JUDGMENT :- Rule. Rule made returnable forthwith. Heard finally by consent of parties. 2. The respondents filed suit for eviction against deceased Ahmed Sharif on ground of bonafide personal requirement. The tenement is a small shop in which deceased Ahemed Sharif used to run a bicycle taxi shop. The landlord-respondent no.1 expressed need for the suit shop for business of his grandsons who were taking education. The suit was dismissed by the trial Court. The appellate court re-appreciated the evidence and reversed findings of the trial court. The appellate court held that the respondents have proved their personal bonafide need and would be put to greater hardship than the deceased tenant if the eviction decree will be refused. The suit, therefore, came to be decreed. Hence, this petition. 3. The original defendant-Ahemed Sharif demised after the appellate Court's Judgment and prior to filing of this petition. The petitioners are his legal representatives. They impugn the Judgment of the appellate court on the ground that its findings are perverse. 4. Shri. A. S. Bajaj, learned counsel appearing for the petitioners, would submit that the appellate court has not considered clear admissions of P.W. Channusa. He would submit that the appellate court failed to see that there was no immediate need for use of the suit tenement in order to commence business. He pointed out that both the grand sons of P. W. Channusa/respondent No.1 were taking education at the material time. According to him, there is clear distinction between the concept of "desire" and "bonafide requirement". He would submit that the plaintiffs had desire to occupy the suit tenement though there was no real need for occupation thereof by the grand sons of P.W. Channusa/respondent No.1. According to him, the grandsons of P.W. Channusa are still taking education and an affidavit in this behalf has been filed. He would further point out that Section 17(1) of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates (Control) Act, 1947 (for short, "Bombay Rent Act") is indicative of the mind of the Legislature. It can be gathered that if such premises can not be occupied within a period of one month for commercial use, then the tenant can re-enter the premises and the landlord may expose himself for criminal action. It can be gathered that if such premises can not be occupied within a period of one month for commercial use, then the tenant can re-enter the premises and the landlord may expose himself for criminal action. Taking cue from Section 17, Shri. A. S. Bajaj, learned counsel for the petitioners, would submit that when the grandsons of the landlord are still taking education, then it is difficult for them to occupy the premises within one month if the decree is to be executed. He would point out that P.W. Channusa desired that the grandsons would take higher education and join services. He also admitted that on the day of cross-examination the premises were required for residence but he further clarified his statement by saying that he is unable to do the business. 5. True, P.W. Channusa blurted out something during the cross-examination regarding his desire that the grandsons should take higher education and should join some services. This single admission cannot totally wipe out the pleadings and the other part of his statement. The grandsons of P.W. Channusa may not have desire to join any services. It is explicit from record that one of them was completing course of Chartered Accountancy at that time. Learned Senior Counsel Shri. V.J. Dixit, would state that he has completed the Chartered Accountant and is not doing Articleship. It is but natural that he would require commercial premises for his practice as Tax Consultants. The future needs of the family members of the landlord can be considered. P.W. Channusa may have a will that the grandsons should join higher services. He may think that his grand-sons should become IAS Officers or IPS Officers. However, the grandsons have followed a particular stream of education in Commerce and one of them is now C.A.. Whereas another is completing his MBA. Secondly, if they will not occupy the premises within one month, then the tenant has a right to claim the tenement under Section 17 of the Bombay Rent Act. That contingency is yet to happen. The provisions of Section 17 of the Bombay Rent Act, would not show that the intention of Legislature is to spell out only the bonafide need which existed as on the date of the suit. That contingency is yet to happen. The provisions of Section 17 of the Bombay Rent Act, would not show that the intention of Legislature is to spell out only the bonafide need which existed as on the date of the suit. The relevant provisions of Section 17 of the Bombay Rent Act, is purportedly drafted so as to arrest misuse of the eviction decree, once obtained on ground of a bonafide requirement or for reconstruction purposes. 6. Another difficulty in the way of the petitioners is that no evidence, what-so-ever, was adduced by the deceased defendant. The deceased defendant only filed his written statement and did nothing more in order to defend his rights. It appears that the appellate court delivered the Judgment on 12th July, 2005 and the defendant demised on 31st July, 2005. So, till the appellate court decided the appeal, the pleadings of the defendants were intact and same. It appears from the written statement of the deceased defendant that he was 'running a cycle shop in the suit premises without any participation or sharing by any of the sons of members of the family. In this view of the matter, the present petitioners, who are the legal representatives of the deceased, cannot claim protection because they were not doing business with him at the time of his death. The relevant provision of Section 5(11)(c)(ii) of the Bombay Rent Act, reads thus: "5. In this Act unless there is anything repugnant to the subject or context, (11) "Tenant" means any person by whom or on whose account rent is payable for any premises and includes:…… (a) xxxxxxxxxxx (aa) xxxxxxxxxxx (b) xxxxxxxxxxx (bb) xxxxxxxxxxx (bba) xxxxxxxxxxx (c)(i) xxxxxxxxxxx (c)(ii) in relation to any premises let for the purposes of education, business, trade or storage, when the tenant dies, whether the death has occurred before or after the commencement of the said Act, any member of the tenant's family using the premises for the purposes of education or carrying on business, trade or storage in the premises, with the tenant at the time of his death, or, in the absence of such member any heir of the deceased tenant, as may be decided in default of agreement by the Court." 7. The petitioners cannot claim such kind of protection inasmuch as the pleadings of the deceased defendant clearly indicate that he alone was doing the business of cycle shop and moreover he did not enter the witness box. The petition itself is silent in this behalf. Faced with this difficulty, learned counsel Shri. A.S. Bajaj, would invite my attention to the affidavit filed by the petitioners which purports to show that the two sons have continued the business. This court in its supervisory jurisdiction can not re-appreciate the evidence. I cannot permit the petition to be converted in to an appeal. 8. In my view, the "bonafide requirement" of the landlord was rather "inchoate" at the material time of filing the suit but since both the grandsons of the landlord are practically at the verge of completing their education and either of them may start using the premises for business purpose, the bonafide requirement cannot be ignored. The appellate Judgment is not patently erroneous. There is no perversity committed while appreciating the evidence by the appellate court. It is well settled that even if decision of the appeal court or other courts are found to be erroneous then also in the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, the errors can not be rectified unless there exists element of perversity or that the error is of such magnitude that can be regarded as patent error. The petition is thus maritless and will have to be dismissed in limine. 9. At this stage, Shri. A. S. Bajaj, learned Advocate for the petitioners would submit that sufficient time may be granted to vacate the suit tenement. I find that the requirement of the grandsons of the landlord can be fulfilled if time of one and half years is granted. The petitioners shall furnish an undertaking within period of three (3) weeks to this court to the effect that they will vacate the premises within period of one and half years i.e. by end of May, 2008, without any murmur. The undertaking shall be verified by the Registrar (Judicial) and kept on record. If such undertaking is given then, the decree for eviction shall not be executable till end of May, 2008. The petitioners also shall deposit the agreed rent by 15th of each month either in the court or pay directly to the landlord regularly. The undertaking shall be verified by the Registrar (Judicial) and kept on record. If such undertaking is given then, the decree for eviction shall not be executable till end of May, 2008. The petitioners also shall deposit the agreed rent by 15th of each month either in the court or pay directly to the landlord regularly. The petitioners shall be made aware that if they will not comply with the undertaking, then they will face action for contempt of the court and moreover, shall be ousted forthwith form the suit tenement by executing the decree, without any further order. If the undertaking is not given within three (3) weeks, then the petition will be deemed as dismissed. Rule made absolute in the above terms. No costs. 10. Since the writ petition is disposed of, Civil Application No.4248/2006 does not survive. Hence, it is disposed of. Petition dismissed.