JUDGMENT Hon’ble Dilip Gupta, J.—This petition has been filed for quashing the order dated 1st February, 1989 passed by the Regional Manager, U.P. State Road Transport Corporation, Varanasi (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Corporation’) by which the petitioner who was working as the Assistant Cashier in Varanasi Depot of the Corporation was removed from service. The petitioner has also challenged the order dated 15th December, 1989 by which the appeal filed by the petitioner against the aforesaid order dated 1st February, 1989 was rejected by the Deputy General Manager of the Corporation. 2. While the petitioner was working as the Assistant Cashier a Charge Sheet dated 7th February, 1987 was issued and he was also suspended. A perusal of the Charge Sheet indicates that between 1983 to 1986 the petitioner had embezzled an amount of Rs. 46,758.36 on various dates and when this was pointed out to him, he deposited the said amount on different dates in the year 1986. Along with the charge-sheet, the petitioner was supplied copies of the reports dated 18th November, 1985, 2nd March, 1986, 17th January, 1986 and 31st March, 1986 submitted by Sri R.K. Srivastava, Senior Auditor and the report dated 21st November, 1985, 3rd January, 1986, 10th January, 1986, 22nd January, 1986, 9th December, 1986, 30th December, 1986 and 31st January, 1986 submitted by Sri R.R. Prajapati, Regional Auditor. It was also mentioned that the petitioner could inspect the receipts and cash book on any working day. The petitioner was also called upon to submit his written statement and in case he wanted to examine himself or any other witness then he was required to clearly intimate the department in writing. The petitioner submitted his written statement. The enquiry was conducted by the Enquiry Officer who submitted his report dated 17th December, 1988 to the Disciplinary Authority. A show-cause notice dated 24th December, 1988 was then sent to the petitioner enclosing a copy of the enquiry report. The petitioner was asked to show cause as to why he should not be removed from the service. The petitioner submitted a detailed reply to the said show-cause notice. The Regional Manager of the Corporation then passed the order dated 1st December, 1989 removing the petitioner from the service of the Corporation. The petitioner was asked to show cause as to why he should not be removed from the service. The petitioner submitted a detailed reply to the said show-cause notice. The Regional Manager of the Corporation then passed the order dated 1st December, 1989 removing the petitioner from the service of the Corporation. The appeal filed by the petitioner against the aforesaid order of removal was rejected by the Deputy General Manager of the Corporation by the order dated 15th December, 1989. 3. Sri P.S. Baghel, learned Counsel for the petitioner submitted that the Corporation had not suffered any pecuniary loss as the petitioner had deposited the amount which was said to have been embezzled by him; that due to heavy work load on the petitioner, which fact has also been admitted by the officers of the Corporation the petitioner may have committed a mistake in not depositing the amount but such mistakes do happen and it cannot be said that the petitioner had embezzled the amount; that the petitioner had not been given any opportunity to examine the witnesses; that the petitioner had not been permitted to cross-examine Sri Bhola Nath Mishra, Sri S.K. Banerji, Sri S.B. Jain and Sri H.P. Gupta; that the documents mentioned in the application dated 24th December, 1988 had not been supplied to the petitioner; that no oral evidence was led by the Corporation and that the Deputy General Manager by a cryptic order dismissed the appeal filed by the petitioner. 4. 4. Sri Samir Sharma, learned Counsel for the Corporation, however, submitted that in cases of embezzlement, particularly when the petitioner had subsequently deposited the amount, the order of removal from service is justified and no sympathy should be shown by this Court; that there had been no denial of natural justice in the conduct of enquiry; that no ground whatsoever had been raised by the petitioner in the Writ Petition that oral evidence had not been led on behalf of the Corporation and, therefore, in such circumstances such a plea cannot be taken during the course of hearing of the petition; that the documents mentioned in the enquiry report had been supplied to the petitioner and, therefore, it was not necessary to supply the other documents sought for by the petitioner as they were not relevant; that adequate opportunity had been given to the petitioner to either examine himself or any other witness but the petitioner failed to avail this opportunity and, therefore, he cannot make any complaint in this regard; that the grievance raised by the petitioner that he was not permitted to cross-examine certain witnesses is not justified as there is nothing on the record to indicate that the said witnesses had been examined on behalf of the Corporation; that the petitioner has not pointed out what prejudice has been caused to him in not supplying the documents or not permitting him to cross-examine certain witnesses and unless the petitioner specifically points out any prejudice caused to him, no interference is called for under Article 226 of the Constitution and that the appellate authority is not required to give detailed reason in case it concurs with the decision of the disciplinary authority. 5. I have carefully considered the submissions advanced by the learned Counsel for the parties. 6. The petitioner was working as an Assistant Cashier in the Corporation. He was holding a post of responsibility. The charges levelled against him related to embezzlement of the funds of the Corporation. When this fact was brought to the notice of the petitioner, he immediately deposited the amount. 6. The petitioner was working as an Assistant Cashier in the Corporation. He was holding a post of responsibility. The charges levelled against him related to embezzlement of the funds of the Corporation. When this fact was brought to the notice of the petitioner, he immediately deposited the amount. It is not the case set up by the petitioner that there was no mistake in the accounting but what he contends is that whatever shortfall existed was subsequently deposited by him when he was asked to do so and, therefore, it is only a case of mistake which was caused on account of the extra burden of work on him. The contention of the petitioner that since pecuniary loss was not caused to the Corporation as the amount had subsequently been deposited by him cannot be accepted. It is only when the auditors pointed out that the petitioner deposited the amount. If such a contention is accepted then in all such cases of embezzlement, the employee has merely, on being caught, to deposit the amount. The question whether it was a case of honest mistake committed by the petitioner or it was a case of embezzlement has been considered at length by the Enquiry Officer who has extensively referred to the reports submitted by the auditors. It is true that the reports submitted by the auditors does mention that such a mistake can happen on account of excess work but the auditors have also stated in the reports that such repeated mistakes for a period of three years cannot be caused merely on account of excess work. The Enquiry Officer has, on a careful perusal of the various reports, recorded a categorical finding that it was a case of embezzlement. 7. Learned Counsel for the petitioner, in effect, wanted the Court to reappraise the evidence and record a different finding. Before considering this aspect of the matter it must not be forgotten that the Supreme Court in the case of High Court of Judicature at Bombay through its Registrar v. Shri Udaysingh s/o Ganpatrao Naik Nimbalkar and others, JT1997 (5) SC 298 held that disciplinary proceedings are not a criminal trial and, therefore, the scope of enquiry is entirely different from that of a criminal trial in which the charge is required to be proved beyond doubt. In the case of disciplinary enquiry, the technical rules of evidence have no application and preponderance of probabilities and some material on record would be necessary to reach a conclusion whether or not the delinquent has committed misconduct. The test laid down is to see whether there is evidence on record to reach the conclusion that the delinquent has committed misconduct and whether as a reasonable man, in the circumstances, would be justified in reaching that conclusion. The same view was reiterated by the Supreme Court in the case of Depot Manager, A.P. State Road Transport Corporation v. Mohd. Yousuf Miya, 1997 (77) F.L.R. and in the case of Lalit Popli v. Canara Bank and others, (2003) 3 SCC 583 . It was held that strict standard of proof or applicability of the Evidence Act stands excluded and the standard of proof in the departmental proceedings is not the same as of the criminal trial. In the disciplinary proceedings the preliminary question is whether the employee is guilty of such conduct as would merit action against him, whereas in criminal proceedings the question is whether the offences registered against him are established and if established what sentence should be imposed upon him. 8. Regarding re-appreciation of evidence by the High Court, the Supreme Court in the case of High Court of Judicature at Bombay through its Registrar v. Shri Udaysingh s/o Ganpatrao Naik Nimbalkar and others, JT 1997 (5) SC 298 clearly held as follows : “..... In judicial review, it is settled law that the Court or the Tribunal has no power to trench on the jurisdiction to appreciate the evidence and to arrive at its own conclusion. Judicial review is not an appeal from a decision but a review of the manner in which the decision is made. It is meant to ensure that the delinquent receives fair treatment and not to ensure that the conclusion which the authority reaches is necessarily correct in the view of the Court or Tribunal. When the conclusion reached by the authority is based on evidence, Tribunal is devoid of power to reappreciate the evidence and would (sic) come to its own conclusion on the proof of the charge. When the conclusion reached by the authority is based on evidence, Tribunal is devoid of power to reappreciate the evidence and would (sic) come to its own conclusion on the proof of the charge. The only consideration the Court/Tribunal has in its judicial review is to consider whether the conclusion is based on evidence on record and supports the finding or whether the conclusion is based on no evidence. This is the consistent view of this Court vide B.C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India, (1995) 6 SCC 749 ; State of Tamil Nadu v. T.V. Venugopalan, JT1994 (5) SC 337 : (1994) 6 SCC 302 (SCC para 7); Union of India v. Upendra Singh, JT 1994 (1) SC 658 : (1994) 3 SCC 357 (SCC para 6); Government of Tamil Nadu v. A. Rajapandian, JT 1994 (7) SC 492 : (1995) 1 SCC 216 (SCC para 4) and B.C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India (at pp. 759-60)” 9. The Supreme Court in Rae Bareli Kshetriya Gramin Bank v. Bhola Nath Singh and others, (1997) 3 SCC 657 held as follows : “ Under these circumstances, the question arises whether the High Court would be correct in law to appreciate the evidence and the manner in which the evidence was examined and to record a finding in that behalf. Judicial review is not akin to adjudication of the case on merits as an appellate authority. The High Court, in the proceedings under Article 226 does not act as an appellate authority but exercises within the limits of judicial review to correct errors of law or procedural errors leading to manifest injustice or violation of principles of natural justice. In this case, no such errors were pointed out nor any finding in that behalf was recorded by the High Court. On the other hand, the High Court examined the evidence as if it is a Court of first appeal and reversed the finding of fact recorded by the enquiry officer and accepted by disciplinary authority. Under these circumstances, the question of examining the evidence, as was done by the High Court, as a first appellate Court, is wholly illegal and cannot be sustained.” 10. Under these circumstances, the question of examining the evidence, as was done by the High Court, as a first appellate Court, is wholly illegal and cannot be sustained.” 10. In R.S. Saini v. State of Punjab, (1999) 8 SCC 90 , the Supreme Court observed as follows : "Before adverting to the first contention of the appellant regarding want of material to establish the charge, and of non-application of mind, we will have to bear in mind the rule that the Court while exercising writ jurisdiction will not reverse a finding of the inquiring authority on the ground that the evidence adduced before it is insufficient. If there is some evidence to reasonably support the conclusion of the inquiring authority, it is not the function of the Court to review the evidence and to arrive at its own independent finding. The inquiring authority is the sole judge of the fact so long as there is some legal evidence to substantiate the finding and the adequacy or reliability of the evidence is not a matter which can be permitted to be canvassed before the Court in writ proceedings. A narration of the charges and the reasons of the inquiring authority for accepting the charges, as seen from the records, shows that the inquiring authority has based its conclusions on materials available on record after considering the defence put forth by the appellant and these decisions, in our opinion, have been taken in a reasonable manner and objectively. The conclusion arrived at by the inquiring authority cannot be termed as either being perverse or not based on any material nor is it a case where there has been any non-application of mind on the part of the inquiring authority. Likewise, the High Court has looked into the material based on which the enquiry officer has come to the conclusion, within the limited scope available to it under Article 226 of the Constitution and we do not find any fault with the findings of the High Court in this regard." 11. In the case of Lalit Popli v. Canara Bank and others, (2003) 3 SCC 583 the Supreme Court observed as follows : "While exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution the High Court does not act as an appellate authority. In the case of Lalit Popli v. Canara Bank and others, (2003) 3 SCC 583 the Supreme Court observed as follows : "While exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution the High Court does not act as an appellate authority. Its jurisdiction is circumscribed by limits of judicial review to correct errors of law or procedural errors leading to manifest injustice or violation of principles of natural justice. Judicial review is not akin to adjudication of the case on merits as an appellate authority.” 12. The adequacy or reliability of the evidence is not a matter which can be permitted to be canvassed before the Court in writ proceedings. The High Court in proceedings under Article 226 does not act as an appellate authority. In the present case, the conclusion arrived at by the enquiring authority cannot be termed as either being perverse or not based on any material and nor is it the case where there has been any non-application of mind by the Enquiry Officer. He has carefully examined the reports submitted by the auditors and has also considered the defence set up by the petitioner in the written statement. Such being the position, in view of the principles enunciated by the Supreme Court in the aforesaid decisions, it is not possible to accept the submissions of Sri P.S. Baghel, learned Counsel for the petitioner that this Court should reappraise the evidence and record a different finding. 13. The contention of the learned Counsel for the petitioner that the petitioner had not been permitted to lead evidence or cross-examine certain witnesses cannot also be accepted. A perusal of the charge-sheet clearly indicates that adequate opportunity had been given to the petitioner to either examine himself or any other witness, he so desired. The petitioner failed to utilise this opportunity and it is not his case that he was not permitted to examine himself or certain witnesses but all that he contends is that he was not permitted to cross-examine certain witnesses. This contention cannot be accepted as there is nothing on the record to indicate that these witnesses were examined on behalf of the Corporation. This contention cannot be accepted as there is nothing on the record to indicate that these witnesses were examined on behalf of the Corporation. If the petitioner wanted to examine these witnesses, he could have indicated so in the written statement, as was intimated to the petitioner in the charge-sheet, but having failed to do so, it is not open to him to now contend that the principles of natural justice had been violated as he had not been permitted to cross-examine these witnesses. 14. Learned Counsel for the petitioner then contended that certain documents mentioned in the application dated 24th February, 1988 had not been supplied to him. The documents sought for were not relied upon by the Enquiry Officer and, therefore, it cannot be said that the principles of natural justice had been violated. This apart, the petitioner has not pointed out that any prejudice had been caused to him on account of non-supply of the documents. The Supreme Court in the case of State of U.P. v. Ramesh Chandra Mangalik, (2002) 3 SCC 443 observed: "Learned Counsel for the appellant has further submitted that particular documents copies of which are said to have not been supplied are not indicated by the respondent much less in the order of the High Court nor their relevance has been pointed out. The submission is that the delinquent will also have to show as to in what manner any particular document was relevant in connection with the inquiry and what prejudice was caused to him by non-furnishing of a copy of the document. In support of this contention, reliance has been placed upon a case reported in 1987 (Supp) SCC 518, Chandrama Tewari v. Union of India. It has been observed in this case that the obligation to supply copies of documents is confined only to material and relevant documents which may have been relied upon in support of the charges. It is further observed that if a document even though mentioned in the memo of charges, has no bearing on the charges or if it is not relied upon or it may not be necessary for cross-examination of any witness, non-supply of such a document will not cause any prejudice to the delinquent. The inquiry would not be vitiated in such circumstances. The inquiry would not be vitiated in such circumstances. In State of Tamil Nadu v. Thiru K.V. Perumal and others (1996) 5 SCC 474 relied upon by the appellant, it is held that it is for the delinquent to show the relevance of a document a copy of which he insists to be supplied to him. Prejudice caused by non-supply of document has also to be seen. In yet another case relied upon by the learned Counsel for the appellant reported in (2001) 6 SCC 392 , State of U.P. v. Harendra Arora and another, it has been held that a delinquent must show the prejudice caused to him by non-supply of copy of document where order of punishment is challenged on that ground. Learned Counsel for the appellant submitted that no material or document has been relied upon by the Inquiry Officer, copy of which or inspection thereof may not have been allowed to the respondent. No material has been obtained after the date of hearing nor any such material has been made use of by the Inquiry Officer. It is further submitted that in the judgment of the High Court it has nowhere been indicated that any material or document, copy of which has not been supplied to the respondent, was used much less any prejudice, if caused to the respondent. Learned Counsel for the respondent could not pinpoint any particular document which may have been made use of by the Inquiry Officer for establishing the charges levelled against the respondent, copies of which or inspection thereof may not have been allowed to the delinquent by the Department. No submission has been advanced on behalf of the respondent on the point of prejudice which may have been caused to the respondent by non-supply of document, if any. The High Court has also not gone into the question of the relevance of the documents copies of which are said to have not been supplied to the respondent and consequent prejudice, if caused. We therefore find that the finding of the High Court that principles of natural justice have been violated for non-supply of documents to the respondent is not sustainable. The cross-examination of a witness which was sought for, had unfortunately died which fact was also brought to the notice of the respondent." (emphasis supplied) 15. We therefore find that the finding of the High Court that principles of natural justice have been violated for non-supply of documents to the respondent is not sustainable. The cross-examination of a witness which was sought for, had unfortunately died which fact was also brought to the notice of the respondent." (emphasis supplied) 15. In Syndicate Bank and others v. Venkatesh Gururao Kurati, 2006 AIR SCW 680 the Supreme Court observed : “In our view, non-supply of documents on which the Enquiry Officer does not rely during the course of enquiry does not create any prejudice to the delinquent. It is only those documents, which are relied upon by the Enquiry Officer to arrive at this conclusion, the non-supply of which would cause prejudice being violative of principles of natural justice. Even then, the non-supply of those documents prejudice the case of delinquent officer must be established by the delinquent officer. It is well settled law that the doctrine of principles of natural justice are not embodied rules. It cannot be put in a strait jacket formula. It depends upon the facts and circumstances of each case. To sustain the allegation of violation of principles of natural justice, one must establish that prejudice has been caused to him for non-observance of principles of natural justice.” 16. Thus, in view of what has been observed by the Supreme Court in the aforesaid decisions, the contention raised by the learned Counsel for the petitioner cannot be accepted. 17. Learned Counsel for the petitioner then contended that the Appellate order does not indicate the reasons for rejecting the Appeal. Sri Samir Sharma, learned Counsel for the respondent has placed reliance upon a decision of the Supreme Court in State Bank of India, Bhopal v. S.S. Koshal, 1994 SCC (L & S) 1019 in support of his contention that in respect of an order of affirmance it is not necessary for the Appellate Authority to give detailed reasons. 18. A perusal of the order passed by the Appellate Authority in the present case shows that the Appellate Authority had examined the entire records including the appeal filed by the petitioner but found no good reason to interfere with the decision taken by the disciplinary authority. 18. A perusal of the order passed by the Appellate Authority in the present case shows that the Appellate Authority had examined the entire records including the appeal filed by the petitioner but found no good reason to interfere with the decision taken by the disciplinary authority. The Supreme Court in the case of S.S. Koshal (supra) examined the order passed by the Appellate Authority which is as follows : “With reference to your appeal dated 31-8-1984, we have to advise that the said appeal was placed by us before the Local Board, the appellate authority, on 25-1-1985. We further advise that the Board in the meeting held on the aforesaid date, resolved as under : "THE BOARD considered at length the facts of the case including the fact that the disciplinary authority has differed from the findings of the inquiring authority in respect of two charges. After having considered the appeal and other relevant papers and having applied their minds, the Board concluded that there are no grounds to sustain the appeal and accordingly RESOLVED that the order of the disciplinary authority be upheld and that the appeal made by Shri S.S. Koshal, be dismissed.” 19. In respect of the aforesaid order, the Supreme Court observed as follows: “We have already extracted the appellate order in full hereinbefore, which shows that it considered at length the facts of the case including the fact that the appellate authority (sic disciplinary authority) had differed from the findings of the Enquiry Officer in respect of the two charges. The appellate authority then says that it considered the relevant grounds of appeal and after considering the facts of the case came to the conclusion that there was no substance in the appeal. In view of the fact that it was an order of affirmance we are of the opinion that it was not obligatory on the part of the appellate authority to say more than this as the order as it is, shows application of mind. The order cannot be characterized as a non-speaking order.” 20. In National Fertilizers Ltd. and another v. P.K. Khanna, (2005) 7 SCC 597 , the Supreme Court also observed that the disciplinary authority is required to give reasons only when it disagrees with the findings of the Enquiry Officer and not when it concurs with that finding. The order cannot be characterized as a non-speaking order.” 20. In National Fertilizers Ltd. and another v. P.K. Khanna, (2005) 7 SCC 597 , the Supreme Court also observed that the disciplinary authority is required to give reasons only when it disagrees with the findings of the Enquiry Officer and not when it concurs with that finding. In view of the aforesaid decisions of the Supreme Court this contention of the learned Counsel for the petitioner cannot be accepted. 21. The contention raised by the learned Counsel for the petitioner that no oral evidence was led on behalf of the Corporation cannot also be accepted as no foundation whatsoever has been led in the Writ Petition regarding this contention. It is not open to the petitioner to raise this contention for the first time during the course of hearing. 22. The contention of the learned Counsel for the petitioner that in such matters a sympathetic view should be taken cannot also be accepted. If the charged employee holds a position of trust where honesty and integrity are inbuilt requirements of functioning, it would not be proper to deal with the matter leniently. Misconduct in such cases has to be dealt with iron hands. This is what was observed by the Supreme Court in Regional Manager, U.P.S.R.T.C., Etawah and another v. Hoti Lal and another (2003) 3 SCC 605 . It was also observed : “Where the person deals with public money or is engaged in financial transactions or acts in a fiduciary capacity, the highest degree of integrity and trustworthiness is a must and unexceptionable. Judged in that background, conclusions of the Division Bench of the High Court do not appear to be proper. We set aside the same and restore order of the learned Single Judge upholding the order of dismissal.” 23. In Regional Manager, R.S.R.T.C. v. Ghanshyam Sharma, (2002) 10 SCC 330 the Supreme Court held that bus conductors who by their actions or inactions cause financial loss to the corporations are not fit to be retained in service. 24. We set aside the same and restore order of the learned Single Judge upholding the order of dismissal.” 23. In Regional Manager, R.S.R.T.C. v. Ghanshyam Sharma, (2002) 10 SCC 330 the Supreme Court held that bus conductors who by their actions or inactions cause financial loss to the corporations are not fit to be retained in service. 24. In Karnataka S.R.T.C. v. B.S. Hullikatti, (2001) 2 SCC 574 the Supreme Court observed that misplaced sympathy was shown by Courts in awarding lesser punishments where on checking it is found that the bus conductors have either not issued tickets to a large number of passengers, though they should have, or have issued tickets of a lower denomination knowing fully well the correct fare to be charged. It is the responsibility of the bus conductors to collect the correct fare from the passengers and deposit the same with the Corporation. They act in a fiduciary capacity and it would be a case of gross misconduct if knowingly they do not collect any fare or the correct amount of fare. 25. In view of the aforesaid decisions it cannot be said that the punishment of removal was not justified in the facts and circumstances of the case. 26. Learned Counsel for the petitioner then submitted that this Court had granted an interim order in favour of the petitioner and the petitioner has also retired from service and, therefore, a sympathetic view should be taken in the matter. I am unable to accept this contention. The petitioner was found guilty of the embezzlement of the funds of the Corporation. The Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasised that in such cases sympathy should not be shown and dismissal from service is a proper punishment. In this context it may be useful to reproduce a passage from the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of State of Madhya Pradesh and another v. Dharam Bir, JT 1998 (4) SC 363 wherein it has been observed as follows : “The plea that the Court should have a “human approach" and should not disturb a person who has already been working on this post for more than a decade also cannot be accepted as the Courts are hardly swayed by emotional appeals.” 27. In Teri Oat Estates (P) Ltd. v. U.T. Chandigarh and others, (2004) 2 SCC 130 , it is stated : “We have no doubt in our mind that sympathy or sentiment by itself cannot be a ground for passing an order in relation whereto the appellants miserably fail to establish a legal right.........” 28. As early as in 1911, Farewell, LJ. in Latham v. Richard Johnson and Nephew Ltd. (1911-13 AER Reprint p. 117) observed : “We must be careful not to allow our sympathy with the infant plaintiff to affect our judgment. Sentiment is a dangerous Will O’ the Wisp to take as a guide in the search for legal principles.” 29. In State of Rajasthan and another v. Kulwant Kaur, 2006 AIR SCW 2622 the Supreme Court observed : “The Respondent herein did not possess the requisite qualification. Only because the order of termination of service of Respondent was directed to be stayed and in obedience of the interim orders passed by the High Court, she was allowed to continue in services, the same, in our opinion, cannot lead to the conclusion that she had been validly holding the post or the order of termination was bad in law.........” 30. Thus, there is no merit in the Writ Petition. It is, accordingly, dismissed. Interim order stands vacated. Petition Dismissed. ———