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2006 DIGILAW 1950 (MAD)

Numeric Power Systems Limited, Chennai, rep. by its Managing Director v. Mohammed Muzaffar, Chennai and Others

2006-08-02

S.R.SINGHARAVELU

body2006
JUDGMENT Per S.R. SINGHARAVELU, J. These original applications are filed by the applicant/plaintiff Numeric Power Systems Limited to pass an order of interim injunction, restraining the respective respondent/defendant from joining the employment of any organization or company engaged in the business of UPS sales, either directly or indirectly with the applicant, pending disposal of the suits. 2. The case in brief in O.A. No.456 of 2006 in C.S. No.411 of 2006 is as follows: The applicant/plaintiff is a company engaged in the manufacture and supply of Uninterrupted Power Supply (UPS) Systems. The respondent/defendant was appointed to the employment of the applicant on 13.9.2004. At the time of joining, the applicant undertook not to join any competing establishment for a period of one year after leaving the services of the applicant company. The respondent, being a Service Engineer, is in frequent contact with the clients and customers of the applicant. 3. In 2006, the applicant, which had a business relationship with a foreign company by name MGE UPS Systems, of France, underwent some difficulties in its relationship with that company. Ultimately, the applicant decided to terminate its relationship with the company. The said MGE UPS Systems of France has now proposed to commence operations in India and will be engaged in manufacture, sales and services of UPS Systems. The applicant has now learnt that the respondent along with about 20 employees, plan to leave the employment of the applicant en masse and join the service of the said MGE UPS. They have no right to do so. 4. In the counter, it is stated that the alleged appointment order dated 13.9.2004 was never executed by the respondent, but only Service Agreement dated 8.11.2004 was entered into. No appointment letter was offered to the respondent. The respondent was trained for and gained experience exclusively in respect of three phase UPS Systems, manufactured by MGE UPS Systems of France. In early 2006, the business relationship between the applicant and MGE soured and they decided to part ways. Most of the employees started to look for new job opportunities and the respondent tendered his resignation on 3.5.2006, which has been accepted by the applicant. Clause 13 of the Appointment Order has no relevance to the proceedings. Due to the resignation of the respondent, the applicant would not suffer any irreparable loss or hardship at all. Most of the employees started to look for new job opportunities and the respondent tendered his resignation on 3.5.2006, which has been accepted by the applicant. Clause 13 of the Appointment Order has no relevance to the proceedings. Due to the resignation of the respondent, the applicant would not suffer any irreparable loss or hardship at all. His joining in another company will not be in any manner prejudicial to the interest of the business activities of the applicant. 5. The applicant has filed reply affidavit, denying the averments in the counter. 6. Varying facts regarding individuals in each case are as follows: Defendant Job profile Date of appointment order and whether signed it or not Non-compete clause and period Sergice Agreement and date and whether signed it or not Datwe of resignation Laste date of employment and handling over charge Md. Muzaffar CS411/2006 Service Engineer 13.9.2004 Appt. Order not signed Clause 13/ one year 8.11.2004 Service agreement signed 3.5.2006 27.5.2006 J. Arun Kumar CS412/2006 Service Engineer 23.9.2004 Signed Clause 6/ six months 23.9.2002 Signed 31.5.2006 31.5.2006 R. Sivakumar CS414/2006 Service Engineer 1.2.2005 not signed Clause 15/ one year No agreement not signed 5.5.2006 26.5.2006 K.R. Shah CS425/2006 VP-Sales Western India 4.12.1999 signed No non-compete clause No agreement N/A 6.5.2006 10.5.2006 Hridaya Narayana Tiwari CS426/2006 Service Technician 1.2.2006 signed Clause 8/ 5 years No agreement No letter P. Karthikeyan CS427/2006 Service Engineer 13.9.2004 not signed Clause 13/ one years 8.11.2004 signed 19.4.2006 31.5.2006 T. Vijayamohan CS428/2006 Service Engineer 8.11.2003 signed Clause 14/ one years 17.11.2003 signed 29.5.2006 29.5.2006 Bejoy Thomas CS429/2006 Service Engineer 10.2.1996 signed No non-compete clause No. S.A. But undertaking signed on 9.5.2006 N/A 6.4.2006 6.5.2006 Rajesh Akolkar CS430/2006 Regl. Manager Mumbai Marketing & Sales 28.10.2002 signed Clause 19/ 18 months No Agreement N/A 4.4.2006 10.5.2006 Antony Arokiadoss CS431/2006 Service Engineer 1.1.2005 signed Clause 15/ one year 15.12.2004 signed valid for 3 years 17.4.2006 15.5.2006 P. Prabhakar CS432/2006 Service Engineer 6.1.2001 signed No Non-compete clause 18.1.2002 signed valid for 3 years 10.4.2006 8.6.2006 V.N. Rajavelan CS433/2006 Service Engineer 20.1.2005 signed Clause 15/ one year 14.2.2002 signed valid for 3 years 4.5.2006 3.6.2006 7. Among the two limbs of arguments advanced by the learned senior counsel Mr. Among the two limbs of arguments advanced by the learned senior counsel Mr. R. Krishnamurthy for the applicant/plaintiff, one is about the confidentiality involved in the job of the respondents/employees, who it was apprehended may carry on to the new employer, where the respondents propose to join. The proposed new employer is none else than the company at France with whom the applicant/plaintiff already entered into an agreement as a sole representative in India. Now, the said company coming itself to get it established in India directly is said to be luring the employees of the petitioner/plaintiff. Considering the job of the employees and also the lack of evidence on the part of the petitioner in establishing as to what is the confidentiality that has been endeavoured to be carried on to the proposed employer, Mr. P.S. Raman, learned senior counsel for employees pointed out that there is lack of evidence in this case that the employees are at all possessed with any trade secret so as to communicate to other, much less to the present company of petitioner. The facts herein do support this view that there is lack of prima facie material in this regard on the side of petitioner. Following are the case laws on this aspect. 8. Referring to a foot note in Commercial Plastics Ltd. v. Vincent 1964 (3) All E.R. 546 which has been mentioned at para 21 of the judgment of a Division Bench of this Court in a case reported in G. R. V. Rajan v. Tube Investment of India Ltd. 1995 (1) LW 274 , it was observed that “the use of more general technical knowledge, acquired in the course of employment, must be carefully distinguished from confidential information and it is not a valid interest which the employer can claim to protect by a restraining covenant.” 9. It has been held in Ambiance India Pvt. Ltd. v. Shri Naveen Jain 2005 (81) DRJ 538 : 2005 (122) DLJ 421, as follows: “6. It is also to be added that a trade secret is some protected and confidential information which the employee has acquired in the course of his employment and which should not reach others in the interest of the employer. However, routine day-to-day affairs of employer which are in the knowledge of many and are commonly known to others cannot be called trade secrets. However, routine day-to-day affairs of employer which are in the knowledge of many and are commonly known to others cannot be called trade secrets. A trade secret can be a formulae, technical know-how or a peculiar mode or method of business adopted by an employer which is unknown to others. 7.....In a business house, the employees discharging their duties come across so many matters, but all these matters are not trade secrets or confidential matters or formulae, the divulgence of which may be injurious to the employer. If the defendant on account of his employment with the plaintiff has learnt some business acumen or ways of dealing with the customers or clients, the same do not constitute trade secrets or confidential informations, the divulgence or use of which should be prohibited.” 10. In the case of American Express Bank Ltd. v. Priya Puri DE-2006-880, it was observed as follows: “34. In the garb of confidentiality, the plaintiff is trying to contend that once the customer of plaintiff, always a customer of plaintiff. Can a competitor Bank be restrained from dealing with the customers of the Bank on the ground that the Bank maintains written record of its customers. The option of the customer/clients to Bank with any one cannot be curtailed on the plea of confidentiality of their details with any particular Bank. Those cases will be different where the processes and products which may be confidential are taken by another organization or company. If the plaintiff Bank does not have a right to insist that no one should deal with its customers, on the ground of confidentiality of the information regarding its customers, the bank cannot be allowed to achieve the same indirectly....”. Thus, information will only be protected if it can properly be classified as a trade secret or as material which, while not properly to be described as a trade secret, is in all the circumstances of such a highly confidential nature as to require the same protection as a trade secret. In this connection, it has not been proved that such confidential designs or drawings or know-how are at all known by the respondents in order to carry to another company. Here, the prospective company to which the employees propose to join is the company under which the petitioner itself had drawn its existence. In this connection, it has not been proved that such confidential designs or drawings or know-how are at all known by the respondents in order to carry to another company. Here, the prospective company to which the employees propose to join is the company under which the petitioner itself had drawn its existence. Therefore, the reasoning that employees may carry the confidentiality may not go in support of petitioner. 11. The other limb is about the executability of the negative covenant during the existence of the employment or (the notice period) that after cessation of that nexus. In this connection, the first case law is Niranjan Shankar Golikari v. Century Spinning and Manufacturing Co. Ltd. AIR 1967 SC 1098 and referring which the next case law is Superintendence Co. of India v. Krishan Murgai AIR 1980 SC 1717 : 1981 (2) SCC 246 . 12. It has been found in G.R.V. Rajan v. Tube Investment of India Ltd. (supra) that the ratio in the judgment of A.P. Sen, J., in Superintendence Co. of India v. Krishan Murgai (supra) in is binding on this Court, which was also found so in R. Babu v. TTK LIG Ltd. formerly London Rubber Co. (India) Ltd. rep. by its President, (Operations), Chennai 2004 (2) CTC 684 in the following lines: “6. ... the judgment of His Lordship. A.P. Sen, J., cannot be construed as a dissenting judgment. It is a case in which two learned Judges of the Bench did not deal with the question while the third learned Judge dealt with and also declared the law. The dictum of His Lordship A.P. Sen, J., is undoubtedly the law declared by the Supreme Court as contemplated by Article 141 of the Constitution of India and it shall be binding on all Courts within the territory of India and there is no escape from that conclusion”. 13. It has also been held at the end of para 35 of the judgment in G.R.V. Rajan v. Tube Investment of India Ltd. (supra) that the judgment of A.P. Sen, J., does not run counter to the judgment of two learned Judges in Niranjan Shankar Golikari v. Century Spinning and Manufacturing Co. Ltd. (supra) and so, the earlier one would prevail. In fact, in Superintendence Co. Ltd. (supra) and so, the earlier one would prevail. In fact, in Superintendence Co. of India v. Krishan Murgai (supra), case it has been clearly laid mat the decision in Niranjan Shankar Golikari v. Century Spinning and Manufacturing Co. Ltd. (supra) is not applicable to a case in which a situation arises after the expiry of the contract of service between the employer and employee. 14. Even according to Niranjan Shankar Golikari v. Century Spinning and Manufacturing Co. Ltd. (supra) negative covenant may be executed during the existence of contract. According to Superintendence Co. of India v. Krishan Murgai it cannot be executed after the expiry of contract of employment. 15. In a Division Bench judgment of Calcutta High Court given in the case of Burn Company, 9 CLJ 190, an Engineer Macdonald had been brought by that company from England to work for them for five years. In case of leaving employment earlier, he was to pay damages. He left employment and refused to pay damages. The Court did not permit him to continue his work with another employer with whom he had joined. 16. It was held in Electrosteel Castings Ltd. v. Saw Pipes Ltd. and Others 2005 (1) CHN 612 that the restriction against the working with a competitor during the period of one’s parent employment is not a restriction against profession but it is a restriction against breach of faith and loyalty. 17. Mr. P.S. Raman, the learned senior counsel for employees cited the following case laws: (i) Jet Airways (I) Ltd. v. Jan Peter Ravi Karnik 2004 (4) Bom. C.R. 487; (ii) Polaris Software Lab. Ltd., rep. by its Company Secretary v. Suren Khiwadkar 2004-I-LLJ-323 (Mad.) and (iii) Ambiance India Pvt. Ltd. v. Shri Naveen Jain (supra). These cases revealed the very same position of law, as laid down in cases of Niranjan Shankar Golikari v. Century Spinning and Manufacturing Co. Ltd. (supra) and Superintendence Co. of India v. Krishan Murgai (supra). 18. To mention again, the proposition laid down in Niranjan Shankar Golikari v. Century Spinning and Manufacturing Co. Ltd. (supra) is as follows: “(i) The considerations against the restrictive covenants are different in cases where the restraint is applied after termination of the contract. (ii) The restraints during the period of the contract are generally not regarded as restraints on trade and, therefore, are outside Section 27. Ltd. (supra) is as follows: “(i) The considerations against the restrictive covenants are different in cases where the restraint is applied after termination of the contract. (ii) The restraints during the period of the contract are generally not regarded as restraints on trade and, therefore, are outside Section 27. (iii) The restrictions operating during the term of the contract may be void if they are excessively harsh or unconscionable”. The substance of the decision of Mr. Justice A.P. Sen on the question of validity of post-service restraint is this: “(a) Section 27 of the Indian Contract Act is a statutory recognition of the English doctrine of restrain on trade. (b) Once statutorily enacted, the rule must be interpreted on the basis of the language of the statute uninfluenced by” the manner in which the analogous provision comes to be construed ... in order to bring the construction within the scope and limitations of the rule governing the English doctrine of restraint of trade“. (c) Whether an agreement is void under Section 27 of the Contract Act must be decided upon the wording of that Section. All agreements in restraint of trade are void. The only exception is in exception No. 1 (d) Section 27 of the Contract Act does not admit, of the test of reasonableness unless the case falls within the exception. (e) Section 27 has wiped out the distinction between partial and total restraint and declares all restraints void unless covered by the exception, (vide Taprogge Ganeshchaft v.I.A.E.C. India Ltd., MANU/MH/0332/ 1988)”. 19. Now, in the series of cases except C. S. No. 426 of 2006, wherein there was abandonment, in all other cases the respective employee has given resignation letter either by post or by E-mail. Learned senior counsel Mr. R. Krishnamurthy relying upon State Bank of Patiala v. Phoolpati 2005 (3) SCC 88 submitted that a complete and effective act of resigning office is one which severs the link of the resignor with his office and terminates his tenure. Learned senior counsel Mr. R. Krishnamurthy relying upon State Bank of Patiala v. Phoolpati 2005 (3) SCC 88 submitted that a complete and effective act of resigning office is one which severs the link of the resignor with his office and terminates his tenure. This position was highlighted by a Constitution Bench of this Court in Union of India v. Gopal Chandra Misra AIR 1978 SC 694 : 1978 (2) SCC 301 and reiterated in Balram Gupta v. Union of India AIR 1987 SC 2354 : 1987 Supp SCC 228, J.N. Srivastava v. Union of India, AIR 1999 SC 1571: 1998 (9) SCC 559 , Nand Keshwar Prasad v. Indian Farmer’s Fertilizers Co-op. Ltd. AIR 1999 SC 558 : 1998 (5) SCC 461 , Shambhu Murari Sinha v. Project and Development India Ltd. AIR 2003 SC 1709 : 2002 (3) SCC 437 . 20. Therefore, it was factually argued that as no resignation was accepted by the petitioner company, there is existing jural relationship and the principle laid in Superintendence Co. of India v. Krishan Murgai (supra) as it was applicable only on a situation after expiry of the contract of employment, may not be applicable and what is stated in Niranjan Shankar Golikari v. Century Spinning and Manufacturing Co. Ltd. (supra) case alone will be applicable as it deals with the effective negative covenant during the existence of the contract of employment. 21. That is why it was held in Electrosteel Castings Ltd. v. Saw Pipes Ltd. (supra) that the clause is bad and against the expressed words in Section 27 of the Indian Contract Act, in so far as it prevents the employees from working with a competitor even after leaving the first employment. It was held that the whole clause may not get tainted because if the employee is working with the employer, he will work with the employer only. That is why it has been clarified by the words of Section 27 that the bad clause is only to that extent void. 22. But in the instant case, before us, there is no cessation of jural relationship of employer and employee because of the reason that the same may come to an end only upon acceptance of resignation letter. This has the basis in State Bank of Patiala v. Phoolpati (supra) and therefore, during the subsistence of contract of employment, the negative covenant can be executed. This has the basis in State Bank of Patiala v. Phoolpati (supra) and therefore, during the subsistence of contract of employment, the negative covenant can be executed. So far as C.S. No. 426 of 2006 is concerned, it is the case of abandoning the duty even without resignation; that may only be indicating the existence of the contract of employment. Abandoning of the employee by itself may not severe the jural relationship. 23. Mr. P.S. Raman, learned senior counsel for the respondents ultimately relied upon Percept D’Markr (India) P. Ltd. v. Zaheer Khan and Another 2006 (2) LW 870, wherein, of course it is found at para 54 that “while construing the provisions of Section 27 of the Contract Act, neither the test of reasonableness nor the principle of restraint being partial is appreciable, unless it falls within express exception engrafted in Section 27 of the Contract Act”, which deals with goodwill of the business. Therefore, reasonability and principle of restraint will be made appreciable only in cases involving goodwill of the business and not otherwise. But even in that judgment at para 42, it has been held that so far as restraint of trade during the post-contractual period, the law is uniform since judgment of Sir. Richard Couch, C.J., in Madhup Chunder v. Rajcoomar Doss (1874) 14 Beng. L.R. 761. It has been further observed as follows: “The interpretation of Section 27 of the Contract Act which found prima facie favour with the Division Bench is one which has been uniformly and consistently followed from 1874 till 2006 by all High Courts in India and which has been approved by this Court in Niranjan Shankar Golikari (supra), Superintendence Co. of India (supra), Gujarat Bottling (supra). Even if there were a case for reconsideration of this 132 year old interpretation, though none is made out by the appellant, such an exercise ought not to be undertaken in the present interlocutory proceedings....” From this it is made clear that, this judgment also approves the law laid down in Niranjan Shankar Golikari v. Century Spinning and Manufacturing Co. Ltd. (supra), Superintendence Co. of India v. Krishan Murgai (supra), case and Gujarat Bottling referred above. Therefore, the negative covenant, according to Niranjan Shankar Golikari v. Century Spinning and Manufacturing Co. Ltd. (supra), Superintendence Co. of India v. Krishan Murgai (supra), case and Gujarat Bottling referred above. Therefore, the negative covenant, according to Niranjan Shankar Golikari v. Century Spinning and Manufacturing Co. Ltd. (supra), is enforceable during the existence of contract and as per the judgment in State Bank of Patiala v. Phoolpati (supra) unless, resignation is accepted, jural relationship continues. Thus, as per the facts of the case, jural relationship exists in many cases up to 2006 and in such cases only the negative covenant is enforceable and in such other cases, where the contract is not in existence, then the negative covenant is not enforceable. 24. Regarding the aspects to be considered before granting injunction, in the case law in Jet Airways (I) Ltd. v. Jan Peter Ravi Karnik (supra) also, it was observed that injunction could be granted: (1) where that breach of contract is clear; (2) where amount of money has been spent on the training of the employees; (3) refusal to grant injunction may lead to inducements being offered to competitors to lure away employees of the plaintiffs; (4) when situation may lead to failures of sanctity of contract; (5) when the negative covenant is conscionable, reasonable and protecting the proprietary interest of plaintiff. 25. Therefore, as I have already found, as per the Supreme Court cases during the existence of employment for notice period only, the negative covenant may be enforced. But the same cannot be enforced so far as for the period of one year after leaving the company is concerned. 26. By applying this formula, so far as Md. Muzaffar and P. Karthikeyan in C.S. Nos. 411 and 427 of 2006 are concerned, contract period of three years expires on 13.9.2007. Similarly, so far as R. Sivakumar, Hridaya Narayana Tiwari, Antony Arokiadoss and V.N. Rajavelan(C.S. Nos. 414, 426, 431 and 433 respectively) are concerned, three years’ contract period has not yet expired. Therefore, injunction of negative covenant for the contract period of three years can be enforced. In remaining cases, as the appointment orders are of the year 1996, 1999 and 2002, three years’ period is over and therefore, negative covenant cannot be enforced. 27. Hence, the applicant is entitled to get an order of interim injunction against the respondents in O.A. Nos. 456, 459, 473, 474, 478 and 480 of 2006 in C.S. Nos. In remaining cases, as the appointment orders are of the year 1996, 1999 and 2002, three years’ period is over and therefore, negative covenant cannot be enforced. 27. Hence, the applicant is entitled to get an order of interim injunction against the respondents in O.A. Nos. 456, 459, 473, 474, 478 and 480 of 2006 in C.S. Nos. 411, 414, 426, 427, 431 and 433 of 2006 and the interim order granted on 15.6.2006 is made absolute and O.A. Nos. 457, 472, 475 to 477 and 479 of 2006 in C.S. Nos. 412, 425, 428 to 430 and 432 of 2006 are dismissed.