1. Heard Mr. R.K. Nokulsana Singh, learned Sr. counsel assisted by Mr. R.K. Milan Singh, learned Advocate appearing on behalf of the petitioners, Mr. A. Nilmani Singh, learned Sr. counsel assisted by Mr. A. Bimol Singh, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent no.3 as well as Mrs. Ch. Bidiyamani Devi, learned G.A. for the respondents 1 and 2. None appears on behalf of respondents 4 and 5. 2. The brief facts of the case of the petitioner-committee are that Kabo Leikai Nupi Keithel Development Committee had been formed by the Women Vendors doing business of different trades in the sheds constructed over the Govt. Khas land under Dag No.805(P), 856(P), 808(P), 833(P), 807(P) and 812(P) of village No.25(A) I.E., with the sole object of running of their business on the said land by seeking allotment of the same from the State Government. The petitioner-committee is a registered body having Registration No.101 of 1995 registered under the Societies' Registration Act. 3. The petitioner-committee approached the Government for the allotment of the said land for the purpose of constructing sheds for running business by converting the same to a market place. While considering the applications filed by the petitioner-committee for allotment, the concerned authority of the Revenue Department, Government of Manipur made an enquiry as to whether or not the said land was a Govt. khas land and also whether or not the said land was a part of the land vested with the Municipal Council. It is also said that the Revenue Department, Government of Manipur also sought the necessary information regarding this land from the Secretary (Planning & Development Authority), Manipur. The Imphal Municipal Council after making a thorough enquiry about the said land had informed the Commissioner (Revenue), Govt. of Manipur that the said land is not vested with the Municipal Council and also there was no plan of the Council on the said land under the letter of the Executive Officer, Imphal Municipal Council being No.IM/19(Pt)/90-91/305 Imphal, the 16th July 1994 to the Commissioner (Revenue), Govt. of Manipur. 4. of Manipur that the said land is not vested with the Municipal Council and also there was no plan of the Council on the said land under the letter of the Executive Officer, Imphal Municipal Council being No.IM/19(Pt)/90-91/305 Imphal, the 16th July 1994 to the Commissioner (Revenue), Govt. of Manipur. 4. After making a thorough enquiry about the status and condition of the said land, the Governor of Manipur in exercise of the powers conferred under section 14(2) of the M.L.R & L.R. Act, 1960 read with Rule 18 of Manipur Land Revenue and Land Reforms (Allotment of land) Rules, 1962 was pleased to allot the said land under the Dag. Nos. mentioned above of Village No.25(A) Kabo Leikai Nongpok sheet No.5 Imphal Municipality to the 37 members of the petitioner-committee for shop site purpose subject to the reservation of an area of 50 ft. from the centre line of Ukhrul Road (Tinsid Road) vide order No.4(1)/31/94-R, Imphal, the 12th October, 1995. It is said that the said allotment order was made after taking into consideration of the long and continuous possession of the said land by the members of the petitioner-committee by developing with huge amount of money and their genuine business in the said land. 5. Necessary premium has also been paid by the petitionercommittee in compliance with the allotment order dated 12.10.1995 and accordingly deed of allotment had been executed on 2.2.1996. Thereafter, formal delivery of possession of the said land to the petitioner-committee had been made on 6.2.1996. After completing all the formalities for preparation of the patta of the said land allotted to the petitioner-committee under the said allotment order dated 12.10.1995, a Jamabandi Patta NO.25(A)/1600(New) had been prepared in the name of the petitioner-committee, a Photostat copy of the Jababandi Patta is also available at Annexure-A/4 to the present writ petition. Such being the situation, according to the petitioner-committee, the petitioner-committee became the owner of the said land and being the owner of the said land, the petitionercommittee have constructed uniform semi pucca shed buildings 37 in number and each member of the petitioner-committee spent Rs.58,796.00 (Rupees fifty eight thousand seven hundred ninety six)only for each shed. After constructing the 37 shop sheds at the cost of Rs.58, 796/- for each shed, the members of the petitionercommittee are running their business in the shop shed. After constructing the 37 shop sheds at the cost of Rs.58, 796/- for each shed, the members of the petitionercommittee are running their business in the shop shed. It is also said that the said land allotted to the petitioner-committee lies to the adjacent north of the bus terminus and all the 37 shop sheds abut to the northern boundary walls of the bus terminus, a copy of the detail expenditure in constructing one of the sheds at the cost of Rs.58, 796.00 is enclosed at Annexure-A/14 to the reply affidavit of the petitioner-committee to the affidavit-in-opposition of the respondent no.3. 6. While the petitioner-committee has been possessing the said land in the manner above said as owner thereof, the Governor of Manipur, without giving any sort of notice to the petitionercommittee, had issued an order being No.4 (1)31/94-R, Imphal the 4th July 1996 for canceling the allotment order dated 15.10.1995 purportedly on the claim made by the Imphal Municipal Council that the said land belongs to Imphal Municipal Council. Being aggrieved the petitioner-committee filed the present writ petition for quashing the impugned orders of the Governor of Manipur dated 4.7.1996 on the main fulcrum that (1) the impugned order dated 4.7.1996 was issued in clear violation of the principle of natural justice; (2) it was issued on the basis of extraneous consideration and also on the basis of information collected behind the back and knowledge of the petitioner-committee; (3) since the Government is abide by the terms and conditions mentioned in the allotment order dated 12.10.1995, the Government cannot act in violation of the terms and conditions mentioned in the allotment order dated 12.10.1995; (4) the Government of Manipur cannot unilaterally determine the terms and conditions mentioned in the deed of allotment dated 2.2.1996 between the petitioner-committee and the Government of Manipur. 7. The main contesting respondent no.3, i.e. the Imphal Municipal Council, also filed their affidavit-in-opposition. The main ground taken in their affidavit-in-opposition is that the said land allotted to the petitioner-committee under the said allotment order of the Govt. of Manipur dated 12.10.1995 is included in the land allotted to the Imphal Municipal Board (later on redesignated or succeeded by the Municipal Council) with the approval of the then Chief Commissioner, Manipur which was conveyed by the Settlement Officer, Manipur under his office letter No.90/Sectt/60- 61/1554-2 dated 16.1.1961. of Manipur dated 12.10.1995 is included in the land allotted to the Imphal Municipal Board (later on redesignated or succeeded by the Municipal Council) with the approval of the then Chief Commissioner, Manipur which was conveyed by the Settlement Officer, Manipur under his office letter No.90/Sectt/60- 61/1554-2 dated 16.1.1961. It is said that the said land was allotted to the Imphal Municipal Council was for the purpose of construction of Sweeper Colony and it is also alleged that the boundaries of the said allotted land of the Imphal Municipal Council are as follows: (a) On the north : Lairikyengbam Leikai Road; (b) On the south : Nallah, (c) On the east : Naga River, and (d) On the West : Khas land. It is also said that the said allotted land of the Imphal Municipal Council was demarcated by the concerned Settlement Supervisor as deputed by the Settlement Officer and thereafter the Imphal Municipal Council had constructed its Sweeper Colony in the said allotted land of the Municipal Council and accommodated therein their employees/Sweepers. It is also said that the Sweeper Colony of the Imphal Municipal Council comprises Dag No.833, 875, 812, 808, 807, 806 and 805 of Imphal Municipal Seat No.5 of earlier survey operation. 8. It is also said in the affidavit-in-opposition that the respondent no.3, Imphal Municipal Council, had never abandoned or relinquished their claims or ownership of the said allotted land of the Imphal Municipal Council. It is also said that the Executive Officer of the Imphal Municipal Council wrote the said letter dated 16.7.1994 mentioned in the writ petition through misapprehension and mis-information and that on coming to know the correct position he wrote the letter dated 21.7.1994 to the Commissioner (Revenue), Govt. of Manipur for treating his earlier letter dated 16.7.1997 as cancelled or withdrawal while stating that the said land of the petitioner-committee had already been allotted to the Imphal Municipal Board. Respondents also had taken the plea that the petitioner-committee is shown to have been registered on 28.10.1995 and the said allotment order in their favour was made on 12.10.1995 on the basis of an allotment application dated 12.10.1994 made to the then Advisor(P), Govt. of Manipur (during the President Rule in Manipur). 9. Respondents also had taken the plea that the petitioner-committee is shown to have been registered on 28.10.1995 and the said allotment order in their favour was made on 12.10.1995 on the basis of an allotment application dated 12.10.1994 made to the then Advisor(P), Govt. of Manipur (during the President Rule in Manipur). 9. It appears that the impugned cancellation order dated 4.7.1996 was issued without giving any opportunity of being heard to the petitioner-committee and also without making any sort of enquiry with the knowledge of the petitioner-committee about the claim of the Imphal Municipal Council, respondent no.3, that the said land allotted to the petitioner-committee was or is a part of the said allotted land of the Imphal Municipal Council. 10. In this regard the learned Sr. counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner-committee strenuously submitted that an administrative order which involved the civil consequences must be made consistently with the rules expressed in the latin maxim “Audi Alteram Partem” and there should be fairness and fair procedure in the administrative action. In support of his contention, he relied on Km. Neelima Mishra -vrs- Dr. Harinder Kaur Paintal & Ors: AIR 1990 SC 1402 and S.N. Mukherjee -vrs- Union of India: AIR 1990 SC 1984 . Para-22 and 23 of AIR in Km. Neelima Mishra(Supra) read as follows: “22. An administrative order which involves civil consequences must be made consistently with the rule expressed in the Latin Maxim audi alteram partem. It means that the decision maker should afford to any party to a dispute an opportunity to present his case. A large number of authorities are on this point and we will not travel over the field of authorities. What is now not in dispute is that the person concerned must be informed of the case against him and the evidence in support thereof and must be given a fair opportunity to meet the case before an adverse decision is taken. Ridge v. Baldwin (1963 (2) All ER 66) (supra); State of Orissa v. Dr. Binapani Dei, (1967) 2 SCR 625 : ( AIR 1967 SC 1269 ). 23. The shift now is to a boarder notion of “fairness” or “fair procedure” in the administrative action. The administrative officers are concerned, the duty is not so much to act judicially as to act fairly (See. Keshav Mills Co. Binapani Dei, (1967) 2 SCR 625 : ( AIR 1967 SC 1269 ). 23. The shift now is to a boarder notion of “fairness” or “fair procedure” in the administrative action. The administrative officers are concerned, the duty is not so much to act judicially as to act fairly (See. Keshav Mills Co. Ltd. v. Union of India, (1973-3 SCR 22 at p.30: ( AIR 1973 SC 389 at Pp393-94): Mohinder Singh Gill v. Chief Election Commissioner, (1978) 1 SCR 405 at p.434: ( AIR 1978 SC 851 at Pp. 871072): Swadeshi Cotton Mills v. Union of India, (1981) 1 SCC 664 : ( AIR 1981 SC 818 ) and Management of M/s M.S. Nally Bharat Engineering Co. Ltd. Vs. The State of Bihar (Civil Appeal No.1102 of 1990 decided on February 9, 1990). For this concept of fairness, adjudicative setting are not necessary, nor is it necessary to have lites inter parties. There need not be any struggle between two opposition parties giving rise to a 'lis'.There need not be resolution of lis inter parties. The duty to act judicially or to act fairly may arise in widely different circumstances. It may arise expressly or impliedly depending upon the context and considerations. All these types of non-adjudicative administrative decision making are now covered under the general rubric of fairness in the administration. But when even such an administrative decision unless it affects one's personal right or one's property rights, or the loss of or prejudicially affects something which would juridically be called at least a privilege does not involve the duty to act fairly consistent with the rules of natural justice. We cannot discover any principle contrary to this concept.” 11. The learned Sr. counsel appearing for the petitioner in order to substantiate the case of the petitioner-committee about the violation of principle of natural justice as well as lack of fairness and fair procedure in issuing the impugned order dated 4.7.1996 had also place reliance on the Canara Bank & Ors - vrs - Debasis Das & Ors: (2003) 4 SCC 557 wherein the Apex Court held that post decisional hearing is not a substitute of pre-decisional hearing and also that even an administrative order which involves civil consequences must be consistent with the Rule of natural justice . Para 19 of the Canara Bank & Ors - vrs - Debasis Das & Ors (Supra) reads as follows: “19. Concept of natural justice has undergone a great deal of change in recent years. Rules of natural justice are not rules embodied always expressly in a statute or in rules framed there under. They may be implied from the nature of the duty to be performed under a statute. What particular rule of natural justice should be implied and what its context should be in a given case must depend to a great extent on the facts and circumstances of that case, the framework of the statute under which the enquiry is held. The old distinction between a judicial act and an administrative act has withered away. Even an administrative order which involves civil consequences must be consistent with the rules of natural justice. The expression “civil consequences” encompasses infraction of not merely property or personal rights but of civil liberties, material deprivations and non-pecuniary damages. In its wide umbrella comes everything that affects a citizen in his civil life.” 12. The learned Sr. counsel, further, submitted that the minimum requirement of natural justice was required even in the case of removal of encroachers from pavement and public street by referring to the decision of the Apex Court(C/B) in Olga Tellies & Ors -vrs - Bombay Municipal Corporation and Ors: AIR 1986 SC 180 . In support of his contention, the learned Sr. counsel submitted that the Government of Manipur is abide by its own order dated 12.10.1995 or in other words, the terms and conditions mentioned in the order of the Govt. of Manipur dated 12.10.1995 is also binding to the author of the order, i.e. the Govt. of Manipur. In order to substantiate the case of the petitioner-committee, the learned Sr. counsel referred to the decision of this court (D/B) in Anchar Ali & Ors -vrs - State of Assam & Ors: AIR 1989 Gauhati 12, wherein this court held: “30. What has been stated in this regard in Prof. de Smith's “Judicial Review of Administrative Action” in the 4th Edition, at page 149, is as below:- “A person prejudicially affected by a decision must be made adequately notified of the case he has to meet in order to exercise any right he may have to make further representations or effectively to exercise a right of appeal. de Smith's “Judicial Review of Administrative Action” in the 4th Edition, at page 149, is as below:- “A person prejudicially affected by a decision must be made adequately notified of the case he has to meet in order to exercise any right he may have to make further representations or effectively to exercise a right of appeal. Thus in one group of cases, tribunals when stating a case on an award of cost have been required to give reasons if their awards depart from normal practice. And in another, licensing justices, empowered to refuse liquor licence on specific ground were held to have failed to hear and determine according to law when they failed to specify the ground for refusal. It would be premature to conclude that these situations exhaust the circumstances in which an implied duty to give reasons may be imposed. Both the pervasive duty to act fairly and the expressed duty to give reasons imposed upon many tribunals may peruse the Courts to develop the existing case law.” In this context reference may usefully be made to what was stated by the British Committee on Ministers Powers (1932). According to it “The observance of principles of natural justice is implicit in the rule of law and the rule of law expressed in the principle of natural justice requires reasoned decisions.” The Committee noted two clearly recognized principles of natural justice. These being: (1) audi alterem partem; and (2) nemo debet esse judex in propria causa. It then observed, “There is a third principle of natural justice, namely, that a party is entitled to know the reasons for the decisions.” “31. All told, it may be stated that though in the present state of Indian law it cannot be held that giving of reasons is a part of natural justice, but nonarbitrariness of an action being increasingly recognized as a part of the equity clause enshrined in the Constitution and as giving of reasons takes care of non-arbitrariness it can definitely be held that even if giving of reasons may not be a part of natural justice, the same does take care of likelihood of violation of Art.14. This apart, requirement of giving reasons would vary from case to case. This apart, requirement of giving reasons would vary from case to case. Where an order is likely to prejudicially affect a person reasons have to be recorded to give meaning and content to his remedy of appeal, review or approach to a writ Court. I would, therefore, say that in the resumption notice which may be issued under R.14, it would do well to give reason of resumption which would enable the aggrieved party to show its cause in a better way. It would also assist a Court of law, in case challenge is made to the resumption, to know if the need for it is based on relevant and germane considerations or is grounded or irrelevant or extraneous considerations.” 13. To the contrary, the learned Sr. counsel for the contesting respondents had place reliance on the following decisions: (1) (1980) 4 SCC 379 : S. L. Kapoor -vrs - Jagmohan & Ors: (2) (1999) 6 SCC 237 : M.C. Mehta -vrs- Union of India & Ors; (3) (1975) 2 SCC 685 : Ishwru Yatayat Co-op. Society -vrs - Transport Authority; (4) AIR 1996 SC 1175 : Gursharan Singh -vrs - New Delhi Municipal Committee; (5) (2003) 5 SCC 437 : Union of India -vrs - International Trading Co. The Apex Court in (1) Sarva Shramik Singh, Bombay Vs. Indian Hume Pipe Co Ltd. & Anr: (1993) 2 SCC 386 held that judgment is to be understood in the facts and circumstances of the case without adding anything to it and no more should be read into it than what it actually says, (2) In Union of India & Ors Vs. Dharmawati Devi & Ors: (1996) 6 SCC 44 the Apex Court held that any essence of the decision and its ratio is binding and not every observation found therein. Every decision must be read as applicable to the particular facts proved. A precedent long recognition matured into rule of stare decisis. (3)In General Manager Northern Railway & Anr Vs Savesh Chopra: (2002) 4 SCC 45 the Apex Court held that a decision of the Supreme Court is only an authority for a proposition which it decides. Proposition should not be extracted from that which the Court has not really decided. 14. A careful perusal of the case law cited by the learned Sr. Proposition should not be extracted from that which the Court has not really decided. 14. A careful perusal of the case law cited by the learned Sr. counsel for the respondents by keeping in view the law laid down by the Apex Court in(1) Sarva Shramik Singh, Bombay Vs. Indian Hume Pipe Co Ltd. & Anr: (1993) 2 SCC 386 , (2) In Union of India & Ors Vs. Dharmawati Devi & Ors: (1996) 6 SCC 44 (3)In General Manager Northern Railway & Anr Vs Savesh Chopra: (2002) 4 SCC 45 , this court is of the considered view that those cases should not help the case of the contesting respondent no.3. 15. In view of the above discussions, this court is of the considered view that the impugned cancellation order dated 4.7.1996 was issued in clear violation of the principal of natural justice and also there was no fairness and no fair procedure in the administrative action of the state respondents in issuing the impugned cancellation order dated 4.7.1996. Therefore, an interference with the impugned cancellation order dated 4.7.1996 is called for and accordingly the impugned cancellation orders dated 4.7.1996 is hereby quashed and set aside. 16. The writ petition is allowed. Parties to bear their own costs.