JUDGMENT S. P. KUKDA Y, J. :- Appellant and his mother Ashabai (original accused No.2) were prosecuted for commission of offence punishable under section 498A and 302 read with 34 of the Indian Penal Code. Both of them are acquitted for offence punishable under section 498A. Accused No.2 is acquitted for offence punishable under section 302 read with 34 of the Penal Code. Appellant, however, is convicted for having committed offence punishable under section 302 of the Penal Code by Ad hoc Additional Sessions Judge, Osmanabad, by his order dated 1st November, 2004 and is sentenced to suffer life imprisonment and to pay fine of Rs. 1,000/-, in default to suffer Rigorous Imprisonment for one month. This order of conviction and sentence is impugned by the appellant in the present appeal. 2. Relevant facts stated in brief are that appellant; his father Tukaram, mother Ashabai (accused No.2) and brothers Bappa, Namdeo, Sambhaji and Vitthal reside at Chinchkhandi, Taluka Ambejogai. Elder brother of the appellant is mentally sick. Except his elder brother all are married. Appellant married deceased Suvarna about four to five years prior to the incident. They have two daughters and one son. Youngest daughter was two and half months old at the time of occurrence. The deceased was properly treated for some time after the marriage. Thereafter, the appellant and his mother started subjecting the deceased to harassment as she could not cook food properly and was reluctant to work in the field. At the relevant time appellant, his brothers Sambhaji, Namdeo and sister Parvati had come to Dahiphal for harvesting sugarcane with others. The workers were living in separate huts, erected in the field of Jagannath Kakde; by the side of the road at Dahiphal. In the beginning appellant was working with his sister. The deceased had been to the house of her father at Karewadi for delivery. About fifteen days prior to the incident, appellant brought his wife from Karewadi and started working with her. The deceased was not willing to work and was insisting on returning to her parental house. Therefore, there were quarrels between the spouses. On 8th January, 2004 all the workers went to the work at 7.00 O'clock in the morning, but the appellant did not join them as he had to go to the dispensary for the treatment of injury to his palm due to pricking of the thorn. Therefore, there were quarrels between the spouses. On 8th January, 2004 all the workers went to the work at 7.00 O'clock in the morning, but the appellant did not join them as he had to go to the dispensary for the treatment of injury to his palm due to pricking of the thorn. The deceased also did not go for work. When the workers returned to the camp, they found the dead body of the deceased in sitting posture at the hut. Her young daughter was weeping by her side. The appellant was not at the house. Brothers of the appellant came to know of the death of their sister-in-law at about 4.00 p.m. They sent message to her father Dhondiram Kawale (P.W.2). Brother of appellant Sambhaji reported the death of his sister-in-law to Yermala Police at 11.30 p.m. On the basis of this report, A.D. No. 1 of 2004 was registered under section 174, Criminal Procedure Code and inquiry was conducted by P.S.I. Kadam (P.W. 6). He visited the scene of the occurrence and held inquest on the dead body (Exh. 26). After despatching the dead body for post-mortem to Primary Health Centre Dahiphal, P.W. 6 prepared panchanama of the scene of occurrence (Exh. 23). Broken red coloured ribbon found around the neck of deceased was attached' under this panchanama. Complainant Dhondiram came to Dahiphal at about 1.00 a.m. when he reached the hut the appellant was not there. He found dead body of his daughter with ribbon around her neck. On the next day he lodged report (Exh. 21) with Yermala Police, alleging that the appellant and his mother have committed murder of his daughter. By that time post-mortem report showing the cause of death to be asphyxia due to strangulation was received. Thus, offence came to be registered against the appellant and his mother under sections 498A and 302 read with 34 of the Indian Penal Code. The appellant came to be arrested on 9-1-2004 at 7.00 p.m. and accused No.2 came to be arrested on 4-3-2004 at 11.20 a.m. After completion of the investigation, both the accused were charge-sheeted. 3. At the trial, though suggestion was given to the Investigating Officer that the appellant had been to Madha for taking his salary, the appellant adopted defence of total denial. 4. In all six witnesses were examined by the prosecution. Dr. Birajdar (P.W. 1) performed autopsy. 3. At the trial, though suggestion was given to the Investigating Officer that the appellant had been to Madha for taking his salary, the appellant adopted defence of total denial. 4. In all six witnesses were examined by the prosecution. Dr. Birajdar (P.W. 1) performed autopsy. He found post-mortem lividity on the left thigh and buttock. The tongue was caught between the teeth and was cyanosed. There was oozing from both nostrils. Injuries on the body consisted of continuous double layered deeply grooved brownish coloured parchment like ligature mark around the neck, starting just above thyroid cartilage on the right side, running obliquely upwards just below the angle of mandible. The ligature mark was running horizontally backwards on the left side. There were abrasions over the ligature mark. Hyoid bone was fractured and subcutaneous areolar tissues underneath the ligature mark were ecchymosed. The lungs were congested and the stomach contained partially digested food. On the basis of this data the medical officer opined that the cause of death is asphyxia on account of strangulation. 5. P.W. 2 stated that his daughter was nicely treated for about four years. Thereafter, appellant and his mother started subjecting her to harassment making a grievance that she is not properly cooking food and is not working in the field. On the day of incident, he received the message at Karewadi at about 8.00 or 9.00 p.m. on 8th and came to Dahiphal at about 1.00 a.m. on 9th. On reaching the hut he saw dead body of his daughter with red coloured ribbon around her neck. On that day he lodged report with Yermala Police (Exh. 21). 6. Sudam (P.W. 3) is paternal uncle of the deceased. He acted as panch to the Panchanama of the scene of occurrence (Exh. 23). In his presence ribbon was attached from the spot under this Panchanama. P.W. 3 had come with his brother. He also speaks of having seen the dead body of his niece with ribbon around her neck and about the ill treatment of the deceased by both accused. 7. Tatyaba Gaikwad (P.W. 4) is one of the workers. He states that on the day of the incident all the workers left for work at 7.00 a.m. appellant did not come as he had sustained injury to his palm due to pricking of thorn. The deceased also did not come for the work. 7. Tatyaba Gaikwad (P.W. 4) is one of the workers. He states that on the day of the incident all the workers left for work at 7.00 a.m. appellant did not come as he had sustained injury to his palm due to pricking of thorn. The deceased also did not come for the work. He went to the hut of appellant on getting the information about the incident and saw dead-body of the deceased with ribbon around her neck. 8. Mehboob Pathan (P.W. 5) who is another worker, has turned hostile. 9. P.S.I. Kadam (P.W. 6) conducted enquiry after registration of the Accidental Death under section 174 of Criminal Procedure Code and has also conducted the investigation. On visiting the spot P.W. 6 held inquest on the dead body on 8th January, 2004 and drew Inquest panchanama (Exh. 26). The body was then sent for post-mortem and ribbon was attached under Panchanama of the scene of occurrence (Exh. 23). During the course of the investigation, appellant was arrested on 9th at 7.00 p.m. and accused No.2 was arrested on 4th March, 2004. 10. On conclusion of the trial, learned trial Judge found that the deceased and the appellant were last seen together at the hut. On appreciation of the evidence, he found evidence of P.W. 2 and P.W. 3 regarding ill treatment of the deceased to be unreliable. The prosecution failed to prove participation of accused No.2 in the commission of offence. However, evidence of P.W. 4 established that the appellant and the deceased were together at the hut at the time of the death of the deceased. The deceased died a homicidal death while in custody of the appellant, but the appellant had neither proved alibi nor had given any explanation regarding the death of his wife. The Trial Judge, therefore, concluded that the appellant is responsible for causing the death of his wife. In conformity of these findings, the Trial Judge convicted the appellant for offence punishable under section 302 and sentenced him as stated earlier. Accused No.2 was acquitted of all the charges levelled against her and the appellant was acquitted of the offence punishable under section 498A of the Penal Code. 11. In support of the appeal, learned counsel for the appellant Shri R. S. Deshmukh referred to the overwriting in spot panchanama regarding seizure of the ribbon to contend false implication of the appellant. 11. In support of the appeal, learned counsel for the appellant Shri R. S. Deshmukh referred to the overwriting in spot panchanama regarding seizure of the ribbon to contend false implication of the appellant. He further argued that the death took place during the day, therefore, in the absence of cogent evidence, inference regarding his presence at the house, cannot be drawn. Learned Counsel would argue that presence of the appellant with his wife at the time of commission of the offence has not been proved by cogent evidence. Even otherwise, solitary circumstance indicating his presence is not sufficient to indict the accused. Suspicion, however, strong is not sufficient to infer guilt of the appellant. It is further contended that the prosecution has not discharged initial burden to establish presence of the appellant with the deceased at the time of occurrence, therefore, absence of his explanation regarding the death of his wife cannot be made foundation for his conviction. In support of his contention learned counsel has placed reliance on the rulings of the Apex Court, reported in AIR 2004 SC 1492 ; AIR 2004 SC 3249 ; AIR 2004 SC 4383 ; AIR 1990 SC 79 ; 1991 AIR SCW 868; AIR 1994 SC 1511 , and AIR 1973 SC 501 . 12. Learned APP Shri Shinde, referred to the evidence of P. W. 4 to contend that presence of the appellant with his wife has been proved by the prosecution. The circumstances established, support the hypothesis of the guilt of the appellant and are inconsistent with his innocence. Learned APP thus, submits that there is no merit in the appeal, consequently the appeal deserves to be dismissed. 13. In the present case, undisputedly the prosecution case is based on the circumstantial evidence. The principles governing such cases are by now well settled. In such cases the prosecution has to establish chain of circumstances which unerringly points to the guilt of the accused. The evidence has to be complete and incapable of supporting any hypothesis consistent with the innocence of the accused. The circumstances must be conclusive in nature. All the circumstances should be complete and should be fully proved. The circumstances sought to be relied upon must be closely connected with the principal fact. The cumulative effect of the circumstances must be capable of ruling out any possibility of the innocence of the accused. The circumstances must be conclusive in nature. All the circumstances should be complete and should be fully proved. The circumstances sought to be relied upon must be closely connected with the principal fact. The cumulative effect of the circumstances must be capable of ruling out any possibility of the innocence of the accused. Relying on the decisions of the Apex Court in Narendra Singh and another vs. State of M. P., AIR 2004 SC 3249 ; Dasari Siva Prasad Reddy vs. Public Prosecutor, High Court of A. P., AIR 2004 SC 4383 ; Padala Veera Reddy vs. State of A. P., AIR 1990 SC 79 ; State of Gujarat vs. Sonabai, 1991 AIR SCW 868; Kagen Bera and another vs. State of W.B., AIR 1994 SC 1511 ; learned counsel for the appellant has rightly contended that suspicion, however strong cannot take place of a legal proof. If the prosecution fails to affirmatively prove guilt of the accused beyond all reasonable doubt, the benefit must go to the accused. Relying on the decision of the Apex Court in Shashi Jena and others vs. Khadal Swain and another, AIR 2004 SC 1492 it is sought to be argued that a solitary circumstance of the death being homicidal cannot form basis of conviction. There can be no quarrel with the principles laid down. However, it has to be borne in mind that there can be no precedent on facts. Each case has to be decided on the facts of that particular case. In criminal cases slight variation in the facts often leads to a different conclusion. It is, therefore, not advisable to superimpose facts of one case on the facts of the given case to arrive at a particular conclusion. In Parasa Raja Manikyala Rao vs. State of A. P., (2003)12 SCC 306 , at page 312 it is observed: "7. This is a strange way of dealing with the accusations and consideration of the guilt or otherwise of the accused. How a person reacts in a given case may be the determinative factor so far as that case is concerned. That cannot be applied as a rule of universal application to all cases irrespective of the fact situation in that particular case. There can be no empirical formula as to how one reacts in a given situation and its effect and impact. That cannot be applied as a rule of universal application to all cases irrespective of the fact situation in that particular case. There can be no empirical formula as to how one reacts in a given situation and its effect and impact. It would be almost like trying to put a square peg in a round hole. To imprint the act of situation of one decided case upon another or observations made in the peculiar facts of a given case to any or every other case notwithstanding the dissimilarity in effect and the distinctive features, is legally impermissible. 9. Each case, more particularly a criminal case, depends on its own facts and a close similarity between one case and another is not enough to warrant like treatment because a significant detail may alter the entire aspect. In deciding such cases, one should avoid the temptation to decide cases (as said by Cordozo) by matching the colour of one case against the colour of another. To decide, therefore, on which side of the line a case falls, the broad resemblance to another case is not at all decisive. The vague and cryptic conclusion arrived at by the trial Court to treat their case differently from the manner it dealt with that of A-1, despite its very observation that the evidence was as cogent against them too as it was against A-1 lacks a judicious approach and determination and, therefore, was rightly interfered with by the High Court after an objective appreciation of the evidence independently and in the light of the relevant and guiding principles of law governing such determination." 14. The law applicable to a case based on the circumstantial evidence is succinctly laid down by the Apex Court in Padala Veera Reddy vs. State of A. P. and others (supra). In para 10 of the report, enumerating the tests to be applied in a case based on the circumstantial evidence, Their Lordships observed : "10. Before adverting to the arguments advanced by the learned Counsel, we shall at the threshold point out that in the present case there is no direct evidence to connect the accused with the offence in question and the prosecution rests its case solely on circumstantial evidence. Before adverting to the arguments advanced by the learned Counsel, we shall at the threshold point out that in the present case there is no direct evidence to connect the accused with the offence in question and the prosecution rests its case solely on circumstantial evidence. This Court in a series of decisions has consistently held that when a case rests upon circumstantial evidence such evidence must satisfy the following tests : "(1) the circumstances from which an inference of guilt is sought to be drawn, must be cogently and firmly established; (2) those circumstances should be of a definite tendency unerringly pointing towards guilt of the accused; (3) the circumstances, taken cumulatively, should form a chain so complete that there is no escape from the conclusion that within all human probability the crime was committed by the accused and none else; and (4) the circumstantial evidence in order to sustain conviction must be complete and incapable of explanation of any other hypothesis than that of the guilt of the accused and such evidence should not only be consistent with the guilt of the accused but should be inconsistent with his innocence. (see Gambhir vs. State of Maharashtra}". 15. Undisputedly the initial burden to establish the guilt of accused lies on the prosecution. The prosecution is not required to prove the impossible but has to adduce best evidence which nature of that particular incident admits. However, once the initial burden is discharged, the onus shifts on the accused. He is then obliged to disclose facts within his special knowledge in view of section 106 of the Evidence Act. Falsity of the explanation can be considered to be providing a missing link which completes the chain of circumstances. The law on this point is succinctly laid down in Trimukh Maroti Kiran vs. State of Maharashtra, 2006 AIR sew 5300. In para 12 and 16 it is observed: "12. If an offence takes place inside the privacy of a house and in such circumstances where the assailants have all the opportunity to plan and commit the offence at the time and in circumstances of their choice, it will be extremely difficult for the prosecution to lead evidence to establish the guilt of the accused if the strict principle of circumstantial evidence, as noticed above, is insisted upon by the Courts. A Judge does not preside over a criminal trial merely to see that no innocent man is punished. A Judge also presides to see that a guilty man does not escape. Both are public duties. (See Stirland vs. Director of Public Prosecution, 1944 AC 315 - quoted with approval by Arijit Pasayat, J. in State of Punjab vs. Karnail Singh, (2003) 11 SCC 271 . The law does not enjoin a duty on the prosecution to lead evidence of such character which is almost impossible to be led or at any rate extremely difficult to be led. The duty on the prosecution is to lead such evidence which it is capable of leading, having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case. Here it is necessary to keep in mind section 106 of the Evidence Act which says that when any fact is especially within the knowledge of any person, the burden of proving that fact is upon him. Illustration (b) appended to this section throws some light on the content and scope of this provision and it reads: (b) A is charged with travelling on a railway without ticket. The burden of proving that he had a ticket is on him." Where an offence like murder is committed in secrecy inside a house, the initial burden to establish the case would undoubtedly be upon the prosecution but the nature and amount of evidence to be led by it to establish the charge cannot be of the same degree as is required in other cases of circumstantial evidence. The burden would be of a comparatively higher character. In view of section 106 of the Evidence Act there will be a corresponding burden on the inmates of the house to give a cogent explanation as to how the crime was committed. The inmates of the house cannot get away by simply keeping quiet and offering no explanation on the supposed premise that the burden to establish its case lies entirely upon the prosecution and there is no duty at all on an accused to offer any explanation. 16. In a case based on circumstantial evidence where no eye-witness account is available, there is another principle of law which must be kept in mind. 16. In a case based on circumstantial evidence where no eye-witness account is available, there is another principle of law which must be kept in mind. The principle is that when an incriminating circumstance is put to the accused and the said accused either offers no explanation or offers an explanation which is found to be untrue, then the same becomes an additional link in the chain of circumstances to make it complete. This view has been taken in a catena of decisions of this Court. (See State of Tamil Nadu vs. Rajendran, (1999)8 SCC 679 (para 6); State of U. P. vs. Dr. Ravindra Prakash Mittal, AIR 1992 SC 2045 (para 40); State of Maharashtra vs. Suresh, (2000)1 SCC 471 (para 27), Ganesh Lal vs. State of Rajasthan, (2002)1 SCC 731 (para 15) and Gulab Chand vs. State of M. P., (1995)3 SCC 574 (para 4). " 17. In the present case, during the post-mortem P.W. 1 found post-mortem lividity on left thigh and buttock. The tongue was caught between the teeth and was cyanosed. There was oozing from both nostrils. Injuries on the body consisted of continuous double layered deeply grooved brownish coloured parchment like ligature mark around the neck, starting just above thyroid cartilage on right side and running obliquely upwards just below the angle of mandible. The ligature mark was running horizontally backwards on the left side. There were abrasions over the ligature mark. Hyoid bone was fractured and subcutaneous areolar tissues underneath the ligature marks were ecchemoised. The lungs were congested and the stomach contained partially digested food. On the basis of this data the medical officer opined that the cause of death is asphyxia on account of strangulation. The medical evidence firmly establish that the deceased died a homicidal death by strangulation. The deceased was found in a sitting posture with ribbon around her neck. The fact that post-mortem lividity was found on the left thigh and buttocks shows that she was strangulated while she was in a sitting posture. In addition, the fact that undigested food was found in the stomach, establish that the death took place soon after the spouses took food. The fact that post-mortem lividity was found on the left thigh and buttocks shows that she was strangulated while she was in a sitting posture. In addition, the fact that undigested food was found in the stomach, establish that the death took place soon after the spouses took food. Evidence of P.W. 4 shows that on the day of the occurrence the appellant and the deceased were together at the hut at 7.00 a.m. The fact that the deceased was strangulated soon after she took food would show that the appellant was with her at the time of the occurrence. In addition conduct of the appellant in not disclosing the incident to anybody and absconding from the house till his arrest on the next day at 7.00 p.m. point to his complicity in commission of the offence. Learned counsel for the appellant has referred to the overwriting in spot panchanama (Exh. 23) for showing that the ribbon was attached from the spot and has contended that the manipulation would show false implication of the appellant. It can be seen that reference to the ribbon around the neck of the deceased is found in the Inquest Panchanama (Exh. 26) which was prepared prior to the Spot Panchanama. Apart from this, P.Ws. 2, 3 and 4 also refer to the ribbon around the neck of the deceased. It is thus, obvious that the investigating officer detected the mistake and later on corrected it. No grievance regarding this mistake was made at the time of the trial. No opportunity is given to the investigating officer to offer an explanation regarding the subsequent correction. In this view of the matter, it is not possible for us to subscribe to the assertion that the appellant has been falsely implicated. The circumstances established by the prosecution give rise to the only inference that the appellant has committed murder of his wife. As the initial burden is discharged by the prosecution, it is for the appellant to explain the circumstances which are within his special knowledge, in view of section 106 of the Evidence Act. The fact that the appellant has not given any explanation under section 313 of Criminal Procedure Code, further strengthens the conclusion that the appellant is the perpetrator of the offence. The fact that the appellant has not given any explanation under section 313 of Criminal Procedure Code, further strengthens the conclusion that the appellant is the perpetrator of the offence. Taking overall view of the circumstances established by the prosecution, in· our considered opinion, no fault can be found with the findings recorded by the trial Judge. In the result, the appeal fails and is dismissed accordingly. Appeal dismissed.