JUDGMENT 1. - This special appeal is directed against the order of the learned Single Judge dismissing the writ petition of the appellant as not maintainable. The learned Single Judge took the view that the order of the Recovery Officer against which the appellant had filed the writ petition was appealable under Section 20 of the Recovery of Debts Due to Banking and Financial Institutions Act, 1993. 2. The submission of the counsel for the appellant is that right of appeal under Section 20 is available only to parties to the proceedings. The appellant was not party to the proceeding and appeal at his instance would not be maintainable. The appellant had filed objection before the Recovery Officer objecting to the auction sale of certain property which, he contends, belongs to him. Sub-section (2) of Section 20 does not suggest that right of appeal is limited only to parties to the proceeding. The words are "any person aggrieved by an order". The appeal, therefore, prima facie was maintainable. In any view, had the appellant preferred appeal and the same had not been entertained by the appellate tribunal, it was open to the appellant to approach this Court. 3. Counsel referred to Sub-section (3) of Section 20 and submitted that the appeal can be filed only within a period of 45 days which period has already expired. We are not impressed by the submission. Firstly, the appellant does not contend that he was not aware of the order of the Recovery Officer which in fact was passed on his application. If he did not file appeal within time, he alone is to blame. Secondly, under proviso to Sub-section (3), the appellate tribunal has power to entertain the appeal even after expiry of period of limitation, if it is satisfied that there was sufficient cause for not filing it within the period of limitation. 4. Counsel then submitted that Section 21 of the Act provides for deposit of 75% of the amount of debt as a condition for filing appeal and therefore, right of appeal, if any, is illusory. We do not find any force in this submission either. Validity of the provision requiring the deposit of part of the assessed amount which is often found in fiscal statutes cannot be challenged nor it has been challenged in this case. We do not find any force in this submission either. Validity of the provision requiring the deposit of part of the assessed amount which is often found in fiscal statutes cannot be challenged nor it has been challenged in this case. As a matter of fact, that question does not arise for consideration in this case. Prime facie Section 21 is applicable only to appeals filed by any person "from whom the amount of debt is due". The appellant is not a debtor and it is not his case that any amount of debt is due from him. Therefore, Section 21 of the Act would not stand in the way of his filing appeal. 5. Counsel referred to judgment of Supreme Court in Industrial Credit and Investment Corp. of India Ltd. v. Grapco Industries Ltd. & Ors., (1999) 4 SCC 710 . The decision is an authority on the grant of interim relief by the tribunal or by the High Court. The question as to whether without exhausting alternative remedy of appeal under the Act, a person can file writ petition was not decided in the case. 6. We find no error in the order of the learned Single Judge to warrant interference by the Division Bench. The appeal is dismissed.Appeal dismissed. *******