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2006 DIGILAW 192 (JHR)

Shankar Prasad v. Rabindra Nath Singh

2006-03-09

N.N.TIWARI

body2006
ORDER N.N. Tiwari, J. 1. This is the tenants-defendants second appeal against the judgment and decree of affirmance passed in Title Appeal No. 38 of 1984 dismissing the appeal filed against the judgment and decree passed by the learned trial Court in Title Eviction Suit No. 47 of 1987/27 of 1992. 2. The plaintiffs filed the suit for eviction against the defendants on the ground of default in payment of rent, personal necessity and breach of terms of tenancy. The plaintiffs claimed themselves as the landlord on the basis of their acquisition of the suit property by virtue of a registered sale deed. The plaintiffs requested the defendants to vacate the suit premises as they require the same also for their own use and occupation as for that need they had acquired the suit premises. The plaintiffs had also to dig a well and repair the compound walls. According to the plaintiffs the defendants had stopped payment of rent since March, 1983 and on that ground also rendered themselves liable for eviction from the suit premises. They also materially damaged the suit premises and breached the terms of tenancy. 3. The defendants appeared and filed written statement contesting the suit. The defendants denied the relationship of landlord and tenant and claimed their own right, title by virtue of an alleged settlement in their favour and also by adverse possession. 4. The trial Court on the basis of the pleadings, framed several issues. After thorough appraisal and discussion of the facts materials and evidences on record, held that there is relationship of landlord and tenant between the plaintiff and the defendants. The trial Court also decided other issues in favour of the plaintiffs and also considered the desirability of the partial eviction of suit premises and after discussion came to the finding that the plaintiffs need will not be satisfied by partial eviction and that they require the entire suit premises for their residential and business purpose. The trial Court, thus, decreed the suit and directed the defendants to vacate the suit premises and hand over khas possession to the plaintiffs. The defendants then filed an appeal before the District Judge, Deoghar, which was registered as Title Appeal No. 38 of 1994. The said appeal was finally heard and decided by the First Additional District Judge, Deoghar by the impugned judgment and decree. The defendants then filed an appeal before the District Judge, Deoghar, which was registered as Title Appeal No. 38 of 1994. The said appeal was finally heard and decided by the First Additional District Judge, Deoghar by the impugned judgment and decree. The Lower Appellate Court has also thoroughly considered and discussed the grounds taken by the appellants, the facts, evidences and materials on record and the provision of law and came to the finding that the plaintiffs have established that there is relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties and that the defendants defaulted in payment of rent and that the plaintiffs required the suit premises for their personal use. The Lower Appellate Court, thus, upheld the findings arrived to by the trial Court and dismissed the appeal. 5. Mr. Lalit Kumar Lai, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the appellants sought to assail the impugned judgments and decrees of the Courts below on the ground that the plaintiffs have pleaded their title in the eviction suit and the trial Court also delved into the said issue of title and decided the same in favour of the plaintiff. Learned trial Court has passed the decree for eviction of the defendants on the basis of title. learned Counsel submitted that both the Courts have erred in deciding the suit on the basis of title which was beyond the scope of the eviction suit filed under the provisions of Bihar Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act and as such the impugned judgments and decrees are vitiated in law. 6. After hearing the learned Counsel and perusing the judgments and decrees of the Courts below, I find that the trial Court has thoroughly considered and has found plaintiffs prima facie title over the land in question, which they have acquired by virtue of a sale deed. The trial Court has thoroughly scrutinized all the documentary and oral evidences and has come to a finding that there is relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties and that the plaintiffs required the suit premises for their personal use and occupation. The trial Court has also examined the question of satisfaction of the need of the plaintiffs by partial eviction of the defendants and has found that the plaintiffs need shall not be satisfied by partial eviction of the defendants and that they require the entire suit premises. The trial Court has also examined the question of satisfaction of the need of the plaintiffs by partial eviction of the defendants and has found that the plaintiffs need shall not be satisfied by partial eviction of the defendants and that they require the entire suit premises. Learned Lower Appellate Court has also thoroughly discussed the facts, evidences and materials on record as well as the provisions of law and has found that the plaintiffs have been able to establish the relationship of landlord and tenant and that they require the suit premises for their personal need. The Lower Appellate Court has further found that the defendants have defaulted in payment of rent and on that ground also have rendered themselves liable for eviction. In view of the said concurrent findings of fact arrived at by the Courts below that there is relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties and that the plaintiffs require the entire suit premises and partial eviction of the defendants will not satisfy the need of the plaintiffs and finding of facts recorded by the Appellate Court that the defendants have also defaulted in payment of rent, there is no scope to disturb the said findings of fact by this Court in exercise of its second appellate jurisdiction. I, therefore, find no merit in this second appeal. It is, accordingly, dismissed.