quantum that once awarded is not a static one and it has to be enhanced taking note of prevailing circumstances and the escalation of the cost of living. 15. We shall now consider the above points in the light of the various decisions of the Supreme Court and High Courts in the matter of payment of compensation in cases of this kind. (i) The decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Saheli, a Women's Resources Centre through Ms. 15. We shall now consider the above points in the light of the various decisions of the Supreme Court and High Courts in the matter of payment of compensation in cases of this kind. (i) The decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Saheli, a Women's Resources Centre through Ms. Nalini Bhanot & Others v. The Commissioner of Police, Delhi, AIR 1990 SC 512, in which it is held as: (paragraphs 10 and 11) "It is now apparent from the report dated 5.12.1987 of the Inspector of the Crime Branch, Delhi as well as the counter affidavit of the Deputy Commissioner of Police, Delhi on behalf of the Commissioner of Police, Delhi and also from the fact that the prosecution has been launched in connection with the death of Naresh, son of Kamlesh Kumari showing that Naresh was done to death on account of the beating and assault by the agency of the sovereign power acting in violation and excess of the power vested in such agency. The mother of the child, Kamlesh Kumari, in our considered opinion, is so entitled to get compensation for the death of her son from the respondent No.2, Delhi Administration. An action for damages lies for bodily harm which includes battery, assault, false imprisonment, physical injuries and death. In cases of assault, battery and false imprisonment, the damages are at large and represent a solatium for the mental pain, distress, indignity, loss of liberty and death. As we have held hereinbefore that the son of Kamlesh Kumari aged 9 years died due to beating and assault by the S.H.O., Lai Singh and as such, she is entitled to get the damages for the death of her son. It is well settled now that the State is responsible for the tortious acts of its employees. The respondent No. 2, Delhi Administration is liable for payment of compensation to Smt. Kamlesh Kumari for the death of her son due to beating by the S.H.O. of Anand Parbat Police Station, Shri Lai Singh." (ii) Another decision of the Supreme Court in Rudul Sah v. State of Bihar & Another, AIR 1983 SC 1086 , in which it is observed as: (paras 10 and 11). In this case, the petitioner was detained illegally in the prison for over fourteen years after his acquittal in a full dressed trial: “.......Article 21 which guarantees the right to life and liberty will be denuded of its significant content if the power of this Court were limited to passing orders of release from illegal detention. One of the telling ways in which the violation of that right can reasonably be prevented and due compliance with the mandate of Article 21 secured, is to mulct its violators in the payment of monetary compensation. Administrative sclerosis leading to flagrant infringements of fundamental rights cannot be corrected by any other method open to the judiciary to adopt. The right to compensation is some palliative for the unlawful acts of instrumentalities which act in the name of public interest and which present for their protection the powers of the State as a shield. If civilization is not to perish in this country as it has perished in some poli others too well-known to suffer mention, it is necessary to educate ourselves into accepting that, respect for the rights to individuals is the true bastion of democracy. Therefore, the State must repair the damage done by its officers to the petitioner's rights. It may have recourse against those officers. Taking into consideration that great harm done to the petitioner by the Government of Bihar, we are of the opinion that, as an interim measure, the State must pay to the petitioner a further sum of Rs.30,000 (Rupees thirty thousand) in addition to the sum of Rs.5,000 already paid by it. The amount shall be paid within two weeks from today. The Government of Bihar agrees to make the payment though, we must clarify, our order is not based on their consent." (iii) A Division Bench judgment of the Delhi High Court in the case of P.V. Kapoor & another v. Union of India & another, 1992 Cri.L.J.128, in which it is observed as: (Para 11) "We, however, find that the complaint of the brother of Pawan Sahni was not rejected or dismissed on merits. Copy of the order of the Magistrate had been Placed before us which shows that the Magistrate was of the opinion that before seeking to prosecute the police officers, permission under Section 132 Criminal Procedure Code should have been obtained. Copy of the order of the Magistrate had been Placed before us which shows that the Magistrate was of the opinion that before seeking to prosecute the police officers, permission under Section 132 Criminal Procedure Code should have been obtained. As the complainant had not obtained the necessary sanction, the Magistrate rejected the complaint. In our opinion, the decision of the Magistrate to this effect cannot oust the jurisdiction of this Court which is called upon to decide inter alia whether the resort to firing by the police was justified or not and whether Devinder Kumar Sharma was or was not properly handled after he had been shot. The filing of the FIRs under Section 173 of the Cr.P.C., against the rioters is also of no consequence. Whereas in those proceedings action is sought to be taken against the rioters, in the present Writ Petition, it is the acts of the police which are sought to be impugned. The pendency of the cases against the rioters can, therefore, be no bar to the decision on trial: the issues arising in the present petition." (iv) The judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Malkiat Singh v. State of UP., 1998 (9) SCC 351 , has held as under: (Paragraphs 2 & 3) "In view of the report of ACJM, this Court on 7.5.1996 passed the following order: "Mr. R.S. Sodhi the learned counsel for the petitioner states that though the learned ACJM found on the basis of photographs that the petitioner’s son Talvinder Singh is one of the persons who died in the incident involving firing by the U.P. Police, the CBI has not accepted the said finding regarding the death of Talvinder Singh. It is obvious that if he is found dead, the Writ Petition be only confined to the question of the entitlement of the petitioner to compensation. If the said Talvinder Singh is alive then he be produced by the police. Issue notice." It is now an accepted position that Talvinder Singh died in the incident which took place on 13.7.1991. All attempts to find his body have proved futile. But from the photograph identified by the father and the grandfather of Talvinder Singh, it is established that he is dead, because the police had taken photographs of all those who were killed in those two encounters. All attempts to find his body have proved futile. But from the photograph identified by the father and the grandfather of Talvinder Singh, it is established that he is dead, because the police had taken photographs of all those who were killed in those two encounters. Therefore, the only question which now survives in this petition is what amount of compensation should be paid to the petitioner to compensate him for the death of his son." (v) The judgment of this Court in the case of R. Dhanalakshmi v. Government of Tamil Nadu, represented by its Chief Secretary. Fort St. George. Madras - 9 and others, 2004 WLR 346, in which it is held as: (Paragraphs 4, 5, 7 and 13) "From the above, it is clear that as far as the Government is concerned, the deceased Rajmohan died only due to torture and inhuman treatment at the hands of Mr. Eswaran, the then Sub Inspector of Police, Karur Police Station. On the above facts, it must be first concluded that the deceased Rajmohan died while he was in police custody and that too, due to harassment at the hands of the Sub Inspector of Police, Karur Police Station. In the matter of custodial death, the Supreme Court in more than one case has upheld the power of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India to award just and reasonable compensation. In fact, even when the custody is taken, the procedure to be followed by the Investigating Agency are enumerated by the Apex Court in the judgment in Shri D.K Basu v. State of West Bengal, 1996 (4) Crimes 233 (SC). Coming to the question of quantum, it must be noted that the deceased was 29 years age on the date when he died in police custody. This fact has not been disputed by the respondents in the counter affidavit. Further, the fact that the deceased left at the time of his death, the petitioner, wife of the deceased aged about 27 years two minor sons by name Gowthaman aged 7 years and Saravanan aged 5 years apart from his mother Anjalaiammal aged 55 years, has not been disputed by the respondent in the counter affidavit. Further, the fact that the deceased left at the time of his death, the petitioner, wife of the deceased aged about 27 years two minor sons by name Gowthaman aged 7 years and Saravanan aged 5 years apart from his mother Anjalaiammal aged 55 years, has not been disputed by the respondent in the counter affidavit. In fact, in para 4 of the counter affidavit, the respondents have stated as follows: "The Writ Petitioner submitted that she is the legal heir of the deceased Rajmohan as the deceased's wife. Records of enquiry revealed that the age of the deceased is 32/95..." In view of the above, the next question to be considered is, as to the actual amount of compensation to which the petitioner is entitled. There is absolutely no difficulty in determining the quantum of compensation when once the monthly income of the deceased is arrived at Rs.6,000 and the age of the deceased as 29 at the time of death. The Apex Court in the judgment in Grewal Ms. & Another v. Deep Chand Sood & others, 2002 (1) LW 491, has broad lined the guidelines to be adopted by the Courts in determining the just and reasonable compensation. The Apex Court has approved the multiplier adopted in the Motor Vehicle cases for the purpose of determining the compensation in the case of custodial torture. Hence, the multiplier method adopted in the case of Motor Accidents is adopted for determining the just and reasonable compensation in this case." (vi) Another Division Bench decision of this Court in the case of K. Kabali v. State of Tamil Nadu & Others, W.A. No. 587 of 2001, rendered by one of us (P. Sathasivam, J.) in which it is observed as: (Para 21) "Taking note of the findings of the Commission of Enquiry that the police personnel were negligent in their duty which resulted in the death of the deceased Ramesh at the age of 22, considering the family circumstances and of the fact that the petitioner a retired employee has to look after three grown up daughters, we are of the view that ends of justice would be met by directing the State Government i.e. the first respondent to pay a further amount of Rs.3 lakhs as compensation in addition to the amount already paid." (vii). Also yet another decision of this Court in the case of P. Ranganayagi & others v. State of Tamil Nadu represented by Secretary, Home Department & others, 2000 (1) LW (Crl.) 96, in which it is held as: (Para 11) "The case on hand is in no way different from the facts and circumstances of the cases of custodial deaths referred to above as admittedly it is found by this Court that the said Dorairaj died when he was in police custody. Therefore, following the ratios laid down by the Apex Court and this Court, I am obliged to direct the first respondent-State to pay a sum of Rs.5,00,000 to the petitioners herein by way of compensation for the custodial death of Dorairaj." 16. A careful reading of the afore-mentioned decisions of the Supreme Court and High Courts would reveal that in case of indiscriminate police firing by not adhering to police standing orders and by not resorting to any precautionary measure, the action of the police is wholly unjustified, and the State is liable to pay compensation to such victims of police firing. 17. From page 261 of the report submitted by the Additional District Magistrate and Additional Collector, Salem to the District Magistrate and Collector, Salem, in his proceedings in R.O.C. No.92027/93 dated 5.9.1993, is found as follows: "But the crowd did not heed to their appeal and the next course of action was mild lathi charge after giving warnings. But as there was no sufficient strength, lathi charge could not be resorted to and on the orders of the RDO, Mettur, two buck shots were fired in the air." Further, in page 262 of the same report cited supra, it is stated as under: "Similarly, Dr. Thiru. Yogain who conducted post-mortem on the dead body of Sekar has also recovered a metal projectile from his body and his vital organs have been damaged by that. From the above reports, it appears that the death of Thiru. Kaliappan would have been most probably due to injuries in his head and the death of Thiru. Sekar due to the damage to his vital organs caused by bullets." 18. From the above reports, it appears that the death of Thiru. Kaliappan would have been most probably due to injuries in his head and the death of Thiru. Sekar due to the damage to his vital organs caused by bullets." 18. In the communication of the Tahsildar, Mettur made in R.O.C. No.B1/193 dated 12.07.1993 addressed to the District Collector, Salem, it has been stated that Kannan was murdered in front of Mecheri police station by Ayyanar and Allimuthu and the said murder was witnessed by one Head Constable by name Rathinarn of Mecheri Police Station and the said Head Constable brought both the accused to the police station. After a few minutes, Allimuthu left the station and he was not taken into custody presumably, he was let off by the police in charge of Mecheri Police Station. After the said accused was let off by the police without any action, the people started gathering in front of the police station at 5:30 p.m. and raised some slogans against the police and demanded the arrest of the said Allimuthu. 19. It is also clear from the said communication that on coming to know about the assembly of crowd in front of the police station, the DSP, Mettur, arrived at the spot and assured the crowd of the arrest of the said Allimuthu. Even after that, the crowd did not ' relent and started insisting upon the arrest of the said Allimuthu. Till 7.30 p.m., the police did not take any action to bring the sufficient police personnel to the spot as admittedly, by 5:30 p.m., nearly 1000 persons had assembled in front of the police station. The DSP, Mettur, who had arrived at the police station at 5:30 p.m. should have anticipated the law and order problem and ought to have secured sufficient police strength contain the mob. But, it is clear from the said communication that no such attempt was made by the DSP, Mettur. It is also to be noted that the RDO, Mettur, was also present at that time. The reason adduced by the RDO in ordering police firing is that there was no sufficient police force. But, it is clear from the said communication that no such attempt was made by the DSP, Mettur. It is also to be noted that the RDO, Mettur, was also present at that time. The reason adduced by the RDO in ordering police firing is that there was no sufficient police force. Even though it is contended that sufficient warning was given to the mob to disperse, the police, in all probability, ought to have anticipated violence as the mob was in front of the police station from 5.30 p.m. onwards, more particularly, when the mob was insisting on the arrest of the said Allimuthu who was admittedly brought to the police station by the Head Constable Rathinam who witnessed the murder. There is no explanation as to how the said Allimuthu, who was brought to the police station for murdering the said Kannan, was let off. Therefore, the mob, in all expectations, assembled before the police station, demanding the arrest of Allimuthu. 20. In the absence of any explanation as to why the DSP and the RDO did not take sufficient precautions to bring the police force to contain the mob, the explanation offered by the respondents that since there was no sufficient police force to order lathi charge before police firing was ordered, cannot be accepted. Even in the First Information Report, it has not been explained as to why the police did not take precautions to contain the mob from 5.30 p.m. onwards except the DSP and RDO who made an attempt to pacify the crowd. The appellants, in all probability, ought to have anticipated law and order problem and should have taken some precautionary measures and should not have ordered straightaway police firing without resorting to lathi charge followed by bursting of tear gas. As per the various stages contemplated under the police standing orders, firing can be ordered only after ordering lathi charge and two buck shots in the air. This procedure has not been followed by the RDO and also the DSP and the conclusion made by the learned single Judge that this action of the police and revenue authorities would amount to police excess and the action of the police is wholly unjustified, is correct. This procedure has not been followed by the RDO and also the DSP and the conclusion made by the learned single Judge that this action of the police and revenue authorities would amount to police excess and the action of the police is wholly unjustified, is correct. Therefore, for the excess of the authorities concerned, they are liable to pay, the compensation and the findings of the learned single Judge cannot be considered as contrary to the law laid down by the Supreme Court and various High Courts and as such, the same cannot be found fault with. 21. One more point argued by the learned counsel for the respondent herein is whether the deceased Sekar was also one of the members in the unlawful assembly. It is the specific case of the petitioner that her husband is running a tailor shop near Mecheri Police Station and in the First Information Report, it is not specifically stated that he was also one of the members in the unlawful assembly. Only in the counter affidavit filed by the respondents 2 and 3, it has been stated by naming the deceased as a member of the unlawful assembly. Neither in the First Information Report nor in the subsequent enquiry conducted by the Tahsildar, it is stated that the deceased Sekar, even though a member of the unlawful assembly, was also violent at the relevant point of time. It is further noted from the report of the Additional Collector, Salem, dated 5.9.1993, that he had examined 30 persons as to the police firing. Two persons by name Subramanian and Elaqyaperumal of Amarain village have deposed that since some persons pelted stones and uprooted the name board of the police station suddenly, the police, without due warning, lathi charge or tear gas, opened fire. Further, one Raju of Pappireddiyur village has also spoken in the same line. None of the witnesses examined by the Additional Collector, has spoken to the participation much less the active participation of the deceased forming a member of the unlawful assembly. 22. Based on the above reports and statement of persons on enquiry, the learned single Judge has observed that it can easily be presumed that even though he may be also one of the persons in the crowd, he may not be called as a member of the unlawful assembly and as such, the appellants have to compensation. 22. Based on the above reports and statement of persons on enquiry, the learned single Judge has observed that it can easily be presumed that even though he may be also one of the persons in the crowd, he may not be called as a member of the unlawful assembly and as such, the appellants have to compensation. 23. From the above findings it is found that the learned single Judge has given due credence to the pleadings and counter pleadings and the file produced before the Court and on proper satisfaction of the entire records, had come to the conclusion that the deceased Sekar died in the police firing due to police excess, without taking proper and adequate measures before police firing and therefore, the petitioner is entitled to get a compensation of laklis in addition to a sum of Rs.50,000 already paid by the Government as exgratia. This decision of the learned single Judge is in conformity with the proposition of law laid down by the Supreme Court and various High Courts as already discussed in the foregoing paragraphs. In that view of the matter and also in view of the fact that no ground is made out by the counsel for the appellants, we find no reason to interfere with the conclusion of the learned single Judge. 24. Taking note of the age of the deceased and the fact that the deceased was the only bread-winner of his family, we are of the view that the ends of justice would be met by directing the State Government to pay the balance amount of compensation of Rs.2 lakhs in addition to a sum of Rs.50.000/- already granted as exgratia since a sum of Rs.1 lakh was already permitted to be withdrawn from the compensation amount of Rs.3 lakhs. Accordingly, the State Government is directed to invest the said sum of Rs.2 lakhs within a period of eight weeks from the date of receipt of a copy of this order in the name of the S. Sivagami, the respondent herein, in a Fixed Deposit, initially for a period of three years in any one of the nationalized banks. It is made clear that the respondent herein would be entitled to receive the interest accrued on such deposit, once in three months. It is made clear that the respondent herein would be entitled to receive the interest accrued on such deposit, once in three months. After the expiry of the said period of three years, the respondent herein is permitted to withdraw the amount and share the same with the dependants of the deceased namely, his mother and two Children. The appeal is dismissed with the above directions. No costs.