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2006 DIGILAW 2003 (PNJ)

P. S. Daima v. State Of Haryana

2006-05-09

ASHUTOSH MOHUNTA, MAHESH GROVER

body2006
Judgment MAHESH GROVER, J. 1. The petitioner has challenged the acquisition proceedings initiated by the State. A notification under Sec.4 of the Land acquisition Act, 1894 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) was issued on 24/1/2001 followed by notification under Sec.6 of the Act dated 22/1/2002. The acquisition was for a public purpose, namely, for the development of an industrial area in village Kassar, Tehsil bahadurgarh, District Jhajjar. The petitioner claims that he was earlier carrying on an industry in Delhi and in pursuance to the directions of the apex court some industries of Delhi were closed and were directed to be relocated in the National Capital Region of Delhi. 2. The petitioner had purchased some land measuring 60 Kanals in village Kassar vide registered sale deed dated 14/3/1996 and mutation was accordingly sanctioned in his name. The principal grievance of the petitioner against the acquisition proceedings is that he has been uprooted from Delhi once and now when he was intending to start his industry on the area which he had purchased, he would be uprooted once again since this area is subject-matter of the two notifications mentioned above under the Act. He also pleaded that the land is required for an industrial purpose which is in conformity with his activities and, therefore, the States project would not be harmed even if he is permitted to carry out the industry. It was also alleged that the respondents have followed a policy of pick and choose and their action in releasing the land of some of the persons was discriminatory and arbitrary and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. 3. The respondents in their reply submitted that the notifications had been issued after following the due procedure of law and there has been no violation of any provisions of the Act. The petitioner had preferred the objections under Sec.5-A which were duly considered and, therefore, the petitioner cannot challenge the notifications on frivolous grounds. It was also pointed out that at the time of acquisition the entire land was vacant except for three rooms which had been constructed in Khasra No.5//25/2. No industry existed at the spot. The notifications were, therefore, in accordance with law and the petitioner had no reason to challenge the same. We have heard the learned counsel and have perused the record as well. 4. Mr. No industry existed at the spot. The notifications were, therefore, in accordance with law and the petitioner had no reason to challenge the same. We have heard the learned counsel and have perused the record as well. 4. Mr. Munish Jolly, learned counsel for the petitioner, contended that the acquisition is bad as it is going to result in the uprooting of the petitioner twice over. He had been uprooted from from Delhi and was desirous of setting up an industry in the National capital Region but now he is going to be uprooted again. Apart from this, he pleaded that the action was discriminatory as some lands have been left out and the petitioners land is sought to be acquired even though he is similarly situated. 5. We are afraid that the plea of hardship cannot be made the basis of quashing the notifications under the Act. The State has the prerogative to acquire lands which they would use for the purpose which is set out in the notifications itself. The State is the absolute judge of its own needs. The land in question is required for industrial purpose which is to come up in a planned and regulated manner. It is not uncommon rather it is the rule of the day to see industries and constructions coming up in a haphazard manner. 6. There is a tendency amongst people to first buy land and then raise construction without the permission of the concerned authorities and then turn around to say that the land cannot be acquired because of an existing structure or an existing industry. In the instant case, however, even as per the saying of the petitioner he was only intending to start an industry and no unit had come up. The respondents in their written statement have categorically said that at the time of issuance of notification under Sec.4 of the Act only three rooms existed in one of the khasra numbers and rest of the area was vacant. 7. Be that at it may, we do not deem it necessary to go into this question as we have already held that the State is the best judge of its needs. The State has been cast with a duty to carry out planned development and, therefore, its judgment cannot be questioned. 7. Be that at it may, we do not deem it necessary to go into this question as we have already held that the State is the best judge of its needs. The State has been cast with a duty to carry out planned development and, therefore, its judgment cannot be questioned. If exemptions are granted as the petitioner wants then it is most likely to jeopardise the development schemes. 8. The Apex Court in the case of Anand Buttons Ltd. V/s. State of Haryana and others, (2005) 9 Supreme Court Cases 164 has also held that the State which has to carry out planned development of an industrial estate is in the best position to judge as to which land can be exempted from acquisition leaving out constructed areas is also a matter of policy and not of law. In view of the above stated reasons, we do not deem it a fit case to interfere in our writ jurisdiction. Consequently, the writ petition is dismissed.