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2006 DIGILAW 2096 (PNJ)

S. E. , Operation Circle, Hseb v. Charan Dass

2006-05-15

SURYA KANT

body2006
Judgment Surya Kant, J. 1. This regular second appeal has been filed by the defendant against whom a suit for declaration filed by the respondent-plaintiff to the effect that he was entitled for the benefit of his past service rendered from 1.10.1951 to 19.6.1959 towards the pensionary benefits, has been decreed by both the courts. 2. Briefly, the facts are that the respondent joined as LDC in the erstwhile Faridabad Development Board on 1.10.1951. He worked as such upto 19.6.1959 when the Board was wound up and merged with State electricity Board under the orders of the Govt. of India. The respondentplaintiff was accordingly absorbed in the Punjab State Electricity Board and upon reorganization of the States of Punjab and Haryana, he came to be allocated to the Haryana State Electricity Board. The plaintiff retired from service on attaining the age of superannuation on 31.3.1987. 3. On August 22, 1988, the State of Haryana issued a circular in terms whereof the benefit of past service rendered in a government department/agency/board could be computed towards retiral benefits in another government department/agency, etc. , subject to fulfilment of certain conditions. This circular was adopted by Haryana State Electricity Board on 11.9.1991. It is significant to note here that the benefit under the circular was expressly made admissible to all those employees "who were in service on 7.2.1986, irrespective of the date of their absorption". Undoubtedly, the respondent-plaintiff was in service as on 7.2.1987. He accordingly claimed benefit of service rendered by him in faridabad Development Board towards his retiral benefits. It was, however, denied to him on the ground that in terms of the government circular, as adopted by the HSEB, the respondent-plaintiff was required to exercise his option within one year and also to deposit the monetary benefits which he had received from the Faridabad Development Board and since both the conditions were not fulfilled by him, he could not avail the benefit of the circular in question. 4. This prompted the respondent-plaintiff to file the present suit which has been decreed by both the courts. The same contentions have been reiterated by Learned Counsel for the appellant. In addition, it is argued that the suit filed by the respondent-plaintiff on 23.8.1996, was hopelessly time barred. 4. This prompted the respondent-plaintiff to file the present suit which has been decreed by both the courts. The same contentions have been reiterated by Learned Counsel for the appellant. In addition, it is argued that the suit filed by the respondent-plaintiff on 23.8.1996, was hopelessly time barred. After hearing Learned Counsel for the parties and having gone through the judgments passed by the courts below as well as the circular in question, the photostat copy of which has been made available by Learned counsel for the appellant, I am of the view that no exception can be made to the view taken by the courts below. It is not denied that, by the time the government circular was adopted by the Haryana State Electricity Board on 11.9.1991, the plaintiff-respondent had retired from service. It is also not denied that no intimation regarding the circular and/or requirement of exercising option within one year, was ever communicated to the respondent. Similarly, he was never asked to deposit the monetary benefits drawn by him from the Faridabad Development Board. Had it been a case where an option was given to the respondent which he failed to avail of and/or refused to avail, the appellant would have been justified in attributing the non-fulfilment of requisite conditions contained in the circular on the part of the respondent. However, the appellant-authorities cannot take advantage of their own wrongs. 5. So far as the delay in filing the suit is concerned, it cannot be denied that the non-payment of revised pension, to which the respondent has been held entitled by the courts below, gives a recurring cause of action in his favour and as such the suit filed by him was not hit by any of the provisions of the Limitation Act. As far as delay is concerned, the courts below have already restricted the benefit admissible to the respondent only upto 38 months preceding the date of filing of the suit. 6. In view of the above stated discussions, it is apparent that no question, much less any substantial question of law, is involved in this appeal. Dismissed.