Judgment :- 1. The plaintiff, who has failed before the First Appellate Court in sustaining the decree and judgment obtained by him in OHS. No. 330/1984 is the appellant. 2. The appellant as plaintiff has filed the Suit for declaration, that the order passed by respondents 1 & 2 as per the proceedings in Na.Ka. No. 176 of 1982 dated 20.9.1982 under which the performance of pooja as Archaga to the plaintiff was reduced from 4 days to 2 days, is null and void, with a consequential relief of permanent injunction, as well as to restore the said two days on the ground that the order was passed without giving any sufficient opportunity or notice, as the case may be, which was opposed by the defendants originally. But subsequently D2 was deleted. 3. The trial Judge, while evaluating the materials produced before him, came to the conclusion, that the proceedings in Na.Ka. No. 176 of 1982 is null and void, since such an order was passed without giving an opportunity to the plaintiff, thereby offending the natural justice. In this way, the Suit came to be decreed on 27.11.1991, which was under challenge before the first Appellate Court in A.S. No. 229/92. 4. The specific defence of the contesting defendants was that the Suit before the Civil Court is not maintainable, in view of the bar imposed under Section 108 of the Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Act, hereinafter called ‘the Act'. This plea was accepted by the First Appellate Court and in this view, upsetting the Trial Court's judgment, the Appeal was allowed, dismissing O.S. No. 330/1984, thereby giving cause of action for the plaintiff to come to this Court, as appellant. 5. This Court, while admitting the Second Appeal, has framed the following substantial question of law: "Whether the learned Subordinate Judge is erred in law in relying upon Section 108 of the Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowment Act for the purpose of holding that the Suit is not maintainable in law, which resulted in reversing the well considered judgment of the learned District Munsif, Coimbatore in O.S. No. 330/84?" 6. Heard the learned counsel for the appellant Mr. S. Balasubramaniam and Mr. N. Manoharan, the learned counsel for respondent No.1 and Mr. A.S. Vijayaraghavan, the learned counsel for respondent No.3. Point: 7. Heard the learned counsel for the appellant Mr. S. Balasubramaniam and Mr. N. Manoharan, the learned counsel for respondent No.1 and Mr. A.S. Vijayaraghavan, the learned counsel for respondent No.3. Point: 7. The plaintiff/appellant's father and the third respondent's father by name Mandrachala Gurukal and Nageswara Gurukal are brothers. They were given right to perform Archaga in Arulmigu Sree Subramaniya Swami Temple, Marudamalai for 10 days, as seen from Ex.A-1. It seems the father of the third defendant died elsewhere in 1944 and thereafter, neither Balasubramaniya Gurukal nor other legal heirs of Nageswara Gurukal have claimed any Archaga right. In view of this, the 10 days Archaga right was distributed among the plaintiff, his father and brothers. In that distribution, elsewhere in 1981, 4 days right was given to the plaintiff, two days right was given to the plaintiff's father and for the two brothers each two days right was given. Thus, the plaintiff/appellant's family members were enjoying the Archaga right for 10 days in a month. The third respondent, who is the son of Nageswara Gurukal claimed Archaga right in view of the fact that kind of right was enjoyed by his father. Conceding his request, as per the proceedings dated 20.9.1982, he was given two days right to perform pooja in a month fixing the dates as 20 & 21st of each month. Because of these proceedings, the plaintiff/appellant's Archaga right was reduced to two days. Therefore, he has filed the Suit, as said above, for the restoration of four days and in this way, the Suit is filed for declaration of the order dated 20.9.1982 as null and void. 8. The learned counsel appearing for the appellant would submit, that the order passed by the temple on 20.9.1982 will not come within the meaning of Section 108 of the Act and therefore, even without exhausting the remedy before the Appellate Authority or Revisional Authority, a Suit could be filed and in this view, the view taken by the First Appellate Court that the Suit is barred under Section 108 of the Act is not sustainable. 9. 9. On the other hand the learned counsel appearing for the temple would submit that the order passed by the authorities would come within the meaning of Section 108 of the Act also and that is why the plaintiff has also preferred an Appeal under Section 56(2) of the Act before the Deputy Commissioner of 14, R. & C.E., who affirmed and confirmed the order dated 20.9.1982 on 13.1.1984 and if at all the plaintiff is aggrieved by the said order, he ought to have preferred a Revision before the Commissioner of 1.R. & C.E. under Section 69 of the H.R. & C.E. Act and without exhausting the revisional remedy, the Suit filed is not maintainable. 10. Section 108 of the Act reads: "No Suit or other legal proceeding in respect of the administration or management of a religious institution or any other matter or dispute for determining or deciding which provision is made in this Act shall be instituted in any Court of Law, except under, and in conformity with the provisions of this Act". 11. The order passed by the authority including the Deputy Commissioner of H.R. & C.E. is only in respect of the administration as well as the Management of the religious institutions viz., Sree Subramaniyaswamy Temple, Marudamalai. This order cannot come within the meaning of any other provisions. This being the position, the impugned order must come under Section 108 of the Act. Therefore, the plaintiff ought to have exhausted his remedy only under Section 69 of the Act and ignoring the same, since the Suit is filed, it is directly hit by Section 108 of the Act, since it says no Suit or other legal proceedings in respect of the administration or management of the religious institution shall be instituted in any Court of law except under and in conformity with the provisions of the Act. 12. The First Appellate Court, properly appreciating the above question of law, has rightly allowed the Appeal, upset the decree and judgment of the Trial Court, in which I am unable to find any infirmity, warranting my interference. Even on facts also, the grievance of the plaintiff appears to be imaginary. The plaintiff's family and the third defendant's family were enjoying the Archaga right for 10 days originally. After the death of the third defendant's father, the entire period was enjoyed by the plaintiffs family. Even on facts also, the grievance of the plaintiff appears to be imaginary. The plaintiff's family and the third defendant's family were enjoying the Archaga right for 10 days originally. After the death of the third defendant's father, the entire period was enjoyed by the plaintiffs family. When the third defendant claimed right, which is not denied, only two days right has been given to the third defendant, that too considering the fact four days are given to the plaintiff, whereas his father and his brothers are given two days each. Therefore, it is seen, the maximum period out of 10 days viz., 8 days are with the plaintiff's family and two days are given to the third defendant. In this way, I find there is no offending of any natural justice and in fact, considering all the above facts, appropriate order appears to have been passed by the authorities concerned, which was confirmed by the Deputy commissioner, H.R. & C.E. and not challenged before the Commissioner, H.R. & C.E. In this view also, the Appeal deserves only dismissal, not warranting any interference by this Court. In the result, the Appeal is devoid of merits and the same is dismissed. Considering the facts and circumstances of the case, the parties are directed to bear their respective costs.