Judgment ( 1. ) THIS revision is filed against the order dated 22-11-2004 passed by VIIth additional District Judge, Gwalior in Civil Appeal No. 25-A/2004, whereby the learned Additional District Judge allowed the application of the non-applicant filed under Section 5 of Limitation Act. ( 2. ) BRIEF facts of the case are that the applicant Dindayal Bansal filed a suit for declaration and permanent injunction on the allegation that he has purchased the suit land from deceased Hariram vide registered sale deed dated 21-10-1965. Non-applicant in August, 1974 illegally encroached the said land. The Trial Court vide judgment and decree dated 12-3-1996 decreed the suit of the applicant and declared him as the owner of the land. ( 3. ) ON 7-2-2001 the non-applicant filed an appeal along with an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act for condonation of delay on the ground that no intimation was given by his Counsel about the decision of the suit and on 11-12-2000 for the first time they came to know about the judgment and decree when applicant filed the certified copy of the judgment and decree. Thereafter the non-applicant applied for certified copy on 13-12-2000 and on 14-2-2000 they wrote a letter to the Counsel. On 18-12-2000 learned Counsel replied the said letter which was received on 10-1-2001 and in the said reply he stated that he was not engaged in the case and Shri K. B. Chaturvedi, Advocate was engaged whereas from the record of the case Shri KB. Chaturvedi appeared till 25-2-1996 and thereafter Shri M. K. Jain, Advocate appeared on behalf of the g. D. A. and he filed his Vakalatnama on 4-4-1995 and he gave wrong information that he was not appearing in the said case before the Trial Court. Due to the aforesaid reason the non-applicant could not file the appeal in time and the cause shown by authority is sufficient to condone the delay. Non-applicant orally raised an objection that during the pendency of appeal that defendant No. 2 Hariram died and no application was filed for substituting the legal heirs of Hariram and as such appeal abate and a whole and prayed for dismissal of the appeal. ( 4. Non-applicant orally raised an objection that during the pendency of appeal that defendant No. 2 Hariram died and no application was filed for substituting the legal heirs of Hariram and as such appeal abate and a whole and prayed for dismissal of the appeal. ( 4. ) THE Trial Court found that the non-applicant had no knowledge regarding decision of the Trial Court and through applicant when they received certified copy from the applicant on 11-12-2000 then only they came to know about the judgment and decree of the Trial Court. It is also held by the Trial court that no intimation was given by the Counsel to the non-applicant, and as such appeal was not filed in time and as such delay was condoned. In respect of the death of defendant No. 2 the Trial Court held that right to sue survives against the remaining defendants, i. e. , applicant, and hence rejected the said objection. ( 5. ) LEARNED Counsel for the applicant submitted that there is a delay of about 5 years and learned Trial Court committed error in condoning the delay. He submitted that earlier Shri K. B. Chaturvedi, Advocate was appointed by non-applicant and lateron Shri M. K. Jain, Advocate was appointed on behalf of the non- applicant and it is the duty of the Counsel to give intimation to his client about day to day proceedings and outcome of the case. He further submitted that it is the duty of the non-applicant itself to well conversant with the day to day proceedings of the case and the non-applicant is the author of the situation and the cause shown by the non-applicant is not sufficient to condone the delay. ( 6. ) LEARNED Counsel for the applicant further submitted that during the pendency of the First Appeal Hariram/defendant No. 2 from whom the non-applicant purchased the suit property, died and no application was filed for substitution of legal heirs and as such the appeal abate as a whole and learned Trial Court committed error in holding that after the death of defendant No. 2 the appeal does not abate and right to sue survives against the applicant. ( 7. ) HEARD the learned Counsel for the parties and perused the record. ( 8. ) THE judgment and decree was passed on 12-3-1996. ( 7. ) HEARD the learned Counsel for the parties and perused the record. ( 8. ) THE judgment and decree was passed on 12-3-1996. In suit the non-applicant engaged Shri K. B. Chaturvedi, Advocate who filed his vakalatnama on 16-1-1985 and he appeared till 22-12-1994. Thereafter Shri m. K. Jain, Advocate filed his Vakalatnama on 4-4-1995 and he appeared till 25-2-1996. The case was fixed for final, arguments on 7-3-1996. On that date Shri m. K. Jain, Advocate did not appeared on behalf of the non-applicant. The decree was passed on 12-3-1996. On 11-12-2000 for the first time the non-applicant came to know about the judgment and decree of the Trial Court dated 13-3-1996 when applicant filed certified copy of the judgment. Immediately thereafter on 13-12-2000 non-applicant applied for certified copy of the judgment and decree of the Trial Court and simultaneously on 14-12-2000 wrote a letter to his Counsel who appeared on behalf of the non-applicant till 25-2-1996. Shri M. K. Jain, Advocate on 18-12-2000 replied the said letter and intimated that his name has been wrongly appeared in the order-sheet whereas shri K. B. Chaturvedi, Advocate was engaged. The said fact was verified by the non-applicant and from the record they found that Shri M. K. Jain, Advocate appeared on 4-4-1995 to 25-2-1996 and he filed his Vakalatnama and gave appearance from time to time before the Trial Court. It was also found correct that no intimation was given by Shri M. K. Jain, Advocate about passing of the judgment and decree dated 12-3-1996. On 18-12-2000 Counsel of non-applicant gave wrong information that he was not appearing in the matter. The trial Court found that due to negligence of the Counsel the parties should not suffer and on relying the decision of the Apex Court in the cases of Rafiq and another Vs. Munshilal and another, AIR 1981 SC 1400 , State of Haryana Vs. Chandra Mani and others, (1996) 3 SCC 132 and Prabhat Kumar Sharma and others Vs. State of U. P. and others, (1996) 10 SCC 62 , condone the delay and allowed the application filed by the non-applicant under Section 5 of the limitation Act. The cause shown by the non-applicant is a cause beyond his control. Chandra Mani and others, (1996) 3 SCC 132 and Prabhat Kumar Sharma and others Vs. State of U. P. and others, (1996) 10 SCC 62 , condone the delay and allowed the application filed by the non-applicant under Section 5 of the limitation Act. The cause shown by the non-applicant is a cause beyond his control. The consideration of the existence of sufficient cause is the discretionary power of the Court but such a discretion has to be exercised on sound judicial principle and not on the mere fancy or whims of the Court. From the fact on record the learned Trial Court found that the cause shown by the non-applicant is sufficient to condone the delay. The delay is caused due to the negligence of the Advocate. The Counsel of the non-applicant did not convey them about the decision of the Civil Suit. The non-applicant after getting knowledge about the judgment and decree immediately applied for certified copy and filed an appeal on 7-2-2001. ( 9. ) THE Honble Apex Court in the case of State of West Bengal Vs. Administrator, Howrah Municipality, (1972) 1 SCC 366 , has observed that the expression "sufficient cause" in Section 5 of the Limitation Act must receive a liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice and generally delays be condoned in the interest of justice where gross negligence or deliberate inaction or lack of bona fide is not imputable to the party seeking condonation of delay. Law of limitation has been enacted to serve the interests of justice and not to defeat it. In the case of N. Balakrishnan Vs. M. Krishnamurthy, (1998) 7 SCC 123 , the Honble Apex Court held that acceptability of explanation of the delay is the sole criterion and length of delay is not relevant. In the absence of anything showing malafide or deliberate delay as a dilatory tactics, the Court should normally condone the delay. However, in such a case the Court should also keep in mind the constant litigation expenses incurred or to be incurred by the opposite party and should compensate him accordingly. In that context the honble Supreme Court observed:- "it is axiomatic that condonation of delay is a matter of discretion of the Court. Section 5 of the Limitation Act does not say that such discretion can be exercised only if the delay is within a certain limit. In that context the honble Supreme Court observed:- "it is axiomatic that condonation of delay is a matter of discretion of the Court. Section 5 of the Limitation Act does not say that such discretion can be exercised only if the delay is within a certain limit. Length of delay is no matter, acceptability of the explanation is the only criterion. Sometimes delay of the shortest range may be uncondonable due to a want of acceptable explanation whereas in certain other cases, delay of a very long range can be condoned as the explanation thereof is satisfactory. Once the Court accepts the explanation as sufficient, it is the result of positive exercise of discretion and normally the Superior Court should not disturb such finding, much less in revisional jurisdiction, unless the exercise of discretion was on wholly untenable grounds or arbitrary or perverse. But it is a different matter when the Fist Court refused to condone the delay. In such cases, the Superior Court would be free to consider the cause shown for the delay afresh and it is open to such Superior Court to come to its own finding even untrammelled by the conclusion of the Lower Court. " ( 10. ) IN the instant case, even though, the appellant appeared not to be as vigilant as he ought to have been, yet his conduct does not, on the whole, warrant to castigate him as an irresponsible litigant. He should have been more vigilant but on his failure to adopt such extra vigilance should not have been made a ground for ousting him from the litigation with respect to the property, concededly to be valuable. ( 11. ) THE Honble Supreme Court in the case of M. K. Prasad Vs. P. Arumugam, AIR 2001 SC 2497 , condoned the delay of 554 days where the advocate of the appellant defendant had withdrawn from the case without informing the party, the suit was decreed ex parte. The defendant/appellant had no information about the ex parte decree and he came to know about passing of decree on receipt of notice of execution proceedings. It is held by the Honble supreme Court that even if there was long delay the same can be condone if there was sufficient cause for condoning the delay, subject to payment of cost. The defendant/appellant had no information about the ex parte decree and he came to know about passing of decree on receipt of notice of execution proceedings. It is held by the Honble supreme Court that even if there was long delay the same can be condone if there was sufficient cause for condoning the delay, subject to payment of cost. In similar circumstances the Honble Supreme Court in the case of Devendraswami vs. Karnataka State Road Transport Corporation, AIR 2002 SC 2545 has condoned the delay. ( 12. ) THE cause shown by the non-applicant is beyond their control and as such Trial Court has not committed any error in condoning the delay and in allowing the application filed by the non-applicant under Section 5 of Limitation Act. The Trial Court has also not committed any error that appeal does not abate because the defendant No. 2 who was the owner of the property seems to have no interest after selling the same to the applicant and failure of the non-applicant to substitute the legal heirs of such owner, the appeal will not abate for non-substituting of his heirs and right to sue survives on the remaining defendant, i. e. , against the applicant. ( 13. ) IN view of the above the Trial Court has not committed any error or irregularity in passing the impugned order. The revision has no merit and is accordingly dismissed without any order as to costs. Civil Revision dismissed.