Judgment Ajai Lamba, J. 1. This Civil Writ Petition has been instituted by the petitioner for issuance of a writ in the nature of cetiorari for quashing impugned order dated 7.9.2001 (Annexure P-4) has been rejected.... 2. The facts as pleaded by the petitioner are that the petitioner was appointed as a Special police Officer (hereinafter referred to as SPO) on 22.5.1992. The petitioner was implicated as an accused in criminal cases bearing F.I.R. No. 125 dated 19.6.1996 registered Under Section 399 Indian Penal Code, Police Station, Division No. 6 Ludhiana, and F.I.R. No. 127 dated 19.6.1996 registered Under Section 25 of the Indian Arms Act, Police Station, Division NO. 6, Ludhiana. It is the case of the petitioner that due to registration of criminal cases and due to facing of trial of the said cases he was not allowed to join duty although no departmental inquiry was pending or contemplated against him. It is further the case of the petitioner in the writ petition that no order of termination or dismissal was ever served upon him. 3. Trial of the cases registered vide F.I.R. 125 of 19,6.1996 and F.I.R. No. 127 dated 19.6.1996 was concluded and culminated to judgments of acquittal dated 3.10.2000 Having been acquitted, the petitioner made a request that he should be allowed to join duty. Neither the petitioner was allowed to join duty nor any decision was, taken on his representation. In these circumstances, the petitioner approached this Court by way of C.W.P. No. 6918 of 2001 praying that the respondents be directed to take a decision on the representation dated 4.12.2000. The matter was heard on 15.5.2001 whereupon, without going into the merits of the case the writ petition was disposed of with a direction to the Deputy Inspector General of Police, Ludhiana, Range, Ludhiana to consider and take action in accordance with law on the representation within a period of here months of the recipt of a copy of the said order. It was further clarified that if there was any other competent authority to take a decision in the matter, the Deputy Inspector General of police may refer the matter to that competent authority for the said purpose. 4. It was further clarified that if there was any other competent authority to take a decision in the matter, the Deputy Inspector General of police may refer the matter to that competent authority for the said purpose. 4. As a consequence of order dated 15.5.2001, passed by this Court in C.W.P. No. 6918 of 2001, the representation (Annexure p-4) has been rejected yide order impugned in this writ petition, which is dated 7.9.2001. The case of the petitioner is based on the Punjab Police, Rules, 1934 (hereinafter referred to as the Rules). The petitioner has pleaded that the impugned action is against the provisions contained in the Rules. 5. Notice of motion was issued and written statement has been filed on behalf of the respondents. In the written statement, it has been pleaded that order dated 4.7.1996 (Annexure R-1) had been passed vide which the petitioner and another SPO had been discharged from service w.e.f. 169.6.1996. It has further been stated in the written statement that the trial Court had acquitted the petitioner not on merits but only by giving him the benefit of doubt. The date of appointment of the petitioner as SPO has been disputed and it has been stated that he was appointed on 26.5.1992. It has further been stated that the petitioner was continuously absent from duty while posted in Police Station, Division No. 3, Ludhiana, w.e.f. 15.6.1996. A report of absence from duty was prepared by the then Station House Officer, Police Station, Division No. 3, Ludhians, which was sent to the Deputy Superintendent of Police (City) and it was the Deputy Superintendent of Police, who forwarded the report with a recommendation to dismiss the petitioner from service. On the said report, a decision was taken that the petitioner was not likely to prove a good and efficient police officer. It is the pleaded case of the respondents that involvement in criminal cases and absence from duty in a disciplined force like police cannot be accepted and therefore, while exercising authority under the Standing Order for Appointment of Special Police Officers dated 5.10.1990 (appended with written statement as Annexure R-2), the petitioner was discharged from service as it was concluded that he was not likely to prove a good and efficient police officer. 6. 6. It has further been pleaded that the representation of the petitioner was rejected and the stand of the respondents is legal in so much as the direction contained in the Standing Orders (Annexure R-2) clearly provides for discharge at any time without issuance of any notice in case the work and conduct of the SPO is not found to be satisfactory. 7. With regard to the repeated reference in the writ petition to the provisions of the Rules and the right of the petitioner in view thereof, it has been pleaded on behalf of the respondents that the appointment, service, discharge from service or promotion are governed solely by the Standing Orders dated 5.10.1990. It has been clarified that the Rules do not apply to the case of the petitioner particularly in view of the fact that the petitioner admits to his being appointed as a SPO. It is the pleaded case of the respondents that the SPOs are appointed on daily wages and, therefore, the rights as pleaded by the petitioner cannot be claimed. With regard to the discharge, it has been pleaded that the registration of FIRs is not the sole reason for taking a decision to discharge the petitioner from service. Rather, the circumstances emanating from two FIRs; one Under Section 399, Indian Penal Code and the other Under Section 25 of the Indian Arms Act, coupled with absence of the petitioner from duty w.e.f. 15.6.1996, were reasons for issuance of order (Annexure R-1). 8. Replication to the written statement has been filed by the petitioner. There is no specific denial to the pleaded facts in the written statement that the petitioner was discharged from service w.e.f. 19.6.1996 vide order dated 4.7.1996.(Annexure R-l). The factum of absence from duty has been denied. It has, however, been admitted that the petitioner was put behind bars due to implication in the aforesaid cases. With regard to the Standing Orders, which govern the services of SPOs, it has only been stated that the Standing Orders are contrary and in contravention of ratio of law and, therefore, have no significance. 9. I have heard the counsel for the parties and have gone through the pleadings with their assistance. 10. With regard to the Standing Orders, which govern the services of SPOs, it has only been stated that the Standing Orders are contrary and in contravention of ratio of law and, therefore, have no significance. 9. I have heard the counsel for the parties and have gone through the pleadings with their assistance. 10. The argument raised by the learned Counsel for the petitioner is that in view of Annexures P-2 and P-3 i.e. the judgments of acquittal in the two FIRs, which have been allowed to become final, the order of discharge should have been withdrawn. It has been argued that the discharge was only on account of pendency of the criminal cases, particularly because there is no mention of absence from duty in order of discharge dated 4.7.1996 (Annexure R-l). In the absence of inquiry and opportunity of hearing, order dated 4.7.1996 ordering discharge of the petitioner from service and order dated 7.9.2001 (Annexure P-6) vide which the representation of the petitioner has been rejected, are bad in law and, therefore, are liable to be quashed. To support the argument, learned Counsel for the petitioner has relied on the judgments in Ex.Const. Ram Niwas v. The State of Haryana and Ors. 1998(4) R.S.J. 36, Raj Kumar, Ex. Constable v. The State of Haryana and Ors. 1998(2) R.S.J. 780 and a judgment rendered by this Court in Civil Writ Petition No. 12077 of 1997 Rajesh Kumar v. State of Punjab and Ors. decided on 6.5.1999, appended with the petition as Annexure P-7. 11. The other argument raised on behalf of the petitioner is that as per the requirement Under Rules 12.21 and 16.2 of the Rules, the case of the petitioner could have been reconsidered. It has been argued on behalf of the petitioner that vide the impugned order, it has been observed by the concerned authority that the post of SPO which fell vacant cannot be filled and the matter could not be reconsidered. It has further been argued on behalf of the petitioner that Under Rule 12.21 of the Rules, a discharge for inefficiency could only be within three years of enrollment. In the case in hand, since the appointment of the petitioner is in May, 1992, whereas the order of discharge has been passed after 19.6.1996, it was not within the competence of the authority to have discharged the petitioner. In the case in hand, since the appointment of the petitioner is in May, 1992, whereas the order of discharge has been passed after 19.6.1996, it was not within the competence of the authority to have discharged the petitioner. The argument further is that in view of the language of Rule 12.21 as also the language of order dated 4.7.1996, it can safely be inferred that the order has been passed Under Rule 12.21 of the Rules. 12. The final argument raised on behalf of the petitioner is that in view of Rule 16.3 of the Rules, no order could be passed and departmental proceedings initiated after acquittal of the petitioner by the criminal court. 13. In reply to the arguments, learned Counsel for the respondents has drawn my attention to the judgments of acquittal (Annexures P-2 and P-3) and it has been highlighted that the petitioner was acquitted only because benefit of doubt was given to the accused in both the cases. Counsel for the respondents has further argued with vehemence that the petitioner was in a disciplined force viz. Police, and, therefore, the very fact that charge of preparation to commit dacoity i.e. Section 399, Indian Penal Code, against the petitioner and six of his co-accused, coupled with the other FIR under the Indian Arms Act, was in itself a grave and serious incident. It has further been argued on behalf of the respondents that order of discharge dated 4.7.1996 (Annexure R-l) is not confined to registration or pendency of the criminal cases. Rather, it is the considered opinion of the concerned officer that the petitioner is required to be discharged from service as he cannot prove to be an efficient police officer. The absence from duty w.e.f. 15.6.1996, coupled with criminal cases which were registered on 19.6.1996, were circumstances which warranted such action against the petitioner. The petitioner was simply discharged from service in view of the conclusion drawn by the authorities that he cannot prove to be an efficient police officer and the conclusion is not baseless and carries no stigma. 14. Counsel for the respondents further submitted that the petitioner cannot take refuge under the technicalities of rules 12.21, 16.2 and 16.3 of the Rules, for the simple reason that these rules are dehors the service conditions of the petitioner. 14. Counsel for the respondents further submitted that the petitioner cannot take refuge under the technicalities of rules 12.21, 16.2 and 16.3 of the Rules, for the simple reason that these rules are dehors the service conditions of the petitioner. Counsel for the respondents has highlighted paras 7, 9 and 10 of the Standing Orders under which the petitioner was appointed, to contend that the orders are legal and are not liable to be set aside. 15. Counsel for the respondents has further placed reliance on a judgment of the Hon ble Supreme Court in State of Punjab and Ors. v. Sukhwinder Singh, to contend that the order of discharge of a probationer cannot be treated as an order of punishment a0s the appointing authority has to necessarily ascertain all the relevant facts before taking a decision whether or not the probationer should be retained in service. 16. Having gone through the record and having considered the judgments relied upon by both the sides, I am of the considered opinion that no interference is called for in the action taken by the respondents. 17. Order of discharge dated 4.7.1996 has not been challenged. The same reads as under: The following SPOs are hereby discharged from service w.e.f. 19.6.1996, as they are not to prove an efficient Police Officer. Sr.No. Name of SPO 1. XX XX XX XX XX 2. SPO Darshan Lal No. 11 1/A. Sd/- Sr. Superintendent of Police, Ludhiana. No. 34686-92/OASI, dated 4.7.96. Copies to: 1. xx xx xx xx xx 2. xx xx xx xx xx 3. ...SPO Darshan Lal No. l1 l/A.-C/O Rl Police Lines, LDH to note for n/action Sd/- Sr. Superintendent of Police, Ludhiana. A specific reference to the "Standing Order for Appointment of Special Police Officers" also needs to be made. The portion relevant to consider the issues involved in this petition is reproduced hereunder: The State Government have approved the enlistment of 9160 S.P.Os - 5000 SPOs for raising five Auxiliary Battalions of one thousand S.P.Os each and 4160 SPOs for Special Police Pickets. To give them incentive and further induction as Constable, the following conditions governing their appointment and further avenues of promotion are given hereunder: XX XX XX XX XX XX XX XX XX XX XX XX (7) ALLOWANCES: The Special Police Officers shall be paid an allowance of Rs. To give them incentive and further induction as Constable, the following conditions governing their appointment and further avenues of promotion are given hereunder: XX XX XX XX XX XX XX XX XX XX XX XX (7) ALLOWANCES: The Special Police Officers shall be paid an allowance of Rs. 30/- per day or such rates as fixed by the Government. xx x xx xx xx xx xx xx xx xx xx xx (9) DISCHARGE OF INEFFICIENT SPECIAL POLICE OFFICERS: Special Police Officer whose work and conduct is not found satisfactory can be discharged any time by the District Senior Superintendent of Police without trie issue of any notice. (10) FURTHER AVENUES OF PROMOTION: The Special Police Officers will be eligible for recruitment as Constable after one year of service provided his work and conduct is found satisfactory by the District; Senior Superintendent of Police, The Officer Incharge, not below the rank of Sub-Inspector of Special Police, Officer shall send a six monthly report on the work and conduct of the Special Police Officer to the Senior Superintendent of Police. The District Senior Superintendent of Police will make selection out of the eligible Special Police Officers. After their selection as Constable, they shall be governed by the Punjab Police Rules. 18. It is not in dispute that the petitioner Was appointed as a SPO and, therefore, his services would be governed under the "Standing Order for Appointment of Special Police Officers", A perusal of para-7 of the Standing Orders clearly shows that a SPO is paid an allowance of Rs. 30/- per day or such rates as fixed by the Government. Under para-9, a SPO whose Work and conduct is not found satisfactory can be discharged any time by the District Senior Superintendent of Police without issuance of any notice Under para-10, it has been provided that after selection as Constable, the SPO shall be governed by the Punjab Police rules, 1934. Therefore, by implication, the services of the petitioner were not governed or controlled by the Rules. 19. The order of discharge from services does not indicate a particular instance or reason for which the order was passed. The work and conduct of the petitioner, therefore, was requierd to be monitored and the instances of involvement in criminal cases coupled with absence from duty having come to the notice of the respondents, the impugned action of discharge from service was taken. The work and conduct of the petitioner, therefore, was requierd to be monitored and the instances of involvement in criminal cases coupled with absence from duty having come to the notice of the respondents, the impugned action of discharge from service was taken. The argument of the petitioner to the effect that acquittal of the petitioner vide judgments of acquittal (Annexures P-2 and P-3), were sufficient causes for reinstatement of the petitioner, to my mind, is without Any basis. As per the facts emanating from the written statement, the factum of petitioner having absented was reported by the concerned Station House Officer to the Deputy Superintendent of Police, who recommended the impugned action against the petitioner to the Senior Superintendent of Police, whereupon order dated 4.7.1996 was passed. In my considered opinion under Para 7 of the Standing Orders the petitioner was only a daily wager. It was reasonable for the authorities to have taken the action, particularly in view of the fact that the petitioner was required to discharge his duties in a disciplined force viz. the police. In view of the Standing Orders, the Rules would have no application to the facts of the case. The arguments addressed on behalf of the petitioner to the effect that order of discharge could not have been passed Under Rule 12.21 of the Rules, or the case of the petitioner could have been reconsidered in accordance with Rule 16.2 of the Rules or even that Under Rule 16.3 of the Rules, no departmental proceedings could be undertaken after acquittal from a criminal court are dehors the present controversy. Counsel for the petitioner has not been able to point out any provision under the Standing Orders dated 5.10.1990 to indicate that the orders have been passed in violation of the Standing Orders. 20. With regard to the case law referred to by the counse for the petitioner suffice it to say that in the cases of Ex. Constable Ram Niwas (supra) and Raj Kumar (supra) this Court was considering the conditions of service/impugned orders in view of rule 12.21 of the Rules and, therefore, the judgments would have no application to the facts of the present case. The cases related to employess whose services were governed by the Rules. 21. Constable Ram Niwas (supra) and Raj Kumar (supra) this Court was considering the conditions of service/impugned orders in view of rule 12.21 of the Rules and, therefore, the judgments would have no application to the facts of the present case. The cases related to employess whose services were governed by the Rules. 21. With regard to the judgment rendered in Rakesh Kumars case (supra), I find that the Standing Orders were not brought to the notice of the Court. The contention on behalf of the petitioner in that case was that the order of discharge was puitive in nature and, therefore, it was the bounder duty of the respondents to act in accordance with the principles of natural justice before terminating his services. This Court came to the conclusion that "If the order passed by respondent No. 3 is read in conjunction with the recommendations made by the two official working under him, there is no escape from the conclusion that the petitioners services have been dispensed with as a measue of punishment and as no enquiry was held into these allegations, the impugned action is liable to be declared as nullity. In our considered view it was the bounder duty of respondent No. 3 to hold an enquiry in consonance with the basic principles of natural justice before he could terminate the petitioners services on the basis of allegations constituting serious mis-conduct". It has further been observed that "It is, thus, evident that the petitioner has been condemned unheard and on this ground alone the termination of his service is liable to be nullified. 22. From a reading of the judgment rendered in Rakesh Kumars case (snpra), it is clear that this Court having lifted the veil of innocuousness attached to the action taken by the employer, found as a matter of fact that it was a measure of punishment and a stigmatic order was involved. It is in this view of the matter that the writ petition was allowed. The judgment is, therefore, distinguishable on facts. 23. I am of the considered opinion that in case in hand, he authority had to take work from the employee and they are the best people to judge whether an employee should be continued in service and made permanent imployee or having regard to his performance, conduct and overall suitability for the job, discontinue the employment. 23. I am of the considered opinion that in case in hand, he authority had to take work from the employee and they are the best people to judge whether an employee should be continued in service and made permanent imployee or having regard to his performance, conduct and overall suitability for the job, discontinue the employment. A daily wager such as the petitioner is on thest and has no right to the post. A simple order of discharge has been passed without giving any reference to any particular incident of misconduct, etc. During the period when the petitioner was working as SPO, there was an opportunity available with the respondents to watch his work, ability, efficiency, sincerity and competence. If he was found suitable, the petitioner could have been made a Constable in terms of para-10 of the Standing Orders. However, since the petitioner has been found unsuitable, the respondents dispensed with his services while the petitioner was still a SPO. My above views find support from the judgment of the Hon ble Supreme Court in Sukhwinder Singhs case (supra). 24. In a latest pronouncement i.e. Abhijit Gupta v. S.N.B. National Centre, Basic Sciences and Ors., it has been held by the Hon ble Supreme Court that while the employee was on probation and the termination during the period was in the legitimate exercise of power of the employer and not stigmatic and punitive and, therefore, did not call for any interference. The Hon ble Supreme Court was dealing with a case wherein the order passed against the employee on probation was somewhat in the following terms: Your performance, ability and capability during the period of probation has been examined and your service during the period of probation is found to be unsatisfactory and hence you are considered unsuitable for the post you have. The governing body is of the view that your performance was unsatisfactory and you are not suitable for confirmation. This order was challenged on the ground that it was stigmatic and the termination was by way of punishment for the alleged misconduct. The learned Single Judge of the High Court allowed the writ petition and quashed the order of termination directing reinstatement of the appellant with ful| back wages. This order was challenged on the ground that it was stigmatic and the termination was by way of punishment for the alleged misconduct. The learned Single Judge of the High Court allowed the writ petition and quashed the order of termination directing reinstatement of the appellant with ful| back wages. The Division Bench of the High Court, however, allowed the Letters Patent Appeal and held that the order was not stigmatic and it was a legitimate exercise of assessment of probationers services by the employer and, therefore, there was no scope for judicial interference therewith. The order of the Division Bench came to be challenged before the Hon ble Supreme Court. A reference may be made to para 14, which reads as under: 14. The real test to be applied in a situation where an employee is removed by an innocuous order of termination is : Is he discharged as unsuitable or is he punished for his misconduct? In Allahabad Bank Officers Association and Anr. v. Allahabad Bank and Ors. this Court was considering a challenge to a compulsory retirement and formulated a practical test to answer the question posed above. This Court (vide para 17) observed that if the order of compulsory removal from the service casts a stigma in the sence that it contains a statement casting aspersion on his conduct or his character, then it can be treated as an order of punishment but not if it merely amounts to highlighting the unsuitability of the employee. As pointed out in this judgment, expressions like "want of application", "lack of potential" and "found not dependable" when made in relation to the work of the employee would not be sufficient to attract the charge that they are stigmatic and intended to dismiss the employee from service. The appeal was dismissed by the Hon ble Supreme Court and the order of termination was not interfered with. 25 Considering the language of the order of discharge from service in the present I case, it is a discharge simpliciter saying that the petitioner would not prove an efficient I police officer. It, therefore, cannot be called punitive or stigmatic in any respect. 26. Learned Counsel for the petitioner has also placed reliance no a judgment of the Hon ble Supreme Court reported in Anoop Jaiswal v. Govt. It, therefore, cannot be called punitive or stigmatic in any respect. 26. Learned Counsel for the petitioner has also placed reliance no a judgment of the Hon ble Supreme Court reported in Anoop Jaiswal v. Govt. of India and Anr., to contend that the order is merely a camouflage for an order of dismissal for misconduct and, therefore, the true character of the order ought to be considered. Learned Counsel for the petitioner has tried to develop the case that order dated 4.7.1996 was punitive and stigmatic in nature. 27. Order dated 4.7.1996 has not been challenged. I have already held that the said order cannot be considered as punitive or stigmatic. In this view of the matter, the judgment rendered in Anoop Jaiswals case (supra) would have no application to the facts of the present case. Rather, the case is squarely covered by the judgment in Abhijit Guptas case (supra). 28. Learned Counsel for the petitioner has also stated that the petitioner, by now, has become over-age being 36 years of age and is presently self-employed and, therefore, compassionate approach be adopted in the present case. I am, however, unable to accept this plea of compassion in the facts and circumstances of the case. 29. No other point has been raised. 30. Having considered the facts, circumstances and the law, the writ petition is without any merit and is dismissed. No costs.