JUDGMENT Hon’ble Dilip Gupta, J.—This Writ Petition has been filed for quashing the order dated 26th December, 1998 passed by the District Inspector of Schools, Etawah by which the representation filed by the petitioner has been rejected as well as the orders dated 26th December, 1998 and 13th January, 2001 passed by the District Inspector of Schools, Etawah passed in connection with the appointment of Sri Jitendra Kumar who has been arrayed as respondent No.4 in the Writ Petition. A further direction has been sought that the respondents may not interfere with the functioning of the petitioner as an Assistant Clerk in the K.K. Inter College, Etawah (hereinafter referred to as the ‘College’) and to disburse the arrears of salary w.e.f. 1st October, 1994 and for payment of current salary also. 2. The College is governed by the provisions of the U.P. Intermediate Education Act, 1921 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Act’). Sri Ghanshyam Das who was a permanent Head Clerk in the College proceeded on long leave as a result of which promotion was granted on ad hoc basis to Sri Ram Singh Verma who was working as the senior most Assistant Clerk in the College. This brought into existence a short-term vacancy on the post of Assistant Clerk in the College. The Manager of the College by means of the appointment letter dated 24th September, 1993 appointed the petitioner on this short-term vacancy on the post of Assistant Clerk on a temporary basis. The District Inspector of Schools, Etawah granted financial approval to the aforesaid temporary appointment of the petitioner for a fixed period from 27th September, 1993 to 26th December, 1993. The leave to Sri Ghanshyam Das was extended as a result of which the District Inspector of Schools granted financial approval to the payment of salary to the petitioner for fixed periods from 27th December, 1993 to 26th March, 1994, from 27th March, 1994 to 30th June, 1994 and lastly from 1st July, 1994 to 26th September, 1994 by means of the communications dated 16th April, 1994, 27th September, 1994 and 21st January, 1994 respectively. 3. Sri Ghanshyam Das retired from the post of Head Clerk of the College on 30th September, 1994 as a result of which a substantive vacancy on the post of Head Clerk came into existence. 3. Sri Ghanshyam Das retired from the post of Head Clerk of the College on 30th September, 1994 as a result of which a substantive vacancy on the post of Head Clerk came into existence. Sri Ram Singh Verma then continued as the Head Clerk in the College and, therefore, a vacancy to the post of Assistant Clerk came into existence. It is the case set out by the petitioner that he continued to work on the said post of Assistant Clerk. In the meantime one Sri Suresh Singh who was working as a Class IV employee in the College filed Original Suit No. 573 of 1994 and as a consequence of the compromise decree dated 28th December, 1997 passed in the said suit Suresh Singh was granted promotion to the post of Assistant Clerk. One Sri Kalyan Singh who was also a Class IV employee in the College was granted promotion against another vacant post of Assistant Clerk in the College. The District Inspector of Schools, however, did not grant financial approval to the payment of salary to the petitioner after 26th September, 1994 as a result of which the petitioner filed a Writ Petition in this Court being Writ Petition No. 15908 of 1998 which was disposed of by the Court by means of the judgment and order dated 19th August, 1998 with a direction that the representation filed by the petitioner may be decided by the District Inspector of Schools within two months in accordance with law. Pursuant to the aforesaid direction issued by this Court, the District Inspector of Schools, Etawah considered the representation filed by the petitioner but by the order dated 26th December, 1998 rejected the representation. The District Inspector of Schools also considered the representation filed by Sri Jitendra Kumar who also claimed appointment to the post of Assistant Clerk in the College by direct recruitment and by the order dated 26th December, 1998 the District Inspector of Schools granted financial approval to the payment of salary to Sri Jitendra Kumar from the date he joined the post on 19th January, 1998. 4. The petitioner has sought the quashing of the aforesaid two orders namely the order rejecting his representation for grant of financial approval and the order by which financial approval was granted for payment of salary to Sri Jitendra Kumar. 5. 4. The petitioner has sought the quashing of the aforesaid two orders namely the order rejecting his representation for grant of financial approval and the order by which financial approval was granted for payment of salary to Sri Jitendra Kumar. 5. A perusal of the order passed in favour of Jitendra Kumar indicates that the Manager of the College had earlier appointed him twice against the leave vacancy of one Sri Ambrish Kumar and later when Sri Ambrish Kumar left the College he was appointed against the substantive vacancy of Assistant Clerk. It is, therefore, clear that Sri Jitendra Kumar had been appointed against the vacancy caused by Sri Ambrish Kumar. The petitioner, however, claims to have been continued on account of the vacancy caused by the promotion of Sri Ram Singh Verma. 6. The District Inspector of Schools, Etawah in the impugned order has clearly noticed that the petitioner had been appointed on a purely temporary basis on account of ad hoc promotion of Sri Ram Singh Verma to the post of Head Clerk. The financial approval to the payment of salary of the petitioner was granted by the District Inspector of Schools, Etawah for a fixed period from 27th September, 1993 to 26th December, 1993. This was subsequently extended from 27th December, 1993 to 26th March, 1994, from 27th March, 1994 to 30th June, 1994 and then from 1st July, 1994 to 26th September, 1994 after which it was never extended. The substantive vacancy to the post of Assistant Clerk which came into existence on account of the promotion of Ram Singh Verma to the post of Head Clerk of the College. It was required to be filled up in accordance with law and, therefore, the petitioner could not have continued on this post merely because he had been earlier appointed on ad hoc basis. 7. It was required to be filled up in accordance with law and, therefore, the petitioner could not have continued on this post merely because he had been earlier appointed on ad hoc basis. 7. Sri Khare, learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner contended that the appointment of Sri Jitendra Kumar was bad in law inasmuch as he was the brother-in-law of the Manager of the College Sri Devi Prasad Patel and the District Inspector of Schools had even earlier in the order dated 22nd April, 1994 held that his appointment was bad on this ground but subsequently even though Sri Devi Prasad Patel continued to the Manager of the College, yet the District Inspector of Schools by the order dated 26th December, 1998 granted financial approval to the payment of salary of Sri Jitendra Kumar. Learned Counsel for the petitioner may be correct in his submission in this regard but what has to be seen is whether the petitioner can seek a direction from this Court for payment of salary irrespective of the fact whether his appointment to the post of Assistant Clerk was valid or not. In the first instance there is nothing on the record to indicate that any advertisement was issued by the College for filling up the post when the Manager of the College had earlier appointed the petitioner on temporary basis against the short-term vacancy to the post of Assistant Clerk. Thus, in such a situation when the substantive vacancy to the post of Head Clerk arose in the College, it was incumbent upon the appointing authority to have issued an advertisement to fill up the said post and the petitioner could not have continued merely because he had earlier been working on a temporary basis against the short-term vacancy. 8. Thus, in such a situation when the substantive vacancy to the post of Head Clerk arose in the College, it was incumbent upon the appointing authority to have issued an advertisement to fill up the said post and the petitioner could not have continued merely because he had earlier been working on a temporary basis against the short-term vacancy. 8. In this connection reference may be made to the decision of the Supreme Court in Union Public Service Commission v. Girish Jayanti Lal Vaghela and others, JT 2006 (2) SC137 where it was observed : “......The appointment to any post under the State can only be made after a proper advertisement has been made inviting applications from eligible candidates and holding of selection by a body of experts or a specially constituted committee whose members are fair and impartial, through a written examination or interview or some other rational criteria for judging the inter se merit of candidates who have applied in response to the advertisement made. A regular appointment to a post under the State or Union cannot be made without issuing advertisement in the prescribed manner which may in some cases include inviting applications from the Employment Exchange where eligible candidates get their names registered. Any regular appointment made on a post under the State or Union without issuing advertisement inviting applications from eligible candidates and without holding a proper selection where all eligible candidates get a fair chance to compete would violate the guarantee enshrined under Article 16 of the Constitution......” 9. In such a situation there is no infirmity in the order dated 26th December, 1998 passed by the District Inspector of Schools, Etawah rejecting the representation filed by the petitioner. 10. The contention of the learned Counsel for the petitioner that the same benefit should have been conferred upon him by the District Inspector of Schools, Etawah as had been conferred upon Sri Jitendra Kumar cannot be accepted for the simple reason that it is for the petitioner to establish his own case and any wrong order passed in favour of Sri Jitendra Kumar cannot confer upon him a ground to insist that an illegal order should be passed in his favour also. 11. This is what has been repeatedly observed by the Supreme Court. 11. This is what has been repeatedly observed by the Supreme Court. In Gurusharan Singh and others v. NDMC and others, 1996 (2) SCC 459 , the Supreme Court observed : “Neither Article 14 of the Constitution conceives within the equality clause this concept nor Article 226 empowers the High Court to enforce such claim of equality before law. If such claims are enforced, it shall amount to directing to continue and perpetuate an illegal procedure or an illegal order for extending similar benefits to others. Before a claim based on equality clause is upheld, it must be established by the petitioner that his claim being just and legal, has been denied to him, while it has been extended to others and in this process there has been a discrimination.” 12. In Union of India and another v. International Trading Co. and another, (2003) 5 SCC 437 , the Supreme Court observed : “.........A party cannot claim that since something wrong has been done in another case direction should be given for doing another wrong. It would not be setting a wrong right, but would be perpetuating another wrong. In such matters there is no discrimination involved. The concept of equal treatment on the logic of Article 14 of the Constitution of India (in short “the Constitution”) cannot be pressed into service in such cases. What the concept of equal treatment presupposes is existence of similar legal foothold. IT does not countenance repetition of a wrong action to bring both wrongs on a par. Even if hypothetically it is accepted that a wrong has been committed in some other cases by introducing a concept of negative equality the respondents cannot strengthen their case.........” 13. In U.P. State Sugar Corporation Ltd. and another v. Sant Raj Singh and others, 2006 AIR SCW 3013 the Supreme Court observed : “Moreover, Article 14 has a positive concept. Nobody can claim equality in illegality." 14. In Ekta Shakti Foundation v. Govt. of NCT of Delhi, 2006 AIR SCW 3601 the Supreme Court observed : “In a converse case, in the first instance, one may be wrong but the wrong order cannot be foundation for claiming equality for enforcement of the same order. As stated earlier, his right must be founded upon enforceable right to entitle him to the equality treatment for enforcement thereof. As stated earlier, his right must be founded upon enforceable right to entitle him to the equality treatment for enforcement thereof. A wrong decision by the Government does not give a right to enforce the wrong order and claim parity or equality. Two wrongs can never make a right.” 15. It must also be pointed out that the vacancy against which Sri Jitendra Kumar had been appointed was on account of Sri Ambrish Kumar whereas the petitioner claims to have been appointed against the vacancy on account of Sri Ram Singh Verma. The petitioner has stated in paragraph No.23 of the Writ Petition that Sri Suresh Singh and Sri Kalyan Singh who had been working as Class IV employees in the College had been promoted to the post of Assistant Clerk in the College. Admittedly there were only three posts of Assistant Clerk in the College and, therefore, the post against which the petitioner claims to have been appointed as Assistant Clerk had been filled up either by Sri Suresh Singh or by Sri Kalyan Singh but the petitioner has not challenged the appointment of either of them in the Writ Petition. Thus, also no relief can be granted to the petitioner. 16. For all the reasons stated above, there is no merit in the Writ Petition. The Writ Petition is, accordingly, dismissed. Petition Dismissed. ———