Judgment ( 1. ) DE-JURE by taking the shelter of the statutory umbrella of Section 24 of the Insecticides Act, 1968 (for bravity the Act) and particularly Sub-section (1) and Sub-section (4) and further placing reliance on the decision of the Apex Court State of Haryana v. Unique Farmaid Private Limited 2001 IAC 544 (SCI) 544, it has been contended learned senior counsel for the petitioners that the prosecution launched by respondent No. 1 under the said Act against the present petitioners is zero. ( 2. ) ACCORDING to prosecutions own showing, the sample of monocrotophos which is a pesticide was obtained by the Inspector appointed under the said Act on 28/7/1994. According to unamended Sub-section (1) of Section 24 of the said Act, the report of the sample is required to be delivered within 60 days by the analyst prescribed under the Act. As per the prosecutions own showing the test was completed by the analyst on 13/10/1994. The report was not delivered within 60 days from the date of collecting of the sample in terms of Sub-section (1) of Section 24 of the said Act. All these facts are undisputed. Thus, there is inherent lacuna in testing the sample and sending its report. Admittedly, the sample was not tested by the analyst appointed under the Act, within 60 days as envisaged under Section 24 (1) of the Act. ( 3. ) APART from this, the expiry date of bulk from which sample of pesticide was obtained, was April, 1995 and the pesticide was manufactured in November, 1993. As per the own showing of the prosecution, the complaint was filed before the competent Court on 20/3/1995. On going through the record, it is gathered that for the first time the Court fixed the date for appearance of accused on 3/5/1995 which would mean that after the expiry of the date of impugned pesticide. Learned Counsel for the parties after verifying the record of the trial Court submitted that for the first time the accused persons/petitioners appeared in the Court on 2/8/2001 which would mean that several years after the date of expiry of the sample of the pesticide. Under Sub-section (4) of Section 24 of the Act, the accused has a right to get the sample examined for test or analysis to the Laboratory. ( 4. ) DY. Under Sub-section (4) of Section 24 of the Act, the accused has a right to get the sample examined for test or analysis to the Laboratory. ( 4. ) DY. Director, Agriculture, on 14/12/1994 sent notice to the petitioner mentioning therein that the impugned sample of pesticide was found to be sub-standard and the said notice was received by the petitioner on 28/12/1994, However, they refuted the averments made in the notice and remain firm about the hallmark of their product i. e. Pesticide and requested that they would like to get it tested by the analyst prescribed under Section 24 (4) of the Act. It be seen that the reply which was sent by the petitioner was prior to the date of expiry of the impugned pesticide. But, they could not exercise their right under Section 24 (4) of the Act, since they appeared in the Court first time on 2/8/2001 and till then they were not at all served. On the basis of these admitted facts, the fate of this case is subjected to the decision of Unique Farmaid Private Limited (supra) in which the Supreme Court, after examining Section 24 of the Act and the mandate given therein, has held that if the accused person is summoned after the expiry date of the pesticide, he was deprived from exercising to get his sample examined by the analyst in accordance to Section 24 (4) of the Act. The decision of Unique Farmaid Private Limited (supra) is squarely applicable to the facts of this case also, since the date of expiry of the impugned pesticide was April, 1995 and the complaint was filed on 20/3/1995, but, for the first time the date of appearance of the accused persons was fixed by the trial Court on 3/5/1995 i. e. after the expiry of the impugned pesticide and the accused persons appeared for the first time in the Court on 2/8/2001. Earlier to this date they were never served, therefore, the view of this Court is that languishing the complaint and prosecuting the petitioners in a zero case would amount to abuse the powers of the law and Court. Thus, I have no option except to quash the complaint launched by respondent No. 1 under the said Act against the petitioners. ( 5. ) EX-CONSEQUENTI, this petition under Section 482, Cr. P. C. succeeds and is hereby allowed. Thus, I have no option except to quash the complaint launched by respondent No. 1 under the said Act against the petitioners. ( 5. ) EX-CONSEQUENTI, this petition under Section 482, Cr. P. C. succeeds and is hereby allowed. The prosecution of the petitioners under the said Act is hereby quashed.