JUDGMENT Hon’ble Umeshwar Pandey, J.—This second appeal challenges the judgment and decree dated 17.12.1994 passed by the Additional District Judge, Ghaziabad, confirming the judgment and decree dated 24.3.1988 passed by the Civil Judge, Hapur, whereby the plaintiff-respondent’s suit for cancellation of sale deed dated 29.12.1980 executed by the deceased appellant No. 12 in favour of the defendant Nos. 3 to 12 and the sale deed dated 8.1.1985 and also sale deeds dated 10.9.1984, 12.9.1984 and 8.1.1985 executed in favour of the defendant Nos. 9 to 12 by the defendants 3, 5 and 6 along with the relief of declaration regarding sale certificate dated 12.12.1983 registered on 29.12.1983 as void ab initio, was decreed. 2. The respondent filed the suit stating that the property in question detailed in schedule v c l n of the plaint consisting of plot Nos. 117, 55, a tube well and a residential building, had been the joint property of his father, the defendant No. 1 Ram Prakash and the plaintiff. For that purpose he has relied upon a pedigree given in para-1 of the plaint. The property is joint Hindu family property since generations and was acquired through joint Hindu family nucleus. The plaintiff claimed his 1/2 share in the property and has pleaded that he was doing farming in the agricultural land along with his father. The property after abolition of zamindari was also held by the plaintiff and defendant No. 1 and it was entered into records as such joint Hindu family property. The name of defendant No. 1 was recorded over it as ‘karta’ of the family. The property detailed in Schedule v was earlier agreed for transfer by defendant No. 1 in favour of two persons namely Veer Pal and Bachan Pal but on objections raised by the plaintiff, the defendant No. 1 transferred only 1/2 share in the said property to those persons on 31.3.1980 and received sale consideration of Rs. 43,512/-. In an incident of marpeet, which took place in between the plaintiffs father, the defendant No. 1 and some other persons, he received some injuries but on being misguided by defendant Nos. 2 to 6, he lodged a report about this incident falsely implicating the plaintiff resulting into his arrest and detention in lockup for about 21 days. 43,512/-. In an incident of marpeet, which took place in between the plaintiffs father, the defendant No. 1 and some other persons, he received some injuries but on being misguided by defendant Nos. 2 to 6, he lodged a report about this incident falsely implicating the plaintiff resulting into his arrest and detention in lockup for about 21 days. The plaintiffs father developed some animosity against him and therefore, on pursuation of the defendant No. 2, the impugned sale deed dated 29.12.1980 transferring the property in dispute, was got executed in favour of defendant Nos. 3 to 6. The said sale deeds are wholly void and the defendant No. 1 had no right to transfer the 1/2 share of plaintiff. No consideration passed for this transfer. The defendant No. 1 was also not in proper mental state to execute the sale deed. It is further pleaded that during the pendency of suit the defendant got the sale deed dated 10.9.1984 and 12.9.1984 executed in respect of disputed property in their favour from defendant Nos. 3 to 5, though, the defendant Nos. 3 to 5 had no right to transfer this property when the suit was already pending against them. Meanwhile during the pendency of the suit the property as detailed in schedule c was auctioned in a proceeding before the Sub-Divisional Officer, Hapur, though such auction was not legally permissible. Therefore, the sale certificate granted and possession given in respect of said land by the S.D.M. concerned was wholly illegal and void. On the aforesaid grounds, the plaintiff thus sought cancellation of sale deeds and declaration regarding the sale certificate issued by the concerned Court, in the present suit. 3. The suit was contested and separate written statements were filed by the deceased defendant No. 1/appellant No. 12 and also by the defendant Nos. 2 to 8. The plaintiffs father, defendant No. 1 denied all the allegations of the plaint and the claim made by the plaintiff over 1/2 share in the disputed property. He inter-alia pleaded that the properties detailed in schedule v c l n of the plaint were his self earned and it never had the nature of a joint Hindu family property. The plaintiff could not legally have any share in this property during his life time. The plaintiffs name was never entered over this property in revenue record before or after abolition of zamindari. The plaintiff could not legally have any share in this property during his life time. The plaintiffs name was never entered over this property in revenue record before or after abolition of zamindari. He was never a tenant in common along with the defendant No. 1. Before abolition of zamindari, the defendant No. 1 was holding tenancy right in the said property and after abolition of zamindari he became Bhoomidhar thereof. It is further pleaded that the defendant No. 1 was in a perfect mental state and the impugned sale deed dated 29.12.1980 was executed after obtaining permission from the concerned authorities. Since the defendant No. 1 was the sole owner of the property, he had every right to transfer the same and the sale deed so executed by him cannot be questioned and set aside. Due consideration amount for this sale was received by the defendant No. 1. 4. The defendant Nos. 2 to 8 also filed written statement reiterating the same facts and the pleadings as were made in the written statement of defendant No. 1. It is further pleaded that the sale transacted by defendant Nos. 3 to 6 in favour of defendant Nos. 9 to 12 are genuine and valid transactions. 5. The trial Court on the basis of aforesaid pleadings of the parties had framed as many as 13 issues in this case and in the findings recorded for issue Nos. 2 and 4 it was held by the Court below that the property in dispute was a joint Hindu family property of which the defendant No. 1 was a ‘karta’ only and in that representative capacity his name had been entered into the records and he could not be said to be a share holder beyond 1/2 part of that property. Accordingly, after holding that the defendant No. 1, Ram Prakash having only 1/2 share in the property, the sale deeds in question exceeding his 1/2 share were declared null and void and were accordingly cancelled to that extent. The appeal preferred before the lower appellate Court against this judgment of the trial Court also did not find favour with the Court and was accordingly dismissed. The first appellate Court also holding that the property was joint Hindu family property and the transferor Ram Prakash, the defendant No. 1 since had limited share of 1/2 therein, he could not transfer anything beyond that share. The first appellate Court also holding that the property was joint Hindu family property and the transferor Ram Prakash, the defendant No. 1 since had limited share of 1/2 therein, he could not transfer anything beyond that share. The Courts have also observed that the entries of defendant’s name in the record were made only in representative capacity by virtue of his being ‘karta’ of joint Hindu family. 6. While admitting this second appeal, the following substantial questions of law were framed by the Court : 1. Whether the property shall be treated as ancestral property after the enforcement of U.P.Z.A. & L.R. Act? 2. Whether the land not covered by personal law on the date of vesting, the grand son acquired any right by virtue of only being member of the family by birth? 3. Whether the suit is barred by Section 49 of U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act or not? 7. The substantial question Nos. 1 and 2 framed as above are since connected with each other, the answer thereof shall be given in a finding recorded together in this judgment. 8. Undisputedly the plaintiff and defendant No. 1 are son and father and the defendant Nos. 3 to 6 are sons of defendant No. 2 in whose favour the defendant No. 1 Ram Prakash is said to have transferred the property of disputed plot Nos. 55 and 117 by the impugned deed dated 29.12.1980. The subsequent transfers made inter se defendant Nos. 3 to 14 are all related to the same property and the disputed sale certificate dated 12.12.1983 also relates to a part of that property. The plaintiff claiming himself to be the son of defendant No. 1 Ram Prakash and enjoying the status of a member of joint Hindu family claims his 1/2 share in the disputed plots. The defendant No. 1 does not deny the plaintiff being his son but at the same time he denies his son’s status of being member of joint Hindu family along with him. He also on the same line claims himself to be the sole owner of the disputed plots having been recorded as Bhumidhar thereof in the basic year of 1359 F. after abolition of Zamindari under the provisions of U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act (for short as the ‘U.P. Act No. 1 of 1952’). He also on the same line claims himself to be the sole owner of the disputed plots having been recorded as Bhumidhar thereof in the basic year of 1359 F. after abolition of Zamindari under the provisions of U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act (for short as the ‘U.P. Act No. 1 of 1952’). Thus, the main dispute between the parties rests around the fact as to whether the plots in question are actually the ancestral property of the family in which the plaintiff has a definite share by virtue of being a member of joint Hindu family or is a property exclusively owned and possessed by the defendant No. 1, which he later on transferred through impugned sale deed dated 29.12.1980 in favour of the defendant Nos. 3 to 6-the sons of defendant No. 2. 9. The Courts below, while interpreting the evidence filed on record in order to prove the property in question as ancestral property of the plaintiff and defendant No. 1 in which the plaintiff claims to have his share to the extent of 1/2, have relied upon certain documents. The most relevant of which are the Khatauni extract of 1336 F., 1359 F. (basic year) and CH Form Nos. 41 and 45. The Khatauni extract of 1336 F. indicates that plots in question, which had the old numbers as 106, 242 and 243 including other plots also were earlier owned by Har Lal, the grand father of defendant Nos. 3 to 6 and father of defendant No. 2 and one Solhu, the father of defendant No. 1. The Khatauni extract of basic year (1359 F.) shows that the aforesaid three plots 106, 242 and 243 were entered into the name of defendant No. 2-Peetam, the son of Har Lal and defendant No. 1 Ram Prakash, the son of Solhu as joint owners. The share belonging to defendant No. 1 in these plots was subsequently converted into plot Nos. 55 and 117 during consolidation operation and this gets reflected from the document (paper No. 155-c) CH Form No. 41, a comparative chart prepared under Rule 90 of U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Rules. The defendant No. 1 is shown to be the Bhumidhar of these plot Nos. 55 and 117. 55 and 117 during consolidation operation and this gets reflected from the document (paper No. 155-c) CH Form No. 41, a comparative chart prepared under Rule 90 of U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Rules. The defendant No. 1 is shown to be the Bhumidhar of these plot Nos. 55 and 117. Therefore, these documents have been interpreted by the trial Court as well as the first appellate Court in the manner as reflecting to the fact that the property came from common ancestor, Solhu, who was father of defendant No. 1-Ram Prakash and grand father of the plaintiff and thus, the property being ancestral property, it was jointly held by the defendant No. 1 along with his son the plaintiff Mahendra Singh. Thus, it has been concluded by the Courts below that the defendant No. 1 did not have any authority to transfer the entire property in which the plaintiff had also 1/2 share and to that extent the impugned sale deed executed by the defendant No. 1 has been held to be void and consequently cancelled. 10. It has not been disputed during the course of argument advanced from across the Bar that this land was held by the family from the date before abolition of zamindari and this fact does find support from the certified copy of the Khatauni extract of 1336 F. Obviously, the nature of this land originally could not have been treated as Bhumidhari because before the abolition of the Zamindari there was no such classification given to a landed property. The creature of this name is U.P. Act No. 1 of 1951 and obviously prior to the implementation and enforcement of this Act, this land was a tenancy land under the possession of the family on behalf of intermediary (zamindar). This land being situated within District Ghaziabad, was also earlier governed by the Agra Tenancy Act, 1926 and certain provisions whereof are quite relevant for the purposes of recording findings to the answer of the aforesaid substantial questions of law. 11. Besides the relevant provisions of Agra Tenancy Act, 1926, the provisions of Section 22 of North Western Provinces Tenancy Act, 1901 and also Sections 32 to 36 and 38 of U.P. Tenancy Act, 1939, are relevant which actually governed the succession right in a tenancy. For convenience those provisions are given below. 11. Besides the relevant provisions of Agra Tenancy Act, 1926, the provisions of Section 22 of North Western Provinces Tenancy Act, 1901 and also Sections 32 to 36 and 38 of U.P. Tenancy Act, 1939, are relevant which actually governed the succession right in a tenancy. For convenience those provisions are given below. These provisions would be helpful in tracing out the mode of succession of tenancy right where an occupancy tenant and ex-proprietary tenant or non-occupancy tenant dies. Sections 20 and 22 of North Western Provinces Tenancy Act, 1901 20. Right of transfer and succession.—(1) The interest of a permanent tenure-holder or a fixed-rate tenant is a heritable and transferable interest. (2) The interest of an exproprietary tenant, an occupancy tenant, or a non-occupancy tenant other than a thekadar, is, subject to the provisions of this Act, heritable, but is not transferable, in execution of a decree of a Civil or Revenue Court or otherwise than by voluntary transfer between persons in favour of whom as co-sharers in the tenancy such right originally arose, or who have become by succession co-sharers therein. (3) The interest of a thekadar is subject to the terms of his lease, heritable but not transferable. 22. Succession to tenancies.—When an exproprietary tenant, an occupancy tenant, or a non-occupancy tenant (other than a thekedar) dies, his interest in the holding shall devolve as follows : (a) on his male lineal descendants in the male line of descent; (b) failing such descendants, on his widow till her death or remarriage; (c) failing such descendants on widow, on his brother, being a son of the same father as the deceased; and failing any such heirs as above mentioned, (d) on his daughter’s son; and (e) failing such daughter’s son, the nearest collateral male relative in the male line of descent : Provided that no such daughter’s son or collateral relative shall be entitled to inherit who did not share in the cultivation of the holding at the time of the tenant’s death. Agra Tenancy Act, 1926 16. Agra Tenancy Act, 1926 16. Occupancy tenants.—Every tenant, who at the commencement of this Act has acquired a right of occupancy under the Agra Tenancy Act, 1901 or under any previous Act, and every person on whom a right of occupancy is conferred in accordance with the provision of Section 17 of this Act, and every person except in Bundelkhand) who is at or after the commencement of this Act a tenant of Government estates other than nazul land, shall be called an occupancy tenant and shall have all the rights and be subject to all the liabilities conferred and imposed on occupancy tenants by this Act. 17. Conferment of right of occupancy.—(1) The following person shall be competent to confer a right of occupancy : (a) a landlord, or a permanent tenure holder, (b) a lambardar, with the written concurrence of all the co-sharers whom he represents, and, if any co-sharer is a minor or otherwise unable to act, with the sanction of the district judge obtained on the application of the natural or certificated guardian of such co-sharer; (c) a mortgage in possession, with the written concurrence of the mortgagor; (d) a mortgagor is possession, with the written concurrence of the mortgagee, or with the sanction of the district judge; (e) a person whose proprietary interest is the subject of litigation in a Court of law, with authority of the Court; (f) the natural or certificated guardian of a minor proprietor, or the manager of a lunatic’s estate, with the sanction of the district judge; (g) the manager of a joint Hindu family with the written consent of the members of the family who have attained majority and, where any of the members of the family is a minor with the sanction of the district judge : Provided that, if the minor has a father or a brother as his natural guardian, the written consent of the natural guardian shall be deemed sufficient; (h) a thekadar in accordance with the provisions of Section 2001 (2); (i) the Court of wards in land under its superintendance; (j) A Hindu woman having a limited estate, with the written consent of the nearest reversioner or the sanction of the district judge. (2) A right of occupancy may be conferred— (a) upon a tenant in his holding or in any part thereof, (b) upon any person in land in which no tenancy subsists, (c) upon any person in land in which a tenancy exists, with effect from the date of the extinction of the tenancy. (3) Notwithstanding anything in the foregoing sub-section, a right of occupancy shall not be conferred in grove-land or pasture-land, or upon a corporation, math or other artificial person. (4) A right of occupancy may be conferred for valuable consideration or gifted provided that such a right shall not be conferred in land under the superintendence of the Court of wards except for valuable consideration, and that the Court of wards shall not delegate its powers to confer such rights. (5) A right of occupancy shall be conferred by registered instrument only. (6) Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 50, the initial rent payable by a tenant upon conferment on him or a right of occupancy shall be the rent which is agreed upon between him and his landlord. U.P. Tenancy Act, 1939 32. Interest of permanent tenure-holder, and fixed rate tenants.—The interest of a permanent tenure-holder and of a fixed-rate tenant is both heritable and transferable. 33. Interest of other tenants.—(1) The interest of a tenant holding on special terms in Oudh, of an ex-proprietary tenant, of an occupancy tenant, of a hereditary tenant, and of a non-occupancy tenant is heritable, but is not transferable otherwise than in accordance with the provisions of this Act. (2) Nothing in the foregoing provisions of this section shall render illegal— (a) a sub-lease of a holding as hereinafter provided, (b) a sale of the interest of a tenant under the provisions of Section 251, (c) a release or transfer of an interest in favour of a co-tenant : Provided that no person shall be deemed to be a co-tenant notwithstanding that he may have shared in the cultivation of the holding, unless he was a co-tenant from the commencement of the tenancy, or has become such by succession or has been specifically recognised as such in writing by the landholder. 34. 34. Succession under personal law in certain cases.—When a permanent tenure-holder, a fixed rate tenant, an occupancy or an ex-proprietary tenant in Oudh or a tenant holding or special terms in Oudh, dies the interest in his holding shall devolve in accordance with the personal law to which the deceased was subject. 35. Succession to a male tenant.—When a male tenant, other than a tenant mentioned in Section 34 dies, interest in his holding shall devolved in accordance with the order of succession given below : (a) Male lineal descendants in the male line of descent : Provided that no member of this class shall inherit if any male descendant between him and the deceased is alive; (b) widow; (c) father; (d) mother, being a widow; (e) step mother, being a widow; (f) father’s father; (g) father’s mother, being a widow; (h) widow of male lineal descendant in the male line of descent; (i) unmarried daughter; (j) brother, being the son of the same father as the deceased; (k) daughter’s son; (I) brother’s son, the brother having been a son of the same father as the deceased; (m) father’s brother; (n) father’s brother’s son; 36. Succession to a female tenant holding an interest inherited as widow etc.—(1) When a female tenant, other than a tenant mentioned in Section 34, who either before or after the commencement of this Act has inherited an interest in a holding as a widow, as a mother, as step-mother, as a father’s mother, or as a daughter dies or abandons such holding surrenders such holding, or a part of such holding or, in the case of a tenant inheriting as a widow or as a daughter, marries, such holding or such part of such holding shall, notwithstanding anything in Section 45, devolve in accordance with the order of succession laid down in Section 35 on the heir of the last male tenant, other than a tenant who inherited as a father’s father under the provisions of that section. (2) When a tenant who inherits an interest in a holding as a father’s father in accordance with the provisions of sub-section (1), or of Section 35, abandons such holding or surrenders such holding or a part of such holding or dies, such holding or such part shall, notwithstanding anything in Section 45, devolve upon the nearest surviving heir of the last male tenant, such heir being ascertained in accordance with the provisions of Section 35. 38. Passing of interest by survivorship.—No person shall be deemed to have an interest in a tenancy to which the provisions of Section 35, Section 36 or Section 37 apply merely by reason of being joint in state with any person with whom a contract of tenancy has been made or who has succeeded to the interest of a tenant or who has become a tenant by operation of law or otherwise; and except in the case of a co-widow of a co-tenant who dies leaving no heir entitled to succeed under the provisions of this Act, no interest in such tenancy shall pass by survivorship. When the persons possessing such interest are joint in estate, they shall be deemed for the proposes of succession to be tenants in common. 12. The pedigree given in para-1 of the plaint showing Har Lal, Solhu and Vijay Ram as real brothers being sons of Jasram is undisputed. The khatauni extract of 1336 F. filed as Ext.-1 on record of the trial Court, indicates that as many as 31 plots were the joint properties of the aforesaid three brothers including Mayaram and Saberam, the sons of Jasram’s brother-Bujjha. Therefore, this document makes it obvious that these plots including the disputed plot Nos. 106, 242 and 243 (old numbers) were in tenancy of the father of the defendant No. 1-Solhu, Har Lal the father of defendant No. 2 and their other collaterals, who are from common ancestor, whose name has, however not been given in the pedigree. Subsequent thereto in the relevant year 1359 F. on abolition of zamindari, these plots are further found to have been entered into relevant khatauni extract (Ext. 4) in the name of defendant No. 1, defendant No. 2 and their collaterals Teekam, Khajan, Mayaram and Saberam. Subsequent thereto in the relevant year 1359 F. on abolition of zamindari, these plots are further found to have been entered into relevant khatauni extract (Ext. 4) in the name of defendant No. 1, defendant No. 2 and their collaterals Teekam, Khajan, Mayaram and Saberam. From these two documents, it further gets fully reflected that after the death of Solhu, his son, the defendnat No.1-Ram Prakash had been recorded as his successor and on the death of Har Lal, his son the defendant No. 2-Peetam has been recorded. The names of all other members of the joint family, who might have been there including that of plaintiff-Mahendra, have not been recorded and this absence of names of other members of the family in the records of these plots has its own relevance in the background of statutory provisions of Tenancy Act, 1901, Agra Tenancy Act, 1926 and U.P. Tenancy Act, 1939. This further probablises the fact that this property in suit consisting of old plot Nos. 106, 242 and 243 were never included in the coparcenary of the family. In case it is found crystalized on the scrutiny of the legal position in the light of case law submitted from the side of the parties, that the tenancy right in the agricultural property is to be governed by the provisions of special statutes if it departs from the old law (Hindu law) in respect of certain matters, it would be deemed that the special enactments supersede the personal law. The aforesaid statutes namely Tenancy Act, 1901, Agra Tenancy Act, 1926 and U.P. Tenancy Act, 1939, though, in its provisions, at certain places recognized the principles of Hindu law but at many places in the matters with regard to the law of succession, transfer, bequest etc. they depart also. Therefore, where these statutes depart from the Hindu law or Muslim law, as the case may be, those provisions of statutes would be applicable and not the old law. But these Hindu Law or Muslim Law can certainly be resorted to in respect of matters for which no provision is made in those special statutes [Ram Chandra Dubey v. Dy. Director of Consolidation, Deoria, 1978 R.D. 1]. It is therefore, undisputable that the rules of personal law are subject to modification by statutory enactment [Kallu v. Sital, 16 A.LJ. But these Hindu Law or Muslim Law can certainly be resorted to in respect of matters for which no provision is made in those special statutes [Ram Chandra Dubey v. Dy. Director of Consolidation, Deoria, 1978 R.D. 1]. It is therefore, undisputable that the rules of personal law are subject to modification by statutory enactment [Kallu v. Sital, 16 A.LJ. 225], in other words if there is any provision in special Act in respect of any matter governed by personal law previously, then the provision of special Act shall prevail and the previous Hindu law to the extent it related to that matter, stands nullified [Ram Chandra Dubey (supra)] If the statutes provide how the interest of the owner of a particular kind of property will pass on after his death, such provision will override and abrogate the rule of personal law in respect of such property. For the purposes to trace out as to how the right of succession from the beginning in the property in question for the purpose of its succession should be governed under such provisions of different statutes coming into force from time to time, we have to advert to the aforesaid quoted provisions of three special enactments and also the U.P. Act No. 1 of 1951. Section 20 (2) of the N.W.P. Tenancy Act, 1901, provide that the interest of an occupancy tenant was heritable subject to the provisions of that Act. Section 22 of that Act lays down a table for the said succession. These statutory provisions obviously have the effect of abrogating the rule of Hindu Law relating to an interest passing by survivorship, in a tenancy holding governed by that Act. In Bhura v. Shahabuddin, (1908) ILR 30 All 128, it has been held that rule of succession laid down in Section 22 of the Tenancy Act, 1901 was a deliberate departure from personal law and would override the latter. In Ali Baksh v. Barkatullah, (1912) ILR 34 All 419, it has been held that Section 22 is independent and exclusive of personal law of the deceased tenant. In a Division Bench case reported in AIR 1932 All 643, it has been observed that the occupancy tenure is a creation of statute and the statute will regulate its devolution. This view has been followed in several decisions given by the Board of Revenue also. In a Division Bench case reported in AIR 1932 All 643, it has been observed that the occupancy tenure is a creation of statute and the statute will regulate its devolution. This view has been followed in several decisions given by the Board of Revenue also. In Puruthavalli Ammal v. Ramalingam, AIR 1970 SC 1730 , the Supreme Court said that the rights conferred on the female Hindus by Section 14 (1) of the Hindu Succession Act make a clear departure from the previous Hindu law and therefore, such previous law cannot be used for circumventing those rights. What gets crystalised from the aforesaid propositions of law and the views taken by the Supreme Court and this Court on the advent of successive laws of the land tenure system, is that when the special enactment deliberately departs from the personal law in respect of various matters including succession, it amounts to superseding the prior law. In this context para-14 of the judgment of the Full Bench of this Court rendered in Chhotey Lal and others v. Jhandey Lal and another, AIR 1972 All 424 is quite relevant and is extracted as below : “It is settled law that rules of personal law are subject to modification by statutory enactment, [Kallu v. Sital, 16 All. LJ 225 : AIR 1918 All 294. If a statute provides how the interest of the owner of a particular kind of property will pass on his death, such provision will override and abrogate the rules of personal law in respect of such properties. Section 20 (2) of the Tenancy Act of 1901 provided that the interest of an occupancy tenant was heritable subject to the provisions of that Act. Section 22 of that Act laid down a table of succession. These statutory provisions will prevail and will have the effect of abrogating the rule of Hindu Law on an interest passing by survivorship, in relation to tenancy holdings governed by that Act. In Bhura v. Shahabuddin, (1908) ILR 30 All 128, it was held that the rule of succession laid down in Section 22 of the Tenancy Act was a deliberate departure from personal law and would override the latter. This decision was followed by another Bench in Ali Bakhsh v. Barkatullah, (1912) ILR 34 All 419. It was held that Section 22 is independent and exclusive of the personal law of the deceased tenant. This decision was followed by another Bench in Ali Bakhsh v. Barkatullah, (1912) ILR 34 All 419. It was held that Section 22 is independent and exclusive of the personal law of the deceased tenant. In 1932 All LJ 605 : (AIR 1932 All 643) a Bench observed that the occupancy tenure is a creation of statute and the statute will regulate its devolution. The same view has been taken by the Board of Revenue in several cases, Sri Lal Voika v. Kesho Das (6 UD 433); Somara v. Kesho Prasad Singh (13 SD of 1912 : 1 RD 322); and Dharam Das v. Phula Kunwar (5 SD of 1925 : 1 RD 508).” 13. Therefore, in the light of aforesaid legal position, it is to be found out if three old plots (106, 242 and 243) in question were a property belonging to the coparcenary body consisting of each male member of the family or it was property exclusively owned by the persons succeeding to these properties under the special provisions of the tenancy law applicable from time to time. In the first place the plaintiff in his pleadings has not alleged this property to be a coparcenary property but since it is pleaded that the property has been a joint Hindu family property in joint cultivation of the plaintiff and his father, the defendant No. 1, the pleading of the plaint to this effect may be deemed to be a contention to the effect that the property was coparcenary property of the family and on these lines the scrutiny in the matter may proceed further. No dispute is there that the property of disputed plot Nos. 55 and 117 (old Nos. 106, 242 and 243) did come from the time of Solhu and Harlal. The documents referred to above being Ext. 3 and 4 (Khatauni extract No. 1336 F. and 1359 F.) are equally relied upon by both the parties. Solhu was father of defendant No. 1 and grand father of the plaintiff. These documents go to reflect that the property was a tenancy held by Solhu and Harlal prior to the abolition of the zamindari in their capacity as tenancy holders from zamindar. It was not of sir khudkast property of the ancestor of the parties nor it has been anywhere pleaded in the plaint. These documents go to reflect that the property was a tenancy held by Solhu and Harlal prior to the abolition of the zamindari in their capacity as tenancy holders from zamindar. It was not of sir khudkast property of the ancestor of the parties nor it has been anywhere pleaded in the plaint. If this property was held by the family when first Tenancy Act of 1901 came into force, it will be treated to be a property heritable under Section 20 (2) of the said Act. Since the land of these plots was held by them as their occupancy tenancy it was a heritable property under Section 20 (2) of Tenancy Act, 1901. The mode of succession to this tenancy shall be governed by Section 22 of the said Act where in clause (a) it is provided that on the death of such a tenant, his interest in the holding shall in the first place devolve on the male lineal descendants in the male line of descent. The other clauses of descendance as are given in clause (b) to (e) however not relevant here. Therefore, even if for the purpose of giving a decision this way or that way it is taken that when the father of Harlal, Solhu and Vijayram namely Jasram died, this Tenancy Act, 1901 was in operation, the property would devolve upon the aforesaid three persons. Later on when Vijayram died, his share in the property is shown to have devolved on Teekam and Khajan, his sons and this fact gets reflected from the khatauni extract of 1336 F. (Ext. 3). The other collaterals, who are shown to have been entered over the plots in 1336 F. are the sons of Bujjha namely Saberam, Mayaram. This Bujjha and Jasram, as per the pedigree, were the real brothers. In the basic year 1359 F., as per Ext. 4 (khatauni 1359 F.) the names of Peetam son of Harlal and Ram Prakash, the defendant No. 1, Teekam, Khajan, Mayaram and Saberam appear over these plots. There is no denial to the fact that in the basic year 1359 F. this plaintiff had also appeared on the scene as a family member but after the grand father-Solhu’s death, his name did not appear on the record along with other joint holders of the tenancy. There is no denial to the fact that in the basic year 1359 F. this plaintiff had also appeared on the scene as a family member but after the grand father-Solhu’s death, his name did not appear on the record along with other joint holders of the tenancy. The absence of the name of plaintiff over these plots is quite conspicuous and it appears to be because of the implication of the provisions of Sections 32 and 35 of U.P. Tenancy Act, 1939, referred to above. Section 32 of U.P. Tenancy Act, 1939 contemplates that the interest of a tenure holder is heritable and transferable and such inheritance as also the mode of inheritance have been described in Section 35 of U.P. Tenancy Act, 1939, quoted above. This Section 35 contemplates that in case of death of a male tenant his interest in the holding shall devolve in accordance with the order of succession given from clause (a) to clause (e) of the said section. In the present context, clause (a) is relevant which says that in such cases on the death of a male tenant his interest in the holding shall devolve on male lineal descendants in the male line of descent provided no member of this class shall inherit if any male descendant between him and the deceased is alive. This provision is very clear in its import that in case of death of a male holding interest in a tenancy leaving behind his son and grand son both, the tenancy right of the deceased shall be inherited only by his son and not by the grand son. The proviso attached to clause (a) of Section 35 disqualifies a male lineal descendant from inheriting or succeeding to the tenancy right if any male descendant of the deceased is alive in between him and the deceased. 14. Learned Counsel appearing for the appellant has thus, made a quite good deal of stress on this point and has submitted that both the Courts below have not taken into consideration the aforesaid provisions of Section 35 of U.P. Tenancy Act, 1939 and have straightway reached a conclusion that the plots in question were the joint properties of father and son and the whole of it was not legally transferable by the father alone. Since Solhu, the grand father of the plaintiff, was holding this property as occupancy tenant, as defined under Section 16, the right so conferred upon him under Section 17 of Agra Tenancy Act, devolved upon the defendant No. 1 alone who came to be recorded as his successor over the same. Learned Counsel has thus, emphasised that the defendant No. 1 had every right to transfer this property alone by virtue of a transferable right which he had acquired under Section 32 of U.P. Tenancy Act as also being a Bhumidhar declared under the new Tenancy Law of U.P. Act 1 of 1951. The learned Counsel has also consented that the conception of joint Hindu family, as envisaged under Hindu Law, cannot be imported for the purpose to recognise the rights of the parties over the disputed plots because from that position of old personal law there had been a departure under the Tenancy Act, 1901, Agra Tenancy Act, 1926 and U.P. Tenancy Act, 1939. 15. It is true that the conception of joint Hindu family constituting coparcenary is that of a common male ancestor with his lineal descendant in the male line within four degrees counting from and inclusive of such ancestor. Thus, it is the common ancestor and the lineal descendants, who together constitute a coparcenary. This is the conception of coparcenary, as given in Mulla’s Principles of Hindu Law (13th Edition paragraph 214). The aforesaid tenancy Acts do not specifically show anything either way on the question whether a Hindu undivided family or coparcener is a person or is competent to become a tenant. In a coparcenary unit each coparcener has his undivided coparcenary interest in the property. Of a coparcenary property, the true position in law is that the members collectively own it each having an interest but here this conception of coparcenary unit cannot be imported for application because of the aforesaid provisions of different Tenancy Acts, which were enacted from time to time. These Tenancy Acts have made specific departure regarding the matters of succession. A tenant dying while holding tenancy rights in the Province of Agra, the devolution and succession to those properties shall definitely be governed under the aforesaid provisions of the Tenancy Acts irrespective of the family being joint. These Tenancy Acts have made specific departure regarding the matters of succession. A tenant dying while holding tenancy rights in the Province of Agra, the devolution and succession to those properties shall definitely be governed under the aforesaid provisions of the Tenancy Acts irrespective of the family being joint. Section 38 says that the members of joint Hindu family shall not be deemed to have an interest in tenancy on the death of another member of the family merely by reason of being joint in State. It also specifically provides that no interest in such tenancy shall pass by survivorship. In the present case the father and son (plaintiff and defendant No. 1) might have been the members of joint Hindu family at the time of death of Solhu but the interest in the tenancy held by Solhu cannot be permitted to pass by virtue of Sections 35 and 38 of the said Act to the plaintiff even if he was joint with his father. Obviously, the defendant No. 2 and defendant No. 1, who have been jointly entered into revenue record as holders of tenancy rights in the disputed plots may be termed as tenants in common (reference to Section 38) but the name of son of defendant No. 1 (plaintiff) being conspicuously absent from the khatauni extract (1336 F.), he shall not be treated to be a tenant in common as has been pleaded by him in the plaint and accepted by the Courts below. 16. It is also not a case of the respondent plaintiff that the family was holding the property in question as sir, khudkast nor it is pleaded that the members of the family were holding that property as occupancy tenant possessing the right to transfer the holding by sale. Therefore, this land in no case could have been settled in favour of the family members on the abolition of zamindari under Section 18 of U.P. Act No. 1 of 1951. The khatauni extract of 1359 F. which also refers to the entries of 1354 F. simply denotes that the defendant No. 1, 2 and other members of the family entered into the record were occupying the plots referred therein and it would be deemed to have been settled with them only under Section 19 of U.P. Act No. 1 of 1951. Thus, on the date of vesting these tenure holders of the plots acquired the status of sirdar under the aforesaid provisions of Section 19. During the consolidation operation of the village when the property was separated among the tenants in common, the C.H. Form No. 45 (Ext. 5) goes to demonstrate to the fact that the defendant No. 1-Ram Prakash, the father of the plaintiff, was given the status of sole Bhumidhar over the new plot Nos. 55 and 117 (old plots 106, 242 and 243). It is in the light of the aforesaid legal position that the consolidation authorities also have come to the conclusion that the defendant No. 1 became the sole Bhumidhar of the plots of his share (106, 242, 243) out of 32 plots mentioned in Ext. 3 and 4 (khatauni extracts of 1336 and 1359 F.). The legal status regarding ownership over the disputed plots which has come to be acquired by the defendant No. 1, is thus, correctly demonstrated from the records which is in accordance with the aforesaid provisions of the different statutes conferring interest in the tenancy holding upon the respective legal heirs on the death of the original tenure holder. 17. From the aforesaid facts and legal position it gets crystalised that the ancestor of defendant No. 1 Ram Prakash, prior to his appearance on the scene held the disputed plots including several other plots as his tenancy over which he was duly entered into the record. From time to time on the death of the tenure holders the property is shown to have devolved upon the legal heirs in accordance with the statutory provisions referred to above and finally it came to be recorded in the names of defendant No. 1, his cousins-Peetam, Teekam, Khajan and other collaterals Mayaram and Saberam in the basic year of 1359F. These documents in the face of the aforesaid statutory provisions of Sections 32, 35 and 38 of the U.P. Tenancy Act, cannot be said to be depicting the aforesaid names of Ram Prakash and others only in representative capacity, also representing the interest of plaintiff and other members of the family. The names so entered in the basic year over these plots are in their individual capacities as sirdars of the said land and no one other than those persons can be said to have acquired any interest over it on that date. The names so entered in the basic year over these plots are in their individual capacities as sirdars of the said land and no one other than those persons can be said to have acquired any interest over it on that date. 18. Learned Counsel for the respondents has cited several legal propositions, which also include the Full Bench case of Chhote Lal (supra) and Ram Chandra Dubey (supra), which have already been discussed above as supporting to the findings recorded above. As regards the other cases one is the Full Bench decision in the case of Ram Awalamb and others v. Jata Shankar and others, 1968 ALJ 1108, which I doubt may not be applicable to the present facts of the case at hand. It relates to a property in which the members of the joint Hindu family hold the interest of the property as tenants in common and not as joint tenant and therefore, the notions of the Hindu law have been carried over for its application by this Court in the said case. As already discussed above, here we do not have such a case where the plaintiff claiming interest in the property would be legally held to be tenant in common and therefore, this principle as laid down will not apply in the present case. 19. The second case is Mahabir v. Suba Lal, 1965 ALJ 582, which deals on a point if a Bhumidhari property entered into the names of the members of joint Hindu family is a tenancy in common or is a joint tenancy. This case law does not actually hammer and deal with a point which is involved in the present case and as such it is not relevant in the present context. 20. The other case Mahendra Kumar and others v. Dy. Director of Consolidation, U.P. Lucknow and others, 1968 RD 365 is also not very much relevant in the present case because it deals with a quite different point of law which does not concern with the present case. It discusses a question whether the ‘karta’ of the family can alone alienate a Bhumidhari holding even for legal necessity for the family or for the benefit of the State. Thus, this Court has held in the aforesaid case that the members of the family are the Bhumidhars of the property and not the family itself. It discusses a question whether the ‘karta’ of the family can alone alienate a Bhumidhari holding even for legal necessity for the family or for the benefit of the State. Thus, this Court has held in the aforesaid case that the members of the family are the Bhumidhars of the property and not the family itself. The ‘karta’ of the family is not empowered under law for such alienation as he is empowered under the Hindu law. 21. The other cases as cited by the learned Counsel for the respondents are Sher Singh and others v. Gamdoor Singh, 1997 (2) AWC 1086 (SC) and Kamta Prasad Misir and another v. Chait Narain Singh and others, AIR 1934 All 531. These cases also do not deal with the point in question. They deal with coparcenary property, which is not a case here as discussed above. 22. The case law of Raghunath Tewari v. Buddhu Ram Tewari and others, AIR 1930 All 315 cited from the respondents’ side, deals with all together different point with regard to the joint Hindu family acquiring occupancy rights under a lease over a property. In the present case we do not have any pleading as to the effect that the family has acquired any lease right over the property in question. In this context another case law cited from the side of the respondents is Mahabir and others v. Sripal and others, 1986 ALJ 947. The facts of this case are entirely different from what we have in the present case at hand. In that case all the plaintiffs including the transferor of the land, the ‘karta’ of the family, were holding the land as intermediaries before the abolition of zamindari. But here in the present case there is no claim from the side of the plaintiff to be holding the property as an intermediary along with his father before the date of vesting. The land of plots in question was found to be in occupancy tenancy and was accordingly entered alone in name of plaintiffs father, the defendant No. 1. The principles laid down in Mahabir’s case would therefore, not help of the respondent-plaintiff. As already held above, the plots in question were settled with holders under Section 19 and not under Section 18 of U.P. Act 1 of 1951. 23. The principles laid down in Mahabir’s case would therefore, not help of the respondent-plaintiff. As already held above, the plots in question were settled with holders under Section 19 and not under Section 18 of U.P. Act 1 of 1951. 23. Thus, from the aforesaid facts and circumstances elaborately discussed, it is found that the plots in suit though, coming from the period of ancestor of the parties came to be held by only those members of the family as its tenants in whose name it had been shown entered in the revenue records. These entries have been made in accordance with the statutory provisions of the aforesaid relevant statutes controlling the tenancy law and also departing in certain matters from the personal Hindu law. The persons of the family, who were not entered over these plots in different years, had not acquired any interest therein simply by virtue of their being members of joint Hindu family and the final record of the ownership over these plots which came into being during consolidation operation of the village, is a document depicting the exclusive ownership of the person (defendant No. 1), whose name is found entered in the record (CH form No. 45, Ext. 5). The property though, coming from the time of ancestor of the parties no interest therein of the other members of the family had actually accrued except of those who were recorded over these plots in the relevant documents. Accordingly, while the grand father (Solhu) was recorded over the plots in question prior to the abolition of zamindari and during the period when the U.P. Tenancy Act was in force, on his death plaintiff, the grand son, could not acquire any interest in the tenancy of those plots in the face of proviso to Section 35 (a) of U.P. Tenancy Act, 1939. The grand son could not take benefit of the personal law which had actually been rendered inapplicable, rather stood abrogated and repelled to that extent under the shadow of provision of Section 35 (a). The aforesaid questions are therefore, answered accordingly. 24. The grand son could not take benefit of the personal law which had actually been rendered inapplicable, rather stood abrogated and repelled to that extent under the shadow of provision of Section 35 (a). The aforesaid questions are therefore, answered accordingly. 24. As regards the substantial question of law No. 3, stress has been laid from the side of learned Counsel for the appellant that since the solitary name of plaintiffs father, the defendant No. 1 was recorded over different plots in the relevant khatauni extract of 1359 F. he (defendant No. 1) again came to be recorded over those plots during consolidation operation by the authorities. If the plaintiff-respondent, Mahendra Singh, the son of defendant No. 1 had any grievance against such recording of entries by the consolidation authorities over the disputed plot Nos. 55 and 117 (old plot Nos. 106, 242 and 243), he had to approach those authorities only for such correction and redressal of his grievances and once he has failed to take recourse to such remedy the bar of Section 49 of U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act, 1953 (U.P. C.H. Act) shall come to operate and those declaration and adjudication of rights cannot be challenged later on before any Civil or Revenue Court. Thus, the learned Counsel has submitted that the respondent-plaintiff could not challenge those entries as are recorded in Ext.-5, CH. Form No. 45 nor he could avoid those entries on the pretext that those entries were recorded in a representative capacity and not otherwise. In order to appreciate the aforesaid contention of the learned Counsel for the appellant, it would be better to refer to the provisions of Section 49 of U.P. C.H. Act, which is as follows : "[49. Form No. 45 nor he could avoid those entries on the pretext that those entries were recorded in a representative capacity and not otherwise. In order to appreciate the aforesaid contention of the learned Counsel for the appellant, it would be better to refer to the provisions of Section 49 of U.P. C.H. Act, which is as follows : "[49. Bar to civil jurisdiction.—Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, the declaration and adjudication of rights of tenure-holders in respect of land lying in an area, for which a [notification] has been issued [under sub-section (2) of Section 4] or adjudication of any other right arising out of consolidation proceedings and in regard to which a proceeding could or ought to have been taken under this Act, shall be done in accordance with the provisions of this Act and no civil or revenue Court shall entertain any suit or proceeding with respect to rights in such land or with respect to any other matters for which a proceeding could or ought to have been taken under this Act :] [Provided that nothing in this section shall preclude the Assistant Collector from initiating proceedings under Section 122-B of the Uttar Pradesh Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950 in respect of any land possession over which has been delivered or deemed to be delivered to a Gaon Sabha under or in accordance with the provisions of this Act."] 25. It is already held above, that right from the beginning after the death of plaintiffs grand father-Solhu the recording of name of the plaintiffs father-Ram Prakash, the defendant No. 1 had been done in the relevant khatauni extract by the authorities in accordance with the statutory provisions of Section 35 (a) of U.P. Tenancy Act, 1939 and he alone had become owner of his share from out of 32 plots as have been shown in khatauni extract of 1336 F. as well as 1359 F. (Ext. 3 and 4). The property in question was not governed for the purpose of succession under the personal Hindu law but it was governed right from time of the Tenancy Act, 1901 onwards under different provisions of the three special enactments referred to above. 3 and 4). The property in question was not governed for the purpose of succession under the personal Hindu law but it was governed right from time of the Tenancy Act, 1901 onwards under different provisions of the three special enactments referred to above. Therefore, the law of succession with regard to those properties, as explained above, the provisions of those special Acts, came to apply in respect of disputed plots by virtue of which till last, before the property was transferred through the disputed sale deeds, plaintiffs father, the defendant No. 1, was the exclusive owner of it. If the plaintiff at any point of time before the adjudication and declaration given by the consolidation authorities, had any objection to such entries recorded earlier or being recorded by the consolidation authorities, he had the remedy only within the provisions of the aforesaid U.P. C.H. Act, which had made final declaration as to the rights of tenure holder under the respective provisions of said Act. If the plaintiff has failed to take the recourse to that remedy available to him, the bar of Section 49 of U.P.C.H. Act would definitely come to apply against him in his challenge to such entries made by the consolidation authorities in the relevant records. The plaintiff has also no right to treat that entry of his father’s name as simply denoting to the entry being in representative capacity for the whole joint family. Even though there may be a presumption as to the jointness of father and son in the family but there is no presumption that joint family possess joint property. It is not necessary for a joint family to possess joint property. There can be a joint family without there being a joint property [Ram Chandra Dubey (supra)]. During consolidation operation the defendant No. 1-Ram Prakash alone and not his son, the plaintiff, has come to be recorded by the authorities over the disputed plots. Therefore, the implication of Section 152 of U.P. Act No. 1 of 1951 is available here, which shall automatically come to apply and it will give right of a Bhumidhar to the person so recorded over a particular property. Therefore, the implication of Section 152 of U.P. Act No. 1 of 1951 is available here, which shall automatically come to apply and it will give right of a Bhumidhar to the person so recorded over a particular property. Section 152 of U.P. Act No. 1 of 1951 obviously repels the principles of Hindu law, which used to say in this regard that the property of a joint Hindu family is transferable only for the benefit of the family and for legal necessity. Section 152 of U.P. Act No. 1 of 1951 gives absolute right to a Bhumidhar for the transfer of his property. Since there is such a clear provision (Section 152) conferring upon a Bhumidhar the right to transfer his interest, the principles of Hindu law could not possibly apply [Ram Chandra Dubey (supra)]. Thus, if the consolidation authorities have declared the defendant No. 1 as Bhumidhar over the disputed plots by recording him as sole Bhumidhar thereof, there was hardly any occasion available to the plaintiff to presume this entry only to be one in representative capacity, also representing his interest in the holdings. Therefore, if there has been adjudication by consolidation Courts regarding declaration of right of defendant No. 1 over the disputed plots and if has been permitted to become final without challenge before the concerned consolidation authorities, the plaintiff cannot later on come in a suit before the Civil Court or any Revenue Court asserting his joint rights over such property. 26. Learned Counsel for the respondent while challenging the appellants has cited several cases which may be enumerated as being Karbalai Begum v. Mohd. Sayeed and another, 1980 RD 300 (SC); Bhola Nath v. Mangaroo, 1981 RD 103 (B.R., F.B.); Rati Ram v. Rajvir and others, 1981 ALJ 58; Raj Bahadur Singh and another v. Board of Revenue, U.P. Allahabad, 1979 RD 50 (All); (Smt.) Vishnu Devi v. Durbal alias K.K. Singh, 1988 RD 283 (All) and Asha Ram v. Ravi Dutt and others, 1985 RD 157 (All). 27. 27. A perusal of the ratio, which have been applied to the aforesaid cases by the Courts, it is true that if the name of one co-tenant has been recorded over a particular property by the authorities, which continues to be recorded till the date of declaration of right and record prepared by the consolidation authorities, the bar of Section 49 of U.P. C.H. Act may not come to apply for a suit by the other co-sharers requiring declaration of their rights. But in the present case as already discussed above, the name of defendant No. 1 over the property in question has alone been recorded by the authorities in the khatauni extracts of different years not in representative capacity but in his personal capacity by virtue of implication of the provisions of special statutes referred to above. The property in question, as per the law applicable from time to time, has not been held to be a coparcenary property and the interest therein devolved under the relevant provisions of special statutes, which have been found to be different from the personal Hindu law. Thus, the members of the family, who were actually joint tenure holders in the tenancy, their names have been shown in the records. But those members of the family, whose names have not been shown in the records, even though they were coparceners, as discussed above, have not been found to be tenants in common along with recorded tenants and in such situations if the consolidation authorities have recorded the name of defendant No. 1-Ram Prakash over his share in the property, his son, the plaintiff shall never be deemed to be a person having any right in the Bhumidhari property after it has been declared to be a property of defendant No. 1 by the consolidation authorities. Therefore, the aforesaid cases referred to above from the respondent’s side, I doubt, shall not be applicable to the fact situation under which this case has been placed. 28. It has also been submitted by the learned Counsel for the respondent that there has not been any adjudication of right by the consolidation authorities for want of any objection from the side of plaintiff and therefore, the bar, as provided under Section 49 may not be made applicable to the present suit. 28. It has also been submitted by the learned Counsel for the respondent that there has not been any adjudication of right by the consolidation authorities for want of any objection from the side of plaintiff and therefore, the bar, as provided under Section 49 may not be made applicable to the present suit. I do not agree with this submission of the learned Counsel simply on the ground that the name of plaintiffs father over the property in question along with other co-tenure holders was continuing in record before the consolidation authorities and if during the consolidation operation when the property was subjected to automatic partition among the recorded tenure holders and the share of plaintiffs father-Ram Prakash was recorded only in his name by the authorities, there was a strong cause of action available to the plaintiff to press before the authorities for also recording his name over the property in question along with his father and if the plaintiff has failed to take recourse to this remedy the bar as provided under Section 49 would definitely come to apply. The plaintiff respondent thus, does not have a justifiable case to escape shackles of the aforesaid bar of Section 49 and the question is answered accordingly. 29. Besides the aforesaid substantial questions already framed in the case while admitting the appeal, the learned Counsel for the respondent has tried to emphasize that since the matter has been concluded by concurrent finding of fact by both the Courts below that the family was a joint Hindu family and property in question was possessed jointly by all the members, there was no scope to challenge those findings in a second appeal before this Court by the appellants and as such the appeal requires to be dismissed. As has already been discussed above, in the findings recorded in all the aforesaid three substantial questions of law I find that this was a case which did involve decision of this Court on substantial question of law and the legal aspect, which had not been touched by both the Courts below while recording their findings in the impugned judgments rendered by them. The main aspect of this case was that the Courts below had not adverted at all to the implications of different provisions of the special statutes of tenancy law which had departed considerably from the Hindu law in the matters relating to succession etc. The question that whether the family was a joint Hindu family or not was not that material as the question whether the property in suit was actually a property belonging to each member of the joint Hindu family or not? This question had not been dealt with by both the Courts below and they had simply proceeded on the presumption that the family was joint and the property held by it was joint conferring interest on each coparcener thereof. The Courts below have not discussed as to whether this was a coparcenary property. Thus, the Courts have also not discussed as to whether each member of the joint family, who was not recorded as co-tenure holder in different revenue records, was at all holding his interest in the property even though, he was not entitled to have such interest under the special provisions of the statutes applicable from time to time. Accordingly, if such important question of law which is patently substantial in nature involving interpretation of the statutes, was there, the second appellate Court, to my mind, had every occasion to interfere into it and the admission of appeal and decisions given thereon were entirely necessary. Learned Counsel has cited different cases on this point, which are as under : Kshitish Chandra Purkait v. Santosh Kumar Purkait and others, (1997) 5 SCC 438 ; Thiagarajan and others v. Sri Venugopallswamy B. Koil and others, (2004) 5 SCC 762 ; Rajeshwari v. Puran Indoria, (2005) 7 SCC 60 ; Kondiba Dagadu Kadam v. Savitribai Sopan Gujar and others, JT 1999 (3) SC 163 and Veerayee Ammal v. Seeni Ammal, (2002) 1 SCC 134 . 30. These cases referred to above, however do not stop the second appellate Court to admit such an appeal when there is a clear cut substantial question of law for decision available in the case. In these cases it is only propounded that the substantial question of law should be such which may not require any substitution of factual finding recorded by the Courts below by the High Court. In these cases it is only propounded that the substantial question of law should be such which may not require any substitution of factual finding recorded by the Courts below by the High Court. The Supreme Court in Kondiba Dagadu Kadam (supra) has also laid down a ratio that the substantial question of law, which has already been decided by the Courts in earlier decisions may not also amount to be worth admitting the second appeal for decision by the High Court. In the present case, as already discussed above, the substantial questions, which have been framed did involve such decisions upon which this Court or the Apex Court had earlier not given any decision and as such those questions are very relevant for admission and decision of this appeal. Therefore, the submission of the learned Counsel for the respondent in this regard does not appear to be convincing as to bar this second appeal from being entertained and decided by this Court. 31. From the aforesaid facts and circumstances and the legal position discussed, I am of the view that the appeal deserves to be allowed and the judgments of the Courts below should be set aside. Accordingly, the appeal is allowed with costs throughout and the judgments and decree of the Courts below dated 24.3.1988 and 17.12.1994 are hereby set aside. The suit of the plaintiff respondent is dismissed. Appeal Allowed. ———