Heard Sri Ramji Srivastava, Advo cate for the petitioner, learned Standing Counsel for the respondents no. 1 and 2 and Sri Sharad Sharma, Advocate for the respondent no. 3. 2. By the present writ petition, the petitioner has prayed for a writ of certiorari quashing the order dated 24-03-2004 passed in RCA No. 50/2003 Sh. Rati Ram Vs. Sh. Kailash Dogra and order dated 24-03-2002 passed by the Prescribed Authority in P. A. No. 25/ 2002, Sh. Kailash Dogra Vs. Sh. Rati Ram and dismiss the release application i. e. PA. Case No. 25/2002. FACTUAL MATRIX OF THE CASe 3. Briefly stated, the dispute relates to the property no. 24/45, Old Dalanwala, Dehradun, where the peti tioner is a tenant and respondent no. 3 is the owner of the property. Release ap plication has been filed under Section 21 (1 ) (a) of the Act No. XIII of 1972 stat ing therein that the respondent no. 3 is the owner of the premises and the peti tioner is month to month tenant on a rent of Rs. 210 per month. 4. According to the case of the landlord/respondent no. 3, he purchased property described in Schedule- A for his personal use and occupation. His fam ily consists of his wife Vijay Laxmi and his minor son Master Shubham aged about 2 years. 5. Landlord in his release applica tion has stated that he is living along with his family in Schedule-A property minus Schedule b accommodation i. e. one room with common Varandah in part. Landlord has submitted that the property mentioned in Schedule-B is in possession of the petitioner and the rest part is in possession of the landlord. The description of the property is as under : "schedulea Portion of property bearing No. 24/ 45, Old Dalanwala, Dehradun, consist ing of 2 rooms, varandah, kitchen, bath room and Angan bounded and butted as under : North: Property of Rakesh Mohan. South: Property of Sri Inder Pal now in occupation of Sri Bhopal Singh Rawat. East: Property of Sri Milkhi Ram. West: Property of Sri V. D. Sharma. "schedules Portion of Schedule a property con sisting of 1 room, 1 tin-shed kitchen, 1 tin shed bath-room and common varandah bounded and butted as under: North: Property of Rakesh Mohan. South: Property of Sri Inder Pal now in occupation of Sri Bhopal Singh. East: Property of Sri Milkhi Ram. West: Property of Sri V. D. Sharma. "schedules Portion of Schedule a property con sisting of 1 room, 1 tin-shed kitchen, 1 tin shed bath-room and common varandah bounded and butted as under: North: Property of Rakesh Mohan. South: Property of Sri Inder Pal now in occupation of Sri Bhopal Singh. East: Property of schedule a property in occupation of the peti tioner. West: Property of Sri V. D. Sharma. " 6. The Prescribed Authority has al lowed the release application. On ap peal, the same was dismissed. Both the courts below have recorded the concur rent findings regarding bonafide need as well as hardship to the landlord. Prescribed Authority has recorded the find ings to the following effect : Hindi BONAFIDE NEED OF THE LAND LORd 7. Respondent no. 3 in paragraph 7 of his affidavit has stated that accom modation is insufficient. Paragraph 7 is quoted below : "7. That as the accommodation in occupation of the petitioner is insuf ficient keeping in view his need, the petitioner requires the said property for his bonafide use and occupation. A portion of the common varandah in occupation of the petitioner is used as a make Shift kitchen and bath room. He requires the said property to meet his need. " 8. Landlord has submitted that he is facing great difficulty in fulfilling his requirement, as he got only one room and the common varandah when in point of fact, the petitioner has no need of the accommodation as he has also a residential accommodation in the name of his wife Smt. Chhoti Devi be ing Premises No. EWS-243, M. D. D. A. Colony on Chandar Road, Dehradun. Along with the application, the respond ent no. 3 has also filed his own affida vit stating therein his personal require ment for the premises in dispute. 9. In the written statement filed by Sri Rati Ram in paragraph 23, it has been stated that he is available with him following accommodation : 1. two big rooms each measuring 14x 16 2. one room measuring about 12x 12, 3. on kitchen measuring 8x 6, 4. bathroom measuring about 6 x 6, 5. Latrine measuring about 3 x 3 6. Three big verandahs" 10. Further in paragraph 51 it has been stated as under : "51. two big rooms each measuring 14x 16 2. one room measuring about 12x 12, 3. on kitchen measuring 8x 6, 4. bathroom measuring about 6 x 6, 5. Latrine measuring about 3 x 3 6. Three big verandahs" 10. Further in paragraph 51 it has been stated as under : "51. That the contents of para 2 of the said affidavit No. 3 are wrong and are denied. It is incorrect to say that Shri Rati Ram is occupying the property which is situated just opposite to the property in which Shri Vikas Kumar is residing. It is entirely incor rect to say that Shri Rati Ram is oc cupying any property. Since Shri Rati Ram is not occupying any said property opposite 23, Old Dalanwala, Dehradun. Hence extent of accom modation cannot be taken into con sideration for deciding the present petition. It is further incorrect to say that Shri Rati Ram obtained any wa ter connection. So far as boundary wall and boundaries of the property wall is concerned these have been wrongly stated by Shri Vikash Kumar. The property alleged to be occupied by Shri Rati Ram is false and concocted story. Rest of the con tents are incorrect and not admitted. Shri Vikas Kumar is put to strict proof thereof. So far as the property men tioned in para 2 of the said affidavit No. 3 is concerned the same belongs to Smt. Sodani Devi wife of Shri Sumera. This property was pur chased by the Sale Deed dated 28-3-2000 and the boundaries of the prop erty has also been wrongly shown. Since the property belongs to the sis ter-in-law of the deponent and hence the deponent occasionally visits the property. There is no residential ac commodation available in the said property. The said property has been mentioned by the petitioner with the sole purpose of mislead the Court and to misrepresent regarding the availability of residential accommoda tion with the deponent. " 11. As will appear from schedule a the landlord is residing in a 2 room ac commodation and the other room being part of varandah, the same cannot be sufficient for the requirement of the land lord, his wife and one child. The afore said fact has been extracted from the af fidavit of the landlord, Vipul Kumar (Paper No. 18), affidavit of Surendra Prasad Tiwari. 12. The afore said fact has been extracted from the af fidavit of the landlord, Vipul Kumar (Paper No. 18), affidavit of Surendra Prasad Tiwari. 12. In the case of Sarla Ahuja Vs. United India Insurance Co. Ltd. AIR 1999 SC page no. 100, it has been ob served as under: "when a landlord asserts that he re quires his building for his own occu pation the Rent Controller shall not proceed on the presumption that the requirement is not bonafide. When other conditions of the clause are sat isfied and when the landlord shows a prima facie case it is open to the Rent Controller to draw a presump tion that the requirement of the land lord is bonafide. It is often said by Courts that it is not for the tenant to dictate terms to the landlord as to how else he can adjust himself with out getting possession of the tenanted premises. While deciding the question of bonafide of the requirement of the landlord it is quite unnecessary to make an endeavour as to how else the landlord could have adjusted him self. " 13. As will appear from the afore said case law that the landlord is the sole judge of his own need, so far as the comparative need is concerned, both the courts below have recorded a finding. The same is finding of Fact. 14. In Jogendra Pal v. Naval Kishore Behal (2002) 5 SCC 397 , it has been observed as under : "8. The need for reasonable interpre tation of rent control legislations was emphasized by this Court in Bega Begum v. Abdul Ahad Khan (1979) 1 SCC 273 . Speaking in the context of reasonable requirement of landlord as a ground for eviction the Court guarded against any artificial exten sion entailing stretching or straining of language so as to make it impos sible or extremely difficult for the landlord to get a decree for eviction. The Court warned that such a course would defeat the very purpose of the Act which affords the facility of evic tion of the tenant to the landlord on certain specified grounds. The Court warned that such a course would defeat the very purpose of the Act which affords the facility of evic tion of the tenant to the landlord on certain specified grounds. In Kewal Singh V. Lajwanti (1980) 1 SCC 290 this Court has observed, while the rent control legislation has given a number of facilities to the tenants, it should not be construed so as to destroy the limited relief which it seeks to give to the landlord also. For instance, one of the grounds for evic tion which is contained in almost all the personal necessity. The concept. of bona fide necessity should be meaningfully construed so as to make the relief granted to the landlord real and practical. Recently in Shiv Sarup Gupta v. Dr. Mahesh Chandra Gupta (1999) 6 SCC 222 the Court has held that the concept of bona fide need or genuine requirement needs a practi cal approach instructed by the reali ties of life. An approach either too liberal or too conservative or pedan tic must be guarded against. 9. The rent control legislations are heavily loaded in favour of the ten ants treating them as weaker sections of the society requiring legislative protection against exploitation and unscrupulous devices of greedy land lords. The legislative intent has to be respected by the courts while inter preting the laws. But it is being un charitable to legislatures if they are attributed with an intention that they lean only in favouir of the tenants and while being fair to the tenants, go to the extent of being unfair to the landlords. The legislature is fair to the tenants and to the landlords-both. The courts have to adopt a reason able and balanced approach while interpreting rent control legislations starting with an assumption that an equal treatment has been meted out to both the sections of the society. In spite of the overall balance tilting in favour of the tenants, while interpret ing such of the provisions as take care of the interest of the landlord the court should not hesitate in leaning in favour of the landlords. Such pro visions are ingrafted in rent control legislations to take care of those situ ations where the landlords too are weak and feeble and feel humble. " 15. In Mst. Such pro visions are ingrafted in rent control legislations to take care of those situ ations where the landlords too are weak and feeble and feel humble. " 15. In Mst. Bega Begum V/s Abdul Ahmad Khan 3979 A. I. R SC page 272, it has been held : "the connotation of the term re quirement should not be artificially extended nor its language so unduly stretched or strained as to make it impossible or extremely difficult for the landlord to get an order of re lease. Such a course would defeat the very purpose of the Act, which af fords the facility of eviction of the ten ant to the landlord on certain speci fied grounds contemplated under sec tion 21 of the Act. The provisions contained in the Act strike a just balance between the genuine need of the landlord on the one hand and the great inconvenience and troubles of the tenants on the other. Since sec tion 21 of the Act is meant for the benefit of the landlord, therefore, it must be so construed as to advance the object behind the said provision. The tenant has to establish that if he is evicted he will suffer greater hard ship as compared to the landlord and must lead clear evidence to show that in spite of the best efforts he was unable to get another alternative suit able accommodation in the absence whereof the scale of relative hardship may be tilted in favour of the landlord as the inconvenience, loss or trouble resulting from a denial of the order of release in favour of the land lord will for out weight the prejudice or the inconvenience which may likely be caused to the tenants. " 16. Following the decision of Bega Begum (supra), in the case of Joginder Pal vs. Naval Kishore Behal, 2002 SC & FB, Rent Cases, 388, the Apex Court has held as under : "5. In Malpe Vishwanath Acharya and Ors. v. State of Maharashtra and Anr. (1998) 2 SCC 1 ) this Court em phasized the need of social legislations like the Rent Control Act striking a balance between rival inter ests so as to be just to law. "the law ought not to be unjust to one and give a disproportionate benefit or protection to another section of the society". (1998) 2 SCC 1 ) this Court em phasized the need of social legislations like the Rent Control Act striking a balance between rival inter ests so as to be just to law. "the law ought not to be unjust to one and give a disproportionate benefit or protection to another section of the society". While the shortage of ac commodation makes it necessary to protect the tenants to save them from exploitation but at the same time the need to protect tenant is cou pled with an obligation to ensure that the tenants are not conferred with a benefit disproportionately larger than the one needed. Socially progressive legislation must have a holistic per ception and not a shortsighted paro chial approach. Power to legislate socially progressive legislation is cou pled with a responsibility to avoid ar bitrariness and unreasonably. A leg islation impregnated with tendency to give undue preference to one section, at the cost of constraints by placing shackles on the other section, not only entails miscarriage of justice but may also in constitutional invalidity. 8. The need for reasonable interpre tation of rent control legislations was emphasized by this Court in Bega Begum v. Abdul Ahad Khan 1979 A. I. R, SC page 272. Speaking in the context of reasonable requirement of landlord as a ground for eviction, the Court guarded against any artificial extension entailing stretching or straining of language so as to make it impossible or extremely difficult for the landlord to get a decree for evic tion. The Court warned that such a course would defeat the very purpose of the Act which affords the facility of eviction of the tenant to the land lord on certain specified grounds. In Kewal Singh v. Lajwanti this Court has observed, while the rent control legislation has given a number of fa cilities to the tenants, it should not be construed so as to destroy the limited relief which it seeks to give to the land lord also. For instance, one of the grounds for eviction which is contained in almost all the Rent Control Acts in the country is the question of land lords bona fide personal necessity. The concept of bona fide necessity should be meaningfully construe so as to make the relief granted to the land lord real and practical. Recently in Shiv Sarup Gupta v. Dr. The concept of bona fide necessity should be meaningfully construe so as to make the relief granted to the land lord real and practical. Recently in Shiv Sarup Gupta v. Dr. Mahesh Chandra Gupta 8 the Court has held that the concept of bona fide need or genuine requirement needs a practi cal approach instructed by the reali ties of life. An approach either too liberal or too conservative or pedan tic must be guarded against. 9. The rent control legislations are heavily loaded in favour of the ten ants treating them as weaker sections of the society requiring legislative protection against exploitation and unscrupulous devices of greedy land lords. The legislative intent has to. be respected by the courts while inter preting the laws. But it is being un charitable to legislatures if they are attributed with an intention that they lean only in favour of the tenants and while being fair to the tenants, go to the extent of being unfair to the land lords. The legislature is fair to the tenants and to the landlords - both. The courts have to adopt a reason able and balanced approach while interpreting rent control legislations starting with an assumption that an equal treatment has been meted out to both the sections of the society. In spite of the overall balance tilting in favour of the tenants, while interpret ing such of the provisions as take care of the interest of the landlord the court should not hesitate in leaning in favour of the landlords. Such pro visions are engrafted in rent control legislations to take care of those situ ations where the landlords too are weak and feeble and feel humble. 30. In providing key to the meaning of any word or expression the con text in which it is set has significance. Colour and content emanating from context may permit sense being preferred to mere meaning depending on what is sought to be achieved and what is sought to be prevented by the legislative scheme surrounding the ex pression. 30. In providing key to the meaning of any word or expression the con text in which it is set has significance. Colour and content emanating from context may permit sense being preferred to mere meaning depending on what is sought to be achieved and what is sought to be prevented by the legislative scheme surrounding the ex pression. Requirement of landlord for his own use, is an expression capa ble for attributing an intention to the legislature that what was intended to be fulfilled is such requirement as would persuade the landlord to have the premises vacated by the tenant, to forego the rental income, and to put the premises to such use as the landlord would deem to be his own use and in the given facts and cir cumstances of a case the Court too would hold it to be so in contradis tinction with a mere ruse to evict the tenant. The legislature intending to protect the tenant also intends to lift the protection when it is the require ment of landlord to put the accom modation to such use as he intends, away from leasing it out. 31. If we do not meaningly construe the concept of requirement the pro vision may suffer from the risk of be ing branded as unreasonable, arbi trary or as placing uncalled for and unreasonable restrictions on the right of the owner to hold and use his property. We cannot place a con struction on the expression for his own use in such a way as to deny the landlord a right to evict his tenant when he needs the accommodation for his own son to settle himself well in his life. We have to give colour and content to the expression and pro vide the skin of a living thought to the skeleton of the words, which the Legislature has not itself chosen to define. The Indian society, its cus toms and requirements and the con text where the provision is set in the legislation are the guides leading to acceptance of the meaning which we have chosen to assign to the words for his own use in Section 13 (3) (a) (ii) of the Act. " 17. The Indian society, its cus toms and requirements and the con text where the provision is set in the legislation are the guides leading to acceptance of the meaning which we have chosen to assign to the words for his own use in Section 13 (3) (a) (ii) of the Act. " 17. The landlord has established that two sons namely Anil Kumar and Kamal Kumar are grown up, one is married, but both are completely unem ployed and thus the requirement for resi dence as well as for raising the business, both the courts below have come to the conclusion that the premises is required for the sons. 18. While recording the finding with regard to comparative hardship, it has come on the record that the landlord has no alternative accommodation, whereas, the tenant has got three room accommodation to accommodate the family members, therefore, the premises has rightly been released in favour of the landlord and the comparative hardship being a relative factor. The hardship also lies in favour of the respondents. 19. In view of the above, I do not find any illegality in the order passed by the two courts below while deciding the need in favour of the landlord. COMPARATIVE HARDSHIp 20. It has come on the record that the landlord, his wife and the children are living in one room, whereas the ten ant has not made any effort to search another accommodation during the pendency of the eviction and as such so far as comparative hardship is con cerned, the same lies in favour of the landlord. 21. In the case of Prem Prakash Gupta and others Vs. Second Additional District Judge, Allahabad and others -Allahabad Rent Cases 1993 (1) page 77, it has been held that no doubt true that the tenant will have to be ousted from a house, if a decree of eviction has been passed, yet such an event by itself will not be a valid ground for refusing a de cree for eviction. The observation in the case of Prem Prakash Gupta (supra) is quoted as below : "as observed by this Court in its de cision in the case of Rajeshwari Prasad Vs. Fateh Bahadur Chaturvedi and others reported in 1984 (1) A. R. C. 387, the bona fide need is the foundation of application for eviction of a tenant without which it cannot be allowed. Fateh Bahadur Chaturvedi and others reported in 1984 (1) A. R. C. 387, the bona fide need is the foundation of application for eviction of a tenant without which it cannot be allowed. Hardship is relative word. In our society with divergence of eco nomic prosperity no single test can be laid down for it. In some cases, draw ing room, guest room, consultation room may be necessary. In other a pretext only. What may be valid and relevant consideration in relation to one landlord and his tenant may not be relevant for the other. " 22. In Badrinarayan Chunilal Bhutada Vs. Govindram Ramgopal Mundada 2003 SCFBRC 166 the Apex Court observed as under : "in Piper Vs. Harvey, 1958 (1) All. E. R. 454, the issue as to compara tive hardship arose for the considera tion of Court of Appeals under the Rent Act, 1957. Lord Denning opined: "when I look at all the evi dence in this case and see the strong case of hardship which the landlord put forward and when I see that the tenant did not give any evidence of any attempts made by him to find other accommodation, to look for another house, either to buy or to rent, it seems to me that there is only one reasonable conclusion to be ar rived at, and that is that the tenant did not prove (and the burden on him to prove) the case is of greater hardship. " Hudson, L. J. , opined: "the tenant has not been able to say anything more than the minimum which every tenant can say, namely, that he has in fact been in occupa tion of the bungalow and that he has not at the moment any other place to go to. He has not, however, sought to prove anything additional to that by way of hardship, such as un successful attempts to find other ac commodation, or indeed, to raise the question of his relative financial in competent as compared with the landlord. " On such state of the case, the Court answered the issue as to comparative hardship against the ten ant and ordered his eviction. " 23. " On such state of the case, the Court answered the issue as to comparative hardship against the ten ant and ordered his eviction. " 23. Both the courts below have re corded a finding of fact regarding the re quirement of the landlord as well as the findings being finding of fact, no inter ference under Article 226 of the Consti tution of India. 24. Both the courts below have come to the conclusion that the land lord is residing in a one room accom modation and as such the family is not able to live properly due to the paucity of the accommodation. Both the courts below have recorded a finding that the landlord requires the accommodation and the requirement of the landlord need no interference under Article 226 of the Constitution of India so far as the bonafide need is concerned. 25. The comparative hardship is also a finding of fact and it has already been pointed out that here being a rela tion, both lies in favour of the landlord. FINDINGS OF FACT : 26. In Nirmala Tandon v. Xth, ADJ, Kanpur Nagar, 1997 (29) ALR 12 (Sum.) it has been stated as under : "the writ petition of this Court un der Articles 226 and 227 of the Con stitution of India in such matters is of supervisory nature only and it does not sit as a Court of Appeal when called upon the Judge, the finding of the competent authorities, viz. , bonafide need of the landlord and comparative hardship of the parties. The Court would not embark upon reappraisal of the evidence or substi tute its own findings of fact in place of the findings reached by the fact finding authorities. It is clearly out side the Court and ambit of the ju dicial review when this Court exercise its powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. " 27. In view of the judgment of the Apex Court reported in Ranjeet Singh v. Ravi Prakash, 2004 A. R. C. (3) 6892 the jurisdiction of the High Court under Ar ticle 226 is limited to the extent that the finding of fact recorded by the court be low cannot be interfered. The two courts below have recorded concurrent findings and High Court cannot act like an ap pellate Court under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India. 28. The two courts below have recorded concurrent findings and High Court cannot act like an ap pellate Court under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India. 28. In Surya Dev Rai Vs. Ram Chander SCC 2003 Vol-6, 675, the Apex Court has held as under : "supervisory jurisdiction under Arti cle 227 of the Constitution is exer cised for keeping the subordinate courts within the bounds of their ju risdiction. When a subordinate Court has assumed a jurisdiction which it does not have or has failed to exer cise a jurisdiction which it does have or the jurisdiction though available is being exercised by the Court in a manner not permitted by law and fail ure of justice or grave injustice has occasioned thereby, the High Court may step in to exercise its supervisory jurisdiction. " "be it a writ of certiorari or the ex ercise of supervisory jurisdiction, none is available to correct mere er rors of fact or of law unless the fol lowing requirement are satisfied: (i) The error is manifest and apparent on the face of the proceedings such as when it is based on clear ignorance or utter disregard of the provisions of law, and (ii) a grave injustice or gross failure of justice has occasioned thereby. " "a patent error is an error which is self-evident i. e. which can be prereceived or demonstrated without involving into any lengthy or compli cated argument or a long-drawn process of reasoning. Where two in ferences are reasonably possible and the subordinate court has chosen to take one view, the error cannot be called gross or patent. " "the power to issue a writ of certio rari and the supervisory jurisdiction are to be exercised sparingly and only in appropriate cases where the judi cial conscience of the High Court dic tates it to act lest a gross failure of justice or grave injustice should occasion. Care, caution and circum spection need to be exercised, when any of the abovesaid two jurisdictions is sought to be invoked during the pendency of any suit or correction is yet capable of being corrected at the conclusion of the proceedings is an appeal or revision preferred there against and entertaining a petition in voking certiorari or supervisory juris diction of the High Court would ob struct the smooth flow and or early disposal of the suit of proceedings. The High Court may feel inclined to intervene where the error is such, as, if not corrected at that every mo ment, may become incapable of cor rection at a latter stage and refused to intervene would result in travesty of justice or where such refusal itself would result in prolonging of the lis. " "the High Court in exercise of cer tiorari or supervisory jurisdiction will not convert itself into a court of ap peal and indulge in reappreciation or evaluation of evidence or correct er rors in drawing inferences or correct errors of mere formal or technical character. " 29. Relying upon the Judgment of Surya Dev Rai Vs. Ram Chandra 2003 (6) SCC 675 , the Apex Court in Ranjeet Singh Vs. Ravi Prakash 2004 (3) SCC 682 , has held as under- "as to the exercise of supervisory ju risdiction of the High, Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of In dia also, it has been held in Surya Dev Rai that the jurisdiction was not available to be exercised for indulg ing in reappreciation or evaluation of evidence or correcting the errors in drawing inferences like a court of ap peal. " 30. In view of the above, I find no infirmity in the orders passed by the courts below while exercising the juris diction under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India. 31. Alternatively, learned counsel for the petitioner Sri Ramji Srivastava has sought time to vacate the accommoda tion. Counsel for the respondents has not objected to the same. Petitioner is granted time to vacate the premises up to 31st of December, 2007 provided an undertaking is given in the following terms by the petitioner : (i) to vacate the premises by 31st December, 2007. (ii) the undertaking shall be furnished by 30th July, 2006. (iii) to pay the entire arrears of rent by 30th July, 2006. (iv) to pay the month to month dam ages for use and occupation by the 1st week of every month. (v) in case of default the decree for eviction shall be executed forth with. 32. Writ Petition is dismissed. No order as to costs. .