Honble ASOPA, J.-By the instant writ petition the petitioner has challenged the order dated 1.4.1992 passed by Khudkasht Commissioner, Rajasthan, Jaipur, invoking suo moto review power under Section 40-A of the Land Reforms and Resumption of Jagir Act, 1952 (for short the Act of 1952), and cancelled the allotment of 25 bighas of land vide orders dated 24.5.1955 and 8.3.1956. 2. Briefly stated the relevant facts of the case are that the petitioner filed an application for allotment of Khudkasht land u/S. 14 of the Act of 1952 and was allotted one Muraba of land (25 bi-has) in Chak 15 DPN on 24.5.1955 in Bhakra Project area. This Murba land was afterwards exchanged in Beed Hanumangarh Chak 18 HMH by the Commissioner vide order dated 8.3.1956. The petitioner invested a huge amount for improvement of this land. In the year 1974 the Khatedari rights were conferred upon him and a Sanad was issued by the District Collector, Sriganganagar. After an inordinate delay of thirty years, the petitioner received a notice from the Khudkasht Commissioner in June, 1985, which was based "on information given by some other person" and it was mentioned therein that the petitioner was not a Jagirdar because no Jagir compensation was taken by him; that the petitioner obtained the Khudkaslit land by wrongly showing himself as Jagirdar during the life time of his father and further the petitioner together with his brother Laxman Singh has already 26 bigha 11 biswa land in possession, therefore, he is not landless. The said notice was revised and the words on information given by some other person were deleted and another notice was issued on 12.11.1986 on the same points. The petitioner submitted reply to the said notice and objected exercise of the suo moto review power u/S. 40-A of the Act of 1952 after 30 years. Reply to all the points was also given but the main thrust of the petitioner was on the point that after thirty years, no review proceedings could be initiated. The said objection has been rejected by the Khudkast Commissioner and the notice has been held to be valid vide order dated 1.4.1992 by holding that the petitioner was neither Jagirdar nor landless, therefore, the review is accepted and the allotments stand cancelled. 3. The said objection has been rejected by the Khudkast Commissioner and the notice has been held to be valid vide order dated 1.4.1992 by holding that the petitioner was neither Jagirdar nor landless, therefore, the review is accepted and the allotments stand cancelled. 3. Against the said order dated 1.4.1992, the petitioner has filed the present writ petition, mainly on the ground that no review proceedings could have been initiated after an inordinate delay of thirty years, although no limitation period is prescribed for invoking suo moto review power but still power has to be exercised within reasonable period that too on the round specified under Order 47 Rule 1 C.P.C. 4. In reply to the grounds of review, the petitioner in Para Nos. 6 and 7, categorically mentioned that in Shekhawati, during the period of Raja Todar Mal (1650), the law of primogeniture was abolished and law of inheritance of equal share by male sons in a Jagir as of birth right was introduced and the said right could have been also exercised during the life time of the father to avoid any kind of dispute in the royal family. The petitioner who is direct descent of Raja Todar Mal under the said right, was given a Jagir by his late father Thakur Suraj Bux Singh Ji during his life time by a deed executed on Baisakh Sudi 15 Samvat 2006, which was pronounced in all the Jagir villages. 5. Admittedly the petitioners late father Thakur Suraj Bux Singh was a recognized Jagirdar. He had full authority and powers to grant a Jagir to any person and such grantee is covered by the definition of Jagirdar under Section 2(g) of the Rajasthan Land Reforms and Resumption of Jagirs Act, 1952 (Act No VI of 1952), which reads as under:- "Section 2(g) "Jagirdar means any person recognized as a Jagirdar under any existing Jagir law and includes a grantee of Jagir Land from a Jagirdar." 6. It was further stated in the writ petition that the Tehsildar has rightly given his report about the entitlement of the petitioner and there appears to be no reason to disbelieve it and further in case compensation is not claimed by a Jagirdar then he will not be ceased to be Jagirdar as per Section 2(g) of the Act of 1952. The non-mentioning of the fact of Thakur Suraj Bux Singh in Form No. 3 of the name of the petitioner will also not dis-entitle him from benefit of Act of 1952. The petitioner has also annexed the order dated 4.10.1980 passed in case of his elder brother (not the eldest) in the suo moto review petition whereby the notice was dropped on the ground that there is nothing on record which can establish any error apparent on the face of the record nor discovery of new or important fact which was previously not known and later on came to his knowledge. Hence, notice is not in accordance with Order 47 Rule 1 C.P.C. 7. The State Government has filed reply to the writ petition and stated that in the present case the petitioner has wrongly presented himself as Jagirdar and after mentioning the wrong facts, he has got himself allotted one murabba of land, that Thakur Suraj Bux Singh had no right to give Jagir to the petitioner. The review proceedings have rightly been held and the order has been rightly passed. But no explanation of exercise of the said power after unreasonable and inordinate delay of thirty years has been given and acceptance of judgment in review of case of Guman Singh except that no period of limitation prescribed and that judgment of Guman Singh is not applicable in the case of the petitioner. 8. The petitioner has submitted rejoinder to the reply and clarified one fact that Jagir was given to him by late Thakur Suraj Bux, a recognized Jagirdar of Bagholi, Ragunathpura and Bhojgarh in Samvat Year 2006 i.e. about 8 years before tile resumption of his Jagir and the review is nothing but a mala fide exercise of power at the instance of powerful political leader. 9. The State Government has filed reply to the rejoinder and again emphasized on the possession of the land of 26 Bigha 11 Biswa in village Bagoli, Tehsil Udaipurwati, District Jhunjhunu in joint khatedari of petitioner and his brother Laxman Singh. 10. 9. The State Government has filed reply to the rejoinder and again emphasized on the possession of the land of 26 Bigha 11 Biswa in village Bagoli, Tehsil Udaipurwati, District Jhunjhunu in joint khatedari of petitioner and his brother Laxman Singh. 10. The submission of the Counsel for the petitioner is that the Khudkasht Commissioner has committed an error of law while exercising the power of suo moto review after unreasonable time and an inordinate delay of thirty years without taking into consideration the aspect of the case that grounds of review mentioned in notice are not covered by Order 47 Rule 1 C.P.C. Further the petitioner earned Khatedari rights on the land and invested a huge amount in improvement of the land. The further submission of the Counsel for the petitioner is that the Khudkasht Commissioner has completely ignored the fact that in Shekhawati, sons of Jagirdar are usually given their share during the life time of Jagirdar and in this particular case when in case of the elder brother (not eldest) of the petitioner Guman Singh the Khudkast Commissioner has dropped the notice against Guman Singh for reasons that grounds mentioned in notice are not covered by Order 47 Rule 1 C.P.C., there appears to be no justification for not dropping the same against him. Moreover in case of his another elder brother Kalyan Singh when a writ petition was filed by the purchaser against the order of the Khudkasht Commissioner, it has been held that exercise of power of suo moto review after a lapse of 30 years is not only having arbitrary nature but is also an exercise of powers in colourable manner. The Counsel for the petitioner has also submitted that the decision of Khudkasht Commissioner in case of Guman Singh was accepted by the State, therefore, the State is prevented on the general principle of issue of estoppel as well as cause of action estoppel to defend the impugned order passed by Khudkasht Commissioner in this case. In support of his submissions, Counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance upon Bhopal Singh vs. The Rajasthan State, 1958 RLW 172; Hope Plantations Ltd. vs. Taluk Land Board, Peermade & Anr. ( 1999(5) SCC 590 ); Bhanu Kumar Jain vs. Archana Kumar & Anr. (2005(1) Supreme Court Cases 787); Ishwar Dutt vs. Land Acquisition Collector & Anr. In support of his submissions, Counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance upon Bhopal Singh vs. The Rajasthan State, 1958 RLW 172; Hope Plantations Ltd. vs. Taluk Land Board, Peermade & Anr. ( 1999(5) SCC 590 ); Bhanu Kumar Jain vs. Archana Kumar & Anr. (2005(1) Supreme Court Cases 787); Ishwar Dutt vs. Land Acquisition Collector & Anr. (2005(7) Supreme Court Cases 190) and Ram Pratap & Ors. vs. State of Rajasthan & Ors. ( 2006(3) RDD 1409 (Raj.)) 11. The Submission of the Counsel for the respondents is that the petitioner is neither Jagirdar nor landless person and he has wrongly presented himself as Jagirdar, after mentioning the wrong fact and has got himself allotted one Muraba of land. The Khudkasht Commissioner passed the review order which is quite legal and justified and is not in violation of principles of natural justice. 12. I have gone through the record of the writ petition and considered the rival submissions of Counsel for both the parties. 13. Before proceeding further to examine this, it would be worthwhile to quote Section 40-A inserted vide Act No. 7 of 1958 and further sub-section (2) inserted vide Act No. 43 of 1960, which are as under:- "[40-A Review. [(1)] The Board, the Jagir Commissioner or the Commissioner for Khudkasht lands may either on an application made, within three months of the 18.1.1958 or of the date of order, whichever is later, by any interested party or suo moto, review an order passed by the Board or by such Commissioner himself or his predecessor in office and pass such order in relation thereto as it or he thinks fit. [(2) No order passed by the Board or the Jagir Commissioner or the Commissioner for Khudkasht Lands shall be reviewed under sub-section (1) otherwise than on any of the grounds mentioned in Rule 1, Order 47 of the First Schedule to the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (Central Act V of 1908), and the provisions of the said Order shall apply.]" Order 47 Rule 1 C.P.C. is as follows: 1. Application for review of judgment.- (1) Any person considering himself aggrieved- (a) by a decree or order from which an appeal is allowed, but from which no appeal has been preferred, (b) by a decree or order from which no appeal is allowed, or (c) by a decision on a reference from a Court of Small Causes, and who, front the discovery of new and important matter or evidence which, after the exercise of due diligence was not within his knowledge or could not be produced by him at the time when the decree was passed or order made, or oil account of some mistake or error apparent on the face of the record, or for any other sufficient reason, desire to obtain a review of the decree passed or order made against him, may apply for a review of judgment to the Court which passed the decree or made the order. (2) A party who is not appealing from a decree or order may apply for a review of judgment notwithstanding the pendency of an appeal by some other party except where the ground of such appeal is common to the applicant and the appellant, or when, being respondent, he can present to the Appellate Court the case on which he applies for the review. [Explanation.—The fact that the decision on a question of law on which the judgment of the Court is based has been reversed or modified by the subsequent decision of a superior Court in any other case, shall not he a -round for the review of such judgment.] 14. Para No. 7 of the judgment reported in Rain Pratap & Ors. (Supra), who is purchaser of land from another brother of the petitioner, who was similarly allotted the land is as under:- "It is well settled that an authority vested with powers to initiate the proceedings which may effect rights of any party adversely should take such action within a reasonable time and without any inordinate delay. In the instant matter as the proceedings under Section 40-A were initiated after a lapse of 30 years, therefore, the same is not only having arbitrary nature but is also an exercise of powers in colourable manner. 15. In the instant matter as the proceedings under Section 40-A were initiated after a lapse of 30 years, therefore, the same is not only having arbitrary nature but is also an exercise of powers in colourable manner. 15. A co-ordinate bench in the aforesaid case has held that although the order is not without jurisdiction on the ground of delay and the same is not only having arbitrary nature but is also an exercise of powers in colourable manner after thirty years. In the aforesaid case the Court has also considered the fact of changing hand of the land. I am in agreement with the said judgment. 16. The review under Section 40-A was rightly rejected by Khudkasht Commissioner on 4.10.1980 by dropping similar notice being not covered by Order 47 Rule 1 CPC in case of elder brother (not eldest) Guman Singh but the same was not considered while passing impugned order dated 1.4.1992 by Khudkasht Commissioner in this case. 17. In review proceedings the Authority/Court concerned is not empowered under Order 47 Rule 1 to re-write the judgment on merits or demerits of the case. Even if two views are possible on the basis of the same material available on record on earlier occasion and thereafter on subsequent occasion then also the review is not permissible. The review is only permissible on the ground mentioned under Order 47 Rule 1 C.P.C. i.e. the discovery of new and important matter or evidence which after the exercise of due diligence were not within his knowledge or could not he produced by him at the time when the decree/order was passed or order made or on account of some mistake or error apparent on the face of the record or for any other sufficient reason. 18. The Supreme Court in the case of M/s. Thungabhadra Industries Ltd. (In all the Appeals) vs. The Government of Andhra Pradesh represented by the Deputy Commissioner of Commercial Taxes, Anantapur (In all the Appeals), AIR 1964 SC 1372 , in Para 11, has held that a review is by no means an appeal in disguise whereby an erroneous decision is reheard and corrected. The relevant portion of Para No. 11 of the aforesaid judgment is as follows:- "11......... The relevant portion of Para No. 11 of the aforesaid judgment is as follows:- "11......... There is a distinction which is real, though it might not always be capable of exposition, between a mere erroneous decision and a decision which could be characterised as vitiated by "error apparent". A review is by no means an appeal in disguise whereby an erroneous decision is reheard and corrected, but lies only for patent error. Where without any elaborate argument one could point to the error and say here is a substantial point of law which stares one ill the face, and there could reasonably be no two opinions entertained about it, a clear case of error apparent on the face of the record would be made out....." 19. Similarly, the Supreme Court again in the case of Smt. Meena Bhanja vs. Smt. Nirmala Kumari Choudhary ( AIR 1995 SC 455 ), has held that review Court not to act as appellate Court. Para No.8 of the aforesaid judgment is as follows:- "8. It is well settled that the review proceedings are not by way of an appeal and have to be strictly confined to the scope and ambit of Order 47, Rule 1, C.P.C. In connection with the limitation of the powers of the Court under Order 47, Rule 1, while dealing with the similar jurisdiction available to the High Court while seeking to review the orders under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, this Court, in the case of Ariban Tuleshwar Sharma vs. Ariban Pishak Sharma ( AIR 1979 SC 1047 ), speaking through Chinnappa Reddy, J., has made the following pertinent observations (Para 3). "It is true there is nothing in Article 226 of the Constitution to preclude the High Court from exercising the power of review which inheres in every Court of plenary jurisdiction to prevent miscarriage of justice or to correct Grave and palpable errors committed by it. But, there are definitive limits to the exercise of the power of review. "It is true there is nothing in Article 226 of the Constitution to preclude the High Court from exercising the power of review which inheres in every Court of plenary jurisdiction to prevent miscarriage of justice or to correct Grave and palpable errors committed by it. But, there are definitive limits to the exercise of the power of review. The power of review may be exercised on the discovery of new and important matter or evidence which, after the exercise of due diligence was not within the knowledge of the person seeking the review or could not be produced by him at the time when the order was made; it may be exercised where some mistake or error apparent on the face of the record is found; it may also, be exercised on any analogous ground. But, it may not be exercised oil the ground that the decision was erroneous on merits. That would be the province of a Court of Appeal. A power of review is not to be confused with appellate power which may enable an appellate Court to correct all manner of errors committed by the Subordinate Court." Now it is also to be kept in view that in the impugned judgment, the Division Bench of the High Court has clearly observed that they were entertaining the review petition only on the ground of error apparent on the face of the record and not on any other ground. So far as that aspect is concerned, it has to be kept in view that an error apparent on the fact of record must be such an error which must strike one on mere looking at the record and would not require any long drawn process of reasoning on points where there may conceivably be two opinions. We may usefully refer to the observations of this Court in the case of Satyanarayan Laxminarayan Hegde vs. Mallikarjun Bhavanappa Tirumale ( AIR 1960 SC 137 ) wherein, K.C. Das Gupta, J., speaking for the Court has made the following observations in connection with an error apparent on the face of the record: "An error which has to be established by a long drawn process of reasoning on points where there may conceivably be two opinions can hardly be said to be an error apparent on the face of the record. Where an alleged error is far from self-evidence and if it can be established, it has to be established, by lengthy and complicated arguments, such an error cannot be cured by a writ of certiorari according to the rule governing the powers of the superior Court to issue such a writ. 20. Here in the instant case, none of the grounds under Order 47 Rule 1 C.P.C. were available to the Khudkshat Commissioner and the Khudkasht Commissioner has acted as appellate Court having same jurisdiction of original Court, by rehearing and rewriting the judgment. On melts, in my view he has acted beyond the scope of review jurisdiction. 21. The impugned order passed by the Khudkasht Commissioner dated 1.4.1992 in respect of allotment made in 1955 and changed in 1956 is not only arbitrary but the same has also been passed by exercising the power in colourable manner as no ground of review available in Order 47 Rule 1 exists for review under Section 40-A of the Act of 1952. 22. In the result, the writ petition is allowed and the order of Commissioner Khudkasht dated 1.4.1992 is quashed and set-aside and review proceedings are ordered to be dropped.