Judgment : K. CHANDRU, J. This is an appeal filed by the District Planning Officer, Dharmauri District and the Child Development Project Officer, Morappur, Dharmapuri District, against the order of the learned Judge dated 26.9.2005 in W.P.No. 31156 of 2005. 2. The respondent was working as an Anganwadi worker (Aaya) in Centre No. 14, Ambatapatti village, with effect from 1.11.1989 on a Non Standard Time Scale. On the basis of a complaint of dowry harassment, a First Information Report was registered against her for offences under, Section 498-A I.P.C. read with Section 312 I.P.C. and under Sections 3 and 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act and it is pending in Crime No. 2 of 2005 before the All Women Police Station, Arur Taluk, Dharmapuri District. She was also arrested and remanded to judicial custody on 10.1.2005 and subsequently enlarged on bail. 3. The second appellant suspended the respondent with effect from 10.1.2005, viz., the date on which she was remanded to judicial custody. It was stated that as she was kept in custody for over 48 hours after her arrest, the deemed order of suspension came to be passed. It was further stated that as she was a temporary worker, she will not be paid any Subsistence Allowance for the period of suspension. 4. The respondent filed W.P.No.31156 of 2005 challenging the said order of suspension stating that she is a widow and she has no other livelihood other than this employment. She had also stated that in spite of her appeal to the District Collector to revoke the order of suspension, the same was not done and she was not paid any Subsistence Allowance. 5. The learned Judge dismissed the writ petition on the ground that this Court will not interfere with the order of deemed suspension, which was passed based on the criminal case. At the same time, the learned Judge held that the respondent cannot be denied Subsistence Allowance and a direction was issued to the appellants to pay the Subsistence Allowance to the respondent/writ petitioner during the pendency of the order of suspension with effect from 10.1.2005. 6. At the same time, the learned Judge held that the respondent cannot be denied Subsistence Allowance and a direction was issued to the appellants to pay the Subsistence Allowance to the respondent/writ petitioner during the pendency of the order of suspension with effect from 10.1.2005. 6. Even though it was the contention of the appellants before us, which was also taken as ground No.6 in the Memorandum of Grounds of Appeal that the provisions and rules relating to regular employees including the provision as to payment of subsistence allowance are not applicable to the respondent, yet, it was argued before the learned Judge that the petitioner was suspended on the basis of the deemed suspension, which power is available only under Rule 17(e) of the Tamil Nadu Civil Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules. 7. We have heard the learned Government Pleader appearing for the appellants and have gone through the records and we do not find any merits in this appeal. 8. Learned Government Pleader appearing for the appellants submitted that the appellants are aggrieved against the direction issued by the learned Judge regarding payment of subsistence allowance and it was his contention that as the respondent was working as a temporary worker, she is not governed by any Rules and she is not eligible for the same. 9. We are afraid this contention is without any substance. It is well settled that if an employee, who is not governed by any Rules or terms of contract of employment but kept under suspension by the employer and if the terms of contract do not provide for temporary suspension, then the employer is bound to pay full wages to the workman. The Supreme Court vide its decision reported in Balvantrai Ratilal Patel v. State of Maharashtra , AIR 1968 SC 800 : 1968-II-LLJ-700 has held as follows : “The general principle therefore is that an employer can suspend an employee pending an inquiry into his misconduct and the only question that can arise in such suspension will relate to payment during the period of such suspension. If there is no express term relating to payment during such suspension or if there is no statutory provision in any enactment or rule the employee is entitled to his full remuneration for the period of his interim suspension. If there is no express term relating to payment during such suspension or if there is no statutory provision in any enactment or rule the employee is entitled to his full remuneration for the period of his interim suspension. On the other hand, if there is a term in this respect in the contract of employment or if there is a provision in the statute or the rules framed there under providing for the scale of payment during suspension the payment will be made in accordance therewith. This principle applies with equal force in a case where the Government is an employer and a public servant is an employee with this qualification that in view of the peculiar structural hierarchy of Government administration, the employer in the case of employment by Government must be held to be the authority which has the power to appoint the public servant concerned. It allows therefore that the authority entitled to appoint the pubic servant is entitled to suspend him pending a departmental enquiry into his conduct or pending a criminal proceeding, which may eventually result in a departmental enquiry against him. But what amount should be paid to the public servant during such suspension will depend upon the provisions of the statute or statutory rule in that connection. If there is such a provision the payment during suspension will be in accordance therewith. But if there is no such provision, the public servant will be entitled to his full emoluments during the period of suspension.” “Further, the same principle was reiterated by the Supreme Court vide its decision reported in V. P. Gidroniya v. State of Madhya Pradesh and Another V. P. Gidroniya v. State of Madhya Pradesh and Another V. P. Gidroniya v. State of Madhya Pradesh and Another , AIR 1970 SC 1494 : 1970-II-LLJ-143: (1970) 1 SCC 363. The relevant passage occurring in paragraph 8 (page 366) is usefully extracted: “It is equally well settled that an order of interim suspension can be passed against the employee while an enquiry is pending into his conduct even though there is no such term in the contract of employment or in the rules, but in such a case the employee would be entitled to his remuneration for the period of suspension if there is no statute or rule under which, it could be withheld.. The distinction between suspending the contract of a service of a servant and suspending him from performing the duties of his office on the basis that the contract is subsisting is important. The suspension in the latter case is always an implied term in every contract of service. When an employee is suspended in this sense, it means that the employer merely issues a direction to him that he should not do the service required of him during a particular period. In other words, the employer is regarded as issuing an order to the employee which because the contract is subsisting, the employee must obey.” 10. Therefore, in the light of the above principles, the appellants cannot shrink the responsibility of paying the subsistence allowance to the respondent as directed by the learned Judge. In any event, during the course of the argument, it was pointed out to the learned Government Pleader, the provisions of the Tamil Nadu Payment of Subsistence Allowance Act, (T.N. Act 43 of 1981) (in short, ‘the PSA Act‘), which provides for subsistence allowance at different rates depending upon the duration of the suspension pending enquiry. Section 2(c) of the PSA Act defines that the term ‘establishment‘ includes an ‘industry‘ which is further defined under Section 2(e) of the same Act. The term ‘industry‘ as per Section 2 (e) of the Act is the same as industry as defined under Section 2 (j) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. The activities in which the respondent was employed will undoubtedly come under the definition of ‘industry‘ within the meaning of Section 2(j) of the I.D. Act. 11. In fact, only by the invocation of the provisions of Section 3 of the Act, the appellants would be saved from paying full wages to the respondent as subsistence allowance because under that section, an employer is bound to pay only 50% of the wages as subsistence allowance for the initial period of 90 days. Thereafter, it is gradually increased depending on the prolongation of the enquiry. It was further pointed out that it is a mandatory provision of the Tamil Nadu Act 43 of 1981 and by applying the provisions of the Act, the State including the appellants are bound to save the States revenue. However, it is for the appellants to decide as to which rate of payment that they would avail themselves of. 12. It was further pointed out that it is a mandatory provision of the Tamil Nadu Act 43 of 1981 and by applying the provisions of the Act, the State including the appellants are bound to save the States revenue. However, it is for the appellants to decide as to which rate of payment that they would avail themselves of. 12. In the light of the above legal principles and the statutory enactment, there is no case for interfering with the direction issued by the learned Judge as the respondent is a widow and had suffered without any subsistence allowance being paid. Therefore, the appellants are directed to pay the subsistence allowance to the respondent within a period of four weeks from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. 13. The writ appeal will stand disposed of to the limited extent indicated above. However, there will be no order as to costs. Consequently, MP is closed.