JUDGMENT Hon’ble R.K. Agrawal, J.—By means of the present writ petition filed under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India, the petitioner, Nirmalesh Kumar Tewari, seeks the following reliefs: “(i) to issue writ order or direction in the nature of certiorari quashing the impugned order dated 25.9.1998 of State Public Service Tribunal, Lucknow, order dated 20.5.1993 of Commandant 32 Bn. P.A.C., Lucknow and order dated 17.8.1993 of Dy. Inspector General, P.A.C., Lucknow (North Sector) (Annexure No. 1 to the writ petition and Annexure Nos.3 and 5 to the claim petition) prepared on 12.10.98. (ii) to issue any other writ order or direction to which this Hon’ble Court may deem fit and proper in the circumstances of the case. (iii) to award cost of the petition to the petitioner.” 2. Briefly stated that the facts giving rise to the present petition are as follows: According to the petitioner, he was appointed on 2st July, 1991 on the post of Constable in 32 Bn. P.A.C., Lucknow. For some reason he remained absent from the duty whereupon the Commandant, 32 Bn. District Lucknow, respondent No. 5 sent a notice to the petitioner on 28th April, 1993, which was replied by the petitioner’s father on 10th May, 1993 as the petitioner was mentally disturbed. The petitioner’s services have been terminated vide order dated 20th May, 1993. He preferred an appeal against the order of termination of his services before the Deputy Inspector General of P.A.C., respondent No. 4, on 21st July. 1993. which appeal was rejected vide order dated 17th August, 1993. The petitioner thereafter preferred a claim petition before the U.P. Public Services Tribunal, Lucknow, which too has been rejected vide order dated 25th September, 1998. All the three orders are under challenge in the present writ petition on the ground that the order of termination dated 20th May, 1993 was passed by the respondent No. 2 without giving any show-cause notice or opportunity of hearing to the petitioner and, therefore, the principles of natural justice have been violated. 3. We have heard Sri Siddheswari Prasad, learned Senior Counsel, assisted by Sri Sandeep Agrawal on behalf of the petitioner and the learned Standing Counsel appearing for the respondents. 4. 3. We have heard Sri Siddheswari Prasad, learned Senior Counsel, assisted by Sri Sandeep Agrawal on behalf of the petitioner and the learned Standing Counsel appearing for the respondents. 4. Sri Siddheswari Prasad submitted that the petitioner was holding a civil post and the protection guaranteed under Article 311 of the Constitution of India was available to him and it was incumbent upon the respondent No. 4 to hold a proper enquiry before terminating the services, which in the present case has not been done and, therefore, the order of termination is wholly illegal and is liable to be set aside. He further submitted that from the averments made in the counter-affidavit filed by Vijai Bahadur Rai, Assistant Commandant, 32 Bn. P.A.C. on behalf of respondent Nos. 3 to 5, it is clear that services of the petitioner have been terminated on the basis of alleged previous misconduct/unauthorised absence from the duty, which, in fact, has been made by way of punishment and it is not the termination simpliciter and the facts stated in the counter-affidavit which led to the passing of the order, if considered then the order would amount to have been passed by way of punishment violating Article 311 of the Constitution In support of the aforesaid plea, he has relied upon a decision of the Apex Court in the case of Jarnail Singh and others v. State of Punjab and others, AIR 1986 SC 1626 . 5. Learned Standing Counsel on the other hand submitted that the petitioner was appointed on 27th March, 1991 as a Constable after completing his training. He was given adverse entry in the year 1991 and 1992. He was a temporary employee. He remained absent from duty for 23 days unauthorisedly from 15th June, 1992 for which he was given punishment of 14 days, P.D. He again remained absent unauthorisedly in the year 1993 for two days for which he was given punishment of 5 days’ P.D. His father had intimated that the petitioner was having some mental problem for which he was asked to get himself medically examined vide letter dated 20th April, 1993 and on its receipt he absented himself. He was given a show-cause notice and after considering the service record, his services were dispensed with vide order dated 20th May, 1993. He was given a show-cause notice and after considering the service record, his services were dispensed with vide order dated 20th May, 1993. As he was a temporary employee, his services have been terminated without holding a regular enquiry as provided under Rule 3 of the Uttar Pradesh Temporary Government Servants (Termination of Service) Rules, 1975, hereinafter referred to as “the Rules” and the order of termination is simpliciter and does not cast any stigma. 6. Having heard the learned Counsel for the parties, we find that the petitioner was admittedly a temporary Constable working in 32 Bn. P.A.C., Lucknow. The order dated 20th May, 1993 has been passed under the provisions of the Rules, on the ground that services of the petitioner is no longer required. The pay for the notice period was also offered. 7. The question is as to whether the order dated 20th May, 1993 terminating the services of the petitioner casts any stigma or is punitive or is termination simpliciter. In the case of Jarnail Singh and others (supra) the Apex Court has held as follows: “20. It thus appears on a consideration of the averments made in the affidavits verified on behalf of the petitioners as well as on behalf of the respondents that the impugned order of termination of service of the petitioners had been made on the ground that there were adverse remarks in the service records of the petitioners as well as there were serious allegations of embezzlement of funds against some of the petitioners. It is quite clear that on consideration of all these adverse entries in the service record as well as serious allegations relating to misconduct, the repetitiousness were not considered fit by the Departmental Selection Committee to recommend the petitioners for regularization of their services as Surveyors. The impugned orders of termination of services of the petitioners are really made by way of punishment and they are not termination simpliciter according to terms of the appointment without any stigma as wrongly stated. It is undisputed that the respondent Nos. 2 and 3 did not follow the mandatory procedure prescribed by Article 311(2) of the Constitution in making the purported orders of termination of services of the petitioners on the ground of misconduct and thus there has been a patent violation of the rights of the petitioners as provided in Article 311(2) of the Constitution. 2 and 3 did not follow the mandatory procedure prescribed by Article 311(2) of the Constitution in making the purported orders of termination of services of the petitioners on the ground of misconduct and thus there has been a patent violation of the rights of the petitioners as provided in Article 311(2) of the Constitution. There is no room for any doubt that the impugned orders of termination of services of the petitioners had been made by way of punishment as the allegations of embezzlement of funds as well as adverse remarks in the service records of these petitioners were the basis and the foundation for not considering the petitioners to be fit for being regularised in their services in accordance with the Government Circular dated October 28, 1980. Therefore, it is clear and evident in the context of these facts and circumstances of the case that impugned order of termination though couched in the innocuous terms as being made in accordance with the terms and conditions of the appointment, yet the impugned orders of termination of services of the petitioners were in fact made by way of punishment being based on the misconduct....” 8. It has now been well settled by the various decision of the Apex Court that if the termination is founded on an employee’s misconduct, it is illegal, while termination motivated by the employee’s misconduct is treated as termination simpliciter. The Apex Court in the case of Pavanendra Narayan Verma v. Sanjay Gandhi PGI of Medical Sciences, (2002) 1 SCC 520 , while considering what should be the best course to determine whether a letter of termination of service was termination simpliciter or stigmatic termination has referred to its earlier decisions in the cases of Parshotam Lal Dhingra v. Union of India, AIR 1958 SC 36 and Dipti Prakash Banerjee v. Satyendra Nath Bose National Centre for Basic Sciences, (1999) 3 SCC 70, and has observed as follows: “Courts continue to struggle with semantically indistinguishable concepts like ‘motive’ and ‘foundation’; and termination founded on a probationer’s misconduct have been held lo be illegal while terminations motivated by the probationer’s misconduct have been upheld. The decisions are legion and it is an impossible task to find a clear path through the jungle of precedents” and formulated the judicial test to determine as to on which side of the fence the case lay, in the following words: “21. The decisions are legion and it is an impossible task to find a clear path through the jungle of precedents” and formulated the judicial test to determine as to on which side of the fence the case lay, in the following words: “21. One of the judicially evolved tests to determine whether in substance an order of termination is punitive is to see whether prior to the termination there was (a) a full-scale formal enquiry (b) into allegations involving moral present the termination has been held to be punitive irreopective of the form of the turpitude or misconduct which (c) culminated in a finding of guilt. If all three facts are present the termination has been held to be punitive irrespective of the form of the termination order. Conversely if any one of the three factors is missing, the termination has been upheld.” 9. In Ravindra Kumar Misra v. U.P. State Handloom Corpn. Ltd., AIR 1987 SC 2408 , the Apex Court pointed out that in a large corporation administration is bound to be impersonal and in regard to public officers assessment of service has got to be in writing for purposes of record, though it cannot be assumed that such an assessment recorded and the order of termination made with reference to that record would automatically take a punitive character. 10. In paragraph 21 of Dipti Prakash Banerjee’s case the Apex Court has held as follows: “If findings were arrived at in an enquiry as to misconduct, behind the back of the officer or without a regular departmental enquiry, the simple order of termination is to be treated as founded on the allegations and will be bad. But if the enquiry was not held, no findings were arrived at and the employer was not inclined to conduct an enquiry but, at the same time, he did not want to continue the employee against whom there were complaints, it would be a case of motive and the order would not be bad. Similar is the position if the employer did not want to enquire into the truth of the allegations because of delay in regular departmental proceedings or he was doubtful about securing adequate evidence. In such a circumstance, the allegations would be a motive and not the foundation and the simple order of termination would be valid. Similar is the position if the employer did not want to enquire into the truth of the allegations because of delay in regular departmental proceedings or he was doubtful about securing adequate evidence. In such a circumstance, the allegations would be a motive and not the foundation and the simple order of termination would be valid. From a long line of decisions it appears to us that whether an order of termination is simpliciter or punitive has ultimately to be decided having due regard to the facts and circumstances of each case. Many a times the distinction between the foundation and motive in relation to an order of termination either is thin or overlapping. It may be difficult either to cagtegorize or classify strictly orders of termination simpliciter falling in one or the other category, based on misconduct as foundation for passing the order of termination simpliciter or on motive on the ground of unsuitability to continue in service”. 11. Applying the principles laid down in the aforesaid cases to the facts of the present case, we find that no enquiry, whatsoever, has been held or instituted against the petitioner in respect of the alleged past misconducts. He was holding the post on temporary basis. The order of termination cannot be said to be founded on the alleged misconduct committed by the petitioner in the past. On the other hand it can safely be said to be motivated by the acts of the misconduct. Thus, the order of termination, which has been passed in accordance with the provisions of Rule 3 of the Rules, which have been framed by the Governor under the provisions of Article 309 of the Constitution of India, does not cast any stigma nor it is punitive in nature. It is, therefore, termination simpliciter. The decision of the Apex Court relied upon by the learned Counsel for the petitioner does not advance the petitioner’s case in view of the principles laid down by the Apex Court in the aforementioned decisions and special facts and circumstances of the case in hand. 12. In this view of the matter, we do not find any error in the impugned order passed by the Tribunal and in the order of termination of petitioner’s services. The writ petition lacks merit and is dismissed. However, the parties shall bear their own costs. Petition Dismissed. ————