RAMRAO GOPALRAO ZANAK EDUCATION SOCIETY, CHIWARA v. VASUDEO ANANDA ZAMBRE
2006-12-05
B.P.DHARMADHIKARI
body2006
DigiLaw.ai
ORAL JUDGMENT :- By this writ petition, petitioner No. I-Institution and petitioner No. 2 - its Principal, challenge the judgment delivered by the University and College Tribunal, Nagpur, on 29-10-1996 allowing the Appeal No. A-18 of 1996 filed by present respondent No.1 and quashing and setting aside his termination dated 6-9-1995 and ordering his reinstatement as a confirmed Peon. The Tribunal has also directed the petitioners to pay him all his emoluments from 7-10-1995 till the date of his joining. This Court has while admitting writ petition, granted stay and therefore respondent No. 1 is still out of employment. 2. Respondent No.1 joined the services as Peon on 1-4-1991 and it appears that he was appointed on probation in time scale up to 31-3-1993. He was also confirmed by issuing separate orders with effect from 10-4-1993 as per resolution passed in the meeting of Executive Body of the College. It appears that the petitioners were not receiving any grant-in-aid initially and the College was started in 1989. In fourth year, i.e. in the year 1993, they started receiving 25% of the grant. As respondent No.1 was about 38 years of his age on the date of appointment, he was overage and hence the petitioners moved Director of Education, Maharashtra State, Pune, for relaxation of age limit. On 30-8-1995, Senior Auditor, Higher Education, Amravati Division, Amravati, wrote to the Director of Higher Education, after conducting audit of College of petitioners and pointed out to him that appointment of respondent No.1 was not legal. On 6-91995, the petitioners issued an order of termination mentioning therein that respondent No. 1 was appointed on purely temporary basis and informed him that he would stand discontinued from 7-10-1995. This order was challenged by respondent No. 1 in the appeal as mentioned above. The College Tribunal after hearing both sides found that the petitioners appointed respondent No. 1 with full knowledge of his age and there is no concealment by respondent No.1 in this respect. The College Tribunal relied upon the judgment in the case of Union of India vs. M. Z. Qazi, reported at 1989 Mh.L.J. 134 = 1990(2) BCR 162 to hold that in such circumstances, the petitioners - management could not have been permitted to raise plea of age bar.
The College Tribunal relied upon the judgment in the case of Union of India vs. M. Z. Qazi, reported at 1989 Mh.L.J. 134 = 1990(2) BCR 162 to hold that in such circumstances, the petitioners - management could not have been permitted to raise plea of age bar. It also relied upon another Hon'ble Apex Court judgment in the case of Shri Anadi Mukta Sadguru A. M. V. S. J. M. S. Trust vs. V. R. Rudani, reported at AIR 1989 SC 1607 , to conclude that primarily it is the responsibility of management to pay salary of employees. In view of these rulings and findings, it allowed the appeal and granted respondent No. 1 reliefs as mentioned above. 3. I have heard Shri V. G. Wankhede, learned counsel for the petitioners and Shri Ghare, learned counsel for respondent No. 1. Nobody appears for respondent No.2. 4. Shri Wankhede, learned counsel contended that the moment it was shown that respondent No. 1 was overage, the College Tribunal ought to have seen that he had no right to post and therefore he could not have been given any relief of reinstatement. He contends that all appointments must be made in accordance with the provisions of law and when respondent No. 1 was found to be overage in view of Rule III (b)(1)(i) of the Standard Code, respondent No.1 could not have been given any relief by the College Tribunal. He contends that the theory of estoppel utilised by the College Tribunal in this respect is misconceived and there is no such estoppel in the matter. He further contends that the judgment of Division Bench of this Court in the case of Anna Manikrao Pethe vs. Presiding Officer, School Tribunal, reported at 1997(3) Mh.L.J. 697 , is squarely applicable because the provisions applicable to colleges are more or less identical. He has also relied upon the judgment of Division Bench of Allahabad High Court in the case of Sushil Kumar Dwivedi vs. Basic Shiksha Adhikari, Banda, reported at 2003 Lab.I.C. 2732, to substantiate his contention. 5. Shri Ohare, learned counsel for respondent No.1, on the other hand, contended that section 59 of the Maharashtra Universities Act, 1994, permits its employee to file appeal before the College Tribunal. He states that though phrase employee is not defined in Maharashtra Universities Act, there is no dispute that respondent No.1 is an employee.
5. Shri Ohare, learned counsel for respondent No.1, on the other hand, contended that section 59 of the Maharashtra Universities Act, 1994, permits its employee to file appeal before the College Tribunal. He states that though phrase employee is not defined in Maharashtra Universities Act, there is no dispute that respondent No.1 is an employee. He argues that the law nowhere requires that respondent No. 1 must be an approved employee and therefore, according to him, the reliance upon the Division Bench judgment of this Court in Anna Manikrao Pethe vs. Presiding Officer, School Tribunal, (supra) is misconceived. He further argues that in the said judgment three issues directed to be framed as preliminary issues by the School Tribunal while adjudicating appeal under section 9 of Maharashtra Employees of Private Schools (Conditions of Service) Regulation Act, 1977, (hereinafter referred to as the Act) are not relevant for deciding present controversy. He argues that said direction in that judgment is itself by way of obiter and according to him, the question whether to frame such three issues or not was not relevant for adjudication of controversy. He argues that in judgment in paragraph 14, the controversy on merit has been concluded by the Hon'ble Division Bench and thereafter in paragraph 15, the Division Bench has laid down necessity of framing and deciding three issues. According to him, the discussion in paragraph 15 was not relevant to the question which already stood adjudicated and therefore was not on the point which fell for consideration before the Division Bench. He contends that those findings are therefore not relevant and also not binding on this Court. In order to explain as what is obiter and what can be said to be ratio decidendi, he has relied upon the judgment of this Court in the case of Mohandas Issardas vs. A. N. Sattanathan, reported at AIR 1955 Bombay 113, the judgments of Hon'ble Apex Court in Gasket Radiators Pvt. Ltd. vs. E.S. I.C., reported at (1985)2 SCC 68 and Amar Nath Om Prakash vs. State of Punjab, reported at (1985)1 SCC 345 . He argues that the application of mind by the College Tribunal in the facts of present case is proper. He further argues that the petitioners have not pointed out any provision which estoped them from employing respondent No.1 though he was overage.
He argues that the application of mind by the College Tribunal in the facts of present case is proper. He further argues that the petitioners have not pointed out any provision which estoped them from employing respondent No.1 though he was overage. He contends that approval of Deputy Director may be relevant only for the purpose of releasing grants but then said question is secondary because primarily it is the responsibility of the petitioners to release the salary of respondent No.1. He contends that respondent No. 1 is satisfied even if his salary is released by the petitioners. According to him, in the circumstances, writ petition as filed is misconceived and is liable to be dismissed. 6. There is no dispute between the parties that respondent No.1 is overage. It is to be noticed that the College in question was started on no grant basis in 1989 and date of birth of respondent No.1 is 24-8-1953. Thus, he was above the age of 35 years on 1-4-1991 or 5-4-1991 when he was granted employment initially. He belongs to OBC and the proposal sent by the management seeking condonation of his age mentions that at the relevant time, he was 38 years old. Respondent No.1 was, therefore, age barred on the date of his initial entry in the service. When in this background, the provisions of Maharashtra Universities Act, 1994, are looked into, section 2(10) defines College to mean a college conducted by the university, or affiliated to the university, situated in the university area. Affiliated College has been defined in section 2(3) to mean college which has been granted affiliation by the university. Section 2(26) defines recognised institution to mean an institution of higher learning, research or specialised studies, other than a college and recognised to be so by the university. Section 81 in Chapter X prescribes conditions for affiliation and recognition. Section 81(1) clause (f) deals with the strength and qualification of teaching and non-teaching staff of the affiliated colleges and recognised institutions, emoluments and the terms and conditions of service and the same are required to be such as are prescribed by the University.
Section 81 in Chapter X prescribes conditions for affiliation and recognition. Section 81(1) clause (f) deals with the strength and qualification of teaching and non-teaching staff of the affiliated colleges and recognised institutions, emoluments and the terms and conditions of service and the same are required to be such as are prescribed by the University. The perusal of section 59 of the Maharashtra Universities Act, 1994, shows that any employee in any university or college or recognised institution, who is dismissed or removed or whose services are otherwise terminated or who is reduced in rank by the university or management and who is aggrieved, has been given right of appeal to the College Tribunal under section 59(1). It is, therefore, clear that an employee covered by section 59(1) of the Maharashtra Universities Act is one whose conditions of service, emoluments etc. are regulated by section 81(1)(f) as mentioned above. The contention of the learned counsel for respondent No. 1 that even though respondent No. 1 is not approved, he can still be continued in service and petitioners-management can be asked to pay his salary, by placing reliance upon the judgment in the case of Shri Anadi Mukta Sadguru S.M. V.S.J.M.S. Trust vs. V. R. Rudani, reported at AIR 1989 SC 1607 , is therefore misconceived. 7. Viewed in this background, it is apparent that the observations of Division Bench of this Court in Anna Manikrao Pethe vs. Presiding Officer, School Tribunal, (supra) in paragraph 15 directing the School Tribunal to frame three preliminary issues while embarking adjudication of any appeal, section 9 of MEPS Act will equally apply to appeals under section 59(1) of Maharashtra Universities Act. The said findings in paragraph 15 of the judgment by Division Bench cannot be said to be obiter because the issue in relation to appeal filed before the School Tribunal under section 9 of the MEPS Act by a teacher who was not qualified arose for consideration before the Division Bench and while answering that issue, the observations have been made by the Division Bench. It, therefore, cannot be said that these observations or findings are totally irrelevant to the question which fell for consideration of Division Bench. In view of these conclusions, it is not necessary for this Court to consider the three judgments cited by learned counsel for respondent No. 1 to explain difference between obiter dicta and ratio decidendi.
It, therefore, cannot be said that these observations or findings are totally irrelevant to the question which fell for consideration of Division Bench. In view of these conclusions, it is not necessary for this Court to consider the three judgments cited by learned counsel for respondent No. 1 to explain difference between obiter dicta and ratio decidendi. The moment it is found that respondent No. 1 was overage, it is apparent that he could not have been employed by the petitioners at all. The efforts made by the petitioners for respondent No. 1 to get his age condoned or relaxed did not clothe respondent No.1 with any additional right in this respect. The relationship between parties is governed by provisions of Maharashtra Universities Act and the service conditions are to be regulated in the manner specified in section 81(1)(f) thereof. In these circumstances, the University and College Tribunal, Nagpur, could not have invoked estoppel to contend that the management was not justified in terminating the services of respondent No. 1 as overage. 8. I, therefore, find that the University and College Tribunal, Nagpur, has refused to exercise the jurisdiction available to it in accordance with law. Its judgment dated 29-10-1996 is, therefore, unsustainable and the same is accordingly quashed and set aside. Writ petition is disposed of accordingly. Rule is made absolute in above terms. There shall be no order as to costs. Order accordingly.