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Madhya Pradesh High Court · body

2006 DIGILAW 204 (MP)

Subhash Yadav v. State of M. P.

2006-02-06

DEEPAK VERMA, DIPAK MISRA

body2006
ORDER Misra, J. -- 1. The petitioners describing themselves as Pro Bono Publico have invoked the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India for issue of a writ of mandamus to the respondents to call for the records relating to the lis in question and after examining the same, to issue a writ of certiorari for quashment of the Cabinet decision taken on 6.9.2004 by which a decision has been taken for withdrawal of thousands of criminal cases pending in various criminal Courts in the State. 2. Filtering unnecessary details that have been asseverated in the writ petition, the facts which are essential to be exposited for the purpose of disposal of the writ petition are that the petitioner No.1 is in active politics for a quarter of a century and a Member of Legislative Assembly and presently the State President of Indian National Congress. He had held the office of the Deputy Chief Minister and Cabinet Minister in the State of M.P. for number of years. The petitioner No.2 is the Chairman of M.P. Legal Cell of Indian National Congress and a nominated member in the Executive Council of Barkatulla University, Bhopal and is an Advocate by profession. It is contended that apart from their involvement in politics, they are also concerned in social activities and have raised various social issues which relate to the collective and common interest of the society at large. 3. According to the writ petitioners, the State Government is responsible for investigation of crime in the State and for prosecution of the offenders. It has the responsibility to maintain law and order and protection of the people in the State. To achieve the aforesaid objections, powers have been conferred on various authorities of tile State under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (in short the "Code"). The powers, as set forth, include establishment of Police Stations, appointment of persons in police force, right of investigation, prosecution in cognizable offences, carrying out directions of the Court from time to time in respect of non-cognizable offences, appointment of Public Prosecutors and to see that a prosecution is carried to its logical end. The powers, as set forth, include establishment of Police Stations, appointment of persons in police force, right of investigation, prosecution in cognizable offences, carrying out directions of the Court from time to time in respect of non-cognizable offences, appointment of Public Prosecutors and to see that a prosecution is carried to its logical end. In essence, it is put forth that the State Government has the obligation in law to take necessary steps to ensure proper and effective measures for investigation and prosecution of criminals and to facilitate the redressal of grievances of the victims. The effective and timely investigation and conclusion of trial are the bounden duty of the State Government and failure in that regard leads to chaotic consequences and state of anarchy gets ushered in. Emphasis has been laid on the factum that there has been rampant growth in crime rate in the State of M.P. during last one year. Despite that the Cabinet took a decision on 6.9.2004 resolving to withdraw thousands of criminal cases pending on or before 11.4.2001 in various Courts. The decision has been taken, as alleged, with the political motive and to benefit the members of ruling party and its allied partners like Bajrang Dal and Vishwa Hindu Parishad, those who are facing criminal prosecution due to timely action taken by the State Government in the past. 4. The Directorate of Public Relations has published and circulated the Cabinet decision as per Annexure P-1. It is asserted that the decision by the State Government has evoked substantial reaction in the society and every section of the society has nurtured a feeling that politically motivated decision has been taken to protect certain criminals and the same has been reported in the newspapers. A reference has been made to the statement made by the Principal Secretary (Home) of the State of M.P. that law and order situation of the State is suffering adversely and it needs and requires substantial improvement and correction. The Principal Secretary (Home) has emphasised the need of stern action against criminal and anti-social elements and has also emphasised upon the necessity for taking action under the National Security Act and the M.P. Rajya Suraksha Adhiniyam to curb and curtail the rampant growth rate which includes communal riots and other kinds of offences. The Principal Secretary (Home) has emphasised the need of stern action against criminal and anti-social elements and has also emphasised upon the necessity for taking action under the National Security Act and the M.P. Rajya Suraksha Adhiniyam to curb and curtail the rampant growth rate which includes communal riots and other kinds of offences. It is urged that in furtherance of politically motivated action, instructions have been issued to the District Magistrates directing them to prepare list of all cases proposed to be withdrawn by 30th November, 2004 and to grant permission for the same by 20th December, 2004 and to issue necessary directions to the Public Prosecutors to take steps for withdrawal of cases by 30th December, 2004. The said direction has been brought on record as Annexure P-4. 5. As pleaded, the Indian National Congress, which is the principal opposition party in the Legislative Assembly, immediately reacted against the motivated action which is determintal to the interest of the society and State. The M.P. Congress Committee submitted a representation to the Governor of the State of M.P. raising a protst as per Annexure P-5. It is put forth that despite the said protest, the State Government has already withdrawn in the first phase 22 thousand criminal cases from various criminal Courts in the State and in most of these cases, the members of the ruling party and its alliances have taken benefit to earn political mileage. It is contended that in the second phase the Cabinet has again scrutinized withdrawal of 75 thousand criminal cases pending in various Courts. It is set forth that under the garb of aforesaid action large number of criminal cases benefiting the political persons are being withdrawn. Number of documents/paper clippings have been filed to show how the cases are being withdrawn at large scale despite unprecedented violence in the State and how the same is being done to benefit the ruling party members. It is contended that section 321 of the Code of Criminal Procedure only empowers the Public Prosecutor in-charge of the case to withdraw from the prosecution of any person as per the mandate engrafted therein. In this backdrop, prayer has been made which has been indicated hereinbefore. 6. We have heard Mr. Ajay Mishra, learned senior counsel with Mr. S.P. Mishra, learned counsel for the petitioners and Mr. T.S. Ruprah, learned Additional Advocate General for the respondent-State. 7. In this backdrop, prayer has been made which has been indicated hereinbefore. 6. We have heard Mr. Ajay Mishra, learned senior counsel with Mr. S.P. Mishra, learned counsel for the petitioners and Mr. T.S. Ruprah, learned Additional Advocate General for the respondent-State. 7. It is submitted by learned senior counsel for the petitioners that the decision taken by the Cabinet is contrary to public interest, public policy and the law governing the field and therefore, deserves to be lanceted in exercise of inherent and equitable jurisdiction of this Court. It is contended by him that the cases which are chosen to be withdrawn are politically motivated to grant political mileage at the cost of law and order situation which is impermissible. It is canvassed by him, the concept of victimology has been thrown over board by such withdrawal of cases and hence, the decision taken by the State Government is absolutely sensitively susceptible. It is propounded by learned senior counsel for the petitioners that by virtue of such a decision the role of Public Prosecutor has melted and paled into insignificance which has pivotal under the ambit and sweep of the provisions of Code of Criminal Procedure and hence the decision taken by the State Government deserves to be quashed. It is urged by him mere delay in trial would not be a ground for withdrawal of the case but unfortunately, the State Government has based its decision on the said infrastructure which is fundamentally fallacious. The learned counsel for the petitioners has commended us to the decisions rendered in 'Common Cause' A Registered Society v. Union of India and others [1997(II) MPWN 1= (1996)4 SCC 33 ], M/s. Attahira Regulated Market Committee v. M/s. nesh Rice Mills [1997 AIR SCW 290] and Raj Deo Sharma v. State of Bihar [ AIR 1998 SC 3281 ]. 8. Combating the aforesaid submissions, it is submitted by Mr. T.S. Ruprah, learned Additional Advocate General for the State that the State Government has taken the decision to withdraw the petty cases keeping in view the doctrine of social peace and the philosophy en grafted under section 321 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Learned counsel for the State further submitted that the decision taken by the Cabinet does not destroy the mandate of section 321 of the Code of Criminal Procedure as the same clearly cannot be done. Learned counsel for the State further submitted that the decision taken by the Cabinet does not destroy the mandate of section 321 of the Code of Criminal Procedure as the same clearly cannot be done. It is canvassed by him that the whole concept of criminal jurisprudence has been totally misunderstood by the petitioners and the present petition has been filed not in public interest but in personal interest to gain publicity which is neither the warrant nor the requirement of a public interest litigation. 9. To appreciate the contentions raised by the learned senior counsel for the petitioners and learned Additional Advocate General for the State, we think it condign to refer to the decision taken in the Cabinet on 6th September, 2004 as contained in Annexure P-1. The decision freely translated in English reads as under : "A decision was taken in the Cabinet to withdraw cases of general nature pending for long in various Courts. For withdrawal of such cases, a Committee shall be constituted under the chairmanship of the District Magistrate. In this Committee, District Police Superintendent and District Prosecution Officer shall be members. The Committee shall be empowered to select an officer of district level for consideration of withdrawal of cases relating to any department. The Committee shall consider only those cases for withdrawal which are pending on or before 1.7.2001. A cell can be constituted for assistance of the members of the Committee for a particular place where the number of cases is much more." At this juncture, it is thought seemly to refer to the circular dated 20th October, 2004 issued by the Home Department to all the District Magistrates. A free translation of the same reads as under : "Sub : Regarding withdrawal of cases of general nature. In various Courts in the State, cases of simple nature are pending consideration for long time. A committee has been constituted at district level under the chairmanship of District Magistrate pursuant to Notification No.F.35-279/2004/C-1 dated 16.9.2004. In continuation of paragraph 4 of above notification, the Law and Legislative Affairs Department has issued necessary instructions to all District Magistrates, District Police Superintendents and District Prosecution Officers regarding withdrawal of cases through Notification No.2210/ 21-K (Abhi.) dated 19.10.2004. Copies of form of letter an instructions/circular to be issued by the concerned District Magistrate in regard to withdrawal of cases are sent herewith. Copies of form of letter an instructions/circular to be issued by the concerned District Magistrate in regard to withdrawal of cases are sent herewith. I would like that proceedings regarding withdrawal of cases of general nature pending for long time in various Courts of the State are completed on preferential basis till 31st December, 2004. The Commissioner of the Division will after scrutiny of the same submit the district-wise information to this department by the end of November or December in the enclosed proforma." 10. The centripodal question which falls for consideration is whether the aforesaid decisions deserve to be axed because of the grounds urged in the petition and the contentions canvassed by learned senior counsel for the petitioners. There can be no shadow of doubt that maintenance of law and order is the sacrosanct obligation of the State. In a democratic policy, every citizen conceives to have perfect justice and in fact tries to see the horizon of pink of perfection, specially criminal justice dispensation system en grafts fair and speedy delivery of justice. In the name of free and speed delivery of justice, the agony and anguish of the victim cannot be kept at bay. It cannot be conceived that in the adjudicatory system of criminal trial, the victim is to be forgotten or kept in the oblivion. A crime in essence mostly always is against the collective and the cry of the collective cannot be marginalized. Not for nothing it had been said when the cry of the collective is curbed or marred, one sees cracks in the City Halls. The justness of justice has to be jealously guarded by the protectors of law. She cannot be allowed to suffer the ignominy at any cost. Beacon light of justice has to illuminate the society. The laser beam has to remove the concavities, for 'law is the safest helmet' -- to borrow the phrase from Sir Edward Coke. 11. In the case at hand, the three facets emerge for consideration and all three are equally important -- the maintenance of law and order situation in a democratic body policy, the weighing of the agony and anguish of victim and the collective cry vis-a-vis the nature of offence committed by the accused. The assertions made in the petition show that the decision is politically motivated. The assertions made in the petition show that the decision is politically motivated. The circular is a sequitur of the same and there has been an attempt to demolish the cry of the collective. Learned senior counsel for the petitioner would submit the role of the Court has not been kept in view. Keeping in view the totality of scenario, we think it condign to state that on a decision taken by the Cabinet and by issue of the circular, a case does not get automatically withdrawn. A decision taken by the State Government to withdraw cannot ripen in unilateral withdrawal of the case. A direction to the Public Prosecutor to withdraw a case is not the ultimate eventuate. In this context, we may profitably refer to section 321 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. It reads as under : "Section 321. Withdrawal from prosecution. A decision taken by the State Government to withdraw cannot ripen in unilateral withdrawal of the case. A direction to the Public Prosecutor to withdraw a case is not the ultimate eventuate. In this context, we may profitably refer to section 321 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. It reads as under : "Section 321. Withdrawal from prosecution. -- The Public Prosecutor or Assistant Public Prosecutor in-charge of a case may, with the consent of the Court, at any time before the judgment is pronounced, withdraw from the prosecution of any person either generally or in respect of anyone or more of the offences for which he is tried, and upon such withdrawal -- (a) if it is made before a charge has been framed, the accused shall be discharged in respect of such offence or offences; (b) if it is made after a charge has been framed, or when under this Code no charge is required, he shall be acquitted in respect of such offence or offences : Provided that where such offence -- (i) was against any law relating to a matter to which the executive power of the Union extends, or, (ii) was investigated by the Delhi Special Police Establishment under the Delhi Special Police Establishment Act, 1946 (25 of 1946), or (iii) involved the misappropriation or destruction of, or damage to, any property belonging to the Central Government, or (iv) was committed by a person in the service of the Central Government while acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his official duty, and the Prosecutor in-charge of the case has not been appointed by the Central Government, he shall not, unless he has been permitted by the Central Government to do so, move the Court for its consent to withdraw from the prosecution and the Court shall, before according consent, direct the Prosecutor to produce before it the permission granted by the Central Government to withdraw from the prosecution." 12. We may at this juncture, notice certain decision in the field. In the case of State of Orissa v. Chandrika Mahapatra [ (1976)4 SCC 250 ], the apex Court expressed thus : "It will, therefore, be seen that it is not sufficient for the Public, Prosecutor merely to say that it is not expedient to proceed with the prosecution. We may at this juncture, notice certain decision in the field. In the case of State of Orissa v. Chandrika Mahapatra [ (1976)4 SCC 250 ], the apex Court expressed thus : "It will, therefore, be seen that it is not sufficient for the Public, Prosecutor merely to say that it is not expedient to proceed with the prosecution. He has to make out some ground which would show that the prosecution is sought to be withdrawn because inter alia the prosecution may not be able to produce sufficient evidence to sustain the charge of that the prosecution does not appear to be well founded or that there are other circumstances which clearly show that the object of administration of justice would not be advanced or furthered by going on with the prosecution. The ultimate guiding consideration must always be the interest of administration of justice and that is the touchstone on which the question must be determined whether the prosecution should be allowed to be withdrawn." 13. In the case of Sheonandan Pas wan v. State of Bihar and others [ (1983)1 SCC 438 ], there Lordships expressed the view that the exercise of powers under section 321 of the Code is an executive function of the Public Prosecutor for which the discretion has been vested with him but the said discretion is not absolute. It is subject to the Court's supervisory function. 14. In the case of Sheonandan Paswan v. State of Bihar and others [ AIR 1987 SC 877 ], the Constitution Bench held as under : "This section enables the Public Prosecutor, in-charge of the case to withdraw from the prosecution of any person at any time before the judgment is pronounced, but this application for withdrawal has to get the consent of the Court and if the Court gives consent for such withdrawal of accused will be discharged if no charge has been framed or acquitted if charge has been framed or where no such charge is required to be framed. It clothes the public prosecutor to withdraw from the prosecution of any person, accused of an offence both when no evidence is taken or even if entire evidence has been taken. The outer limit for the exercise of this power is "at any time before the judgment is pronounced." 15. Their Lordships further in paragraphs 70 and 71 ruled thus : "70. The outer limit for the exercise of this power is "at any time before the judgment is pronounced." 15. Their Lordships further in paragraphs 70 and 71 ruled thus : "70. The section gives no indication as to the grounds on which the public prosecutor may make the application, or the consideration on which the Court is to grant its consent. The initiative is that of the Public Prosecutor and what the Court has to do is only to give the consent and not to determine any matter judicially. The judicial function implicit in the exercise of the judicial discretion for granting the consent would normally mean that the executive function of the Public Prosecutor has not been improperly exercised, or that is not an attempt to interfere with the normal course of justice for illegitimate reasons or purposes. 71. The Court's function is to give consent. This section does not obligate the Court to record reasons before consent is given. However, it should not be taken to hold that consent of the Court is a matter of course. When the public prosecution makes the application for withdrawal after taking into consideration all the materials before him the Court exercises its judicial discretion by consent or declines consent. The section should not be construed to mean that the Court has to give a detailed reasoned order when it gives consent. If on a reading of the order giving consent, a highest Court is satisfied that such consent was given on an overall consideration of the materials available the order giving consent has necessarily to be upheld." 16. In the case of Bansi Lal v. Chandal Lal and another [ AIR 1976 SC 370 ], it has observed that reasons to grant permission should not be accepted as necessary for mere asking but the Court must be satisfied on the material placed before it that the grant of permission would serve the administration of justice and that permission was not sought with an ulterior purpose unconnected with vindication of the law which the executive organs are in duty bound to further maintain. 17. In case of R.M. Tewari v. State (NCT of Delhi) and others with Government of NCT, Delhi v. Judge, Designated Court II (TADA) and Mohd. Mehfooz v. Chief and another [ (1996)2 SCC 610 ], the apex Court held as under : "..... 17. In case of R.M. Tewari v. State (NCT of Delhi) and others with Government of NCT, Delhi v. Judge, Designated Court II (TADA) and Mohd. Mehfooz v. Chief and another [ (1996)2 SCC 610 ], the apex Court held as under : "..... Designated Court was right in taking the view that withdrawal from prosecution is not to be permitted mechanically by the Court on an application for that purpose made by the Public Prosecutor. It is equally clear that the Public Prosecutor also has not to act mechanically in the discharge of his statutory function under section 321 of the Criminal Procedure Code on such a recommendation being made by the Review Committee." 18. This Court in the case of Hariram Singh Thakur v. State of M.P. [ 1994 JLJ 117 = 1994 CrLJ 745 ], refused to interfere with the order of refusal to accord permission from withdrawal of prosecution on the ground that 'circumstances justified declining of consent'. 19. In the case of Tariq Riyaz v. State of M.P. [ 1999(II) MPJR 267 ], this Court expressed the view as under : ".... In absence of any materials being put forth before the Court except stating that there was public interest because of a letter written by the authority in the Department of Law it cannot be said that the Court below exercised their discretion in an injudicious manner. As is apparent from the communication and the application filed by the Public Prosecutor the Court was not apprised of the basis or on what material the Public Prosecutor was satisfied that the case warranted withdrawal and accordingly sought permission of the Court. The present case is not where the prosecution has sought withdrawal on the basis that it would not be able to produce sufficient evidence to sustain the charge or that it was not properly founded. This is not a case where it is canvassed that the policy of the State Government required withdrawal of the case. The cause put forth is that the public interest requires the withdrawal. It is to be borne in mind that an onerous duty is cast on the Court to see that the permission is not sought on the ground which are extraneous to the interest of justice and the offenders go unpunished without justification because of withdrawal of prosecution against them. It is to be borne in mind that an onerous duty is cast on the Court to see that the permission is not sought on the ground which are extraneous to the interest of justice and the offenders go unpunished without justification because of withdrawal of prosecution against them. The statutory duty which has been conferred on the Public Prosecutor is a sacrosanct one and it has to be performed independently being apprise of material on record and on a perusal of the reasoning which are sanguine, genuine and objectively sustainable. A spacious or mercurial submission in the petition without any I supporting material would not meet requirement of law as that would indicate that the Public Prosecutor has not really applied his mind with keenness and objectivity and the Court in its turn would not be a position to exercise its discretion at this juncture. The factual matrix in the present case clearly exposits that the Public Prosecutor had no material with him except the letter of the Law Department while filing the application under section 321 of the Code and as a consequence thereof the Court was not in a position to have even a cursory glance at the material available with the Prosecutor. As has been held by the apex Court in the case of Bansi Lal (supra), the Court must be satisfied on the material placed before it. In absence of any material before the Court the net result is that consent is to be granted for asking. In that case, it becomes a mere formality which is contrary to the mandate of law. On a close scrutiny of the application filed by the Public Prosecutor and the communications made by the authorities in the Department of Law to the Public Prosecutor it is plain as day that the Public Prosecutor did not apply his independent mind and the petition was quite spacious and nothing was brought to the notice of the Court. Nothing has been spelt out how the public interest is served in withdrawal of the criminal case against the petitioner." 20. The apex Court in the case of Abdul Karim etc. v. State of Karnataka and others etc. [AIR 2001 SC 116], after referring to the case of Sheo Nandan Paswan (supra) laid down the dictum in following manner : "8. The apex Court in the case of Abdul Karim etc. v. State of Karnataka and others etc. [AIR 2001 SC 116], after referring to the case of Sheo Nandan Paswan (supra) laid down the dictum in following manner : "8. The appellant in Criminal Appeal Nos.741-743/2000 before us opposed the Special Public Prosecutor's application. He is the father of Shakel Ahamed who, as the application recites, had, allegedly, been killed by Veerappan and his associates. The appellant's statement of opposition referred to the abduction of Rajkumar and alleged that, consequent thereupon, the Government of the State of Karnataka had yielded to the demands of Veerappan and his associates, and this had been widely publcized by the media. The statement of opposition submitted no cogent reasons had been given for the decision to drop the TADA cases. It submitted that it was the duty of the Special Public Prosecutor to inform the Court of the reasons prompting him to withdraw the prosecution and of the Court to apprise itself of these reasons. The Special Public Prosecutor rejoined to the statement of opposition by contending that all cases against Veerappan and his associates were not being withdrawn, and they would be prosecuted. He therefore, denied the submission in the statement of opposition that the Government of the State of Karnataka had yielded to blackmail by Veerappan. xxx xxx xxx 19. The law, therefore, is that though the Government may have ordered, directed or asked a Public Prosecutor to withdraw from a prosecution, it is for the Public Prosecutor to apply his mind to all the relevant material and, in good faith, to be satisfied thereon that the public interest will be served by his withdrawal from the prosecution. In turn, the Court has to be satisfied, considering all that material, that the Public Prosecutor has applied his mind independently thereto, that the Public Prosecutor, acting in good faith, is of the opinion that his withdrawal from the prosecution is in the public interest, and that such withdrawal will not stifle or thwart the process of law or cause manifest injustice. 20. It must follow that the application under section 321 must aver that the Public Prosecutor is, in good faith, satisfied, on consideration of all relevant material, that his withdrawal from the prosecution is in the public interest and it will not stifle or thwart the process of law or cause injustice. 20. It must follow that the application under section 321 must aver that the Public Prosecutor is, in good faith, satisfied, on consideration of all relevant material, that his withdrawal from the prosecution is in the public interest and it will not stifle or thwart the process of law or cause injustice. The material that the Public Prosecutor has considered must be set out, briefly but concisely, in the application or in an affidavit annexed to the application or, in a given case, placed before the Court, with its permission, in a sealed envelope. The Court has to give an informal consent. It must be satisfied that this material can reasonably lead to the conclusion that the withdrawal of the Public Prosecutor from the prosecution will serve the public interest; but it is not for the Court to weigh the material. The Court must be satisfied that the Public Prosecutor has considered the material and, in good faith, reached the conclusion that his withdrawal from the prosecution will serve the public interest. The Court must also consider whether the grant of consent may thwart or stifle the course of law or result in manifest injustice. If, upon such consideration, the Court accords consent, it must make such order on the application as will indicate to higher Court that it has done all that the law requires it to do before granting consent." 21. Thus from the aforesaid pronouncement of law it is plain as noon day that the public prosecutor has a sacrosanct duty to apply his mind to the documents and to see that no prosecution is withdrawn because of a letter has been issued until he is fully satisfied. The Court indubitably and irrefragably, has a duty. The Court cannot afford to abdicate its obligation and grant permission as if it is a routine duty. The conception of approach is a mechanical, routine and de-skilled manner. The gravity of the offence, service to public interest, social concinnity and collective good are to be kept as paramount consideration. The collective cannot be allowed to suffer. The sotto voce of the order of the executive and application filed by the Public Prosecutor are to be appreciated in proper perspective. In cases of this nature the collective cries aloud : "What is he whose grief bears such an emphasis? The collective cannot be allowed to suffer. The sotto voce of the order of the executive and application filed by the Public Prosecutor are to be appreciated in proper perspective. In cases of this nature the collective cries aloud : "What is he whose grief bears such an emphasis? Whose phrase of sorrow conjures the wandering stars, and makes them stand like wonder-wounded hearers?" 22. We have said so as in most cases, the right of the collective is to weigh supreme and the individual right unless totally protected has to yield or succumb. The maxim Saluspopuli est supreme lex has to be respected in the sphere of law making as well as following the law. The general well-being of the Society can never be allowed to take a back seat since the purpose of law is to permit the welfare of citizen in a collective manner. The quint-essentiality of section 321 of the Code has connectivity and nexus is to see that there is no manifest injustice and sub-serving of public interest. We need not say any further on this core as we have already indicated the law engrafted under section 321 of the Code and the pronouncement of law thereon. 23. In view of our preceding analysis, we only observe that while the cases are sought to be withdrawn, the Public Prosecutor must act as mandated in law and should not act as if he is a post office. The Court as has been indicated hereinbefore must satisfy itself in consonance of the law governing the field and should not be solely guided by the application and pass an order of consent as a routine manner. It must be borne in mind that no Court should act as a post office as the Court has a duty to perform and the duty has to be done with Kantian rigroism. There is no escape from it. We do hope that the State Government. Public Prosecutor as well as the Court having jurisdiction shall keep themselves alive to their respective roles and do the needful. 24. The writ petition is accordingly disposed of without any order as to costs.