S. P. KUKDA Y, J.:- The appellant is convicted of the offence punishable under section 302 of the Indian Penal Code and is sentenced to suffer rigorous imprisonment for life and to pay fine of rupees 1000 in default to suffer rigorous imprisonment for one month. This order of conviction and sentence passed upon him by 2nd Ad hoc Additional Sessions Judge, Aurangabad, on 26-10-2004 is impugned by the appellant in the present appeal. 2. The prosecution case, in nutshell, is that Uttamrao Chavan is native of village Jalgao; Tq. Vaijapur, District Aurangabad. His agricultural land is situated within the area of Jalgao adjoins river Dheku on the west. Field of Haribhau Bhagwat (P.W.8) is to the east of river Dheku. There is a bore well and pipe line in the field of P.W.8 by the side of the river. Near the bore well a pit is dug for the percolation of the water. This place is used by his family and the family complainant (P.W.1) for washing clothes. P.W.8 resides at his house with his wife Nehabai 9 (P.W.4), his mother, who is blind and deaf, son Chandrakant (P.W.12) and daughter-in-law. Crop of sugar cane and cotton was planted in some portion of the field and grass was taken from the portion near the bore well. Lasur-Jalgao Road is to the east of the house of P.W.8. Field of Prakash Tambe (P.W.9) is to the east of this road. Uttamrao resides at the village with his wife Kantabai (not examined) and two sons Ganesh (Complainant) and Mahendra (Appellant). Ganesh married Sadhana (deceased) on 20-2-2003. Appellant had an evil eye on the deceased and had caught her hand on one occasion with intention to seduce her. The deceased disclosed this fact to her husband and mother-in-law. Since then by way of precaution, either the complainant or his mother used to be constantly in the company of the deceased. Suresh Gaikwad and Changdeo Hajare, who are friends of the complainant, came to know about the conduct of the appellant. Eventually, the news leaked and became a topic of discussion in the village. Parents of the complainant, were not in favour of separating the appellant, therefore, the complainant was thinking of taking up a job and leaving the house. 3. Suresh Gaikwad and Changdeo Hajare, who are friends of the complainant, came to know about the conduct of the appellant. Eventually, the news leaked and became a topic of discussion in the village. Parents of the complainant, were not in favour of separating the appellant, therefore, the complainant was thinking of taking up a job and leaving the house. 3. At the time of the marriage of the deceased her father-in-law purchased ornaments for her, worth Rs.28633 from the shop of Dineshkumar Mutha (P.W.S). On 17-7-2003, appellant took ornaments of his mother and the ornaments of the deceased purchased from the shop of P.W.S. At about 8.00 or 8.30 in the morning, appellant went to the shop of P.W.S, produced the receipt and sold these ornaments to P.W.S for Rs.21000/- Maternal aunt of the appellant had kept her ornaments with her sister for safe keeping. The appellant took these ornaments and sold them through Ajay Nagare (P.W.11) for Rs.7500/-. The appellant, however, returned these ornaments when he was persuaded by his relatives. The fact that the appellant tried to molest her and had stolen ornaments, was disclosed by the deceased and her husband to the parents of the deceased. 4. On 17-7-2003, as usual at about 9.00 a.m. P.W.1 went to his field in the morning for performing agricultural operations. P.W.8 and his daughter-in-law were weeding grass in the portion where sugar cane was sown. At about 10.00 O'clock, the deceased and Kantabai came to the field with tiffin for P.W.1. On their arrival, Kantabai started cutting thorny branches of the tree and the deceased went to the bore well of P.W.8 for washing clothes. P.W.4 gossiped with the deceased for some time and went to the hut for household work. Sometime later, she saw appellant going towards the bore well with a bicycle. Immediately thereafter, she heard a shriek and came out from the house. She saw that the deceased had sustained an injury and had fallen down. Appellant was standing by her side with axe in his hand. Having seen the dastardly act done by the appellant, P.W.4 condemned the appellant by saying "Melya" (You scoundrel) and accosted her husband. In response, P.W.8 came there and saw appellant standing near the victim. She saw that the deceased had sustained an injury and had fallen down. Appellant was standing by her side with axe in his hand. Having seen the dastardly act done by the appellant, P.W.4 condemned the appellant by saying "Melya" (You scoundrel) and accosted her husband. In response, P.W.8 came there and saw appellant standing near the victim. As P.W.8 was approaching him, the appellant dropped the axe and started running in the direction of the river P.W.8 started chasing the appellant and asked P.W.9 to apprehended the appellant. The appellant crossed the river at the place where there were thorny plants. As P.W.8 was bare footed, he abandoned the chase and retuned to the scene of occurrence. having heard the noise, P.W.1 and Kantabai came to the scene of occurrence. P.W.1 tied the injury of his wife with the cloth provided by P.W.4. He then requested Bhausaheb Gadhe who was passing by the road to bring a Jeep for taking the injured to the hospital. After arrival of the vehicle, the injured was taken to the dispensary at Lasur Station. The medical officer declared her to be dead. The deceased was brought back to her house. P.W.1 then went to police station, Vaijapur and reported the incident. His complaint (Exh.38) was recorded by the P.S.O. at about 12.30 p.m. and the investigation was handed over to P.S.I. Jatale (P.W.l4). The investigating officer visited house of P.W.1; held inquest on the dead body and prepared Panchanama (Exh.34). After sending the dead body to Rural Hospital, Vaijapur; for the postmortem, the investigating officer visited the spot. Bicycle, axe, sample of blood stained soil and the control soil, basket with clothes were attached from the spot under Panchanama (Exh.33). On the same day, he attached the clothes of the deceased under panchanama (Exh.14) and recorded statements of witnesses including that of P.W.4. Articles attached were sent to the Forensic laboratory and statement of some witnesses were recorded by Judicial Magistrate First Class, Vaijapur under Section 164 of Cr.P.C. On completion of investigation, the investigating officer submitted charge-sheet against the appellant to the court of Judicial Magistrate First Class, Vaijapur. During the trial, the appellant adopted defence of false implication. 5. The prosecution examined in all 14 witnesses in support of its case. During the trial, the appellant adopted defence of false implication. 5. The prosecution examined in all 14 witnesses in support of its case. The complainant turned hostile and denied the contents of the F.I.R. P.W.5 testified that appellant came to his shop with the police officers on 22-8-2003. In response to the enquiries he disclosed that the appellant had sold ornaments purchased from his shop about 1020 days for Rs.20,000/- to 22,000/-. P.W.11 stated that the appellant sold some ornaments through him for Rs.7500 about one month prior to 21-8-2003. The deceased had informed her parents regarding the sexual overtures of her brother-in-law and the theft of the ornaments committed by him. Vijayabai (P.W.6), mother of the deceased, her father Subhash (P.W.7) and grand father Ramrao (P.W.13) have mentioned these facts in their deposition. However, as the complainant has turned hostile and the calculations based on the evidence of P.W.5 and P.W.11 tend to show that the theft of the ornaments was committed after the occurrence, the trial Judge did not place reliance on the evidence regarding the motive, given by the relatives of the deceased. 6. P.W.3 Dr. Anand Patil performed autopsy on 17-7-2003 at 5.30 p.m. He found single injury on the dead body in the form of an incised wound on right upper 1/3rd of the neck, oblique in direction; having the size of 7 x 5 x 1.5 cms. Skin and sub-cutanous tissues were cut, exposing sterno-mastoid muscle. Vessels and jugular vein were cut, whereas the carotid artery was partially cut. The death was caused on account of hemorrhagic shock due to cutting of carotid artery. The medical officer ruled out possibility of the death being caused by accidental fall on sharp object or self inflicted Injury. 7. P.W.4 is an illiterate lady. At the trial she stated that on the day of occurrence, the deceased came to the bore well for washing clothes. She chatted with her for some time and went inside her house. From the house, she saw appellant going towards the bore well with bicycle. Within short time she heard a shriek sounding like voice of the pup. On hearing the shriek, she came out from the house and saw appellant standing near the deceased with an axe. The deceased had sustained bleeding injury on the right side of her neck and was lying on the ground. Within short time she heard a shriek sounding like voice of the pup. On hearing the shriek, she came out from the house and saw appellant standing near the deceased with an axe. The deceased had sustained bleeding injury on the right side of her neck and was lying on the ground. Having seen the dastardly act of the appellant, she remonstrated the appellant by saying "Melya". The appellant stared at her, thus, she got frightened and ran towards her husband shouting that the appellant had cut down the deceased. On hearing the shouts her husband came out from the sugar cane crop and went towards the appellant. Appellant threw the axe and ran away. No damaging admission could be elicited during the cross-examination of this witness. 8. P.W.8 stated that on hearing the shouts of his wife, he came out for the sugar cane field and saw the appellant standing with axe in his hand. His bicycle was lying nearby. The deceased had sustained bleeding injury on her neck and was lying on the ground; her legs were in the water of the ditch and the head on the grassy portion. P.W.9 was spraying insecticide on cotton crop. He asked P.W.9 to catch the appellant who was running towards the river and started chasing the appellant. The appellant entered the river where there were thorny plants thus, he gave up the chase, as he was bare footed and returned to the scene of the occurrence. 9. P.W.9 stated that on 17th July, 2003 at about 10.00 to 11.00 O'clock in the morning, he was spraying insecticide in his field. When he heard shouts ofP.W.8, he saw appellant running away from a distance of 100 feet. The appellant entered the stream and disappeared. He then went to the scene of the occurrence in the field ofP.W.8. The deceased had sustained bleeding injury on her neck. P.W.8 and P.W.4 were there. Complainant and his mother Kantabai also came there. The deceased was then taken to the hospital. 10. P.W.12 Chandrakant is the son of P.W.8. He stated that at the time of the incident he had been to the neighbouring field. At about 11.00 or 11.30 in the morning, he heard the shouts and came to his field. The deceased was lying on the ground with bleeding injury to her neck. The axe was lying near the ditch. P.W.12 Chandrakant is the son of P.W.8. He stated that at the time of the incident he had been to the neighbouring field. At about 11.00 or 11.30 in the morning, he heard the shouts and came to his field. The deceased was lying on the ground with bleeding injury to her neck. The axe was lying near the ditch. Complainant, parents of the complainant and his parents were at the spot. On the arrival of the police Panchanama of the scene of the occurrence was prepared in his presence. Grass stained with blood, control soil, basket containing clothes brought for washing, axe and bicycle were attached under Panchanama (Exh.33). 11. P.I. Jatale (P.W.14) stated that on 17-7-2003 complainant lodged report (Exh.38) at the police station at about 12.30 p.m. On the basis of this report the offence was registered under section 302 of the Penal Code. He then visited the spot and prepared inquest Panchanama (Exh.34), incriminating articles including axe, bicycle, basket, clothes, blood stained soil and control soil were attached under Panchanama (Exh.33) in presence of the witnesses. Clothes of the deceased were attached under Panchanama (Exh.14). He then recorded statements of seven persons. On 23rd he sent incriminating articles to the Forensic Laboratory. Subsequently the investigation was handed over to A.P.I. Goutam (not examined). 12. The Trial Judge found that the prosecution case rests on the circumstantial evidence. Relying on the evidence of the medical officer, the Trial Judge held that the deceased died a homicidal death and rejected the defence of accidental or suicidal death. In view of the evidence of P.W.5 and P. W.11 showing that the theft of ornaments might have been committed after the incident and the improvements in the evidence of P.Ws.6, 7 and 13, the Trial Judge held that evidence regarding motive is not reliable. However, he found the evidence of P.W.4, 8 and 9 to be trustworthy. Their evidence established the chain of circumstances leading to the inescapable conclusion that the appellant and appellant alone caused death of the deceased. In conformity of this conclusion, the Trial Judge convicted the appellant of committing murder of the deceased and sentenced him as stated earlier. 13. In support of the appeal, learned counsel Smt. Sadhana Jadhav argued that in the ordinary course the murderer would not wait at the scene of the occurrence. In conformity of this conclusion, the Trial Judge convicted the appellant of committing murder of the deceased and sentenced him as stated earlier. 13. In support of the appeal, learned counsel Smt. Sadhana Jadhav argued that in the ordinary course the murderer would not wait at the scene of the occurrence. Thus, the prosecution witnesses must have seen him from the back side while he was running away. If this fact is accepted, the evidence of P.W.4, 8 and 9 that they saw the appellant is based on conjectures and surmises. Conviction can not be founded on such evidence. For this proposition reliance is placed on the decision of the Apex Court in the matter of Bhimappa Chandappa Hosmani and others Vs. State of Karnataka, reported in 2006 AIR SCW 5043 : [2006 ALL MR (Cri) 3572 (S.C.)]. Pointing out that no blood was found on the weapon and the possibility that the injury might not have been caused by the axe having curved blade, learned counsel argued that the evidence falls short of establishing chain of circumstances excluding the possibility of innocence of the appellant. Referring to the anomalies pointed out, learned counsel contends that the appellant deserves to be acquitted. 14. Appearing on behalf of the respondent State, learned Additional Public Prosecutor Shri. Shinde, supported the order of conviction and sentence passed by the Trial Court. Referring to the principles laid down by the Apex Court in Usman Mian and others Vs. State of Bihar, reported in (2004)10 SCC 786; learned A.P.P. contends that the cogent and reliable evidence ofP.W.4, 8 and 9 establish the chain of circumstances which excludes the possibility of the innocence of the accused and proves his guilt beyond doubt. 15. In the present case, it is not in dispute that there is no eye-witness to the incident. The prosecution relies solely on the circumstantial evidence to establish guilt of the appellant. In all cases it is not essential for the prosecution to produce direct evidence. Conviction can be founded on the circumstantial evidence if the circumstances proved forge a chain, so complete that it does not admit any hypothesis than the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused. Each of the circumstances has to be conclusively proved and should be incompatible with the innocence of the accused. Conviction can be founded on the circumstantial evidence if the circumstances proved forge a chain, so complete that it does not admit any hypothesis than the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused. Each of the circumstances has to be conclusively proved and should be incompatible with the innocence of the accused. The evidence on record has to be pragmatically assessed in coming to the conclusion of the guilt of the accused. If upon evaluating the evidence in proper perspective two inferences are possible, one consistent with the innocence of the accused and the other compatible with his guilt, benefit of doubt must go to the accused. In all cases it is not necessary that there should be long chain of the circumstances. What is required is that the circumstances proved unerringly point to the guilt of the accused and exclude every possibility of his innocence. The test to be applied in such cases are laid down by the Apex Court in Sardar Khan vs. State of Karnataka, (2004)2 see 442, at page 446. In para 20 of the report it is observed. "20. There cannot be any doubt whatsoever that with a view to satisfactorily prove the commission of a crime on the basis of circumstantial evidence, the prosecution must satisfy that: (1) the circumstances from which an inference of guilt is to be drawn must be cogently and firmly established; (2) the circumstances should have a tendency to unerringly point to the guilt of the accused; and (3) the circumstances taken cumulatively should form a chain so complete that there is no escape from the conclusion that within all human probabilities the crime is committed by the accused and no one else. One of the factors which had been taken into consideration by both the courts below is that the appellant was absconding since the date of incident and he had to be arrested." 16. If the prosecution case rests solely on the circumstantial evidence, the evidence has to be tested on the touchstone of the principles applicable to such cases. In expounding the law on the subject, learned Additional Public Prosecutor Shri. Shinde has rightly referred to the decision of the Supreme Court in Usman Mian vs. State of Bihar, (2004)10 SCC 786, at page 793. In expounding the law on the subject, learned Additional Public Prosecutor Shri. Shinde has rightly referred to the decision of the Supreme Court in Usman Mian vs. State of Bihar, (2004)10 SCC 786, at page 793. While considering the principles enunciated by the earlier decisions to the commentary on the subject in Wills; Circumstantial Evidence (Chapter VI) which lays down the rules specially to be observed in the case of circumstantial evidence which are (1) the facts alleged as the basis of any legal inference must be clearly proved and beyond reasonable doubt connected with the factum probandum; (2) the burden of proof is always on the party who asserts the existence of any fact, which infers legal accountability; (3) in all cases, whether of direct or circumstantial evidence, the best evidence must be adduced which the nature of the case admits; (4) in order to justify the inference of guilt, the inculpatory facts must be incompatible with the innocence of the accused and incapable of explanation, upon any other reasonable hypothesis than that of his guilt; and (5) if there be any reasonable doubt of the guilt of the accused he is entitled as of right to be acquitted. 17. In the present case, the prosecution has adduced evidence regarding motive for the commission of the crime by examining mother of the deceased (P.W.6), her father (P.W.7) and grandfather (P.W.13). The Trial Judge has discarded their evidence as the version ofP.W.5 and P.W.l1 tends to show that the theft might have been committed after the occurrence. Both these witnesses have given the time of the appellant by approximation. Their evidence does prove that the appellant had sold ornaments belonging to his mother and the deceased. Assuming that the sale was after the incident, it does ipso facto give rise to an inference that the theft must have been committed soon after the incident. The theft can precede the sale. The fact that after persuasions, the appellant had retuned ornaments of his materal aunt substantiates this inference. Further, if in fact the deceased had disclosed sexual overtures of the appellant to her husband and mother-in-law, it is but natural that she would disclose this fact to her parents, nay, before taking a decision to acquaint her husband about the conduct of her brother-in-law; the deceased would consult her parents. Further, if in fact the deceased had disclosed sexual overtures of the appellant to her husband and mother-in-law, it is but natural that she would disclose this fact to her parents, nay, before taking a decision to acquaint her husband about the conduct of her brother-in-law; the deceased would consult her parents. The evidence of P.Ws.6, 7 and 13 on this point appears to be natural and trustworthy. It is true that because the non-examination of A.P.I. Gautam the defence did not get the opportunity of proving alleged improvements made by these witnesses and that there is some delay in recording their statements, but these facts would not justify the conclusion that their evidence is per se unreliable. The fact that other evidence on record is sufficient to establish guilt of the appellant is also not sufficient reason to lightly brush aside evidence of the relatives of the deceased on the ground that they are partisan witnesses. Considering the totality of the circumstances, in our opinion, the conclusion of the Trial Judge that the evidence of these witnesses on the point of conduct of the appellant towards the deceased and the theft of ornaments by him can not be accepted. Evidence of these witnesses regarding motive is trustworthy. Their evidence establish motive for the commission of offence. 18. There is no dispute that the deceased died a homicidal death. Evidence of P.W.3 shows that, the deceased had sustained an incised wound on right upper 1/3rd of the neck which was oblique in direction; having the size of 7 x 5 x 1.5 cms. Skin and sub-cutanous tissues were cut, exposing sterno-mastoid muscle. Vessels and jugular vein were cut, whereas, the carotid artery was partially cut. The death was caused on account of hemorrhagic shock due to cutting of carotid artery. P.W.3 has rightly ruled out possibility of accidental or suicidal death. An injury of this kind, especially on the right side of the neck, can not be self inflicted. The theory of accident also can not be accepted as a person washing the clothes would either fall forward or backward. He would not fall on the side of the body. Thus, there can be no impediment in holding that the deceased died a homicidal death. The site selected, the weapon used and the force applied establish beyond doubt that the injury was inflicted with the intention of causing the death. He would not fall on the side of the body. Thus, there can be no impediment in holding that the deceased died a homicidal death. The site selected, the weapon used and the force applied establish beyond doubt that the injury was inflicted with the intention of causing the death. 19. Learned Counsel for the appellant has propounded a theory that the culprit would not wait at the scene of occurrence after commission of the offence. Therefore, in all probability, P.Ws.4, 8 and 9 must have seen the assailant from the back side while he was running away. It is also argued that the axe found at the spot does not have blood on the blade and could not have been used for the commission of offence as the injury sustained by the deceased could not have been caused by the axe having curved blade. The medical officer has categorically rejected the suggestion that the axe having curved blade would not cause such an injury. The axe was found under the pipe of the bore well from which the water was flowing. This fact explains absence of the blood on the blade of the axe. Considering these circumstances, we are unable to sustain contention of the learned counsel that the axe found on the spot was not used for the commission of the offence. 20. Learned Counsel has next contended that the natural conduct of the culprit would be to escape from the scene of occurrence immediately after accomplishing his object. Therefore, no reliance can be placed on the evidence ofP.W.4 that the appellant was waiting at the scene of the occurrence after assaulting the deceased. In support of this contention, reliance is placed on the decision of the Apex Court in Bhimappa Chandrappa Hosmani and others Vs. State of Karnataka. In that case, mother of the deceased made improvements in her evidence to show that her son (P.W.2) who was sleeping inside the house had seen the incident from the beginning. P.W.2 himself admitted during his cross-examination that he came on the scene of occurrence only after the incident and had seen dead body of his brother. In this background, it is held that evidence of P.W.1 and P.W.2 is not reliable. In our considered opinion, this ruling is not applicable to the facts of the present case. Each case depends on its own facts. In this background, it is held that evidence of P.W.1 and P.W.2 is not reliable. In our considered opinion, this ruling is not applicable to the facts of the present case. Each case depends on its own facts. Similarly between two cases it is not sufficient to justify application of the dictum of one case to the other, without considering the issues involved in proper perspective. In the present case, the theory propounded by learned counsel for the appellant that prosecution witnesses must have been the culprit from the backside while he was running away has no foundation from the evidence on record. Besides, it must be borne in mind that each person reacts differently in a given situation. Some are stupefied, some feel remorse and some try to frighten the onlookers. The reaction of the perpetrator depends upon his personality and the situation in which he finds himself at the crucial moment. Reaction time for each individual is also different. Therefore, it can not be assumed as a rule that the assailant would invariably run away from the scene of the occurrence after perpetrating the offence. The presence of P.W.4, P.W.8 and P.W.9, at the scene of occurrence is natural and is not denied. Evidence of P.W.4 shows that while she was at the house; she saw the appellant going towards the scene of occurrence with his bicycle. Soon thereafter, she heard the shriek, came out from the house and saw the appellant standing near the victim with axe in his hand. Considering the fact that the incident has taken place in a broad day light and the fact that P.W.4 could have seen the appellant by taking only few steps, after emerging form the house, her evidence appears to be logical and trustworthy. Her evidence is corroborated by the evidence of P.W.8 and P.W.9. Both of them are acquainted with the appellant. P.W.8 was weeding grass in the sugar cane crop. He came to the spot on hearing the shouts of his wife and saw the appellant near the deceased who was lying on the ground. When he was approaching the spot, the appellant started running away. He chased the appellant but had to abandon the chase as he was bare footed and the appellant crossed the stream at the place where there were thorny plants. When he was approaching the spot, the appellant started running away. He chased the appellant but had to abandon the chase as he was bare footed and the appellant crossed the stream at the place where there were thorny plants. P.W.9 has also stated that he was spraying insecticide on the cotton crop in his field. On hearing the call of P.W.8, he looked up and saw the appellant who was running away. He then unstrapped the spray pump and came to the spot. At that time, he saw the deceased lying near the ditch with bleeding injury to her neck. P.W.4 and P.W.5 disclosed name of the appellant to the mother and brother of the appellant immediately after the incident. The incident took place at about 11.00 or 11.30 a.m. and the name of the appellant is mentioned in F.I.R. lodged on the basis of information given by these witnesses at 12.30 p.m. On the basis of this report, offence came to be registered against the appellant. Statement ofP.W.4 was recorded on the same day. She has mentioned name of the appellant in her statement. Besides, the bicycle of the appellant is found on the spot. All these circumstances lend credence to the evidence of P.W.4, P.W.S and P.W.9. No material omissions or contradictions in their evidence are brought On record. The evidence of these witnesses do not suffer from any infirmity. Therefore, no fault can be found with the conclusion of the Trial Judge that the evidence of P.W.4, P.W.S and P.W.9 is cogent, consistent and reliable. Considering totality of the circumstances, we can not persuade ourselves to accept contention of learned counsel for the appellant that the witnesses saw the assailant from the back side and presumed that he is the appellant; therefore, no reliance can be placed on their evidence. 21. Considering totality of the circumstances, we can not persuade ourselves to accept contention of learned counsel for the appellant that the witnesses saw the assailant from the back side and presumed that he is the appellant; therefore, no reliance can be placed on their evidence. 21. Evidence of the prosecution witnesses establish that (i) the appellant had an evil eye on the deceased (ii) this fact was disclosed by the deceased to her parents (iii) the appellant had committed theft of the ornaments of the deceased and his mother and sold sole them to P.W.S and 11 (iv) P.WA was the appellant going towards the spot with his bicycle and (v) P.W.4 and S had been the appellant near the deceased immediately after the incident (v) P.W.4 had immediately disclosed his name to the husband and mother-in-law of the deceased (vi) name of the appellant is mentioned in the F.I.R. lodged soon after the incident and (vii) the bicycle of the appellant was found at the scene of occurrence. These circumstances proved by the prosecution establish beyond doubt that the appellant has committed murder of his sister-in-law. Considering the totality of the circumstances, in our considered opinion, no fault can be found with the conclusion of the Trial Judge that the appellant has committed murder of the deceased. In the result, the appeal must fail and is dismissed accordingly. Appeal dismissed.