ORAL JUDGMENT :- The petitioner-employer has by this writ petition questioned the order dated 29-11-1996 passed by the respondent-Regional Provident Fund Commissioner, imposing damages to the tune of Rs. 86,860/- on the petitioner Society under section 14-B of the Employees' Provident Funds and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952 (hereinafter referred to as "the Provident Fund Act" for short). This Court has while issuing Rule, granted interim stay on petitioners depositing Rs. 50,000/- towards damages and giving security for balance amount. The said interim order is operating even today. 2. In view of the arguments advanced, it is not necessary to narrate the facts in detail. 3. Advocate A. M. Gordey, appearing for petitioner has basically questioned the order on the ground that it is non-speaking and also mechanical. He has contended that in the notice issued on 21-5-1996 before initiation of action, period specified was from June, 1983 to May, 1992, while in the impugned order the damages are levied for the period from June, 1983 to February, 1995. He further states that the damages could not have been levied in view of paragraph No. 29 of the Employees' Provident Funds Scheme read with paragraph Nos. 30 and 38. He invites attention to the Schedule produced along with the petition to show that the actual date on which the salary was paid to its employees by the petitioner and also the date of payment of contribution to respondent. According to him the payment has been made within reasonable time and also within the required time, after the salary was actually disbursed and hence there was no scope for levying any damage. He has further contended that when this position along with the financial condition of the petitioner society, due to which it could not release salary of other employee within time was placed for consideration of respondent by filing reply to the notice, the said situation is not considered by the Authority at all. He invites attention to the impugned order to state that the damages at the maximum possible rate has been levied without indicating any reason as to why the highest payable rate of damages is being applied even to petitioner. He argues that there is no finding recorded that the late deposit of Provident Fund dues by petitioner was intentional and petitioner was also not given any opportunity in relation to the rate of damages applied. He argues that there is no finding recorded that the late deposit of Provident Fund dues by petitioner was intentional and petitioner was also not given any opportunity in relation to the rate of damages applied. He argues that the penalty rate prescribed in paragraph No. 32-A, are not mandatory and respondent has got discretion in the matter. He further states that the dates from which the damages have been charged or calculation of those damages, are not made available to the petitioner and according to him those calculations must form part of the impugned order, because the errors in calculation are justiciable before this Court. He therefore, contends that the impugned' order is non-speaking order. He has relied upon various judgments in support of his contention to which I will be making reference little later. 4. Advocate R. S. Sundaram, appearing for respondent, has contended that, though in the notice served upon the petitioner there is a error while specifying the period for which damages were sought to be recovered, in the charts served upon the petitioner along with the said show cause notice, the entire period has been covered and therefore, there is no confusion. He invites attention to the reply filed by the petitioners before the Provident Fund Authority to state that the reply is in reference to those charts. According to him, there is no prejudice caused to the petitioner in this respect. He further states that section 14-B of the Provident Fund Act, does not contemplate any mala fides or otherwise on the part of the defaulting employer it becomes applicable the moment the default takes place. While commenting upon the chart prescribed by paragraph No. 32-A of the Scheme, he states that no doubt the said paragraph uses the word "may", but still as the rates of damages are specifically mentioned therein corresponding with the period of delay, the authority has not been given any discretion to vary with said rates. He points out that this amended provision has come into force from 1-9-1991 and before that the rate of damages provided for was 25 % for period from October, 1982 to September, 1991. He further argues that power to reduce damages has been given to only Central Board by paragraph No. 32-B and hence, there is no such discretion with the Authority. He further argues that power to reduce damages has been given to only Central Board by paragraph No. 32-B and hence, there is no such discretion with the Authority. He also invites attention to the provisions of section 2-B, which defines the basic wages and states that the wage has been defined for the purpose of Provident Fund Act as Wages Payable. He contends that actual payment or actual disbursement of wages to employees is not contemplated by the Act. He also invites attention to the provisions of paragraph No. 30 and 38 to point out that again the word used in those paragraphs is "payable" and hence, the stand of present petitioner that they have paid the provident fund dues after releasing salary to its employees is misconceived. He argues that the salary becomes payable at the end of the month and therefore by 15th of next month the provident fund dues becomes payable. He further invites attention to paragraph No. 40 to state that the entry of such payment has to be taken in the card every month. He states that words "actually drawn" used in paragraph No. 29(3) cannot be interpreted to mean actually released or paid. He further states that the schedule produced by the petitioner before this Court was not supplied by the petitioner to the authority which has calculated the damages. He lastly argues that only defence taken before the authority was that of financial difficulties and according to him, this defence is not a legal or valid defence, for the defaults in discharge of Provident Fund Liability. He also relies upon the judgment to which I will be making reference, little later. 5. Perusal of the show cause notice dated 21-5-1996 mentions that the action for damages proposed was for the period from June, 1983 to May, 1992. The said notice also mentions that it is accompanied by statements. The accompanying statements show that period from June, 1983 to February, 1995 is mentioned in it. The reply filed by the petitioners on 20-6-1996, before the respondent clearly shows that the reply has been filed after perusing the statement along with this notice. The said notice also mentions that it is accompanied by statements. The accompanying statements show that period from June, 1983 to February, 1995 is mentioned in it. The reply filed by the petitioners on 20-6-1996, before the respondent clearly shows that the reply has been filed after perusing the statement along with this notice. It is therefore, clear that the petitioners were aware that the respondent are considering the levy of damages under section 14-B for period from June, 1983 to February, 1995 and they got opportunity to place their stand before the respondent in relation to this period. 6. The question raised is that the rate of damages applied by the respondent in the case of petitioner is maximum. The respondent has also not disputed that they have charged damages at the maximum rate prescribed in paragraph No. 32-A. On the other hand stand of respondent is that it is the only rate at which the damages can be levied. Perusal of provisions of paragraph No. 32-A shows that it uses the word "may recover from employer by way of penalty, damages at the rates given below". Thereafter the table has been given and table is in two columns. The first column is period of damages and the next column is prescribing rate of damages in percentage. The rate of damages increases if the period of default is more. In this connection when the judgment on which Advocate Gordey, has placed reliance i.e. AIR 1979 SC 1803 , Organo Chemical Industries and another vs. Union of India and others, is perused, the said judgment upholds the constitutional validity of section 14-B. The challenge before the Hon'ble Apex Court to validity was on the ground that section 14-B confers arbitrary powers in favour of the Authority levying damages. The same has been negated by the Hon'ble Apex Court and the observations of the Hon'ble Apex Court in paragraph Nos. 12, 13, 38 and 40 are important. The Hon'ble Apex Court has stated that the word "damage", itself is very significant and after describing the various types of damages in paragraph No. 13, the Hon'ble Apex Court has in paragraph No. 38 found that the said argument cannot be accepted. 12, 13, 38 and 40 are important. The Hon'ble Apex Court has stated that the word "damage", itself is very significant and after describing the various types of damages in paragraph No. 13, the Hon'ble Apex Court has in paragraph No. 38 found that the said argument cannot be accepted. The Hon'ble Apex Court has noticed that the guidelines are provided for fixing quantum of damages and the power of the Regional Provident Fund Commissioner to impose damages under section 14-B is quasi-judicial function. The wealth of employment and limitations of word "damages" is itself found to be sufficient to serve as guidelines in fixing the import. In paragraph No. 38 it has been also noticed that the quasi-judicial function has to be exercised by the Regional Provident Fund Commissioner, after giving reasonable opportunity of being heard to all the defaulters and the discretion to award damages can be' exercised within the limits fixed by the statute. It has been observed that having regard to the punitive nature of the powers exercisable under section 14-B and the consequences that ensue therefrom, an order under section 14-B must be a speaking order, containing the reasons in support of it. In paragraph No. 40 the Hon'ble Apex Court has also rejected the contentions that because of absence of remedy like appeal, the said provisions under section 14-B was liable to be declared as void or illegal. Advocate Sundaram has invited attention to paragraph No . .18 and 47 of this judgment to state that this judgment only contemplates an opportunity to the defaulter to show cause. He has argued that this judgment nowhere states that the damages prescribed at maximum rate should not be levied. He has further stated that the judgment delivered is prior to coming into force of paragraph No. 32-A. Perusal of paragraph No. 18 shows that the Hon'ble Apex Court has noticed that section 14-B may include a punitive sum quantified according to the circumstances of the case and in exemplary damages, aggravating element is prominent. In paragraph No. 47 the Hon'ble Apex Court has noticed that purpose of section 14-B is not merely to provide compensation to employees, but it serves two purposes. It has been noticed that it is meant to penalize defaulting employer as also to provide reparation for the amount of loss suffered by the employees. In paragraph No. 47 the Hon'ble Apex Court has noticed that purpose of section 14-B is not merely to provide compensation to employees, but it serves two purposes. It has been noticed that it is meant to penalize defaulting employer as also to provide reparation for the amount of loss suffered by the employees. It is not only a warning to employers in general not to commit a breach of the statutory requirements of section 6, but at the same time it is meant to provide compensation or redress to the beneficiaries i.e. to recompense the employee for loss sustained by them. 7. Advocate Sundaram has relied upon the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court reported at AIR 1998 SC 688 , M/s Hindustan Times Ltd. vs. Union of India and others. He has invited attention to paragraph No. 15 and in paragraph No. 15, the Hon'ble Apex Court has considered the earlier judgment mentioned above i.e. in Organo's case (supra). However, the said judgment also shows that the defence of power cut, financial problems relating to other indebtedness or the delay in realisation of amounts paid by cheques or drafts cannot be justifiable grounds for employer to escape liability. The observations in paragraph No. 28 shows that the employer can claim prejudice if action is initiated after delay, if it is proved that between the period of default and between the period of action under section 14-B, he has changed the position to his detrimental to such an extent that if the recovery is made after a large number of years, the prejudice caused to him would be irretrievable. 8. Advocate Gordey has also invited attention to the judgment of this Court reported at 1983 Mh.L.J. 454, Josts Engineering Limited, Bombay vs. Union of India and another. In the said judgment, the learned Single Judge of this Court has relied upon the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court in case of Organo (supra), and in paragraph No. 10 has found that the damages contemplated under section 14-B covers (a) compensation for actual loss, and (b) the punitive element. It is further observed that the authority assessing the damages is obliged to write a speaking order of his assessment setting out the reasons for it so that it was readily exposed to the scrutiny of the Court exercising writ jurisdiction and this was the guarantee against arbitrariness. It is further observed that the authority assessing the damages is obliged to write a speaking order of his assessment setting out the reasons for it so that it was readily exposed to the scrutiny of the Court exercising writ jurisdiction and this was the guarantee against arbitrariness. While examining the order impugned before him, the learned Single Judge has found that no differentiation is made between the two heads of damages and it contained no mention for actual loss or for punitive damages. It has been observed that the Authority was probably not aware that he has to assess the damages in these two heads. The contention of Authority/Department that the order was speaking order, because it deals with defence taken by the petitioner, has been rejected and it has been observed that the assessment of damages is a vital aspect of function of the quasi-judicial authority under section 14-B. The speaking order must show the application of mind by the authority to the assessment of actual loss and of penal damages and must state what is the allocation between the two heads. In paragraph No. 15, the table prescribed by the department for calculating the damages which appears to be on the same lines as prescribed in paragraph No. 32-A is also considered. 9. Advocate Sundaram, has also brought to the notice of this Court the judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court reported at AIR 2001 SC 1818 , M/s K. Streetlite Electric Corporation vs. Regional Provident Fund Commissioner, Haryana, and states that this is the last word of Hon'ble Apex Court insofar as the interpretation of section 14-B is concerned. I find that this judgment considers the law as expounded in Hindustan Times Limited case (supra). 10. Perusal of the various judgments mentioned above, therefore, clearly show that the Authority writing a order under section 14-B is obliged to point out the actual damages and also the damages imposed as penalty. If the order is not indicating application of mind in relation to these heads, the order has been held to be a non-speaking order. Not only this but the judgment also show that the Authority exercising the function to assess damages in paragraph No. 32-A read with section 14-B is exercising quasi-judicial function, and therefore, it has to take into account the difficulties placed before it by the employers. Not only this but the judgment also show that the Authority exercising the function to assess damages in paragraph No. 32-A read with section 14-B is exercising quasi-judicial function, and therefore, it has to take into account the difficulties placed before it by the employers. The contentions that the Authority is therefore obliged to levy damages at the maximum rate prescribed in paragraph No. 32A does not appear to be correct. The discretion in the matter is very much available with the Authority and all judgments on which the parties have placed reliance unequivocally indicate this. Even the plain language of paragraph 32-A shows that the word used therein is "may". As already pointed out those provisions has been brought into force from 1-9-1991 and if the framers of scheme wanted to force the authority to recover damages at the maximum rate specified in the table, there was no need to use the word "may". The word "shall" could have been very well used in it. In view of the judgments referred above and in view of the language of paragraph No. 32-A, I find that the argument of respondent in this respect cannot be sustained. It is also pointed out that paragraph No. 32-A cannot be interpreted to defeat scheme of section 14-B as laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court and as expounded by the learned Single Judge of this Court otherwise it would itself become vulnerable. 11. In this background when the impugned order is perused, the impugned order nowhere speaks about such damages or its penal part as mentioned above. It is further apparent that the maximum rate stipulated in paragraph No. 32-A has been mechanically applied and from the arguments advanced, it appears that the respondent is under wrong impression that it has no discretion to levy damages at lesser rate than prescribed. 12. During the arguments it was shown to this Court that the chart supplied by the respondent to the petitioner is having some incorrect entries. Advocate Sundaram, has demonstrated to this Court that these incorrect entries were only clerical mistake and there was no prejudice caused to the petitioner on account of any such entry. However, petitioner have given example of those mistakes to contend that even the arithmetical calculations undertaken by the authority to calculate the damages need to be supplied to the petitioner. Advocate Sundaram, has demonstrated to this Court that these incorrect entries were only clerical mistake and there was no prejudice caused to the petitioner on account of any such entry. However, petitioner have given example of those mistakes to contend that even the arithmetical calculations undertaken by the authority to calculate the damages need to be supplied to the petitioner. The petitioner contends that there could be errors in those calculations and in any case those calculations are also justiciable and hence, must be supplied to the petitioner. Advocate Sundaram stated that the calculation are always performed on separate sheet and the petitioner have not pointed any single error or mistake in the calculation though entire data was available with them. 13. In the light of the findings reached by me above, I find that the impugned order is not sustainable. In view of this finding, I do not find it necessary to record any findings on other arguments advanced before me by the parties. The impugned order dated 29-11-1996 passed by the respondent is accordingly quashed and set aside. The matter is restored back to the file of the respondent. The respondent shall give opportunity of hearing to the petitioner in accordance with law and thereafter shall pass appropriate orders on the lines mentioned above. As the matter is being sent back, the Authority shall pass such orders as early as possible and in any case within a period of three months. The petitioner shall co-operate with the Authority in this exercise. 14. The Authority shall provide to the petitioner calculations if demanded by· the petitioner for the purpose of ascertaining its correctness. The interim arrangement ordered by this Court on 4-4-1997 while issuing Rule in the matter shall remain in operation for a period of three months. Writ petition is thus allowed. Rule is made absolute in the aforesaid terms, however, in the facts and circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to cost. Writ petition allowed.