Judgment Arvind Kumar, J. 1. The petitioners have invoked the extra ordinary jurisdiction of this Court under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India, through the instant petition, seeking issuance of writ in the nature of certiorari, quashing the award dated 23.8.2004 (Annexure P-1) vide which respondent No. 1 has been ordered to be re-instated with continuity of service and payment of 50% back wages within stipulated period of six months, failing which he would get interest @ 6% per annum. 2. The brief facts of the case are that respondent No. 1-workman was appointed as Bulldozer Operator with the petitioner-management on 1.11.1990. Since his appointment was on 89 days basis, the same was extended from time to time till 5.7.1996. Thereafter, his services were not extended. The workman raised an industrial dispute on the ground that his services were terminated by the management on 15.7.1996 without any notice, charge sheet, enquiry or compensation and that the juniors to him are still in service of the management and new persons were also appointed by the management after terminating his services. The appropriate government referred the dispute to the Labour Court for adjudication under Section 10(i)(c) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (for brevity, the Act) and the Labour Court on 23.9.2004 made the impugned award Annexure P-1 in the manner stated above. Hence this writ petition. 3. The stand of the petitioner-management is that respondent No. 1-workman was engaged as Bulldozer Operator on 89 days basis and in that stop-gap arrangement he had worked from 1.11.1990 till 15.7.1996 but intermittently. He was never employed continuously, therefore, did not work for 240 days in the preceding 12 calendar months. Thus, denial of further extension of his service does not amount to retrenchment, therefore, has been wrongly awarded reinstatement with back wages. The Labour Court has not appreciated the fact that since the petitioner department is not an "Industry", the service of respondent No. 1 were not governed by the afore-stated Act rather the same is governed by Punjab Civil Services Rules. 4. We have heard learned Counsel for the parties and have also perused the paper book as also the award dated 23.9.2004 impugned before us. 5. 4. We have heard learned Counsel for the parties and have also perused the paper book as also the award dated 23.9.2004 impugned before us. 5. Learned State counsel has argued that respondent-workman Was being appointed intermittently, as a stop gap arrangement, on 89 days basis and that he had not completed 240 days in preceding 12 calendar months from the date of his termination, as such, he is not entitled to protection under Section 25-F of the Act. Contention is meritless. The claim of the workman was that he joined as a Bulldozer Operator on 6.4.1990 and continuously worked with the department till 15.7.1996 i.e. the day when his services were terminated. The onus was on department to produce the record, in their custody, to show that workman was only appointed intermittently on 89 days basis, as a stop gap arrangement and had not completed 240 days in preceding 12 calendar months from the date of termination. A bare perusal of award shows that management-petitioner, for the reasons best known to it, had not produced any such record, to rebut the claim of the workman. At this juncture, the State counsel, to substantiate the plea, has referred to the attendance sheets of daily wages staff (Annexure P-3/T) from the period November 90 till June, 1996. The said document does not convince us. It is the plea of the management itself that the workman had worked up to 15.7.1996, but a bare perusal of the said attendance sheet shows that the same is only up to June 1996. There is absolutely no explanation for having not submitted the attendance sheet for the month of July 1996. Therefore, no authenticity can be attached to the said attendance sheet and an adverse inference can be drawn against the petitioner-management. A perusal of the award shows that the Labour Court, on the basis of letter dated 22.7.2003 (Ex.M2 before it) written by the petitioner-management to other allied offices giving instructions to stop the bulldozer working at any place, has rightly observed that the bulldozer working had existed till 22.7.2003 and in this backdrop there was no occasion for the petitioner-management to terminate the services of the workman on 15.7.1996. The question whether a particular department is an Industry is a question of fact which can be decided by leading evidence. The question whether a particular department is an Industry is a question of fact which can be decided by leading evidence. An issue has been framed in this regard by the Labour Court, but the petitioner-management had led no evidence to substantiate the said plea and as such the issue has been decided against the petitioner-management. Therefore, for want of any evidence, to which the management was required to lead at appropriate stage, the plea, at this juncture, that the management is not an "Industry" is not sustainable. 6. While exercising the extra ordinary jurisdiction under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India, this Court would not sit as a Court of appeal over the findings of fact recorded by the Labour Court. Even otherwise, we are satisfied that on the basis of evidence on record, the Labour Court has correctly concluded the relevant facts. In our view these findings are neither perverse nor based on no evidence. In these circumstances, it would not be just and proper to interfere with the award made by the Labour Court. 7. In view of the above, we do not find any merit in the present writ petition and the same is dismissed.