O. N. KHANDELWAL, J. Respondent Nos. 1 and 2 (landlords) had filed a suit for eviction and recovery of rent and damages against tenants Shanti Devi and Vidya Devi (respondent Nos. 3 and 4) and sub-tenants Hazari Lal and Mewa Lal. Mewa Lal died issueless on 16-6-1988, his widow Smt. Ram Janki also died on 25- 10-1996. Application for substitution was moved on 12-5-2000 alleging that the brother of the deceased Mewa Lal (i. e. Hazari Lal) is already on record, therefore, the consequential amendment should be permitted and abatement, if any, should be set aside after condoning the delay. That application has been allowed by the JSCC/additional District Judge Bahraich on 27-4- 2004, which is now under challenge in this revision. 2. The defendants Nos. 1 and 2 (Namely Shanti Devi and Vidya Devi) who are Opposite Party Nos. 3 and 4 in this writ petition, in paragraph-16 of their written statement admitted this fact that the disputed shop was given to defendant Nos. 3 and 4 (Mewa Lal and Hazari Lal) on partnership and in paragraph-18 they had further admitted that they had started taking rent from them on account of adverse finding by the Trial Court and Appellate Court in a suit of accounting. Respondent Nos. 1 and 2 had specifically alleged in the plaint that Smt. Shanti Devi and Vidya Devi (respondent Nos. 3 and 4) are their tenants who have sub-let the premises in suit to Mewa Lal and Hazari Lal. 3. Defendant Nos. 3 and 4 in their written statement admitted that they were permitted by Ram Pyari to run their business in shop in suit and according to the arrangement they have been paying rent to Smt. Ram Pyari and to Babu Ram. It was further alleged that Babu Ram had moved an application (No. 24/1977) for release of premises under Section 21 of U. P. Act No. 13 of 1972, which was dismissed by the prescribed authority on 22-12-1978 and the appeal No. 3 of 1979 was also dismissed on 22-3-1980 against which writ petition had been filed by the landlords which was pending in the High Court. 4. The defendants of this case had moved an application to stay the proceeding till the disposal of the aforesaid writ but the same was rejected on 19-3-1982. 4. The defendants of this case had moved an application to stay the proceeding till the disposal of the aforesaid writ but the same was rejected on 19-3-1982. Thereupon the proceedings of this eviction suit remained stayed on account of pendency of the writ petition No. 3414 of 1982, Mewa Lal & Ors. v. Rameshwar Prasad, which was ultimately dismissed in 1995. The order was not communicated to the trial Court. For the first time it came to know about the disposal of the writ petition on 21-4-2000 when the copy of the order passed in writ petition was filed. 5. The plaintiffs moved an application No. C-46 dated 12-5-2000 for amendment and substitution alongwith an application No. C-47 for condonation of delay under Section 5 supported by an affidavit C- 48. It was specifically stated that the writ petition No. 3414/1982 filed by Mewa Lal and other defendant against the Courts order dated 19-3-1982 was pending before the High Court and the plaintiffs were under the impression that defendants must have moved an application for substitution. The plaintiffs was not required to move any substitution application. Similar advice was given by their Counsel and they came to know in the Month of April 2000 that the Writ Petition has been dismissed whereupon they applied for copy of the order, Hazari Lal, heir of the deceased (Mewa Lal and his wife Smt. Ram Janki) is already on record as defendant No. 4, therefore, question of abatement does not arise. But in case it is held that abatement had taken place. In that case delay under Section 5 of Limitation Act be condoned and substitution be allowed. 6. The revisionist Hazari Lal defendant No. 4 filed his objection 52-C dated 3-1-2001 that admittedly Mewa Lal (defendant No. 3) had died on 16-6-1988 and since her widow Ram Janki was not brought on record during the prescribed period of limitation, therefore, suit as against Mewa Lal had abated, Ram Janki had adopted her nephew Desh Raj Gandhi and therefore, he became her legal heir after her death on 25-10-1996 and thus the suit has abated and the application is barred by time. 7. Application C-47 regarding condonation of delay was allowed on 22-11-2001 and date was fixed for disposal of C-46. Through writ petition No. 8/2002. 7. Application C-47 regarding condonation of delay was allowed on 22-11-2001 and date was fixed for disposal of C-46. Through writ petition No. 8/2002. This order dated 22-11-2001 was challenged and was set aside on 19-9-2003 with a direction to decide the plaintiffs substitution application afresh after recording a finding about the question whether Desh Raj Gandhi is the legal representative of deceased Mewa Lal or not. 8. Sub-station application No. 46-C was allowed on 9-9-2003 but the order was recalled and the parities were permitted to lead evidence to prove and disprove that Des Raj Gandhi is the adopted son of Mewa Lal. Ultimately, vide order dated 17-1-2004 it was held that he is not the adopted son, delay was condoned on payment of rupees thousand as costs and application No. 46-C for substitution was allowed on 27-4-2004. 9. I have heard the learned Counsel for the parties. 10. It has been the consistent view of the Honble Supreme Court that the application for condonation of delay to set aside the abatement should be liberally allowed and acceptance of explanation should be the rule and refusal an exception. In Ram Nath Sao @ Ram Nath Sahu & Ors. v. Gobardhan Sao & Ors. , the Honble Supreme Court has observed that the Courts should not proceed with the tendency of finding fault with the cause shown and reject the petition by a slipshod order in over jubilation of disposal drive. Acceptance or explanation furnished should be the rule and refusal an exception more so when no negligence or inaction or want of bona fide can be imputed to the defaulting party. On the other hand, while considering the matter the Courts should not lose sight of the fact that by not taking steps within the time prescribed a valuable right has accrued to the other party which should not be lightly defeated by condoning the delay in a routine manner. In another case 2003 (21) LCD 648, Sardar Amarjit Singh Kalra (Dead) by Lrs. & Ors. v. Pramod Gupta (Smt.) (Dead) by Lrs. & Ors. , Honble Supreme Court has again held that Laws of procedure are meant to regulate effectively, assist and aid the object of doing substantial and real justice and not to foreclose even an adjudication on merits of substantial rights of citizen under personal property and other laws. & Ors. v. Pramod Gupta (Smt.) (Dead) by Lrs. & Ors. , Honble Supreme Court has again held that Laws of procedure are meant to regulate effectively, assist and aid the object of doing substantial and real justice and not to foreclose even an adjudication on merits of substantial rights of citizen under personal property and other laws. Procedure has always been viewed as the handmaid of justice and not meant to hamper the cause of justice or sanctify miscarriage of justice. A careful reading of the provision contained in Order 22 CPC as well as the subsequent amendments thereto would lend credit and support to the view that they were devised to ensure their continuation and culmination in an effective adjudication and not to retard the further progress of the proceedings and thereby non-suit the others similarly placed as long as their distinct and independent rights to property or any claim remain intact and not lost forever due to death of one or the other in the proceedings. The provisions contained in Order XXII are not to be construed as a rigid matter of principle but must ever be viewed as a flexible tool of convenience in the administration of justice. 11. Then again in Mithailal Dalsangar Singh & Ors. v. Annabai Devram Kini & Ors. , 2004 (22) LCD 612, it was observed that the Courts have to adopt a justice-oriented approach dictated by the uppermost consideration that ordinarily a litigant ought not to be denied an opportunity of having a lis determined on merits unless he has, by gross negligence, deliberate inaction or something akin to misconduct, dis- entitled himself from seeking the indulgence of the Court. The opinion of the trial Judge allowing a prayer for setting aside abatement and his finding on the question of availability of "sufficient cause" within the meaning of sub-rule (2) of Rule 9 of Order 22 and of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 deserves to be given weight, and once arrived at would not normally be interfered with by superior jurisdiction. It has also been observed that a simple prayer for bringing the legal representatives on record without specifically praying for setting aside of an abatement may in substance be construed as a prayer for setting aside the abatement. 12. It has also been observed that a simple prayer for bringing the legal representatives on record without specifically praying for setting aside of an abatement may in substance be construed as a prayer for setting aside the abatement. 12. This legal position cannot be doubted that after the death of Mewalal in 1988 the suit as against him had automatically abated after the expiry of 90 days as his wife Smt. Ram Janki had not been brought on record but the prayer made in the substitution application No. 46-C also includes a prayer of setting aside abatement and delay in moving this application had also been sufficiently explained in application C-47. Therefore, these applications have rightly been allowed in view of the observations made by Honble Supreme Court in the aforesaid cases. 13. The same view has been followed by this High Court in 1999 (17) LCD 814, State of U. P. v. Om Prakash Sharma & Ors. , 1999 (17) LCD 328; Raghubar Dayal & Ors. v. VIIIth Additional District Judge, Meerut & Ors. ; 1999 (17) LCD 906; Mst. Fakhrun & Ors. v. Hafizulla alias Kalloo & Ors. and 1986 Alld. LJ 1096, Smt. Mehtab Begum v. Ahmad. This Court has gone to the extent to hold that in a case where applicant applies for condonation of delay and for bringing on record the legal representative, a prayer for setting aside the abatement is implicit in the prayer for substitution. 14. It is also been noted that the real brother of the deceased Mewalal is already on record. Therefore, a simple note under Order XXII, Rule 2 of the CPC was sufficient to enable the plaintiff to proceed with the suit. (M. A. Davar v. Ahamad Ali Khan, AIR (39) 1952 Calcutta 219 ). 15. The fact that the Court had already made a note of abatement with respect to such defendant will not necessitate an application for setting aside the abatement. The Court can suo-moto vacate the order of abatement and make a note under Order 22 Rule 2 when the fact is brought to its notice. 16. There is one more aspect of the matter. The suit was filed by the landlord against the tenants for their eviction, firstly on the ground that they were in arrears of rent and secondly that they have sub-let it to defendants Nos. 16. There is one more aspect of the matter. The suit was filed by the landlord against the tenants for their eviction, firstly on the ground that they were in arrears of rent and secondly that they have sub-let it to defendants Nos. 3 and 4 (Hazari Lal and Mewa Lal), therefore, in my view the death of a sub-tenant will not cause the abatement of the suit as a whole and thus, the suit was not liable to abate. The abatement, if any, which is said to have occurred for not bringing the wife of the deceased on record in time has been rightly set aside by the Court below after condoning the delay for valid and reasonable ground. 17. The revisionist Counsel cited the case reported in 1997 (2) JCLR 871 (SC) : AIR 1998 SC 1276 , P. K. Ramachandran v. State of Kerala & Anr. , according to which the delay should not be condoned without recording satisfaction of reasonable or satisfactory explanation for inordinate delay. In the present case plausible and acceptable explanation has been given by the plaintiff. Another case cited by the revisionist is 1997 (2) JCLR 871 (SC) : AIR 1998 SC 1276 , P. K. Ramachandran v. State of Kerala, regarding the abatement of appeal for non- substitution of heirs but the facts of that case are quite different from that of the present case and no benefit can be derived on the basis of the said ruling. 18. A Division Bench of this High Court in Uttar Pradesh Avas Evam Vikas Parishad, Lucknow v. Balbir Singh & Anr. , 1999 (2) ARC 404, has dismissed the substitution application simply on the ground that no prayer for setting aside abatement had been made but as I have observed above application C-47 contains a prayer that in case the suit is found to have abated, it may be set aside. It was further argued by the revisionists Counsel on the basis of law laid down by Honble Supreme Court in Babu Shukram Singh v. Ram Dular & Ors. It was further argued by the revisionists Counsel on the basis of law laid down by Honble Supreme Court in Babu Shukram Singh v. Ram Dular & Ors. , AIR 1973 SC 204 and State of Punjab v. Nathu Ram, AIR 1962 SC 89 , that the suit had abated as a whole but this argument cannot be accepted simply because the suit was mainly for eviction of the tenants and incidentally sub-tenants were also impleaded as defendants against whom allegation of sub-tenancy was made. Therefore, in spite of death of any of the sub-tenant the cause of action will survive and the suit will not abate as a whole. 19. No other point was either argued or pressed before me. 20. There is neither any jurisdictional error nor any material irregularity has been committed in passing the impugned order. This revision has no force and is dismissed with costs. The record of the Trial Court be sent back at once for further proceedings in the matter. The parties are directed to appear before the Trial Court on 1-3-2006. Revision dismissed. .