JUDGMENT R.M. SAVANT, J. :- The petitioner has invoked the writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India for quashing and setting aside the order dated 17/20-12-2004 by which order the respondent No.2 i.e. Vice Chancellor. Dr. Babasaheb Ambedkar Marathwada University, has rejected the representation of the petitioner for grant of pension. The petitioner has consequently prayed for directions against the respondents directing them to pay compassionate pension. 2. The factual matrix in the above petition lies in a narrow compass. The petitioner joined the Printing Press of Dr. Babasaheb Ambedkar Marathwada University as Foreman on 1-7-1964. The petitioner worked as such upto May, 1984. It appears that the petitioner was granted three days casual leave from 165-1984 to 18-5-1984. Thereafter since no leave was balance to the credit of the petitioner, the petitioner's absence from 16-5-1984 to 18-5-1984 (sic) i.e. for a period of 166 days was treated as leave without pay. The petitioner thereafter also did not join duties and continued to remain absent. 3. It appears that as per the Service Rules applicable, vide letter dated 17-51985 the office of the respondent No.2 called upon the petitioner to join duties within 30 days and was put to notice that at the end of the said period his services would be deemed to be terminated. The petitioner did not respond to the said letter and therefore, the petitioner's services came to be automatically terminated from 16-6-1985 in terms of the Service Rules. The said automatic termination was communicated to the petitioner vide letter dated 21-1-1986 by the Registrar of the said University. It appears that much after the automatic termination of the petitioner's services, the State Government vide Government Resolution dated 49-2000 introduced pension scheme for the employees of the Printing Press of the respondent No. 2 University. The said Resolution came to be issued as a consequence of the order dated 28th June, 1996 passed by this Court in Writ Petition No. 3626 of 1998. By the said Resolution, the terms and conditions on the basis of which the pension scheme becomes applicable are mentioned. The petitioner, in view of the said Resolution, therefore made an application to respondent No.2 herein for grant of pension albeit compassionate pension. The said application of the petitioner came to be rejected by the respondent No.2 vide letter dated 17-20/12/2004, which is impugned in the present petition. The petitioner, in view of the said Resolution, therefore made an application to respondent No.2 herein for grant of pension albeit compassionate pension. The said application of the petitioner came to be rejected by the respondent No.2 vide letter dated 17-20/12/2004, which is impugned in the present petition. The request of the petitioner for grant of pension was refused on the ground that the petitioner's services were terminated in view of the operation of Rule 50 of the Maharashtra Non Agricultural Universities and Affiliated Colleges Standard Code Rules, 1984 (hereinafter for brevity sake referred to as the Standard Code Rules, 1984). 4. In reply to the petition, an affidavit has been filed on behalf of respondents No.2 and 3 by one Pannalal Baburao Bhingari. In the said affidavit it is averred that the petitioner was in the habit of habitually remaining absent, and therefore, on account of his absence in the year 1984 for a period of 166 days and thereafter the petitioner having not joined duties when called upon to do so vide letter dated 7-5-1984, the petitioner's services came to be automatically terminated from 16-6-1985. The said affidavit refers to the relevant Standard Code Rule, namely, Rule 50 under which the petitioner's services came to be terminated and Rule 111 which contemplates forfeiture of the past service of an employee on account of dismissal or removal. The said affidavit also raises an objection to the maintainability of the above petition on the ground of delay and latches. 5. We have heard Mrs. Ansari, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner, Mr. Suryawanshi, learned AGP appearing on behalf of respondent No. 1 and Mr. Thombre, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of respondent Nos. 2 and 3. On behalf of the petitioner the learned Counsel Mrs. Ansari made twofold submission. It was the submission of the learned Counsel that the automatic termination under Rule 50 was bad in law as the services of an employee could not be terminated in the said manner. It was further the submission of the learned Counsel that assuming that the petitioner's services stood automatically terminated the petitioner's past service could not be effaced as is sought to be done. The learned Counsel further submitted that the petitioner would be entitled to the past service for whatever retiral benefits he would be entitled to on the said basis. It was further the submission of the learned Counsel that assuming that the petitioner's services stood automatically terminated the petitioner's past service could not be effaced as is sought to be done. The learned Counsel further submitted that the petitioner would be entitled to the past service for whatever retiral benefits he would be entitled to on the said basis. It was further submitted that forfeiture of the past service relying on Rule III of the Standard Code Rules would amount to virtually imposing double penalty on the petitioner as the petitioner's services had already stood automatically terminated and the petitioner therefore cannot be visited again with the penalty of forfeiture of his past service. The learned Counsel for the petitioner relied upon the following judgments for the proposition that even for unauthorised absence the respondents No.2 and 3 were obliged to departmentally proceed against the petitioner and only based on the outcome of the said proceedings to punish the petitioner. ' (i) 1998(2) SCC 346 , U. P. Co-operative Federation Ltd. vs. Ram Singh Yadav and others. The said case was of wilful absence of the employee who was respondent before the Apex Court. The Apex Court in paragraph 11 and 12 has observed as follows : "11. When leave was granted in special leave petition filed by the appellant in this case, on the interim application it was ordered that there would be stay of payment of backwages to the respondent until further orders. Record of this appeal shows that there has been controversy again if after the impugned judgment of the High Court the respondent ever joined his service. On the other hand, it was stated by the appellant that the respondent had moved the High Court for taking contempt proceedings against the officer of the appellant for not allowing him to join the duty. This Court recorded that the respondent it seemed was not reporting for duty whereas on the other hand he took out contempt proceedings in the High Court. The Court noted that the registered letters dated 2-3-1990 and 25-9-1990 were sent to the respondent to join duty but he did not appear to have responded to the same and instead to put pressure he had taken out contempt proceedings in the High Court. This Court expressed unhappiness about the manner in which the respondent was proceeding with the matter. This Court expressed unhappiness about the manner in which the respondent was proceeding with the matter. It was directed that in order to give a last chance to the respondent he should report for duty latest by 15-1-1994, failing which, the Court would be constrained to infer that he was not interested in the job. The matter did not end there. The appellant again approached this Court complaining that though in pursuance of earlier order the respondent did join the duty but he again absented himself. Be that as it may, we are not concerned with the conduct of the respondent or any action which the appellant could take against him for his alleged misconduct during the pendency of this appeal. It would, however, appear that because of the pendency of this appeal the appellant chose not to take any action against the respondent. It is always open to the appellant to initiate disciplinary proceedings against the respondent for his remaining absent unauthorisedly or not joining duty during the pendency of this appeal if the circumstances so warrant. "12. It could not be denied that the respondent is an employee within the meaning of clause (xi) of Regulation 2 of the Regulations. He is in the whole-time service of the appellant. He is not a casual worker employed on daily wages or a person in part-time service of the appellant. It is not material for us to examine therefore if the respondent is temporary or has been substantively appointed to the post he is holding. The impugned order is in fact an order of removal of the respondent from service. It is not a termination in the strict sense within the meaning of Regulation 19 as the requirements of the Regulation have not been met and that is also not the case of the appellant that the also not the case of the appellant that the action was under Regulation 19. That being so the impugned order of termination is in fact removal of the respondent from the service and procedure as prescribed in Regulations 84 and 85 had therefore to be met. That has admittedly not been done. There is no charge-sheet, no enquiry officer and no enquiry proceedings. Regulations prescribe detailed procedure for conduct of the disciplinary proceedings. Provisions of Regulations 84 and 85 have certainly been violated to the prejudice of the respondent. That has admittedly not been done. There is no charge-sheet, no enquiry officer and no enquiry proceedings. Regulations prescribe detailed procedure for conduct of the disciplinary proceedings. Provisions of Regulations 84 and 85 have certainly been violated to the prejudice of the respondent. We therefore uphold the order of the High Court setting aside the termination of service of the respondent by order dated 22-5-1978 to the extent that the respondent has to be reinstated in the service though it does not preclude the appellant from holding an enquiry or passing proper order in accordance with law. However, since on the admission of the respondent himself that he has not worked from 21-7-1977 till the impugned judgment dated 3-7-1989 of the High Court the respondent would not be entitled to any pay and allowance for that period. This is so as the respondent is at fault in not joining his new posting without any valid reason. Though ultimately if there is no enquiry or the respondent is exonerated this period shall be counted towards his pensionary and other benefits". (ii) The next judgment relied upon by the learned Counsel for the petitioner is 2000 AIR SCW 4117, M/s Scooter India Ltd. vs. M. Mohammad Yaqub and another. This was a case wherein the Apex Court has held that over staying of leave cannot result in automatic termination of service and that the employee had to be provided with an opportunity of hearing. The Apex Court went on to hold that the Standing Order providing for such automatic termination without affording an opportunity of hearing to an employee was bad. Therefore, relying upon the said judgments the learned Counsel for the petitioner submitted that the order automatically terminating the petitioner's services was unsustainable and therefore had to be set aside and the petitioner was entitled to all the consequential benefits. 6. On behalf of respondents No. 2 and 3 Shri Thombre, learned Counsel appearing for them made the following submissions. That the petition was grossly belated as the petitioner has filed the above petition challenging the order dated 21-1-1986 terminating his services in the year 2004. The learned Counsel therefore submitted that the petitioner was not entitled to any reliefs on the said ground itself. That the petition was grossly belated as the petitioner has filed the above petition challenging the order dated 21-1-1986 terminating his services in the year 2004. The learned Counsel therefore submitted that the petitioner was not entitled to any reliefs on the said ground itself. The learned Counsel Shri Thombre further submitted that in terms of Rule 111 of the Standard Code Rules, 1984, the past service of an employee is forfeited in case of his dismissal or removal on the application of die said Rule 111. Therefore, according to the learned Counsel for the respondents No.2 and 3, the petitioner would not be entitled to pension. The learned Counsel further submitted that at the time when the petitioner's services were terminated there was no pension scheme applicable and the same was introduced only by the Government Resolution dated 4-9-2000. The petitioner therefore was not entitled to claim pension. The learned Counsel Shri Thombre relied upon the judgment reported in AIR 1975 se 1064 in the matter of Mohd. Abdul Salamkhan vs. Sarfraj Ahmed. The said judgment was cited by Shri Thombre in support of his submissions that dismissal and removal are interchangeable words and would mean the same thing. The said judgment was cited by Shri Thombre as in Rule 111 of the Standard Code Rules the forfeiture of the past service of an employee is contemplated if he has been dismissed or removed. Therefore, relying on the said judgment it is the contention of Shri Thombre that the respondent No.2 and 3 are entitled to forfeit that the respondent No.2 and 3 are entitled to forfeit the past service rendered by the petitioner. 7. We have heard the learned Counsel for the parties at length. Since the petitioner is sought to be denied retiral benefits on the application of the said Standard Code Rules, it would be relevant to reproduce the Rules which are relevant in the instant case. "43. Penalties.- (1) Without prejudice to the provisions of any law for the time being in force, the following penalties may, for good and sufficient reasons and as hereinafter provided, be imposed on the University or the College employee found guilty of misconduct. (a) Minor penalties (i) censure, (ii) fine, (iii) withholding of increment of pay, (iv) withholding of promotion. "43. Penalties.- (1) Without prejudice to the provisions of any law for the time being in force, the following penalties may, for good and sufficient reasons and as hereinafter provided, be imposed on the University or the College employee found guilty of misconduct. (a) Minor penalties (i) censure, (ii) fine, (iii) withholding of increment of pay, (iv) withholding of promotion. (v) recovery from his pay, or such other amounts as may be due to him, of the whole or part of any pecuniary loss caused by him to the University or the College, by negligence or by breach of orders. (b) Major Penalties- (i) Reduction to a lower stage in the time-scale of pay, for specified period with further direction as to whether or not the employee will earn increments of pay during the period of such reduction and whether on the expiry of such period, the reduction shall or shall not have the effect of postponing the future increments of his pay, (ii) reduction to a lower time-scale of pay, grade, post or services which shall, ordinarily be a bar to the promotion of the employee to the time-scale of pay, grade, post or service from which he was reduced, with or without further directions regarding condition of restoration to the time-scale of pay, grade, post or service from which he was reduced, and his seniority and pay on such restoration, (iii) compulsory retirement, (iv) removal from service, which shall not be a disqualification for future employment under the University or the College. Explanation. The following shall not amount to penalty within the meaning of this rule, namely, (i) withholding of increment of pay of the employee for his failure to pass any departmental examination, in accordance with the rules or orders, or the terms of his appointment probation; (ii) stoppage of an employee, at the efficiency bar, in the time-scale of pay, on the ground of unfitness to cross the bar by the employee; (iii) non-promotion of the employee, whether in substantiate or in officiating capacity, after consideration of his case, to a service, grade or post for promotion to which he is eligible, on administrative ground not connected with his conduct. (iv) reversion of the employee officiating in higher service, grade or post to a lower grade or post on the ground that he is considered to be unsuitable for such higher service, grade or post, or on any administrative ground not connected with his conduct. (v) reversion of the employee, appointed on probation to any other service, grade or post; to his permanent service, grade or post held by him under the University or the same college management, during or at the end of the period of probation, in accordance with the terms of his appointment or the rules and orders governing such probation. (vi) repatriation of the service of the employee whose services have been borrowed from outside authority or recalling the employee from the foreign employment to such authority; (vii) compulsory retirement of an employee in accordance with the provisions relating to his superanuation or retirement; (viii) termination of services (i) of the employee appointed on probation, during or at the end of his probation, in accordance with the terms of his appointment or rules or orders governing such probation; or (ii) of a temporary employee on grounds unconnected with his conduct or (iii) of the employee under an agreement, in accordance with the terms of such agreement. (2) Where a penalty mentioned in item (b)(i) or (b) (ii) in sub-rule (1) is imposed on the employee, the Authority imposing the penalty shall expressly state in the order imposing the penalty that the period for which the reduction is to be effective shall be exclusive of any interval spent on leave before the period is completed". 50. Deserter.- The employee who absents from duty without permission for a period of more than thirty days, shall be deemed to be deserter and his services shall stand terminated automatically on the expiry of the period of thirty days : Provided that, whenever the employee is not able to attend the duties as prescribed and not able to communicate reasons of his absence for the reasons beyond his control, the Competent Authority may, by a special order condone his absence." "111. Forfeiture of service on dismissal or removal - Dismissal or removal of a non-teaching employee from service or post entails forfeiture of his past service. 155. Grant of Compassionate Pension. Forfeiture of service on dismissal or removal - Dismissal or removal of a non-teaching employee from service or post entails forfeiture of his past service. 155. Grant of Compassionate Pension. (1) A non-teaching employee who is removed or required to retire from the service of the University or affiliated College for misconduct or insolvency shall be granted no pension other than a Compassionate Pension. (2) A non-teaching employee who is removed or required to retire from the service of University or of the affiliated college on the ground of inefficiency, shall, if he be eligible for a superannuation, or retiring pension, be granted such pension. If he is not eligible for a superannuation or retiring pension he shall be granted no pension other than a Compassionate Pension." 8. As can be seen from the said Rules quoted above, Rule 43 mentions the various penalties which can be imposed by the said University on an employee found guilty of misconduct. The penalties are divided into minor penalties and major penalties. It is significant to note that automatic termination is not one of the penalties contemplated under the said Rule 43. Rule 50 contemplates automatic termination if the employee remains absent for more than 30 days. He shall be deemed to be a deserter. By the proviso to the said Rule, a power is conferred on the competent authority to condone the absence. Rule 111 contemplates forfeiture of past service if there is dismissal or removal. 9. In the instant case, the admitted position is that the petitioner has put in more than 20 years service prior to his automatic termination on 16-6-1985. The automatic termination of his services is on account of the fact that the petitioner had remained unauthorisedly absent and therefore on the application of Rule 50, the automatic termination of his service came into operation. The question that begs an answer is whether Rule 111 providing for forfeiture of past service could be applied to the petitioner's case as is sought to be done by the respondents. The answer in our view can only be in the negative. The question that begs an answer is whether Rule 111 providing for forfeiture of past service could be applied to the petitioner's case as is sought to be done by the respondents. The answer in our view can only be in the negative. It is pertinent to note that the said automatic termination under Rule 50 can only be termed as a termination simpliciter on account of unauthorised absence, otherwise in the case of a misconduct a Departmental Enquiry is contemplated under the said standard Code Rules wherein there has to be an adherence to the principles of natural justice. As there is no enquiry contemplated or no procedure to be followed, there is merely severance of the relationship of employee-employer on account of the said automatic termination. Therefore, in our view the said automatic termination can be dubbed only as a termination simpliciter without any stigma. Another aspect to be noted is that there is a power conferred on the competent authority by the proviso to the said Rule to condone the absence. If there is power for condoning the absence, it is a pointer to the fact that the said automatic termination is not a misconduct. Now looking at Rule 111 of the Standard Code Rules, a plain reading thereof makes it absolutely clear that the forfeiture of the past service of an employee could only be on account of dismissal or removal which obviously cannot be equated with termination simpliciter which is contemplated under Rule 50. We are therefore of the view that Rule 111 of the Standard Code Rules would have no application in cases covered by Rule 50 and therefore there cannot be any forfeiture of the past service of an employee. 10. We find considerable merit in the submission of Mrs. Ansari that the forfeiture of past service would amount to the employee suffering twice over inasmuch as the employee's services already stand automatically terminated and under Rule 111 he also stands to lose his past service. This in our view cannot be an interpretation of the said Rules and therefore the forfeiture of the past service in the case of the present petitioner is wholly impermissible. Resultantly, the respondent Nos. 2 and 3 would have to take into consideration the past service of 20 years rendered by the petitioner for retiral benefits. 11. This in our view cannot be an interpretation of the said Rules and therefore the forfeiture of the past service in the case of the present petitioner is wholly impermissible. Resultantly, the respondent Nos. 2 and 3 would have to take into consideration the past service of 20 years rendered by the petitioner for retiral benefits. 11. Another aspect to be noted is that under Rule 155 of the said Standard Code Rules even in case of misconducts an employee would be entitled to compassionate pension. Therefore a person whose services stood automatically terminated under Rule 50 cannot be worst of than a person who has been held guilty of misconduct. Therefore looking at it from the said angle also, we are of the view that the petitioner would be entitled for his past service to be taken into consideration for any retiral benefits. 12. As regards the point of delay and laches urged on behalf of the respondent Nos. 2 and 3 by the learned Counsel Shri Thombre, the respondents are losing sight of the fact that the pension scheme was introduced for the employees of the Printing Press of the said University pursuant to the directions issued by this Court in Writ Petition No. 3626 of 1988. The said resolution dated 4-9-2000 has been issued in compliance of the directions issued by this Court. The said pension scheme is made applicable w.e.f. 1-10-1982. In view of the said Government Resolution it was but natural that the petitioner got a ray of hope of getting benefit of the pension scheme and therefore filed the instant petition. Since the pension scheme was made applicable by said Government Resolution of 4-9-2000 and is made applicable w.e.f. 1-10-1982, the petitioner whose services came to be automatically terminated on 16-6-1985 would have been entitled to the benefit of the same but for the wrongful forfeiture of his past service. The delay according to us, if any, in approaching this Court, is therefore of no consequence. In the context of the submissions made by the learned Counsel for respondent No. 2 on the point of delay and laches, the learned Counsel for the petitioner in reply submitted that the petitioner is not interested in getting the automatic termination communicated vide letter dated 21-1-1986 set aside though arguments have been advanced by her on the said basis. In the context of the submissions made by the learned Counsel for respondent No. 2 on the point of delay and laches, the learned Counsel for the petitioner in reply submitted that the petitioner is not interested in getting the automatic termination communicated vide letter dated 21-1-1986 set aside though arguments have been advanced by her on the said basis. The learned Counsel further submitted that the petitioner is only interested in the second relief i.e. past service of 20 years rendered by the petitioner could not be forfeited and that the petitioner should be paid pension on the said basis as per the Government Resolution dated 4-9-2000. 13. In view of the submissions made by the learned Counsel for the petitioner that the petitioner is not interested in getting the automatic termination set aside, the said issue does not remain for our consideration and therefore no interference is called for with the said termination of the petitioner from 16-51985 communicated vide letter dated 21-1-1986. However in view of our findings recorded earlier in this judgment that Rule 111 of the Standard Code Rules would have no application to the petitioner's case and that the respondents therefore would not be entitled to forfeit the past service of 20 years or thereabout rendered by the petitioner, we issue the following directions: (i) The petitioner's past service of 20 years cannot be forfeited under Rule 111 and the petitioner consequently would be entitled to pension on the said basis as per the Government Resolution dated 4-9-2000. (ii) The pension payable to the petitioner as per Government Resolution dated 4-9-2000 should be calculated within a period of two months from date and pension should be paid to the petitioner within one month of the said calculation and from month to month thereafter. 14. Rule is accordingly made absolute to the aforesaid extent with parties left to bear their respective costs. Order accordingly.