JUDGMENT By this application under section 397 read with section 401 of Criminal Procedure Code the applicant takes exception to the order passed by the learned Sessions Judge, Bhandara in Criminal Appeal No. 01/2004, against judgment and order of conviction and sentence passed in Sessions Trial No.65/2002 by the learned 2nd Ad-hoc Assistant Sessions Judge, Bhandara dated 18.12.2003, convicting him for the offence punishable under section 376 of I.P.C. & sentencing him to undergo R.I. for 7 years and to pay fine of Rs.5000/-, in default to suffer S.I. for 2 months, wherein the conviction of the applicant accused, was maintained for the offence under section 376, however, his sentence was modified to 4 years R.I. enhancing the fine to Rs.10000/- in default to suffer S.I. for five months. Facts of the of the prosecution case as summarized by the learned Judge needs to be mentioned. On 29.5.2002 prosecutrix - Sunita d/o Waman Tembhurne had given her hair band to the mother of the accused - Tekram Ghormare. The mother of the accused had gone to the field directing the said Sunita to collect it at noon from her house. At about 4.00 p.m. she went there. Accused was alone in the house. Accused asked her to take it from the house. When she came inside the house, accused caught her hand and took her in the inner room of the house. She tried to give jerk and escape, but to no effect. Accused made her to lie down on the ground, removed her clothes and also his own clothes; when she started crying, the accused gagged her mouth and committed sexual intercourse with her forcibly. Some persons had gathered in front of the house of the accused, as such Sunita stayed there for some time and thereafter accused took her out of the house through the rear door and she went towards the tank and after some time she again returned and asked him to reach her to her father's house. She was taken to her house. On reaching home, the prosecutrix Sunita disclosed about the incident to her parents, then meeting was held. At about midnight prosecutrix Sunita's father Waman took her to police station, where she lodged report. The offence was registered bearing crime no.88/2002 under section 376 of Criminal Procedure Code. Later on the investigation was carried out. She was taken to her house. On reaching home, the prosecutrix Sunita disclosed about the incident to her parents, then meeting was held. At about midnight prosecutrix Sunita's father Waman took her to police station, where she lodged report. The offence was registered bearing crime no.88/2002 under section 376 of Criminal Procedure Code. Later on the investigation was carried out. During the investigation the Investigating Officer recorded statements of witnesses, collected clothes, same were sent to Chemical Analyser, prosecutrix was sent for medical examination and after due investigation the charge sheet was filed against the applicant - accused. In turn the case was committed to the court of Sessions wherein the learned Ad-hoc Assistant Sessions Judge held trial for the offence under section 376 I.P.C. bearing Sessions Trial No.68/2002. After the trial and hearing the prosecution and the defence, the learned Trial Judge, found accused guilty of the offence punishable under section 376 of the I.P.C. and he was sentenced to suffer R.I. for 7 years and to pay fine of Rs.5000/- in default to suffer simple imprisonment for 2 months, this judgment of sentence dated 18.12.2003 was challenged by the applicant accused before the Sessions Judge, Bhandara in Criminal Appeal NO.1/2004. Learned Sessions Judge, Bhandara maintained the order of conviction, however, he reduced the sentence of the applicant to four years, enhancing the fine to Rs.10000/-, in default to suffer S.I. for five months. 3. This judgment and order is challenged in this revision application. 4. Learned counsel for the applicant has submitted that the age of the prosecutrix is not established to be below 16 years. He has submitted that the documentary evidence [exhibit 29 i.e. birth certificate] is not properly proved and therefore, at the time of incident she can not be held to be of below 16 years. According to him, she was studying in Xth standard, normally in village area the admissions in the Ist standard are taken after 6 years. So in any case she would be of more than 16 years at the time of offence. Further according to him the meeting was held for lodging report against applicant and therefore, the report was concocted one. He has mainly submitted that the prosecution has failed to produce medical evidence of ossification test or any other medical evidence regarding the age of the prosecutrix for proving it to be below 16 years. Further according to him the meeting was held for lodging report against applicant and therefore, the report was concocted one. He has mainly submitted that the prosecution has failed to produce medical evidence of ossification test or any other medical evidence regarding the age of the prosecutrix for proving it to be below 16 years. Birth certificate which is produced by the prosecution is not at all reliable. According to him, the date of birth of the prosecutrix is given to be 4.9.1987, as per the said certificate and no name of the born infant is also given in the same, so also officer concerned is not examined, so the said certificate can not be treated as proved according to law. In any case he submits that benefit of doubt should be given to the accused. According to him, the intercourse if any, it was with consent and therefore, point of age of the prosecutrix was immaterial in the circumstances of the case. Apart from that he submitted that the prosecution has failed to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubts. 5. Yet another submission which he has raised is that, the menstruation of the prosecutrix had started about 3 years back, prior to the evidence. Therefore, when clearly the menstruation of Girls start at 14 years of age, the possible age of the prosecutrix at the relevant time would be more than 16 years and therefore, the prosecution case has to be held not proved beyond reasonable doubts. Therefore, according to him, the findings of conviction of the trial court as well as of appellate court against the applicant/accused are not sustainable at law, they are illegal, incorrect and improper and therefore, liable to be set aside. 6. As against this learned A.P.P. Mr. Kakde has submitted that the certificate of age produced by the Investigating Officer, has sufficiently been proved. There is no doubt about it. In fact no serious challenge about the same has been raised by the accused / defence, in the evidence. No suggestions were given, much less substantiated; to challenge the contents of the said certificate. It is also submitted that as per medical science the menstruation can start at the age of girl between 11 to 13. In fact no serious challenge about the same has been raised by the accused / defence, in the evidence. No suggestions were given, much less substantiated; to challenge the contents of the said certificate. It is also submitted that as per medical science the menstruation can start at the age of girl between 11 to 13. It does not start by way of rule at 14 years of age and therefore on that count only it can not be held that the girl must have been of more than 16 years of age. He further submitted that the defence evidence led by the accused applicant was totally improbable and false. Therefore, order of Appellate Court does not call for any interference. 7. Parties have relied on some authorities which I would discuss in the course of the judgment. 8. In the above circumstances, the only point for my consideration is whether the impugned judgment in Criminal Appeal NO.1/2004 decided by Sessions Judge Bhandara is incorrect, improper or unjust at law. 9. On perusal of the judgment of the learned Appellate Judge, it would be seen that he has given consideration to all the material points raised by the defence including that of the admissibility and proof of exhibit 29 - Certificate of date of birth of the prosecutrix and also other submissions. He has also considered as to whether the prosecutrix was the consenting party to the act of the accused in the incident. Prima facie there appears to be no sufficient reason to dislodge the reasons appended by him for his findings. 10. Therefore, this is a case of concurrent finding by the trial court as well as the appellate court. The observations of both trial court and appellate court are appealing. Therefore, there should be glaring illegality perverseness in the orders passed by the learned appellate Judge, to be demonstrated by applicant so as to make this court to set aside that order. 11. Learned Appellate Judge has also considered the evidence led by the prosecution vis-a-vis defence evidence on record. 12. He has also given the detailed reasons as to why he is accepting the testimony of the prosecutrix Sunita and discarding the evidence led by the defence witness. Therefore, unless it is shown that the said judgment is based on no material or the inference is totally perverse, revision application can not succeed. 13. 12. He has also given the detailed reasons as to why he is accepting the testimony of the prosecutrix Sunita and discarding the evidence led by the defence witness. Therefore, unless it is shown that the said judgment is based on no material or the inference is totally perverse, revision application can not succeed. 13. In the present revision application, learned counsel for the applicant has mainly contended that the age of the prosecutrix is not proved to be below 16 years and therefore the consent for sexual intercourse given by the prosecutrix is valid. As such accused can not be held guilty of the said charge. For this purpose, he has relied on the authority AIR 1956 Nagpur 74 [State ..vs.. Kamruddin], wherein in paragraph 22 it has been observed thus: (22) True, the entry shows that the name of the girl born to Laxman on 10.9.1939, is Jai, but, in our opinion, the name 'Jai' written on 29.10.1939 is not admissible in evidence without there beingindependent evidence to prove it. The Birth and Death Register is no doubt a document within the meaning of S.35, evidence Act and is therefore relevant and has evidentiary value. But this does not mean that each and every entry made in that register is admissible. Only such entries as are made therein by persons in the discharge of their official duty are admissible. The relevant rule do not show that any duty is enjoined on the person concerned to note the name of the child born. Lord Parker of Waddington in delivering the judgment of the Judicial Committee of the Privi Council in - 'Rai Bhaiya Digraj Deo Bahadur vs.. Beni Mahto AIR 1917 P.C. 197(1)(C) observed at page 197(1): Now clearly this register is an official document, and therefore, it is admissible in evidence under S. 35 of he Indian Evidence Act. It may be possible that in the case of such a document if it could be shown that any particular part was in excess of the official duty by reason of which it came into existence, that part might not be admissible, but no attempt has been made to show this in the present case. In the present case it has been shown that the name of .Jai. was written in Ex. P-9, is, therefore, inadmissible in evidence unless it is established by independent evidence. In the present case it has been shown that the name of .Jai. was written in Ex. P-9, is, therefore, inadmissible in evidence unless it is established by independent evidence. The entry was made on 29.10.1939. The person who has made it is not examined. Shravan (P.W.9) who is examined in connection with Exhibit P-9 who is examined in connection with Exhibit P-9, is therefore, inadmissible in evidence unless it is established by independent evidence. The entry was made on 29.10.1939. The person who has made it is not examined. Shravan (P.W.9) who is examined in connection with Exhibit P-9 admits that he did not know who had made that entry in the register. Thus all that it can be said is that the prosecution has proved that a girl was born to Laxman on 10.9.1939. But this is not sufficient to establish that the girl was Jai. A mere entry in a Birth and Death Register to the effect that a daughter was born to a person without any statement as to the identity of the girl is not sufficient to prove the birth of a particular person. The identity of that person has to be fully established by other evidence: -'Kemanta Kumar ..vs... Alliantz Stuttgarter Life Insurance Co. Ltd. AIR 1938 Cal 120(D) and - Biseswar Misra ..vs.. The King, AIR 1949 Orissa 22 (E). Laxman has two other daughters. The prosecution should therefore have led other evidence in respect of the age of Kum. Jai and connected it with the entry in the register. Her father was examined as P.W. 2, but no questions were put to him to prove the age of Kum. Jai. Shevanti (D.W.5), sister of Kum. Jai was examined as a witness for the defence no questions were put to her also to prove the age of Kum. Jai. Thus, in our opinion, the prosecution has failed to prove that Kum. Jai was under the age of 18 years on the date of incident. He has also referred to the judgment of this court in 2005 (1) Mh.L.J. 94 [Gangadhar s/o Gonduram Tadme ..vs.. Trimbak s/o Govindrao Akingire and others] in paragraph 8,9,10 the following are the observations. Jai. Thus, in our opinion, the prosecution has failed to prove that Kum. Jai was under the age of 18 years on the date of incident. He has also referred to the judgment of this court in 2005 (1) Mh.L.J. 94 [Gangadhar s/o Gonduram Tadme ..vs.. Trimbak s/o Govindrao Akingire and others] in paragraph 8,9,10 the following are the observations. 8- Sub-section (2) of Section 22 very clearly states that .Until the entry has been so signed or the conditions specified in the proviso to sub-section (1) have been complied with, the birth or death shall not be deemed to be registered under this Act., Apparently therefore, in order to give the presumptive value to the entries made in the register of birth, the condition specified under sect-section (1) of section 22 has necessarily to be satisfied. It is a mandatory provision and non-compliance thereof will result in the registration to be treated as not one done under the said Act. If the registration ceases to be the one under the said Act, any certificate issued in relation to such entries can not have legal sanctity. The entries which are made without compliance of the conditions specified in the priviso to sub-section (1) or in the absence of signature of the person giving notice, would not carry any presumptive value under section 114 of the Evidence Act. In other words, any certificate issued without compliance of the mandatory requirement under section 22(1) of the said Act, cannot be considered as a certificate issued under the provisions of the said Act and any such certificate, therefore, will not carry presumptive value under section 114 of the Evidence Act. 9. Bare perusal of the certificate in respect of the third child produced by the petitioner would disclose that the column in relation to the person who might have attended the wife of the petitioner at the time of delivery has been left without being filled in. As regards the name and address of the person who had given the notice of birth, it only discloses the expression Chaprasi. (Peon). Neither the name of the person is disclosed nor his address or identity. Being so, the certificate cannot have presumptive value under section114 of the Evidence Act, nor it can be said to be a certificate issued under the said Act bearing in mind the provisions of section 22(2) of the said Act. (Peon). Neither the name of the person is disclosed nor his address or identity. Being so, the certificate cannot have presumptive value under section114 of the Evidence Act, nor it can be said to be a certificate issued under the said Act bearing in mind the provisions of section 22(2) of the said Act. 10. Considering the provisions of law relevant and applicable to the mater in issue, therefore, no fault can be found with the authorities below in having not given presumptive value to the entries in the alleged certificate of birth of the third child of the petitioner. AT the same time, the orders passed by the authorities below cannot be found fault with as the same have been passed after analysing the entire evidence on record in proper perspective. Evidently, the testimony of Smt. Ranadive discloses that the wife of the petitioner was pregnant much after the alleged date of birth of child claimed by the petitioner and that the she was in the 28th week of her pregnancy till 14.12.2001. No material was produced before the authorities nor the petitioner could establish the said finding to be not borne out from the records or either to be perverse. Besides this, the learned counsel for the applicant has also relied on the judgment of this Court reported in 2006 ALL MR (Cri) 3057 [ Amit @ Bapu Nanasaheb Bhandwalkar ..vs.. State of Maharashtra], wherein in paragraph 9 this court has observed : 9. On the other hand, the learned Special Public Prosecutor referred to the judgment in the case of Sushil Kumar ..vs.. Rakesh Kumar (AIR 1994 SC 230) and pointed out that the burden of initial proof regarding the age was on the accused and the statements made by his own mother and brother emphatically stated that the accused was born on 6.8.1983. The entries in the school register could not be proved by examining the concerned Clerks/staff who had made such entries on the basis of the school leaving certificate issued by the Primar Schools at village New Kopare and village Ambodi and, therefore, these documents do not meet the requirement of section 35 of the Evidence Act and hence not reliable. We may usefully refer to a recent decision the case of Ravinder Singh Gorkhi ..vs.. We may usefully refer to a recent decision the case of Ravinder Singh Gorkhi ..vs.. State of U.P. (2006) 5 SCC 584 , wherein the school leaving certificate was not an original one and it was merely a second copy. It was stated to have been signed by the Head Master on 30.4.1998 and it stated that the appellant was admitted on 1.8.1967 in the school and his name was struck off from the roll on 6.5.1972. The Head Master had not admitted that the copy given by him was a true copy of the original certificate. It was also not shown whether any register was required to be maintained under any statute and the original register was not produced. Their Lordships observed. Determination of the date of birth of a person before a court of law, whether in a civil proceeding or a criminal proceeding, would depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case. Such a date of birth has to be determined on the basis of the materials on records. It will be a matter of appreciation of evidence adduced by the parties. Different standards having regard to the provision of section 35 of the Evidence Act can not be applied in a civil case or a criminal case. In the case of Birad Mal Singhvi ..vs..Anand Purohit (1988 Supl SCC 604) it has been held that to render a document admission under Section 35, three conditions must be satisfied namely, (a) entry that is relied on must be one in a public or other official work, register or record; (b) it must be an entry stating a fact in issue or relevant fact; and (c) it must be made by a public servant in discharge of his official duty, or any other person in performance of a duty specially enjoined by law. It was further held that an entry relating to the date of birth made in the school register is relevant and admissible under Section 35 of the Act but the entry regarding the age of a person in a school register is of not much evidentiary value to prove the age of the person in the absence of the material on which the age was recorded. This view is squarely applicable in the instant case because the certificate issued by the Primary Schools where admitted the accused studied were not placed before the court nor the certificates which were placed before the court were supported by the record from these Primary Schools. The person who made these entries purportedly were not examined and in any case some of the documents which were recently issued indicated the date of birth of the accused i.e. 6.7.1983, whereas in some other documents the said date to be 6.8.1983. Mr. Sawant the learned Special Public Prosecutor was therefore, right in his submission that by way of an after thought the accused was trying to find out some way or the other to get out of the clutches of the law and save himself from the sentence awarded by to learned Additional Sessions Judge. The learned counsel for the State has also relied on one reported judgment of this court i.e. 2005(1) Mh.L.J. page 762 -[Ramesh s/o Mahadeo Meshram and another ..vs.. State of Maharashtra] wherein in paragraph 12 following are the observations: 12. Much has been made by the defence as to absence of clinching evidence as to the age of the prosecutrix. As the evidence stands through evidence of witness Namdeorao Nakade P.W. 9 who happened to be Headmaster of the Dr. Bhabha School, Zarpada where the prosecutrix had her eduction and as per the school record as stated by this witness her date of birth was 20.6.1983 and accordingly he issued the certificate. It was on the basis of this evidence the prosecution claimed that the prosecutrix was of 15 years of age. The trial Court accepted evidence of this witness. The Trial Court has the evidence as whatever he had stated before the court has been supported by the record. Original school record was brought before the court and defence could not bring out any infirmity in the certificate issued by this witness regarding the date of birth of prosecutrix. As such the authenticity of the date of birth as recorded in the certificate is duly established. As the prosecutrix was less tan 16 years of age, there was no question of consent. As such the authenticity of the date of birth as recorded in the certificate is duly established. As the prosecutrix was less tan 16 years of age, there was no question of consent. That apart, in the facts and circumstances of the case having regard to the specific plea taken by the defence of false implication and even denial of sexual intercourse with the prosecutrix by the appellants, the question of consent does not arise. In such a situation as observed by the trial court the issue of consent was totally irrelevant in the facts and circumstances of the case. Apart from that if we consider the medical evidence particularly the factum of injuries sustained by the prosecutrix and having regard to the age of the injury as described as given by Medical Officer - Dr. Vandana Kukde, in the absence of any explanation, it indicates that there was resistance whatever was possible to the prosecutrix in the situation that one of the accused was holding her and also silencing her, there was resistance offered by her and in that situation it is very difficult even to infer that the prosecutrix was consenting party. In addition to that the fact of finding on local examination of the private part of the prosecutrix certainly goes to show that there was sexual assault on her against her consent. In such a situation we have to take into consideration the age of the prosecutrix and her ability to offer resistance in the presence of both the appellants when one of the appellant was thwarting her efforts to resist. There was swelling on her private part, there was tenderness. Having regard to this specific finding positive as it is on clinical as well as local examination of the prosecutrix by the Doctor, there is absolutely no room for holding that the prosecutrix was a consenting party. On the other hand the positive finding as observed by the Medical Officer does suggest that sexual intercourse on the prosecutrix was against her consent. There was indication of penetration. Therefore, all this evidence on record has clinchingly proved that the accused had sexual intercourse with the prosecutrix against her wish or desire. The trial court has therefore, rightly found that the appellants have committed rape on the prosecutrix.. 14. It is necessary to bear in mind that in the present case the prosecutrix is student. Therefore, all this evidence on record has clinchingly proved that the accused had sexual intercourse with the prosecutrix against her wish or desire. The trial court has therefore, rightly found that the appellants have committed rape on the prosecutrix.. 14. It is necessary to bear in mind that in the present case the prosecutrix is student. She is taking education. She is learning in Xth standard. She has categorically in her evidence stated that her date of birth is 4.9.1987. During the cross examination, except suggestion nothing is there to show that she is deposing false. In crossexamination she has stated : It is correct to say that at the time of incident I was studying in 10th standard. It is not correct to say that date of birth stated by me is wrong. There is nothing further in cross examination besides this, on this aspect. As the prosecutrix is taking education in 10th standard, there is reason to believe that she must be knowing her date of birth which is recorded in the school record register. In fact as she is taking education in Xth standard and the incident appears to be of the month of May, there is reason to believe that she would have been required to fill in some forms for the examination in which she must have been required to state her date of birth, therefore, knowledge of the date of birth, which she stated in examination in chief, not assailed properly in cross examination, will have to be accepted as true. In my opinion, even without referring Exhibit 29, the date of birth as stated by the prosecutrix in her evidence has to be accepted. 15. Apart from this, as regards the admissibility of the proof of exhibit 29, suffice it to say that this certificate is taken by Investigating Officer during the investigation. Investigating Officer has stated that this certificate was given to him by the father of the prosecutrix. It is stated by him in cross examination that it was correct to say that at the time of incident complainant was studying in Xth standard and he did not enquire in her school regarding her date of birth. He did not get the age of complainant decided by radiology as suggested by the Medical Officer. He volunteered that He had received her date of birth extract. He did not get the age of complainant decided by radiology as suggested by the Medical Officer. He volunteered that He had received her date of birth extract. He further stated that it is correct to say that he had not personally collected birth date extract exhibit 29 and it is not correct to say that exhibit 29 is false. Assuming that the age of the prosecutrix is not proved by exhibit 29 for any reason whatsoever, suffice it to mention that even defence did not call any material from the school of the prosecutrix to show that date of birth stated by her in her evidence is false and it is not in accordance with the record of the school register. This is not to draw any adverse inference because of the non compliance of anything by the defence, but it is only to show that the testimony of prosecutrix in this behalf can be accepted. In my opinion there is no sufficient material on record to cast doubts on the validity of exhibit 29. It is true that the person who has issued certificate is not examined, but the fact remains that it was collected by Investigating Officer during the investigation and there is no nothing substantial on record to show that it can be said to be false or concocted, particularly in view of the categorical statement regarding date of birth by the prosecutrix. 16. I am of the opinion that the age of the prosecutrix even if little above of 16 years, would not make her consent good sans other positive evidence on record. The intercourse in the present case can not be said to be with her consent, considering the circumstances of the cases. In the evidence of the prosecutrix and other witnesses there is suggestion about bad terms between the community of the accused and that of the prosecutrix. In such situation, it is very difficult to accept the theory of her going to the house of the accused, with consent for .sexual intercourse.. In the evidence of the prosecutrix and other witnesses there is suggestion about bad terms between the community of the accused and that of the prosecutrix. In such situation, it is very difficult to accept the theory of her going to the house of the accused, with consent for .sexual intercourse.. In fact Medical Officer's evidence does not show that she is habituated for the intercourse, it does appear that it is a solitary and perhaps first act of sexual advance if at all it is there, by the prosecutrix and even by the accused in such circumstances, particularly in view of the evidence of the Medical Officer- P.W. Chhaya Kapgate which reads as under: Perinial examination Police heir present not matted. Laleia Magura -No injury seen. Leebia Minure - small dlerusion present over pcosteric part with longside 2 mm x 1mm. valoul examination :hymen torn at 4 O clock, tendernest present. No bleeding, Admits 1 finger abrasion over left side of neck, scab formed, raddim brown - side 2mm Vimmn. Age of injury about 20, 24 hrs. opinion above injuries may lie cause by hard is blunt object . I heal in about 7 to 8 days in absent of complication. The construte cringing her had also brought letter dated 30.5.02. Now I see office copy it bears my signature. it is at Exh.17 in response to quarries there in I gave my opinion. 1.The above girl is not eligible to as sexual intercourse on she is temaged. 2. It cannot say that there is sexual intercourse but there is hard handing of her private parts. I referred her to radiologist to General hospital Bhandara for determining age. Viginal Smea, slide aginel swale, pubic har, blood samples of patient taken 12 sealed hunded over to P.C. 141 Mr. Bhute of P. Stn. Sakoli. Now I see medical certificate it bears my signature contents are correct Exh.18. Only suggestion given to her in cross examination is that menses generally start at 14 years of age and therefore, it is contended that the age of the prosecutrix works out to be became more than 16 years. As already stated above, I do not think that the evidence of the prosecutrix on the date of birth is dis-believable and therefore, the suggestion hardly makes out any case for the defence. 17. As already stated above, I do not think that the evidence of the prosecutrix on the date of birth is dis-believable and therefore, the suggestion hardly makes out any case for the defence. 17. To fortify above view at this stage it is necessary to refer the Text Book of Gynecology, Edition 1990 page 54 wherein it has been observed: Puberty is a slow process involving several years during which the secondary sexual characteristics develop to maturity and menstruation is established. The menarche, or time of onset of menstruation, varies with race and family, but the average for most girls is from twelve to thirteen years of age. Therefore, the the age of puberty to the girl may start at the age of 12 to 13 years. It is not necessary that it would start only at the age of 14 years. Therefore, the defence submission in this behalf can not be accepted. 18. Here is the case where the defence witness, has alleged that the prosecutrix had intercourse with some other person; Govinda. He has also stated that he has noticed that intercourse and he had appraised the parents of the prosecutrix about the same. However, in cross examination, his evidence is totally shattered. 19. It is pertinent to note that when defence of the accused is that prosecutrix had intercourse with somebody else on the same date that too in a bush, the case against the accused would be fortified when such defence is not established. Again I have to say that this is not to say that because defence had led false evidence, prosecution case is accepted, only what need to be clarified is that, prosecution case in this behalf is un-assailable. Therefore, I do not find any sufficient reason to hold that the judgment of the appellate court confirming the findings of lower court is wrong, incorrect and unjust. 20. Learned counsel for the revision applicant has submitted that the sentence imposed by the learned Appellate Judge is harsh, in these circumstances it should be reduced. On perusal of the impugned judgment, it appears that the learned Trial Judge has considered the applicability of the observations of this Court in 2003(3) Mh.L.J. 584 [ Hanmant Ramhari Ghodake ..vs.. 20. Learned counsel for the revision applicant has submitted that the sentence imposed by the learned Appellate Judge is harsh, in these circumstances it should be reduced. On perusal of the impugned judgment, it appears that the learned Trial Judge has considered the applicability of the observations of this Court in 2003(3) Mh.L.J. 584 [ Hanmant Ramhari Ghodake ..vs.. State of Maharashtra], it was a case where prosecutrix had candidly admitted in her evidence that the intercourse was with her consent and accused was to marry her, therefore, she waited at the place where the intercourse took place. In my opinion offence in the instant case can not be treated as merely a technical offence. It is not possible to say that leniency in the circumstances is called for, more particularly in view of the prosecution case, as alleged that, the prosecutrix had gone to the house of the accused for collecting bow and there she was sexually assaulted. Attempt to involve some other person for offence in defence has also to be deprecated. Therefore I do not find that there is sufficient reason for any interference in the sentence as modified by the learned Appellate Judge. The result therefore is that the revision application needs to be dismissed. Accordingly it is dismissed.