JUDGMENT Hon’ble Dilip Gupta, J.—This petition has been filed for quashing the order dated 25.11.1983 passed by the Assistant Regional Manager, U.P. State Road Transport Corporation, Banda (hereinafter referred to as the Corporation’) by which the petitioner has been removed from the service of the Corporation and the order dated 2.4.1984 by which the Appeal filed by the petitioner against the aforesaid order was rejected by the Regional Manager, Jhansi. 2. The petitioner was working as a Driver in the Corporation. A charge-sheet dated 31.5.1983 was issued to the petitioner mentioning therein that on 4.1.1983 while he was driving bus No. UTP-3805 on the Rajapur-Karvi route, the checking authorities signalled for stopping the bus but the petitioner did not stop the bus as a result of which the checking authorities were prevented from inspecting the bus which was carrying about 150 passengers. Prior to the issuance of the charge-sheet, the petitioner and the Conductor of the bus Ram Sewak Misra had been placed under suspension by the order dated 5.1.1983. The petitioner submitted a reply to the charge-sheet but as the same was not found to be satisfactory, the departmental enquiry was initiated against him. The petitioner was ultimately removed from the service of the Corporation by the order dated 25.11.1983. The Appeal filed by the petitioner against the said order was also rejected by the order dated 2.4.1984. When the petition was filed, the petitioner had challenged the order dated 25.11.1983 only and it was stated in the petition that the petitioner had been orally intimated a week back that the Appeal filed by him had been rejected. It is only by way of the amendment application that the appellate order dated 2.4.1984 was challenged. 3. Learned Counsel for the petitioner Sri A.N. Srivastava submitted that the petitioner was not given any opportunity to show-cause against the proposed punishment and nor was the copy of the enquiry report served upon him and, therefore, the order dated 25.11.1983 removing him from service was liable to be set aside on the ground of violation of the principles of natural justice. He further submitted that no opportunity had been granted to the petitioner to lead his defence and nor was he permitted to cross-examine the witnesses and that the appellate order does not give any reason for rejecting the Appeal. 4. He further submitted that no opportunity had been granted to the petitioner to lead his defence and nor was he permitted to cross-examine the witnesses and that the appellate order does not give any reason for rejecting the Appeal. 4. Sri Samir Sharma, learned Counsel appearing for the Corporation, however, submitted that Regulation 64 of the Uttar Pradesh State Road Transport Corporation Employees (Other than Officers) Service Regulations, 1981 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the 1981 Regulation’) does not provide for a second show-cause or enquiry report to be served upon the delinquent employee; that as the Enquiry Officer and the disciplinary authority were the same as has been stated by the petitioner in paragraph 6 of the writ petition, it was not necessary to serve a copy of the enquiry report; that adequate opportunity had been granted to the petitioner to lead evidence and to cross-examine the witnesses produced by the Corporation and that it was not necessary for the appellate authority to give detailed reasons once it concurred with the decision of the disciplinary authority. 5. I have carefully considered the submissions of the learned Counsel for the parties. 6. The first contention that has been advanced on behalf of Sri A.N. Srivastava, learned Counsel for the petitioner is that principles of natural justice had been violated as a copy of the enquiry report was not served upon him and in support of this contention he has placed reliance upon the decision of the Supreme Court in Union of India and others v. Mohd. Ramzan Khan, AIR 1991 SC 471 and R.K. Vashisht v. Union of India and others, 1993 Supp (1) SCC 431. 7. This contention of the learned Counsel for the petitioner has to be examined in the light of the provisions contained in the Regulations as they existed at the relevant time. Regulation 64 which is the relevant Regulation does not provide for a supply of the Enquiry Report. The Supreme Court in the case of Mohd. Ramzan Khan (supra) held that the supply of a copy of the Enquiry Report along with the recommendations, if any, in the matter of proposed punishment to be inflicted would be within the rules of the natural justice and the delinquent would, therefore, be entitled to a supply of the copy thereof. The Supreme Court in the case of Mohd. Ramzan Khan (supra) held that the supply of a copy of the Enquiry Report along with the recommendations, if any, in the matter of proposed punishment to be inflicted would be within the rules of the natural justice and the delinquent would, therefore, be entitled to a supply of the copy thereof. The aforesaid decision of the Supreme Court was considered subsequently by the Supreme Court in the case of Managing Director, ECIL Hyderabad, etc., etc. v. B. Karunakar etc., etc. AIR 1994 SC 1074 and in case of Oriental Insurance Company Ltd. v. S. Balakrishnan, AIR 2001 SC 400. 8. In ECIL (supra) the Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court explained the earlier decision in Mohd. Ramzan Khan (supra) and the relevant observations are as follows : “However, it has to be noticed that although it is in Mohd. Ramzan Khan’s case (supra) that this Court for the first time accepted and laid down the law that the delinquent employee is entitled to the copy of the report before the disciplinary authority takes its decision on the charges levelled against him. ................................... It has, therefore, to be accepted that at least till this Court took the view in question in Mohd. Ramzan Khan’s case (supra), the law on the subject was in a flux. ................................... It will, therefore, have to be held that notwithstanding the decision of the Central Administrative Tribunal in H.G. Patel’s case (supra) and of the Gujarat High Court in Premnath K. Sharma’s case (supra) and of the other Courts and tribunals, the law was in an unsettled condition till at least 20th November, 1990 on which day the Mohd. Ramzan Khan’s case was decided. Since the said decision made the law expressly prospective in operation the law laid down there will apply only to those orders of punishment which are passed by the disciplinary authority after 20th November, 1990. This is so, notwithstanding the ultimate relief which was granted there which, as pointed out earlier was per incuriam. No order of punishment passed before that date would be challengeable on the ground that there was a failure to furnish the inquiry report to the delinquent employee. This is so, notwithstanding the ultimate relief which was granted there which, as pointed out earlier was per incuriam. No order of punishment passed before that date would be challengeable on the ground that there was a failure to furnish the inquiry report to the delinquent employee. The proceedings pending in Courts/tribunals in respect of orders of punishment passed prior to 20th November, 1990 will have to be decided according to the law that prevailed prior to the said date and not according to the law laid down in Mohd. Ramzan Khan’s case (supra). The need to make the law laid down in Mohd. Ramzan Khan’s case (supra) prospective in operation requires no emphasis. As pointed out above, in view of the unsettled position of the law on the subject, the authorities/managements all over the country had proceeded on the basis that there was no need to furnish a copy of the report of the Inquiry Officer to the delinquent employee, and innumerable employees have been punished without giving them the copies of the reports. In some of the cases, the orders of punishment have long since become final while other cases are pending in Courts at different stages. In many of the cases, the misconduct has been grave and in others the denial on the part of the management to furnish the report would ultimately prove to be no more than a technical mistake. To reopen all the disciplinary proceedings now would result in grave prejudice to administration which will far outweigh the benefit to the employees concerned. Both administrative reality and public interests do not, therefore, require that the orders of punishment passed prior to the decision in Mohd. Ramzan Khan’s case (supra) without furnishing the report of the Inquiry Officer should be disturbed and the disciplinary proceedings which gave rise to the said orders should be reopened on that account. Hence we hold as above." (Emphasis supplied) 9. In Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. (supra) the Supreme Court observed as follows : “The question, however, still remains to be considered is whether the High Court was justified in interfering with an order of punishment passed by the disciplinary authority merely on the ground that non-supply of enquiry report has vitiated the entire proceedings. In Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. (supra) the Supreme Court observed as follows : “The question, however, still remains to be considered is whether the High Court was justified in interfering with an order of punishment passed by the disciplinary authority merely on the ground that non-supply of enquiry report has vitiated the entire proceedings. It had not been brought to the notice of the learned Judges of the Court that the judgment of this Court in Managing Director, ECIL, Hyderabad v. B. Karunakar, (1993) 3 SCC 727 : (1994 AIR SCW 1050: AIR 1994 SC 1074 : 1994 Lab IC 762) which is a Constitution Bench decision of the Court, and which clarifies the entire position. Without being aware of the correctness of law, the High Court appears to have interfered with an order of dismissal passed in a disciplinary proceedings in grave charges like the one with which we are concerned in the present case. Applying the principles indicated by this Court in ECIL case to the facts of the present case, we cannot conceive any prejudice, which is said to have been caused to the delinquent, and, therefore, non-supply of the enquiry report could not have been held to have vitiated the entire proceedings. In the aforesaid premises, we set aside the impugned order passed by the learned single Judge of the High Court as well as the judgment of the Division Bench of the High Court, and hold that the writ petition filed by the respondent stands dismissed.” 10. In P.D. Agrawal v. State Bank of India and others, 2006 AIR SCW 2504 the Supreme Court observed as follows : “However, the contention of Mr. Rao that only because a copy of the enquiry report was not furnished to the Appellant by the Disciplinary Authority, there has been a violation of the mandatory provisions of the regulations, cannot also be accepted for the reasons stated hereinafter. The order of punishment of removal against the Appellant was passed against the Appellant on 22nd July, 1990. The decision of this Court in Mohd. Ramzan Khan (supra), as noticed hereinbefore, was decided on 20th November, 1990 wherein the law laid down by this Court, while holding that a delinquent officer cannot be called upon to make a representation on the quantum of punishment without furnishing a copy of the enquiry report, was expressly given a prospective effect. The decision of this Court in Mohd. Ramzan Khan (supra), as noticed hereinbefore, was decided on 20th November, 1990 wherein the law laid down by this Court, while holding that a delinquent officer cannot be called upon to make a representation on the quantum of punishment without furnishing a copy of the enquiry report, was expressly given a prospective effect. It was, therefore, not at all necessary for the Disciplinary Authority, keeping in view the law as it then stood, to furnish a copy of the enquiry report to the Appellant.” 11. In the present case, Regulation 64 of the Regulations does not provide for a copy of the Enquiry Report to be served upon the delinquent employee. The case of Mohd. Ramzan Khan and R.K. Vashisht relied upon by the learned Counsel for the petitioner were considered by the Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in ECIL (supra) and it was held that the law laid down will apply to only those orders of punishment which were passed by the Disciplinary Authority after 20th November, 1990. In the present case the order for removal from the service was passed by the Disciplinary Authority on 25th November, 1983. The relevant Regulation existing at that time did not provide for supply of copy of the enquiry report. Thus the first contention of the learned Counsel for the petitioner cannot be accepted. 12. It also needs to be mentioned that in paragraph 6 of the writ petition, the petitioner has stated that the enquiry was conducted by Sri A.H. Khan, Assistant Regional Manager and the order of removal was also passed by Sri A.H. Khan, Assistant Regional Manager. It is, therefore, a case where the disciplinary authority itself has conducted the enquiry. In such a situation it has been held by the Supreme Court in Mohd. Ramzan Khan and ECIL that it is not necessary to supply a copy of the Enquiry Report. In the entire petition, the petitioner has also not pointed out what prejudice has been caused to him on account of the non-furnishing of the enquiry report and, therefore, in view of the decision of the Supreme Court in Oriental Insurance Company Ltd. (supra) it has to be held that non-supply of the enquiry report does vitiate the enquiry proceedings. Thus also this contention of the learned Counsel for the petitioner cannot be accepted. 13. Thus also this contention of the learned Counsel for the petitioner cannot be accepted. 13. The next contention of the learned Counsel for the petitioner is that a second show-cause notice was not served upon the petitioner so as to enable him to file a representation against the penalty proposed to be imposed upon him and in this connection he has placed reliance upon decisions of this Court in Shitla Prasad v. State of U.P. and others, 1986 (52) FLR 579 and upon an unreported decision of this Court in Writ Petition No. 8652 of 1987 (Satya Pal Sharma v. U.P. State Road Transport Corporation, Lucknow and others). In both these decisions reliance has been placed upon certain provisions of the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) which required the employer to give a reasonable opportunity to the delinquent employee of making a representation against the penalty proposed. In the present case, learned Counsel for the petitioner has not placed before the Court any such requirement under the Regulations and Regulation 64 does not provide for any such issuance of notice. Thus this contention of the learned Counsel for the petitioner cannot be accepted. 14. The next contention of the learned Counsel for the petitioner is that opportunity was not given to either lead evidence in defence or to cross-examine the witnesses produced on behalf of the Corporation. A perusal of the writ petition shows that such a ground has not been taken by the petitioner and, therefore, such a contention which has been raised during the course of the hearing of the writ petition cannot be entertained. Even otherwise, a perusal of the impugned order clearly shows that adequate opportunity had been provided to the petitioner to lead evidence and also to cross-examine the witnesses of the Corporation. In fact, the petitioner cross-examined Sri K.P. Verma, the Traffic Inspector, who was a member of the Checking Squad. 15. Learned Counsel for the petitioner then contended that the Appellate order does not indicate the reasons for rejecting the Appeal. In this connection, it may be pertinent to point out that a copy of the Appeal filed before the Regional Manager of the Corporation has not been brought on record and in the absence of the copy of the Appeal, it is not possible to ascertain the grounds that had been taken by the petitioner in Appeal. In this connection, it may be pertinent to point out that a copy of the Appeal filed before the Regional Manager of the Corporation has not been brought on record and in the absence of the copy of the Appeal, it is not possible to ascertain the grounds that had been taken by the petitioner in Appeal. Sri Samir Sharma, learned Counsel for the respondent has placed reliance upon a decision of the Supreme Court in State Bank of India, Bhopal v. S.S. Koshal, 1994 SCC (L & S) 1019 in support of his contention that in respect of an order of affirmance it is not necessary for the Appellate Authority to give detailed reasons. 16. A perusal of the order passed by the Appellate Authority in the present case shows that the Appellate Authority had examined the entire records including the appeal filed by the petitioner but found no good reason to interfere with the decision taken by the disciplinary authority. The Supreme Court in the case of S.S. Koshal (supra) examined the order passed by the Appellate Authority which is as follows : “With reference to your appeal dated 31-8-1984, we have to advise that the said appeal was placed by us before the Local Board, the appellate authority, on 25-1-1985. We further advise that the Board in the meeting held on the aforesaid date, resolved as under : “THE BOARD considered at length the facts of the case including the fact that the disciplinary authority has differed from the findings of the inquiring authority in respect of two charges. After having considered the appeal and other relevant papers and having applied their minds, the Board concluded that there are no grounds to sustain the appeal and accordingly RESOLVED that the order of the disciplinary authority be upheld and that the appeal made by Shri S.S. Koshal, be dismissed.” 17. In respect of the aforesaid order, the Supreme Court observed as follows: “We have already extracted the appellate order in full hereinbefore, which shows that it considered at length the facts of the case including the fact that the appellate authority (sic disciplinary authority) had differed from the findings of the Enquiry Officer in respect of the two charges. In respect of the aforesaid order, the Supreme Court observed as follows: “We have already extracted the appellate order in full hereinbefore, which shows that it considered at length the facts of the case including the fact that the appellate authority (sic disciplinary authority) had differed from the findings of the Enquiry Officer in respect of the two charges. The appellate authority then says that it considered the relevant grounds of appeal and after considering the facts of the case came to the conclusion that there was no substance in the appeal. In view of the fact that it was an order of affirmance we are of the opinion that it was not obligatory on the part of the appellate authority to say more than this as the order as it is, shows application of mind. The order cannot be characterized as a non-speaking order.” 18. In National Fertilizers Ltd. and another v. P.K. Khanna, (2005) 7 SCC 597 , the Supreme Court also observed that the disciplinary authority is required to give reasons only when it disagrees with the findings of the Enquiry Officer and not when it concurs with that finding. In view of the aforesaid decisions of the Supreme Court this contention of the learned Counsel for the petitioner cannot be accepted. 19. Sri A.N. Srivastava, learned Counsel for the petitioner then submitted that the findings that had been recorded against the petitioner are based merely on presumption, as it cannot be assumed that all the 150 passengers had not taken the Tickets merely because the petitioner did not stop the Bus on being asked by the Checking Squad. 20. The Supreme Court in the case of High Court of Judicature at Bombay through its Registrar v. Shri Udaysingh s/o Ganpatrao Naik Nimbalkar and others, JT 1997 (5) SC 298 held that disciplinary proceedings are not a criminal trial and, therefore, the scope of enquiry is entirely different from that of a criminal trial in which the charge is required to be proved beyond doubt. In the case of disciplinary enquiry, the technical rules of evidence have no application and preponderance of probabilities and some material on record would be necessary to reach a conclusion whether or not the delinquent has committed misconduct. In the case of disciplinary enquiry, the technical rules of evidence have no application and preponderance of probabilities and some material on record would be necessary to reach a conclusion whether or not the delinquent has committed misconduct. The test laid down is to see whether there is evidence on record to reach the conclusion that the delinquent has committed misconduct and whether as a reasonable man, in the circumstances, would be justified in reaching that conclusion. The same view was reiterated by the Supreme Court in the case of Depot Manager, A.P. State Road Transport Corporation v. Mohd. Yousuf Miya, 1997 (77) F.L.R. and in the case of Lalit Popli v. Canara Bank and others, (2003) 3 SCC 583 . It was held that strict standard of proof or applicability of the Evidence Act stands excluded and the standard of proof in the departmental proceedings is not the same as of the criminal trial. In the disciplinary proceedings the preliminary question is whether the employee is guilty of such conduct as would merit action against him, whereas in criminal proceedings the question is whether the offences registered against him are established and if established what sentence should be imposed upon him. 21. In view of the principles laid down in the aforesaid decisions of the Supreme Court, it cannot be said that the decision taken by the disciplinary authority was bad in law. The petitioner did not stop the bus when being asked to do so by the Checking Squad and, therefore, a reasonable inference can be drawn that the passengers or at least some of them were travelling without tickets. 22. Sri A.N. Srivastava, in the end, submitted that the punishment imposed upon the petitioner was disproportionate to the gravity of the charges levelled against the petitioner. 23. Sri Samir Sharma, learned Counsel for the Corporation, however, submitted that a Bus Driver, who causes financial loss to the Corporation is not fit to be retained in service and, therefore, it cannot be said that the order of punishment is disproportionate to the gravity of the charges levelled against the petitioner. 24. 23. Sri Samir Sharma, learned Counsel for the Corporation, however, submitted that a Bus Driver, who causes financial loss to the Corporation is not fit to be retained in service and, therefore, it cannot be said that the order of punishment is disproportionate to the gravity of the charges levelled against the petitioner. 24. The scope of interference by Courts with the quantum of punishment has been the subject matter of a number of decisions and it has been repeatedly emphasised that interference cannot be done in a routine manner and that the principles relating to judicial review of administrative action have necessarily to be examined. 25. The famous “Wednesbury Case” Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd. v. Wednesbury Corp., (1947) 2 All ER 680 (CA) is considered to be the landmark in so far as the basic principles relating to judicial review of administrative or statutory discretion are concerned. A passage from the judgment of Lord Greene is important and is quoted : “It is true that discretion must be exercised reasonably. Now what does that mean? Lawyers familiar with the phraseology used in relation to exercise of statutory discretions often use the word ‘unreasonable’ in a rather comprehensive sense. It has frequently been used and is frequently used as a general description of the things that must not be done. For instance, a person entrusted with a discretion must, so to speak, direct himself properly in law. He must call his own attention to the matters, which he is bound to consider. He must exclude from his consideration matters, which are irrelevant to what he has to consider. If he does not obey those rules, he may truly be said, and often is said, to be acting ‘unreasonably’. Similarly, there may be something so absurd that no sensible person could even dream that it lay within the powers of the authority.......In another, it is taking into consideration extraneous matters. It is unreasonable that it might almost be described as being done in bad faith; and in fact, all these things run into one another.” (emphasis supplied) 26. The principles of judicial review of administrative action were further summarized by Lord Diplock in Council of Civil Service Unions v. Minister for the Civil Service, 1984 (3) All. ER. 935, (commonly known as CCSU case) as illegality, procedural impropriety and irrationality. The principles of judicial review of administrative action were further summarized by Lord Diplock in Council of Civil Service Unions v. Minister for the Civil Service, 1984 (3) All. ER. 935, (commonly known as CCSU case) as illegality, procedural impropriety and irrationality. It was observed in this case as follows : “.......Judicial review has I think, developed to a stage today when, without reiterating any analysis of the steps by which the development has come about, one can conveniently classify under three heads the grounds on which administrative action is subject to control by judicial review. The first ground I would call ‘illegality’, the second ‘irrationality’ and the third ‘procedural impropriety’. That is not to say that further development on a case-by-case basis may not in course of time add further grounds. I have in mind particularly the possible adoption in the future of the principle of proportionality’ which is recognized in the administrative law of several of our fellow members of the European Economic Community.” “By ‘irrationality’ I mean what can by now be succinctly referred to as ‘Wednesbury unreasonableness’. It applies to a decision which is so outrageous in its defiance of logic or of accepted moral standards that no sensible person who had applied his mind to the question to be decided could have arrived at it.” (emphasis supplied) 27. In Union of India and another, v. G.Ganayutham (1997) 7SCC 463 the Supreme Court after referring to the aforesaid Wednesbury case and CCSU case held : “We are of the view that even in our country—in cases not involving fundamental freedoms—the role of our Courts/tribunals in administrative law is purely secondary and while applying Wednesbury and CCSU principles to test the validity of executive action or of administrative action taken in exercise of statutory powers, the Courts and tribunals in our country can only go into the matter, as a secondary reviewing Court to find out if the executive or the administrator in their primary roles have arrived at a reasonable decision on the material before them in the light of Wednesbury and CCSU tests. The choice of the options available is for the authority; the Court/tribunal cannot substitute its view as to what is reasonable. ......................................... The choice of the options available is for the authority; the Court/tribunal cannot substitute its view as to what is reasonable. ......................................... In such a situation, unless the Court/tribunal opines in its secondary role, that the administrator was, on the material before him, irrational according to Wednesbury or CCSU norms, the punishment cannot be quashed. Even then, the matter has to be remitted back to the appropriate authority for reconsideration. It is only in very rare cases as pointed out in B.C. Chaturvedi case that the Court might — to shorten litigation — think of substituting its own view as to the quantum of punishment in the place of the punishment awarded by the competent authority." (emphasis supplied) 28. In B.C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India and others, (1995) 6 SCC 749 , which has been referred to in the aforesaid decision in G.Ganayutham (supra), the Supreme Court after referring to a number of its earlier decisions observed as under : “A review of the above legal position would establish that the disciplinary authority, and on appeal the appellate authority, being fact-finding authorities have exclusive power to consider the evidence with a view to maintain discipline. They are invested with the discretion to impose appropriate punishment keeping in view the magnitude or gravity of the misconduct. The High Court/Tribunal, while exercising the power of judicial review, cannot normally substitute its own conclusion on penalty and impose some other penalty. If the punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority or the appellate authority shocks the conscience of the High Court/Tribunal, it would appropriately mould the relief, either directing the disciplinary/appellate authority to reconsider the penalty imposed, or to shorten the litigation, it may itself, in exceptional and rare cases, impose appropriate punishment with cogent reasons in support thereof." (emphasis supplied) 29. In Apparel Export Promotion Council v. A.K. Chopra, AIR 1999 SC 625 , the Supreme Court again observed : “...............Even insofar as imposition of penalty or punishment is concerned, unless the punishment or penalty imposed by the Disciplinary or the Departmental Appellate Authority, is either impermissible or such that it shocks the conscience of the High Court, it should not normally substitute its own opinion and impose some other punishment or penalty." 30. The matter relating to quantum of punishment was also elaborately considered by the Supreme Court in Om Kumar and others v. Union of India, (2001) 2 SCC 386 and it was observed : “But where an administrative action is challenged as “arbitrary” under Article 14 on the basis of Royappa (1994) 4 SCC 3 (as in cases where punishments in disciplinary cases are challenged), the question will be whether the administrative order is “rational” or “reasonable" and the test then is the Wednesbury test. The Courts would then be confined only to a secondary role and will only have to see whether the administrator has done well in his primary role, whether he has acted illegally or has omitted relevant factors from consideration or has taken irrelevant factors into consideration or whether his view is one which no reasonable person could have taken. If his action does not satisfy these rules, it is to be treated as arbitrary. [In G.B. Mahajan v. Jalgaon Municipal Council, (1991) 3 SCC 91 ] Venkatachaliah, J. (as he then was) pointed out that “reasonableness” of the administrator under Article 14 in the context of administrative law has to be judged from the stand point of Wednesbury rules. In Tata Cellular v. Union of India, (1994) 6 SCC 651 ; Indian Express Newspapers Bombay (P) Ltd. v. Union of India, (1985) 1 SCC 641, Supreme Court Employees’ Welfare Assn. v. Union of India, (1989) 4 SCC 187 and U.P. Financial Corpn. v. Gem Cap (India) (P) Ltd. (1993) 2 SCC 299 while judging whether the administrative action is “arbitrary" under Article 14 (i.e. otherwise then being discriminatory), this Court has confined itself to a Wednesbury review always. Thus, when administrative action is attached as discriminatory under Article 14, the principle of primary review is for the Courts by applying proportionality. However, where administrative action is questioned as “arbitrary” under Article 14, the principle of secondary review based on Wednesbury principles applies. (emphasis supplied) 31. Proportionality was also explained by observing : “By “proportionality”, we mean the question whether, while regulating exercise of fundamental rights, the appropriate or least-restrictive choice of measures has been made by the legislature or the administrator so as to achieve the object of the legislation or the purpose of the administrative order, as the case may be. (emphasis supplied) 31. Proportionality was also explained by observing : “By “proportionality”, we mean the question whether, while regulating exercise of fundamental rights, the appropriate or least-restrictive choice of measures has been made by the legislature or the administrator so as to achieve the object of the legislation or the purpose of the administrative order, as the case may be. Under the principle, the Court will see that the legislature and the administrative authority “maintain a proper balance between the adverse effects which the legislation or the administrative order may have on the rights, liberties or interests of persons keeping in mind the purpose which they were intended to serve”. The legislature and the administrative authority are, however, given an area of discretion or a range of choices but as to whether the choice made infringes the rights excessively or not is for the Court. That is what is meant by proportionality.” 32. In Karnataka S.R.T.C. v. B.S. Hullikatti, (2001) 2 SCC 574 the Supreme Court observed that misplaced sympathy was shown by Courts in awarding lesser punishments where on checking it is found that the bus conductors have either not issued tickets to a large number of passengers, though they should have, or have issued tickets of a lower denomination knowing fully well the correct fare to be charged. It is the responsibility of the bus conductors to collect the correct fare from the passengers and deposit the same with the Corporation. They act in a fiduciary capacity and it would be a case of gross misconduct if knowingly they do not collect any fare or the correct amount of fare. 33. In Regional Manager, R.S.R.T.C. v. Ghanshyam Sharma, (2002) 10 SCC 330 the Supreme Court held that bus conductors who by their actions or inactions cause financial loss to the corporations are not fit to be retained in service. 34. In Regional Manager, U.P.S.R.T.C., Etawah and another v. Hoti Lal and another, (2003) 3 SCC 605 the Supreme Court observed : “If the charged employee holds a position of trust where honesty and integrity are inbuilt requirements of functioning, it would not be proper to deal with the matter leniently. Misconduct in such cases has to be dealt with iron hands. Misconduct in such cases has to be dealt with iron hands. Where the person deals with public money or is engaged in financial transactions or acts in a fiduciary capacity, the highest degree of integrity and trustworthiness is a must and unexceptionable. Judged in that background, conclusions of the Division Bench of the High Court do not appear to be proper. We set aside the same and restore order of the learned Single Judge upholding the order of dismissal.” (emphasis supplied) 35. In Regional Manager, Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation v. Sohan Lal, (2004) 8 SCC 218 it was pointed out by the Supreme Court : “Assuming for argument sake that the High Court by the impugned order proceeded on the basis that though the misconduct is proved the punishment was disproportionate and it is on that basis that the impugned order is made, even then we are unable to agree with the order of the Appellate Bench of the High Court because it is not the normal jurisdiction of the superior Courts to interfere with the quantum of sentence unless the said sentence is wholly disproportionate to the misconduct proved. No such finding has been recorded by the Appellate Bench in the impugned order. Since, the misconduct proved is one of dishonesty, the quantum of loss is immaterial, it is the loss of confidence that matters................” (emphasis supplied) 36. In V. Ramana v. A.P.S.R.T.C. and others, (2005) 7 SCC 338 the Supreme Court observed : “The common thread running through in all these decisions is that the Court should not interfere with the administrator’s decision unless it was illogical or suffers from procedural impropriety or was shocking to the conscience of the Court, in the sense that it was in defiance of logic or moral standards. In view of what has been stated in Wednesbury case the Court would not go into the correctness of the choice made by the administrator open to him and the Court should not substitute its decision for that of the administrator. The scope of judicial review is limited to the deficiency in decision-making process and not the decision. To put it differently unless the punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority or the Appellate Authority shocks the conscience of the Court/Tribunal, there is no scope for interference.” (Emphasis supplied) 37. The scope of judicial review is limited to the deficiency in decision-making process and not the decision. To put it differently unless the punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority or the Appellate Authority shocks the conscience of the Court/Tribunal, there is no scope for interference.” (Emphasis supplied) 37. In Canara Bank v. V.K. Awasthy, (2005) 6 SCC 321 , the Supreme Court after considering the aforesaid decisions observed that interference by the Courts with the quantum of punishment cannot be in a routine manner and in a matter where the bank employee has failed to discharge his duty with utmost honesty, integrity, devotion and diligence the punishment of dismissal from the bank was justified. 38. The aforesaid decisions of the Supreme Court clearly emphasise that where the punishment in disciplinary cases is challenged as being arbitrary, the question that would arise for consideration would be whether the administrative order is “rational” or “reasonable” and the test then to be applied is the “Wednesbury” test. The Courts will then be confined only to a secondary role to find out if the action satisfies the test. The disciplinary authority and the appellate authority, being fact finding authorities, have the exclusive power to consider the evidence with a view to maintain discipline and they are vested with the discretion to impose appropriate punishment keeping in view the gravity of the misconduct. It has also been emphasised that the High Court while exercising the power of judicial review cannot normally substitute its own opinion and impose some other penalty unless the punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority or the appellate authority shocks the conscience of the Court in the sense that it is in defiance of logic or moral standards. The aforesaid decisions also make it clear that no misplaced sympathy should be shown by the Courts when it is found that the Bus Conductors have either not issued tickets to a large number of passengers or have issued tickets of a lower denomination and that Bus Conductors who cause financial loss to the Corporation are not fit to be retained in service. It has also been pointed out that if the charged employee holds a position of trust then in such cases misconduct has to be dealt with iron hands. 39. The charges levelled against the petitioner related to causing financial loss to the Corporation. It has also been pointed out that if the charged employee holds a position of trust then in such cases misconduct has to be dealt with iron hands. 39. The charges levelled against the petitioner related to causing financial loss to the Corporation. The question, therefore, that is required to be considered is whether even in such case, the Court in exercise of power of judicial review should interfere with quantum of punishment. The Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasised that Bus Conductors who cause financial loss to the Corporation irrespective of the amount involved are not fit to be retained in service and that in such matters no sympathy should be shown by awarding lesser punishment. In such cases the Bus Conductors act in a fiduciary capacity and, therefore, highest degree of integrity and trustworthiness is required. It cannot, therefore, be said by any stretch of imagination that the punishment of removal from service of the Corporation imposed by the disciplinary authority is disproportionate to the gravity of misconduct. 40. Thus, as none of the contentions advanced by the learned Counsel for the petitioner has any force, the writ petition is dismissed. Petition Dismissed. ———