P. R. BORKAR, J.:- This is an appeal preferred by the original respondent husband, being aggrieved by the order of awarding maintenance of Rs.1,000/- passed under Section 25 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 by the learned Principal Judge, Family Court, Aurangabad in Petition No.C-39/2001 on 30-11-2002. 2. Most of the facts giving rise to this appeal are undisputed. Present respondent Leelabai approached the Family Court, Aurangabad with a case that on 16-12-1997 she had legally married the present appellant. Madhuri a daughter was born in the wedlock, however, the appellant and the respondent could not carryon the happy married life and so respondent Leelabai filed Petition No.331 of 1999 for maintenance under Section 125 of the Criminal Procedure Code. The said petition came to be dismissed on 25-3-2000 as respondent Leelabai could not satisfy the Court that she was legally wedded wife of appellant Bhausaheb. 3. Thereafter respondent Leelabai filed Petition No.B-7/2000 for declaration that her marriage with appellant Bhausaheb was a valid marriage and Madhuri was their legitimate child. At the same time, she filed another application bearing Petition No.E-525/2000 for maintenance under Section 125 of the Criminal Procedure Code on behalf of the child Madhuri. Both the petitions were heard together and decided by a common judgment dated 29-9-2001. It was held that the marriage was not a valid marriage, since respondent Leelabai was having a spouse living at the time of alleged marriage and therefore, the petition for declaration of validity of marriage was dismissed, however, Madhuri was awarded maintenance at the rate of Rs.500/- per month under Section 125 of the Criminal Procedure Code. 4. Thereafter, respondent Leelabai filed Petition No.C-39/2001 under Section 25 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955. The same was heard by the Principal Judge, Family Court, Aurangabad and he awarded maintenance of Rs.1,000/- per month to respondent Leelabai from the date of the petition., It is this order dated 30-11-2002 which is challenged in the present appeal. 5. The main point that was raised for our consideration is whether respondent Leelabai is entitled to maintenance under Section 25 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 (hereinafter referred to as, "the H.M. Act") in view of earlier declaration that her alleged marriage with appellant Bhausahed was not valid marriage. 6. Pending this appeal, a Reference was made by the Division Bench to a Larger Bench. 6. Pending this appeal, a Reference was made by the Division Bench to a Larger Bench. The Honourable the Chief Justice formulated a Full Bench for deciding the issue under Reference. Two cases of this Court, (i) Shantaram Tukaram PatH Vs. Dagubai Tukaram Patil (1987 Mh.L.J. 179) and (ii) Krishnakant Mulashankar Vyas Vs. Reena Krishna Vyas ( AIR 1999 BOM. 127 ) were the decisions declaring that even if marriage between the parties was void, the wife is entitled to maintenance under Section 25 of the H.M. Act; whereas the Full Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in the case of Abbayolla M. Subba Reddy Vs. Padmamma ( AIR 1999 A.P. 19 ) took view that where marriage is nullity, Section 25 of the H.M. Act has no application. In view of the fact that the earlier petition of the wife for declaration of her marriage with the appellant was decided by judgment dated 29.1.2001, the Division Bench felt that the matter should be referred to the Larger Bench. 7. The Full Bench heard advocates of both sides and answered the Reference as follows on paragraph 24. "24. For the reasons discussed above, with due respect, it is held that the decisions of the Bombay High Court, upholding right of maintenance to "illegitimate wife" [or "faithful mistress"] by liberal construction of word "wife" as contained in Section 25 of H.M. Act, cannot be said to be a good law and are required to be overruled to that extent." 8. Being dissatisfied with the Ruling of the Full Bench, the respondent wife approached the Honourable Supreme Court and her Special Leave Petition No.(C) 6875 of 2004 was dismissed by the Honourable Supreme Court on 27-8-2004. The order reads thus: "Heard the learned counsel for the petitioner. Delay condoned. The special leave petition is dismissed." 9. It is argued by Shri. Barlota, advocate for the appellant that in view of the answer by the Full Bench to the Reference, the respondent is not entitled to any maintenance and so the appeal be allowed and the order passed by the Family Court be set aside. He also referred to the definitions of 'Decree', 'Decree Holder' as given in the Civil Procedure Code. 10. He also referred to the definitions of 'Decree', 'Decree Holder' as given in the Civil Procedure Code. 10. Shri. Jondhale, advocate appearing for respondent Leelabai argued that the Honourable Supreme Court dismissed the Special Leave Petition in limine without reasons and in the case of Ramesh Chandra Daga Rampratapji Daga Vs. Rameshwari Ramesh Chandra Daga ( AIR 2005 SC 422 : 2005(5) ALL MR (S.C.) 159) the Honourable Supreme Court has laid down that even a wife whose first marriage is subsisting when she entered into second marriage and though such second marriage of the wife is null and void, she is entitled to maintenance under Section 25 of the H.M. Act. Shri Jondhale, advocate argued that the Ruling of the Full Bench of this Court on Reference made in this matter thus stands overruled by the case of Ramesh Chandra Daga (supra) and therefore, this Court cannot interfere with the order of maintenance awarded by the Family Court. Shri. Barlota, advocate, on the other hand, stated that though the law laid down in Ramesh Chandra Daga's case becomes the law of the land and binding on all, so far as parties to this proceeding are concerned, in view of dismissal of Special Leave Petition, there is Bar of principle of res judicata and this Court will have to follow the decision of the Full Bench given in the Reference. 11. Section 25(1) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 reads thus: "25. Permanent alimony and maintenance :- (1) Any court exercising jurisdiction under this Act may, at the time of passing any decree or at any time subsequent thereto, on application made to it for the purpose by either the wife or the husband as the case may be order that the respondent shall pay to the applicant for her or his maintenance and support such gross sum or such monthly or periodical sum for a term not exceeding the life of the applicant as, having regard to the respondents own income and other property, if any, the income and other property of the applicant [the conduct of the parties and other circumstances of the case] it may seem to the Court to be just and any such payment may be secured, if necessary, by a charge on the immovable property of the respondent. (emphasis supplied)" 12. In the case of Chand Dhawan (SMT) Vs. (emphasis supplied)" 12. In the case of Chand Dhawan (SMT) Vs. Jawaharlal Dhawan, (1993)3 SCC 406 , the Supreme Court in para 23 considered Section 25 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 and the following observations are made therein: “23............ So while sustaining her marriage and preserving her marital status, the wife is entitled to claim maintenance from her husband. On the other hand, under the Hindu Marriage Act, in contrast, her claim for maintenance dependent lite is durated (sic) on the pendency of a litigation of the kind envisaged under Sections 9 to 14 of the Hindu Marriage Act, and her claim to permanent maintenance of alimony is based on the supposition that either her marital status has been strained or affected by passing a decree for restitution of conjugal rights or judicial separation in favour or against her, or her marriage stands dissolved by a decree of nullity or divorce, with or without her consent. Thus when her marital status is to be affected or disrupted the court does so by passing a decree for or against her. On or at the time of the happening of that event, the court being seizing of the matter, involves its ancillary or incidental power to grant permanent alimony. Not only that, the court retains the jurisdiction at subsequent stage to fulfil this incidental or ancillary obligation when moved by an application on that behalf by a party entitled to relief. The court further retains the power to change or alter the order in view of the changed circumstances. Thus the whole exercise is within the gammit (sic gamut) of a diseased or a broken marriage. And in order to avoid conflict of perceptions the legislature while codifying the Hindu Marriage Act preserved the right of permanent maintenance in favour of the husband or the wife, as the case may be, dependent on the court passing a decree of the kind as envisaged under Sections 9 to 14 of the Act. In other words without the marital status being affected or disrupted by the matrimonial court under the Hindu Marriage Act the claim of permanent alimony was not to be valid as ancillary or incidental to such affectation or disruption." 13. In other words without the marital status being affected or disrupted by the matrimonial court under the Hindu Marriage Act the claim of permanent alimony was not to be valid as ancillary or incidental to such affectation or disruption." 13. Section 25 of the H.M. Act speaks about exercising power of granting permanent alimony or maintenance at the time of passing any decree or at any time subsequent thereto on the application made to it while exercising jurisdiction under the Act. So, the Court must be passing decree under the Act or at any time subsequent thereto, permanent alimony or maintenance can be awarded. Under the H.M. Act, Sections 5 to 8 deal with conditions, ceremonies and registration of Hindu marriages. So, there is no question of passing any decree under sections 1 to 8. Section 9 relates to restitution of conjugal rights. Section 10 relates to judicial separation. Section 11 relates to void marriages and Section 12 relates to voidable marriages. Sections 13, 13-A, 13-B, and 14 relate to divorce. So, it is argued before us that petition bearing No.B-7/2000 for declaration that marriage in between respondent Leelabai and appellant Bhausaheb was valid marriage and Madhuri was their legitimate daughter, was a petition/suit for declaration which is not covered by the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, as no such petition was contemplated. The certified copy of the judgment and order passed therein is produced in the Family Court at Exh.20. It is not mentioned therein that the petition for declaration regarding validity of marriage was under particular provision of Hindu Marriage Act. Section 11 of the H.M. Act which is regarding void marriages is to the effect that any marriage solemnized after, the commencement of the Act shall be null and void and may, on a petition presented by either party thereto, against the other party be so declared by a decree of nullity if it contravenes anyone of the conditions specified in clauses (i), (iv) and (v) of Section 5. 14. In this case, the respondent wife has claimed in the petition that her marriage with the appellant was valid. 14. In this case, the respondent wife has claimed in the petition that her marriage with the appellant was valid. Such declaration can be claimed under Section 7(1) clause (a) r/w Explanation (b) of the Family Courts Act, 1984, which specifically lays down that a suit or proceeding or a declaration as to the validity of a marriage or as to the matrimonial status of any person can be filed in the Family Court. So far as legitimacy of child Madhuri is concerned, Explanation (e) of Section 7 of the Family Courts Act, 1984 would be relevant. So, the earlier petition was necessarily a petition under the Family Courts Act, 1984. 15. The learned advocate Shri. Barlota drew our attention to Section 2, Sub-sections (2) and (3) of Civil Procedure Code, which relate to definitions of "decree" and "decree-holder". Decree means the formal expression of an adjudication, which so far as the Court exercising it conclusively determines the rights of the parties with regard to all or any of the matters in controversy in the suit and may be either preliminary or final. Decree-holder means any person in whose favour a decree has been passed or an order capable of execution has been made. It is argued before us that by holding that marriage of the appellant and the respondent was not valid, there was no determination of rights of parties with regard to each other and so it is argued before us that there is no executable decree passed in favour of respondent Leelabai and therefore Section 25 of the H.M. Act is not applicable. 16. In the case of Ramesh Chandra Daga [2005(5) ALL MR (S.C.) 159] (supra), as para 3 onwards discloses, the husband was an income-tax practitioner in the town of Ratlam. His first marriage was solemnized with late Smt. Usha in 1963. The marriage of wife Rameshwari, it is alleged, was arranged with one Girdhari Lal Lakhotia on 15-5-1979. According to the wife, the customary rituals of marriage were not completed as in the marriage ceremony family members quarrelled over dowry. She filed a divorce petition No.76 of 1978 in Matrimonial Court at Amravati but it was not prosecuted and no decree of divorce was passed. According to the wife, the customary rituals of marriage were not completed as in the marriage ceremony family members quarrelled over dowry. She filed a divorce petition No.76 of 1978 in Matrimonial Court at Amravati but it was not prosecuted and no decree of divorce was passed. It was case of the wife that in accordance with the prevalent custom in Maheshwari community a Chhor Chithhi or a document of dissolution of marriage was executed between the wife and her previous husband on 15-5-1979 and it was later got registered. After death of his previous wife, Ramesh Chandra Daga remarried Rameshwari on 11-7-1981 and at that time registered Chhor Chithhi was shown and given to Ramesh Chandra Daga. Thereafter the wife was driven out of the house and she filed proceedings in the Family Court, Bombay for grant of a decree of judicial separation and maintenance for herself and her daughter. The husband filed counter petition seeking declaration that his second marriage with Rameshwari as null and void on the ground that on the date of second marriage her marriage with Girdhari Lal Lakhotia had not been dissolved by any Court in accordance with the provisions of the Act. The husband not only disputed validity of second marriage but also parentage of daughter Puja. The Family Court, Bombay allowed the petition of the wife and granted in her favour a decree of judicial separation and also granted maintenance and dismissed the counter petition filed by the husband seeking declaration of his second marriage with Rameshwari as null and void. The High Court dismissed the wife's petition for decree of judicial separation and granted declaration of second marriage as null and void in favour of the husband. It maintained decree of granting maintenance to the wife and daughter and the parties approached the Supreme Court. The Honourable Supreme Court in paragraphs 18, 20 and 22 made the following observations: "18. In the present case, on the husband's petition, a decree declaring- the second marriage as null and void has been granted. The learned counsel has argued that where the marriage is found to be null and void meaning non-existent in eye of law or non est, the present respondent cannot lay a claim as wife for grant of permanent alimony or maintenance. The learned counsel has argued that where the marriage is found to be null and void meaning non-existent in eye of law or non est, the present respondent cannot lay a claim as wife for grant of permanent alimony or maintenance. We have critically examined the provisions of Section 25 in the light of conflicting decisions of the High Court cited before us. In our considered opinion, as has been held by this Court in Chand Dhawan's case (supra), the expression used in the opening part of Section 25 enabling the 'Court exercising jurisdiction under the Act' 'at the time of passing any decree or at any time subsequent thereto' to grant alimony or maintenance cannot be restricted only to, as contended, decree of judicial separation under Section 10 or divorce under Section 13. When the legislature has used such wide expression as 'at the time of passing of any decree', it encompasses within the expression all kinds of decrees such as restitution of conjugal rights under Section 9, judicial separation under Section 10, declaring marriage as null and void under Section 11, annulment of marriage as voidable under Section 12 and Divorce under Section 13. 20. It is well known and recognized legal position that customary Hindu Law like Mohammedan Law permitted bigamous marriages which were prevalent in all Hindu families and more so in royal Hindu families. It is only after Hindu Law was codified by enactments including the present Act that bar against bigamous marriages was created by Section 5(i) of the Act. Keeping into consideration the present state of the statutory Hindu Law, a bigamous marriage may be declared illegal being in contravention of the provisions of the Act but it cannot be said to be immoral so as to deny even the right of alimony or maintenance to a spouse financially weak and economically dependant. It is with the purpose of not rendering a financially dependant spouse destitute that Section 25 enables the court to award maintenance at the time of passing any type of decree resulting in breach in marriage relationship. 22. The facts of the present case fully justify grant of maintenance both to the wife and the daughter." In the case before Their Lordship, it was the husband who had filed petition under Section 11 of the H.M. Act for declaration of marriage as null and void. 22. The facts of the present case fully justify grant of maintenance both to the wife and the daughter." In the case before Their Lordship, it was the husband who had filed petition under Section 11 of the H.M. Act for declaration of marriage as null and void. The wife has also filed petition for judicial separation under Section 10 of the H.M. Act; whereas in the present case, the wife's petition for declaration of valid marriage was necessarily under Section 7 of the Family Courts Act, 1984. So, it is argued that the decree passed in petition No.B-7/2000 was not a decree under the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 but under the Family Courts Act, 1984. It may also be recalled that the other petition No.E/525/2000 decided along with the petition of wife Leelabai was under Section 125 of the Criminal Procedure Code and not under the provisions of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955. 17. The main question that is canvassed before us is whether the decision in the case of Ramesh Chandra Daga [2005(5) ALL MR (S.C.) 159] (supra) can be followed by this Court while disposing of this Family Court Appeal in view of the decision of Full Bench of this court as finalised by dismissal of Special Leave Petition. It is argued that there is bar of principle of res judicata. 18. Reliance was also placed on the case of P. Nallammal Vs. State rep. by Inspector of Police, AIR 1999 SC 2556 . In that case, it was held that dismissal of Special Leave Petition does not amount to upholding of law propounded by High Court in decision challenged. Relying on this case, it is argued that the ratio of Ramesh Chandra Daga [2005(5) ALL MR (S.C.) 159] (supra) is, therefore, binding on this Court, as it cannot be said that the Supreme Court has upheld the-law propounded by the Full Bench of this Court. 19. On same point, the case of State of Manipur Vs. L. Ongbi Sahayaima Devi, AIR 1996 SC 2124 was also cited. In that case, in para 9, it is laid down that: "9................. The dismissal of Special Leave Petition by non-speaking order which does not contain the reasons for dismissal does not amount to acceptance of the correctness of the decision sought to be appealed against. L. Ongbi Sahayaima Devi, AIR 1996 SC 2124 was also cited. In that case, in para 9, it is laid down that: "9................. The dismissal of Special Leave Petition by non-speaking order which does not contain the reasons for dismissal does not amount to acceptance of the correctness of the decision sought to be appealed against. The effect of such a non-speaking order of dismissal without anything more only means that Supreme Court has decided only that it is not a fit case where the special leave petition should be granted. Such an order does not constitute law laid down by Supreme Court for the purpose of Article 141 of the Constitution." 20. It is argued by Shri. Barlota, advocate for the appellant that nowhere in the said case it is laid down that in between the inter-parties the decision confirmed by dismissal of Special Leave Petition does not operate as res judicata, and therefore, he stated that though the decision of Full Bench of this Court is not the law of the land in view of case of Ramesh Chandra Daga [2005(5) ALL MR (S.C.) 159] (supra), still it operates as res judicata. 21. The learned advocate Shri. Jondhale cited a case of Karnataka State Road Transport Corporation, Bangalore Vs. R. Maheshwari and others, AIR 2003 KARNATAKA 456, which is a Full Bench authority for proposition that when two judgments are rendered by Benches consisting of equal number of Judges, the judgment later in time would prevail. The case was mainly cited, because there was reference to the case of Chand Dhavan (supra). Reference was made to Savitaben Somabhai Bhatiya Vs. State of Gujarat, (2005)3 SCC 636 = ( AIR 2005 SC 1809 ). Therein it is laid down by Division Bench of the Honourable Supreme Court that word "wife" within the meaning of Section 125 of the Criminal Procedure Code only refers to legally married wife. Following observations are made in paras 15 and 18 of the said judgment : "15. In Smt. Yamunabai's case (supra), it was held that expression 'wife' used in Section 125 of the Code should be interpreted to mean only a legally wedded wife. The word 'wife' is not defined in the Code except indicating in the Explanation to Section 125 its inclusive character so as to cover a divorcee. In Smt. Yamunabai's case (supra), it was held that expression 'wife' used in Section 125 of the Code should be interpreted to mean only a legally wedded wife. The word 'wife' is not defined in the Code except indicating in the Explanation to Section 125 its inclusive character so as to cover a divorcee. A woman cannot be a divorcee unless there was a marriage in the eye of law preceding that status. The expression must therefore be given the meaning in which it is understood in law applicable to the parties. The marriage of a woman in accordance with the Hindu rites with a man having a living spouse is a complete nullity in the eye of law and she is therefore not entitled to the benefit of section 125 of the Code or the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 (in short the 'Marriage Act'). Marriage with person having living spouse in null and void and not voidable. 18.It may be noted at this juncture that the legislature considered it necessary to include within the scope of the provision an illegitimate child but it has not done so with respect to woman not lawfully married. However, desirable it may be, as contended by learned counsel for the appellant to take note of the plight of the unfortunate woman, the legislative intent being clearly reflected in Section 125 of the Code, there is no scope for enlarging its scope by introducing any artificial definition to include woman not lawfully married in the expression 'wife'." 22. Reliance was also placed on Minarani Majumdar Vs. Dasarath Majumdar, AIR 1963 CALCUTTA 428. The Division Bench of Calcutta High Court while interpreting Section 25 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 stated that the order dismissing a petition for divorce by husband under Section 13 is not a decree within the meaning of Section 25 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955. In that case also, it is laid down that, expression 'any decree' in the context of Section 25 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 means any of the decrees referred to in earlier provisions of the Act i.e. any decree for restitution of conjugal rights or of judicial separation or of nullity of marriage or of divorce passed under Sections 9 to 14 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955. When the main petition (in that case for divorce by the husband) is dismissed and no substantive relief is granted under Sections 9 to 14 of the H.M. Act, there is no passing of any decree as contemplated by Section 25 of the H.M. Act and the jurisdiction to make an order for maintenance under the Section does not arise. In para 5, reference was made to the case of Hormusji M. Kalapesi Vs. Dinbai H. Kalapesi, ILR (1955) BOMBAY 856 = AIR 1955 BOM 413. It is also argued before this Court that this Division Bench cannot review the decision of the Full Bench after dismissal of Special Leave Petition and take a different view in the same matter. 23. Reliance was also placed on State of Maharashtra and another Vs. Prabhakar Bhikaji Ingle, AIR 1996 SC 3069 (1). In that case, order of dismissal of employees was confirmed by the Supreme Court in the Special Leave Petition by refusing to grant leave. It is held that the order is final and cannot be reviewed by Tribunal by setting aside dismissal order, more so, when it has knowledge of dismissal of the Special Leave Petition. So, it is debatable whether really this Court can, at this stage, consider the ratio in Ramesh Chandra Daga [2005(5) ALL MR (S.C.) 159] (supra) in view of the fact that this Court had made reference of the only issue involved in this matter to the Full Bench and the Special Leave Petition against the finding of Full Bench was dismissed by the Honourable Supreme Court. So far as parties to the proceedings are concerned, the issue regarding right to maintenance under Section 25 of the H.M. Act is decided. 24. Reliance was also placed on the case of U.P. State Road Transport Corporation Vs. State of V.P. and another, AIR 2005 SC 446 . In that case, the principle of res judicata was considered and it is observed that the principle is of general application and not limited by specific words of Section 11 of the Civil Procedure Code. The principle is based on need of giving finality to judicial decisions. The principle which prevents the same case being twice litigated is of general application and is not limited by specific words of Section 11 of the Civil Procedure Code. The principle is based on need of giving finality to judicial decisions. The principle which prevents the same case being twice litigated is of general application and is not limited by specific words of Section 11 of the Civil Procedure Code. Res judicata applies also between two stages in the same litigation to this extent that a Court, whether the trial Court or a Higher Court having at an earlier stage decided a matter in one way will not allow the parties to re-agitate the matter again at a subsequent stage of the same proceedings. 25. The case of Kunhayammed and another Vs. State of Kerala and another, AIR 2000 SC 2587 is cited for proposition that where exercise of jurisdiction is in two stages, grant of leave and hearing of appeal, refusal to grant leave does not mean that order impugned is affirmed. But that was interpretation of Article 136 of the Constitution. It is laid down that if the petition seeking grant of leave to appeal is dismissed, it is an expression of the opinion of the Court that a case for invoking appellate jurisdiction was not made out. 26. It is necessary to refer to some more Rulings on principle of res judicata before we draw any conclusion. The Province of Bombay Vs. The Municipal Corporation of Ahmedabad, AIR 1954 BOMBAY 1 is a Full Bench Ruling, in which various aspects of doctrine of res judicata are considered. Particularly from paras 76 and 77, following observations are relevant for the present case. “………… Therefore, the first and the primary consideration in applying S.11 is to decide what is the 'res' which is determined which could become 'res judicata'. If the 'res' is a question of law, it may become 'res judicata'. But if the 'res' is the finding of certain facts, then what becomes 'res judicata' is only those facts and not the interpretation of the law which led the Court to find those facts. In this particular case the 'res' which was determined in suit No.907 of 1942 was the validity of the Collector's order. herefore, whenever a question arises as to whether a question of law operates as 'res judicata', the question that the Court must address itself is: Is it a question of law which is dissociated from and unconnected with the rights claimed or denied as between the parties to the litigation? herefore, whenever a question arises as to whether a question of law operates as 'res judicata', the question that the Court must address itself is: Is it a question of law which is dissociated from and unconnected with the rights claimed or denied as between the parties to the litigation? If it is dissociated or unconnected, then the question of law does not constitute a decision which operates as 'res judicata'. If, on the other hand, the question of law is directly connected or associated with the rights claimed or denied and constitutes the very decision of the Court, then the question of law would operate as 'res judicata'." 27. In the present case, absolutely there is no dispute regarding facts. As stated earlier, at Exh.20, there is certified copy of the judgment which shows that on 11-8-2000 present respondent Leelabai filed Petition No.B712000 on behalf of herself and her daughter Madhuri and claimed declaration that her marriage with the appellant solemnized on 16-12-1997 was a valid marriage and petitioner Madhuri is their legitimate daughter. The learned Principal Judge, Family Court, Aurangabad by the judgment and order dated 29-9-2001 declared that petitioner no.2 Madhuri was an illegitimate daughter of the present appellant and the respondent. Rest of the claim was dismissed. In other words, the Court refused to grant declaration regarding validity of marriage. The judgment shows that marriage was held to be not valid because spouse of present respondent Leelabai was alive when she entered into marriage with appellant Bhausaheb, and therefore, only point that has remained to be decided in the present appeal is whether a wife whose marriage is void for violation of condition laid down in Section 5(1) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 is entitled to maintenance under Section 25 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955. So, it is a pure question of law arising on proved facts. It cannot be said that the question of law which is raised for Reference by the Division Bench to the Full Bench was dissociated or unconnected with the rights claimed or denied as between the parties to the litigation. Therefore, it cannot be said that question of law answered by the Reference Court would not operate as res judicata, particularly when the Special Leave Petition filed by present respondent Leelabai was summarily dismissed. 28. Therefore, it cannot be said that question of law answered by the Reference Court would not operate as res judicata, particularly when the Special Leave Petition filed by present respondent Leelabai was summarily dismissed. 28. In the case of Satyadhyan Ghosal and others V s. Smt. Deorajin Debi and another, AIR 1960 SC 941 , in paras 7 and 8 following observations are made: "7. The principle of res judicata is based on the need of giving a finality to judicial decisions. What it says is that once a res is judicata, it shall not be adjudged again. Primarily it applies as between past litigation and future litigation. When a matter whether on a question of fact or a question of law - has been decided between two parties in one suit or proceeding and the decision is final, either because no appeal was taken to a higher court or because the appeal was dismissed, or no appeal lies, neither party will be allowed in a future suit or proceeding between the same parties to canvass the matter again. This principle of res judicata is embodied in relation to suits in S.11 of the Code of Civil Procedure; but even where S.11 does not apply, the principle of res judicata has been applied by courts for the purpose of achieving finality in litigation. The result of this is that the original court as well as any higher court must in any future litigation proceed on the basis that the previous decision was correct. 8. The principle of res judicata applies also, as between two stages in the same litigation to this extent that a court whether the trial court or a higher court having at an earlier stage decided a matter in one way will not allow the parties to re-agitate the matter again at a subsequent stage of the same proceedings. ....." Thus, the principle on which doctrine of res judicata is based is need of giving finality to the judicial decisions. The Supreme Court has also considered that principle of res judicata applies also as between two stages in the same litigation. In the present matter, at one stage vital question of law affecting the result of the case was referred by the Division Bench to the Full Bench. The Supreme Court has also considered that principle of res judicata applies also as between two stages in the same litigation. In the present matter, at one stage vital question of law affecting the result of the case was referred by the Division Bench to the Full Bench. The Full Bench answered the Reference and the Special Leave Petition against the same was dismissed, thus confirming the answer by the Full Bench. Now the same Division Bench is deciding the appeal as a further stage of same proceedings. So, under the circumstances, the parties cannot be allowed to re-agitate same matter merely because in the subsequent Ruling of Ramesh Chandra Daga another view is taken. The remedy open to the aggrieved party was in approaching the Supreme Court by filing curative application. Still after this decision, it may approach the Honourable Supreme Court. The decision of Full Bench of this Court on Reference was decision of this High Court and this Division Bench cannot alter or reverse it at this stage. This is more so since the Special Leave Petition filed against the decision of the Full Bench was dismissed by the Honourable Supreme Court. 29. The Full Bench case of Chanan Dass Vs. Union of India and others, AIR 1968 PUNJAB & HARYANA 529 is similar case, wherein similar question had arisen. In that case, the Division Bench on Reference by a Single Judge decided only question of law remitting the case to the Single Judge for deciding other points arising in the case. Letters Patent Appeal was thereafter filed against the decision of the Single Judge. It was held by the Full Bench that Letter Patent Bench cannot examine the correctness of the view taken by earlier Division Bench on question of law. In para 7, Reference was made to the Supreme Court judgment and following quotation was relied upon; "7................... In State of West Bengal Vs. Hemant Kumar, AIR 1966 SC 1061 , at p.l066, their Lordships observed :- “This argument proceeds on a fundamental misconception, as it seeks to equate an incorrect decision with a decision rendered without jurisdiction. A wrong decision by a court having jurisdiction is as much binding between the parties as a right one and may be superseded only by appeals to higher tribunals or other procedure like review which the law provides. A wrong decision by a court having jurisdiction is as much binding between the parties as a right one and may be superseded only by appeals to higher tribunals or other procedure like review which the law provides. The learned Judges of the High Court who rendered the decision on 4-4-1952 had ample jurisdiction to decide the case and the fact that their decision was on the merits erroneous as seen from the later judgment of this Court, does not render it any the less final and binding between the parties before the Court. There is, thus, no substance in this contention. The decision of the High Court dated 4-4-1952 bound the parties and its legal effect remained the same whether the reasons for the decision be sound or not. This observation of their Lordships applies exactly to the present case." It is further observed that even if subsequently the opinion of Full Bench is different from the opinion of the Division Bench, that does not mean that the decision of the Division Bench, inter-parties is no longer binding and conclusive between those parties. It is now well settled position of law that a wrong decision by a court having jurisdiction is as much binding between the parties as right one and may be superseded only by appeals to higher tribunals or other procedure like review which the law provides. Here we rely on the case of State of West Bengal Vs. Hemant Kumar, AIR 1966 SC 1061 . So, even if the Supreme Court in the case of Ramesh Chandra Daga [2005(5) ALL MR (S.C.) 159] (supra) has taken a different view, the issue referred by the Division Bench to the Full Bench and answer thereto by the Full Bench has attained finality between the parties and subsequent decision of the Supreme Court cannot take away the bar of res judicata. 30. In the case of Supreme Court Employees Welfare Association Vs. Union of India and others, AIR 1990 SC 334 similar question had arisen. In that case, as paras 21 to 23 show, there were some judgments of the High Court regarding L.D.Cs. and Class IV employees and they attained finality because the Special Leave Petitions filed on behalf of the Union of India against said judgments of Delhi High Court were summarily dismissed by the Supreme Court. It was observed in para 23: "23. and Class IV employees and they attained finality because the Special Leave Petitions filed on behalf of the Union of India against said judgments of Delhi High Court were summarily dismissed by the Supreme Court. It was observed in para 23: "23. It is true that by the dismissal of a Special Leave Petition in limine, this Court does not lay down any law under Article 141 of the Constitution, but the question is whether after the dismissal of the Special Leave Petition the judgment against which the Special Leave Petition was filed becomes final and conclusive so as to operate as res judicata between the parties thereto." At the end of para 28 it is observed that so far as Supreme Court employees are concerned in those proceedings the only enquiry to be made is whether the judgments of the Delhi High Court relating to the L.D.Cs. and the Class IV employees have become final and conclusive between the employees of the Delhi High Court and the Union of India. The Supreme Court refused to hold that the said decision has become res judicata so far as Supreme Court employees are concerned. In para 28, it is stated that the doctrine of res judicata is a universal doctrine laying down the finality of litigation between the parties. When a particular decision has become final and binding between the parties, it cannot be set at naught on the ground that such a decision is violative of Art.l4 of the Constitution. So far as the parties are concerned, they will always be bound by the said decision. In other words, either of the parties will not be permitted to reopen the issue decided by such decision on the ground that such decision violates the equality clause under the Constitution. 31. It cannot be said that in the present case the question of law referred by the Division bench to the Full Bench was unrelated to the facts involved in the matter. So, it is not a case that there was some decision unrelated to the facts which gave rise to a right, that cannot operate as res judicata. It is not also that there was some decision on question of jurisdiction which is said to be barred by principle of res judicata. So, it is not a case that there was some decision unrelated to the facts which gave rise to a right, that cannot operate as res judicata. It is not also that there was some decision on question of jurisdiction which is said to be barred by principle of res judicata. As observed in para 24, if the question of law is related to the fact in issue, an erroneous decision on such a question of law may operate as res judicata between the parties in a subsequent suit or proceeding, if the cause of action is the same. In the present case, the question of law referred to the Full Bench was related to the facts in issue and, therefore, the answer given by the Full Bench to the Reference is very much binding on the parties to the present litigation. 32. Finally, we may also refer to the case of Union of India and others Vs. Southern Railway Employees Co-operative Stores Workmen Union and others, (1998)5 SCC 530 . In that case, Central Administrative Tribunal (CAT) held that 172 workers in Railway Employees Co-operative Stores were regular railway servants. Civil Appeal against the judgment of the CAT was dismissed by the Supreme Court. Review Petition was also dismissed by the Supreme Court. It was held that the judgment of the CAT was binding on the Union of India. It cannot escape liability under the judgment on the plea that another Bench of CAT had taken a contrary view in a similar case. The direction was given to implement the judgment conferring status of regular railway employees on the persons who were applicants before the Tribunal. 33. To sum up our conclusions, in the first place, the order obtained by present respondent Leelabai in Petition No.B-7/2000 decided by the learned Principal Judge, Family Court, Aurangabad on 29.9.2001 is not a decree under the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 within the meaning of Section 25 of the said Act. It was necessarily a proceeding under Section 7(1) clause (a) r/w Explanation (b) of the Family Courts Act, 1984, and therefore, respondent Leelabai is not entitled to maintenance under Section 25 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955. It was necessarily a proceeding under Section 7(1) clause (a) r/w Explanation (b) of the Family Courts Act, 1984, and therefore, respondent Leelabai is not entitled to maintenance under Section 25 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955. Secondly, as between the present appellant and the respondent the law laid down by the Full Bench is binding in spite of view taken by the Honourable Supreme Court in the case of Ramesh Chandra Daga [2005(5) ALL MR (S.C.) 159] (supra) as doctrine of res judicata squarely applies. Thirdly, this Division bench could not review or reconsider the answer to the Reference given by the Full Bench, more particularly when the Special Leave Petition against the same was dismissed by the Honourable Supreme Court, otherwise this Division Bench would be sitting almost in appeal or review against said decisions. 34. In the result, appeal is allowed and the order of maintenance passed by the Principal Judge, Family Court, Aurangabad on 30-11-2002 is set aside. In the circumstances of the case, parties are directed to bear their own costs. Appeal allowed.