Judgment ( 1. ) THE appellants/defendants preferred this appeal under Section 100 of CPC being aggrieved by the judgment and decree dated 26-2-2005 passed by 3rd Additional District Judge, Sagar in Civil Regular Appeal No. 6-A/03, affirming the judgment and decree under Section 12 (1) (f) of Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act, 1961 (in short the Act) passed by 3rd Civil Judge Class-II, Bhopal in Civil Original Suit No. 46-A/98, vide dated 30-4-01. ( 2. ) RESPONDENT/plaintiff has filed a suit for eviction against the defendant/appellant on the ground available under Section 12 (1) (f) of the Act for non-residential bonafide genuine requirement of respondent No. 3, Mukesh Kumar regarding shop situated at Gujrati Bazar Katra Ward, Sagar as mentioned in the plaint. ( 3. ) WHILE in the written statement by admitting the tenancy, the aforesaid ground for eviction was denied by the appellant. It has also been contended that respondent have various alternative accommodation in their family in the same town. The disputed shop is very small, Le. , 13 x 5 ft. , in which the appellants are running the medical shop, the same is not suitable to the respondents for their alleged need as they want to start General Stores and spice shop. Hence, the alleged need is neither bonafide nor genuine in any manner and prayed for dismissal of the suit. ( 4. ) IN view of the aforesaid pleadings after framing the issues the evidence was recorded, on appreciation of it the suit was decreed on the aforesaid ground by the Trial Court. On appeal by affirming the same it was dismissed. Hence this appeal is preferred by the tenant/appellant. ( 5. ) SHRI Rohit Arya, learned Senior Advocate assisted by Shri Sanjay Lai, learned Counsel for the appellant has submitted that the question of bonafide genuine requirement of respondents has not been examined by the Courts below on proper appreciation of the available evidence on record. The shop in dispute is very small and the same is not suitable for the alleged need of the respondents as they wants to start the business of General Stores and spice shop, in a small place such business is not possible but the same has not been considered. Beside this, it was also submitted that in the family of the respondents various alternative accommodations are available in the same town. Beside this, it was also submitted that in the family of the respondents various alternative accommodations are available in the same town. The same have been proved by admissible evidence but it was not considered with proper approach and contrary to it the decree has been passed by the Trial Court and the Appellate Court has also committed error in confirming the same. According to him alleged need of respondents should have been examined objectively but the Court below have not considered this aspect in passing the decree. In support of his contention he has cited a decision of the Apex Court in the matter of Shiv Sarup Gupta v. Dr. Mahesh Chand Gupta, reported in AIR1999 SC 2507 , JT1999 (5 )SC 201 , 1999 (4 ) SCALE334 , (1999 )6 SCC222 , [1999 ]3 SCR1260 , 1999 (2 )UJ1261 (SC ), and submitted that in view of availability of alternate accommodation with the respondents the question of bonafide genuine requirement of respondents is still open before this Court and prayed for admission of this appeal. In alternate he has also submitted that on dismissal of appeal at this stage some reasonable time be given for vacating the premises and prayed for 9 months time for the same. ( 6. ) HAVING heard the learned Counsel on perusing the record it appears from the pleadings and the evidence that whatever other alternate accommodation as said and alleged by the appellant are not belonging to the respondents although some of the accommodation belonging to other members of their family or joint family. In view of the settled position of law that the house of the wife could not be treated as alternate accommodation for the husband as laid down by this Court in the matter of Rajkumar v. Ved Prakash, reported in 1982 JLJ 451 , and house of joint family could also not be treated as alternate accommodation in view of the decision of this Court in the matter of Sushila v. Maharaj Singh, reported in 1990 MPLJ 445 . Thus, the need of the plaintiff/landlord to start his business in his own premises for which they have no any other accommodation of his own then their need could not be said malafide and decree cannot be refused. ( 7. Thus, the need of the plaintiff/landlord to start his business in his own premises for which they have no any other accommodation of his own then their need could not be said malafide and decree cannot be refused. ( 7. ) SO far the case cited by the appellant is concerned, this Court has no dispute about the principle laid down in it but the same is not applicable to this case as the bonafide genuine requirement of respondents for the alleged business for which they do not have any other alternate accommodation of his own have been proved by both the Courts below. ( 8. ) EVEN otherwise on going through the evidence, I have not found any perversity, infirmity or irregularity in appreciation of evidence for passing the impugned judgment and decree. The findings of the Courts below are based on sound principle and on proper appreciation of evidence. So for objection regarding size of the shop is concerned, it is suffice to say that the Court is not the rationing authority to control the need of respondent. The respondent is the best judge of his need and accordingly the same has been proved, thus, this objection is also not sustainable under the law. ( 9. ) BESIDES this the concurrent finding of Courts below on the ground of bonafide genuine requirement comes under the purview of finding of fact and same cannot be interfered under Section 100 of CPC as it does not involve any question of law in view of the law laid down by the Apex Court in the matter of Dr. Ranbirsingh v. Asharfilal, reported in JT1995 (6 )SC 668 , 1995 (5 )SCALE470 , (1995 )6 SCC580 , [1995 ]supp3 SCR847. Thus, in the absence of any substantial question of law this appeal cannot be admitted as a matter of right of the parties because scope of Section 100 is very limited in view of law laid down by the Apex Court in the matter at Kondiba Dagadu Kudam v. Savitribai Sopan Gujar and Ors. reported in AIR1999 SC 2213 , 1999 (2 )CTC468 , JT1999 (3 )SC 163 , (1999 )II MLJ105 (SC ), RLW2000 (1 )SC 89 , 1999 (2 )SCALE633 , (1999 )3 SCC722 , [1999 ]2 SCR728 , 1999 (2 )UJ820 (SC ). ( 10. reported in AIR1999 SC 2213 , 1999 (2 )CTC468 , JT1999 (3 )SC 163 , (1999 )II MLJ105 (SC ), RLW2000 (1 )SC 89 , 1999 (2 )SCALE633 , (1999 )3 SCC722 , [1999 ]2 SCR728 , 1999 (2 )UJ820 (SC ). ( 10. ) IN view of the aforesaid discussion in the lack of question of law rather than substantial question of law this appeal has no merits, hence the same is dismissed at the stage of motion hearing. However, considering the alternative submission of the appellants with the consent of the counsel for the respondent, appellants are given time upto 31st October, 2006 for vacating the premises subject to deposit the entire arrears of rent, decretal amount within 30 days from today and also on payment of monthly mesne profit @ monthly rent regularly along with on submitting a usual undertaking within 30 days to the satisfaction of Trial Court for vacating the premises in compliance of the decree within aforesaid period. If these conditions or any of it is not complied by the appellant then respondent would be at liberty to execute the decree forth with accordance with law. ( 11. ) APPEAL is dismissed with aforesaid observation. ( 12. ) THERE shall be no order as to costs.