Judgment :- (Criminal Appeal preferred against the judgment passed by the learned Special Judge cum Chief Judicial Magistrate, Chengalpattu in Spl.C.C.No.4 of 1995, dated 30.6.1999 acquitting the accused.) This Criminal Appeal has been filed against the acquittal of the respondents/accused who were charged under Section 7 and 13(2) r/w. Section 13(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. 2. The brief facts of the prosecution case are as follows:- (a) On 14.6.2003, P.W.3, the complainant, for the purpose of enlisting him as a contractor wanted to get a solvency certificate for Rs.10,00,000/= and submitted an application with necessary enclosures in the Taluk Office, Ponneri. The Headquarters Deputy Tashildar who received the application made an endorsement to meet the Revenue Inspector of Minjur and hand over the application to the complainant. On the same day the complainant with the application approached A.1, K.Subramanian, Revenue Inspector of Minjur and handed over the application to him. But, A.1 returned the same to the complainant saying that Chitta Adangal Certificate should be obtained from the Village Administrative Officer and also informed him that some amount should be given to him for recommending for the issue of the Solvency Certificate. The complainant informed him that he was not in a position to give any amount and on that A.1 told him that he would consider that aspect afterwards. (b) The complainant after meeting the VAO on 14.6.1993 and 21.6.1993 with necessary Certificate obtained from the VAO met A.1 at the Taluk Office, Ponneri on 21.6.1993 with his friend Subramanya Mudaliar and at that time A.1 demanded Rs.5,000/= from the complainant by saying that he has to give Rs.2,000/= to the Tashildar out of that amount. When the complainant pleaded before him about his inability, A.1 prepared a statement in the application and returned the same to the complainant saying that he has to come and meet him again if he want to get the Solvency Certificate. With that application the complainant met the Tashildar, R.Pandurangan with his friend Subramanya Mudaliar on the same day. The Tahsildar after perusing the application form informed the complainant that he should spend some amount for getting the Solvency Certificate and directed him to meet A.2 S.Subburayan, who is an Assistant who would explain in detail. On that, the complainant and his friend with the application met A.2 S.Subburayan. The Tahsildar after perusing the application form informed the complainant that he should spend some amount for getting the Solvency Certificate and directed him to meet A.2 S.Subburayan, who is an Assistant who would explain in detail. On that, the complainant and his friend with the application met A.2 S.Subburayan. A.2 on perusing the application informed them that A.1 has to sign in three places and to get the signatures by paying some amount to him the complainant should give him a sum at the rate of 2% for the amount mentioned in the Solvency Certificate. The complainant again pleaded his inability to offer that amount. On that, A.2 directed him to get the signatures from A.1 and he would speak about the amount to be paid later. (c) On 22.6.1993 the complainant met A.1 and wanted his signatures as directed by A.2. A.1 finally demanded Rs.1000/= to be paid to him on 23.6.1993 if at all he wanted to get the signatures and returned the application file to the complainant without putting his signatures. With the application the complainant met A.2 Subbruyan on the same day at Ponneri. A.2 informed the complainant that for getting the solvency certificate he has to give Rs.10,000/= to the Tashildar and without that amount the certificate could not be issued. After persuasion A.2 finally asked him to bring Rs.3,000/= on 23.6.1993 and with the signatures of A.1 but without the file being arranged for the issue of the Certificate A.2 returned the application to the complainant with the enclosures. (d) Thereafter the complainant made a written complaint on 23.6.1993 at 10.45 a.m., before the Deputy Superintendent of Police, V & AC., Chennai City-II Detachment and the same was registered as a case in Cr.No.5/AC/93/M.CII under Section 7 and 13(2) r/w. Section 13(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 against A.3 Pandurangan, Tahsildar, A.1 K.Subramanian, Revenue Inspector of Minjur and A.2, Subburayan, Assistant of Taluk Office, Ponneri. (e) Pursuant to the same, a trap was arranged on 23.6.1993 and carried out successfully at 17.15 hours and A.1 and A.2 were caught red-handed at Ponneri Taluk Office whey they demanded and accepted Rs.1,000/= and Rs.3,000/= respectively from the complainant. At the time of trap the Tahsildar was attending a meeting with DSP of Ennore and a public of Pulikat in his room. At the time of trap the Tahsildar was attending a meeting with DSP of Ennore and a public of Pulikat in his room. The amount so accepted as illegal gratification was also recovered from A.1 and A.2. They were arrested at 2045 hours and released on bail at 21.45 hours. The Phenolphthalein test conducted on both the hands of A.1 and A.2 proved positive. P.W.11, Deputy Superintendent of Police conducted further investigation and submitted final report against the accused as stated earlier under the Prevention of Corruption Act. (f) Before the Chief Judicial Magistrate, on behalf of the prosecution, P.Ws 1 to 11 were examined, Exs.P.1 to P.28 and M.Os 1 to 10 were marked. On behalf of the accused Exs.D.1 to D.16 were marked no witness was examined. When the accused were questioned under Section 313 Cr.P.C., with regard to the incriminating circumstances appearing in the evidence of the prosecution witnesses as against them, they denied the allegation of receiving illegal gratification as false. (g) On a consideration of the oral and documentary evidence, the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Chengalpattu came to the conclusion that the offences under Sections 7 and 13(2) r/w. Section 13(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 alleged against the accused are not proved and acquitted them. Aggrieved over the said acquittal, this Criminal Appeal has been filed by the State. 3. It is well settled law that in case of admission of receipt of money by the Government Servants where allegation of corruption is pleaded, when there is an explanation offered by the Government Servant, as to why the money was received by him, various Courts have held that if the explanation is probable and reasonable then the accused has to be acquitted. 4. In Sundara Krishnan V. State etc., reported in 1998-2- L.W.(Crl) 718, this Court held as follows:- "18. Like every other criminal case, a case of bribery is subject to the rule that the accused is presumed innocent and that the burden to discharge the aid innocence is paramountly on the prosecution. However strong the suspicion against the accused if every reasonable possibility of innocence has not been excluded, he is entitled to acquittal. Whenever circumstances arise, they must be proved and not by themselves presumed.".... However strong the suspicion against the accused if every reasonable possibility of innocence has not been excluded, he is entitled to acquittal. Whenever circumstances arise, they must be proved and not by themselves presumed.".... "If therefore the evidence regarding the demand and acceptance of bribe leaves room for doubt and does not displace the presence of innocence wholly, the charge cannot be said to have been established." "26. ...In a case of corruption, especially in a trap case, when the accused on admitting the acceptance of the tainted money, attributes different reasons for having obtained the same from the complaint, it becomes the duty of the accused to discharge the burden by establishing with valid evidence, the reason that is attributed by him for the acceptance of the tainted money. But while discussing as to what should be the standard of proof that could be expected from the accused under such circumstances wherein the accused takes up a plea admitting the acceptance of the tainted money, but comes forward to attribute other reasons for the acceptance of the same. .... "it would be unreasonable on the part of the Courts to expect the accused to prove his version with the such standard i.e., required for the proof of a civil case i.e., preponderance of probabilities but in such a situation if the accused is able to offer proper explanation to the satisfaction of the court in a convincing manner, that is sufficient for the courts to hold that the accused has cast off his burden of proof pertaining to the stand taken by him."....."The Apex Court has held that even in such event wherein the accused fails to discharge that part of the burden cast on him, still, since the accused is presumed innocent at the outset, the initial burden cast on the prosecution regarding the proof of the entire case against the accused with proof beyond reasonable doubts persists and unless the prosecution is able to prove with such standard of proof beyond all reasonable doubts, the accused would still become entitled to be acquitted." 5. In State of Tamil Nadu Vs. S.Krishnamurthy, reported in 2002 (4) Crimes 295 (SC) the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as follows:- "4.....It also noticed the fact that granting of patta certificate was not the sole responsibility of the respondent and it was a cumulative act of various officials of the taluk Office. In State of Tamil Nadu Vs. S.Krishnamurthy, reported in 2002 (4) Crimes 295 (SC) the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as follows:- "4.....It also noticed the fact that granting of patta certificate was not the sole responsibility of the respondent and it was a cumulative act of various officials of the taluk Office. Therefore, the High Court also came to the conclusion that a demand for an individual bribe in the acts and circumstances of the case cannot be accepted." "5.....The prevalence of the practice in the office in question of collecting the flag day fund and the teacher's day fund seems to have been an authorised practice, though we do not approve of such practice. While considering a criminal appeal, if the existence of such practice is established and the defence taken by the accused is in conformity, with such practice, we are in agreement with the High Court that the mere fact that the respondent received a sum of RS.300/= would not ipso facto lead to the conclusion that the money in question was received by him as a bribe of showing an official favour." 6. In Duraisami Vs. State of Tamil Nadu, reported in 2005 SCC (Cri) 1508, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as follows:- "1. ....The appellant admitted the receipt of Rs.500/= from PW1 but he contended that he had sold Indira Vikas Patras to PW1 on 1.12.1987 and for which he had not paid the money and the amount which was paid on 16.3.1988 was the value of those Indira Vikas Patras"..... "3. ....The appellant admitted the receipt of Rs.500/= from PW1 but he contended that he had sold Indira Vikas Patras to PW1 on 1.12.1987 and for which he had not paid the money and the amount which was paid on 16.3.1988 was the value of those Indira Vikas Patras"..... "3. The learned Single Judge reversed the acquittal passed by the Special Judge, firstly for the reasons that the appellant did not give a statement at the time of his arrest that the money he had received was towards the value of two Indira Vikas Patras sold by him to PW1 and secondly, PW 2 who was allegedly present at the time of sale of Indira Vikas Patras did not depose that the appellant had been selling these Indira Vikas Patras on credit"....."We do not think that the learned Single Judge was justified in rejecting the evidence of DW.2 Once Exhibit P.16 was found to be a true and genuine document, the case set up by the defence has to be accepted and in that view of the matter we do not think that the learned Single Judge was justified in reversing the acquittal passed by the Special Judge." 7. In T.Subramanian Vs. State of Tamil Nadu, reported in 2006 (1) SCC (Cri) 401, the Apex Court held thus:- "12. Mere receipt of Rs.200/= by the appellant from P.W.1 on 10.7.1987 (admitted by the appellant) will not be sufficient to fasten guilt under Section 5(1)(a) or Section 5(1)(d) of the Act, in the absence of any evidence of demand and acceptance of the amount as illegal gratification"....."If the reason for receiving the amount is explained and the explanation is probable and reasonable, then the appellant had to be acquitted as rightly done by the Special Court."... "15....The above evidence no doubt proves that a sum of Rs.200 was paid by PW 1 to the appellant. But the crucial question is whether the appellant had demanded the same amount as illegal gratification to show any official favour to PW1 and whether the said amount was paid by PW 1 and received by the appellant as consideration for showing such official favour."... 8. In Punjabrao Vs. But the crucial question is whether the appellant had demanded the same amount as illegal gratification to show any official favour to PW1 and whether the said amount was paid by PW 1 and received by the appellant as consideration for showing such official favour."... 8. In Punjabrao Vs. State of Maharashtra, reported in 2004 SCC (Cri) 1130, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as follows:- "3....It is, of course, true as observed by the High Court that when the investigating officer seized the amount from the accused Patwari, he did not offer the explanation that it was in relation to a collection of loan, but that by itself would not be sufficient to throw away the explanation offered by the accused in his statement under Section 313 when such explanation could be held to be reasonable under the facts and circumstances of the case, as indicated by the learned Special Judge while acquitting the accused." 9. In Suraj Mal Vs. The State Delhi Administration reported in AIR 1979 SC 1408 , the Apex Court held as follows:- "2....In our opinion mere recovery of money divorce from the circumstances under which it is paid is not sufficient to convict the accused when the substantive evidence in the case is not reliable".... 10. The FIR supposedly prepared on 23.6.1993 has been actually concocted only on 24.6.1993 in which the Tahsildar has been shown as A.1. However, PW.10, Dy. Superintendent of Police obtained the signature of A.1 as a surety for A.2 and A.3 on 23.6.1993. 11. Another distorting feature is that the FIR is said to have been registered on 23.6.1993. In the FIR A.3, Pandurangan, Tahsildar has been arrayed as an accused (as A.1). If he was an accused as per the FIR, and the FIR has been registered on the same day, I am at a loss to understand as to how the same accused mentioned as A.1 in the FIR was accepted as a surety for the other two accused, namely the Revenue Inspector and the Assistant of the Taluk Office who are arrayed as A.1 and A.2 in the charge sheet. If it is so that on 23.6.1993 when the FIR is said to have been registered, the Tahsildar A.3 was not arrayed as an accused, but implicated only later on, on the next day, i.e., on 24.6.1993, on which date the FIR has reached the Court, then there is no explanation as to why the co accused is accepted as a surety for the other two accused. 12. Further, in spite of the instantaneous reaction of A.2 and A.3 that the money was received only towards Flag Day Collection, the prosecution vainly charged the accused of an offence under the Act. Legally the prosecution has not been able to establish the demand and acceptance by the accused. There is no corroboration of the testimony of P.W.3. P.W.4 who had accompanied the complainant, PW.3 at all times, has turned hostile. P.W.5's testimony on the amount demanded by A.1 and A.2 are directly at variance with the evidence of P.W.3. P.W.5 himself admits the immediate explanation of A.1 and A.2 that the amount was received towards Flag Day Collection. This explanation of the accused is supported by the testimony of P.W.2 (Collector) who has deposed that failure to collect funds for Flag Day would result in disciplinary action. Thus the conclusion of the trial court is founded on strong principles of law, the formidable onslaughts of the defence against prosecution evidence and preponderant probability of the defence explanation Immediately at the time of arrest, the accused have stated that the amounts were collected only for Flag Day contribution. The explanation is probalised by the evidence of the official witnesses like the Tahildar, Collector. 13. Primarily to establish a charge under Section 7 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, a case of demand and acceptance have to be established beyond reasonable doubt. To quote their lordships in the case of State Vs. Minaketan (AIR 1952 Orissa 267) what constitutes bribery is a question of law; whether on evidence the crime has been committed is a question of fact. If therefore the evidence regarding the demand and acceptance of bribe leaves room for doubt and does not displace wholly the presumption of innocence the charge cannot be said to have been established. Viewed in this context, the charge of demand has to be analyzed. If therefore the evidence regarding the demand and acceptance of bribe leaves room for doubt and does not displace wholly the presumption of innocence the charge cannot be said to have been established. Viewed in this context, the charge of demand has to be analyzed. According to the prosecution the first accused is supposed to have demanded a sum of Rs.5,000/= on 21.6.1993 and later scaled it down to Rs.2,000/= on 22.6.1993 and reiterated the same on 22.6.1993. In pursuance thereof he is supposed to have obtained a sum of Rs.2000/= as illegal gratification. The deposition of P.W.3 would reveal that no demand whatsoever was made on any of these dates. The prosecution may argue that since PW4 was declared hostile, P.W.3 would have to be relied upon. However, it should be noted that the demand alleged to have been made on 22.6.193 itself has been refuted by P.W.4 who had accompanied P.W.3. IN his deposition P.W.4 has stated that P.W.3 did not report or complain anything about the respondent. P.W.3 himself denies having met A.1 on 22.6.1993. The testimony of P.W 5 on the amount demanded by A.1 and A.2 is contrary to that of P.W.3. P.W.5 who was never in the picture earlier is totally incompetent to conclude ton the nature of amount discussed in the incident. Further when the amount demanded has been clearly proved as towards Flag Day collection, there cannot be any motive or reward and consequently no statutory presumption could be drawn under Section 20 of the Act. Thus when none of the ingredients save that they are the public servants could be proved, the prosecution cannot be established the charge under Section 7 of the Act. 14. Learned counsel for the appellants also submitted that there is no abuse of position by the respondents/accused in receiving the money as the amount received proved as collected for flag day collection and there is no criminal intent and guilty mind on the part of the respondents/accused. The evidence of P.W.9, Deputy Tahsildar who has not been declared hostile has clearly testified to the verity of the collection as towards flag day, no motive or criminal intent whatsoever could be imputed to the Respondent much less interpreted as illegal, gratification, motive or reward for his official act. Thus the charge under Section 13(2) fall to the ground. 15. Thus the charge under Section 13(2) fall to the ground. 15. The trial court has appreciated the evidence of P.W.3, complainant against the relevant criteria of proof. The testimony of P.W.3 is a bundle of contradictions. Neither P.W.4 nor even P.W.5 has corroborated the particulars of his version of demand and acceptance. Thus the trial court has weighed the evidence let in by the prosecution against the required degree of proof beyond the realm of reasonable doubt, it has viewed the respondents explanation, particularly in relation to the nature of amount communicated to the complainant, in the light of preponderance of probabilities. The prosecution merely states through P.W.3, that P.E.3 had been asked by A.3 to meet A.2 and ascertain the expenditure to be incurred. The prosecution has neither stated the exact amount demanded by A.3 nor spelt out the material particulars of demand by A.3 which is legally essential for proving the alleged demand. P.W.3 has stated that A.1 demanded initially Rs.2,000/= and later reduced it to Rs.500/=. P.W.3 in his cross examination states that he did not meet A.1 on 22.6.1993. In the absence of P.W.3 having seen A.1 on 22.6.1993 the entire version of P.W.3 falls to ground. 16. The trial court has trenchantly appreciated the oral and documentary evidence let in by the prosecution in the proper perspective and arrived at conclusions based on substantive evidence and settled position of law on this aspect. The trial court has rightly concluded that there has been no demand and acceptance and that the money allegedly demanded was only towards Flag Day collection. 17. The deposition of P.W.3 in respect of the second accused is still more perplexing. P.W.3 states that on 21.6.1993 A.2 had demanded 2% or Rs.10,000/= and on 22.6.2003 asked for Rs.5,000/= and later reduced it to Rs.3,000/=. This falsehood is proved by DE.1 and PE.25 which establish the A.2 having gone on duty to Kancheepuram and Chennai on these two dates respectively. This is also admitted by P.W.9 and noting thereof in the attendance register is admitted by PW.10. 18. As regards A.3, the prosecution has roped in A.3 only as an afterthought. The FIR would show A.3 as A.1. If the FIR which is the starting point of investigation for the prosecution could show A.3 as A.1 it is a puzzle as to how the prosecution could obtain his signature as a Mahajar surety/witness. 18. As regards A.3, the prosecution has roped in A.3 only as an afterthought. The FIR would show A.3 as A.1. If the FIR which is the starting point of investigation for the prosecution could show A.3 as A.1 it is a puzzle as to how the prosecution could obtain his signature as a Mahajar surety/witness. Still worse is the letter of P.W.10 to the Tahsildar (A.3) for the issue of solvency certificate on 24.6.1993. This is an empirical proof of the prosecution's contrivance to implicate A.3. In view of A.3 not even having seen the file of P.W.3 prior to 23.6.1993, as admitted by P.W.11, there is absolutely no possibility of any demand by A.3. 19. Moreover, at one point of time, P.W.3 states that the first accused had omitted to sign at three places and at another point of time, he says that the first accused had omitted to sign at two places. Thus there are three different versions deposed in the matter of A.1 having signed the application. P.W.3 states that he had affixed only two signatures. P.W.5 states that he had signed at three places and P.W.10 states that A.1 had signed at four places. 20. The deposition of P.W.4 though declared hostile cannot be totally cast aside. It is the prosecution case that he has accompanied P.W.3 at every stage. But a perusal of the statement would show that it demolishes the statement of P.W.3 that he had met the second and third accused. Thus he has not corroborated the testimony of P.W.3. The testimony of P.W.3 cannot stand independent of and separate from that of P.W.4. Both are inextricably, intermingled and cannot remain independent of each other. 21. As regards P.W.5, his conduct and testimony have shown that he is not an independent witness. Throughout it is found that he is hyper interested in supporting the prosecution. When P.W.3 himself states that he had not met A.1 on 22.6.1993 the testimony of P.W.5, that A.1 asked P.W.3 whether he had brought the money that A.1 had demanded previous defuses the credibility and reliability of P.W.5 in one stroke. Still worse is he parrots the version of the prosecution on the role of the accused contrary to the contents of PE.8, DE.12 and DE.13. Besides, his testimony on the amount demanded by A.1 and A.2 are directly at variance with PW.3. Still worse is he parrots the version of the prosecution on the role of the accused contrary to the contents of PE.8, DE.12 and DE.13. Besides, his testimony on the amount demanded by A.1 and A.2 are directly at variance with PW.3. All the more, P.W.5 admits the instantaneous explanation of A.1 and A.2 that the amount was received towards Flag Day Collection. IN any case PW.5 is not competent to speak on the purpose for which the amount was handed over to the accused as he had not accompanied the complainant either on 21st or 22nd June, 1993. P.W.5 at the most can be treated as a party of the raiding team and interested in the trap. 22. As already referred, the ruling of their Lordships of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of State of Tamil Nadu Vs. S.Krishnamoorthy has rendered the institutionalized practice of Flag Day collection as accepted one. In this case as well the deposition of P.W.10 proves that the accused had received the amount M.O.1 and M.O.2 only towards Flag Day Collection. D.E.8 and the deposition of P.W.11 clearly show that the accused were expected to collect funds for Flag Day for the period between 7.12.1992 to 6.12.1993. Admittedly a target of Rs.1,10,000/= had been fixed for collection towards Flag Day. DE.10 shows failure to collect this amount would result in disciplinary action by the Collector. PW.9 has testified that all the accused particularly A.2 are empowered to collect money to achieve the Flag Day target. P.W.9 has also stated that receipt books had not been supplied at the time of occurrence and that the Taluk Office had addressed a letter to the Collector (DE.11) for supply of receipt book. 23. Thus on an analysis of the oral and documentary evidence and instantaneous explanation, it is clear that the amount was intended only for flag day collection and presumption under Section 20 can be raised only if the prosecution had initially shown that the amount was towards illegal gratification. In the present case, the prosecution has neither considered the explanation of the accused nor that of the Head of the Office. It is settled law that where the accused gives a spontaneous explanation right at the moment the crime is committed the explanation becomes res gestae within the meaning of Section 6 of the Evidence Act. In the present case, the prosecution has neither considered the explanation of the accused nor that of the Head of the Office. It is settled law that where the accused gives a spontaneous explanation right at the moment the crime is committed the explanation becomes res gestae within the meaning of Section 6 of the Evidence Act. Even if such statement is of doubtful admissibility in a case of corruption because the investigation could be set to have started before the statement was made, it should be admissible especially when it is exculpatory statement as the conduct of the accused under Section 8 of the Evidence Act. P.W.5 has expressly admitted that A.1 and A.2 immediately explained MO.1 and MO.2 as having been received for flag day. This spontaneous reaction has been corroborated by the Head of the Office in his questioning under Section 313 Cr.P.C., But the prosecution has insidiously scuttled the evidence of the same by posthumously casting him as the third accused. This afterthought is clearly attested by the fact that A.3 had signed as witness and stood as surety for A.1 and A.2. 24. In the landmark judgment of Sitaram Vs. State of Rajasthan ( AIR 1975 SC 1432 ) the Apex Court held that mere recovery of money was not enough to entitle the drawing of presumption under Section 20 of the Prevention of Corruption Act. This principle was further reinforced by the same Supreme Court in the case of Surajmal Vs. State of Delhi ( AIR 1979 SC 1408 ) in which it held that mere recovery of money divorced from the circumstances under which it was paid was not sufficient when the substantive evidence in this case was not reliable to prove payments of prior demand to show that the accused voluntarily accepted the money as illegal gratification. In this case obviously the circumstances in which the money was paid clearly and directly contradict the prosecution's imputations. 25. Admittedly, there is an immediate explanation offered by the accused which is more probable than the allegations brought out in the evidence of the prosecution. Like every other criminal case, a case of bribery is subject to the rule that the accused is presumed innocent and that the burden to discharge the aid innocence is paramountly on the prosecution. 25. Admittedly, there is an immediate explanation offered by the accused which is more probable than the allegations brought out in the evidence of the prosecution. Like every other criminal case, a case of bribery is subject to the rule that the accused is presumed innocent and that the burden to discharge the aid innocence is paramountly on the prosecution. However strong the suspicion against the accused if every reasonable possibility of innocence has not been excluded, he is entitled to acquittal. Whenever circumstances arise, they must be proved and not by themselves presumed. If therefore the evidence regarding the demand and acceptance of bribe leaves room for doubt and does not displace the presence of innocence wholly, the charge cannot be said to have been established. The accused have discharged their burden by proving that the sum of Rs.1,000/= and Rs.3,000 were respectively collected only for the purpose of Flag Day Collection. 26. The learned Chief Judicial Magistrate has examined the depositions and appreciated their evidentiary value as mandated by several High Courts and Supreme Court. He has inter alia concluded that the prosecution has failed to establish demand and acceptance by the respondents on account of total absence of corroboration by P.W.4. He has found the explanation of the defence worthy of acceptance in relation to the receipt of money as towards Flag Day collection. It is thus palpable from the aforesaid submissions that the prosecution has failed miserably to establish the charge against the respondents/accused. The judgment of the trial court is neither perverse nor born out of anomalous appraisal of evidence. The conclusions have been drawn based on substantive evidence tendered before the trial court. 27. It is thus palpable from the aforesaid submissions that the prosecution has failed miserably to establish the charge against the respondents/accused. The judgment of the trial court is neither perverse nor born out of anomalous appraisal of evidence. The conclusions have been drawn based on substantive evidence tendered before the trial court. 27. Since the respondents having thoroughly discredited the prosecution's theory of demand and acceptance through the cross examinations of PW3 and PW.5 and the absence of corroboration for the testimony of PW.3, in relation to demand prior to 23.6.1993 and demand and acceptance on 23.6.1993; the respondents having proved the witnesses of the prosecution itself namely PW.2, PW.10, and PW.11, that the receipt of money was intended only for Flag Day collection; the prosecution having proceeded on the basis of a fabricated FIR and A.3 having roped in as such after 24.6.1993 without any legal basis whatsoever therefore, the evidence of PW5 autographing even the self contradictory testimony of PW.3 and consequently becoming unworthy of reliability or acceptance; the evidence of PW.2, Collector that failure to collect funds for flag day would result in disciplinary action; the instantaneous reply of the accused as to the nature of the amount received the ruling of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the case of State of T.N., Vs. S. Krishnamoorthy that an institutionalized practice of flag day collection cannot be rejected as illegal and in the case of T. Subramanian Vs. State of Tamil Nadu that mere receipt of money in the absence of proof of demand and acceptance of money as illegal gratification is not sufficient to establish the guilt of the accused, if the accused offers reasonable and probable explanation based on evidence, the accused would be entitled to acquittal, the conclusion of the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Chengalpattu acquitting the accused from the charges for the alleged offences under Sections 7 and 13(2) read with Section 13(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act does not call for any interference and therefore this Criminal Appeal is dismissed.