JUDGMENT 1. - The present writ petition has been filed by Dr. Murli Dhar Upadhyaya challenging the order of penalty dated 30.6.1993, whereby he was removed from service. The petitioner died on 15.2.1998. His legal representatives were however allowed to substitute him as petitioners on their application. The petitioner was posted as Veterinary Assistant Surgeon at Panchayat Samiti, Sagwada, Distt. Udaipur. A charge-sheet under Rule 16 of the C.C.A. Rules was issued to him by the respondents on 25.6.1986. The charge against him was that he connived with Manager Central Co-operative Society, Loan Supervisor and other Officers in preparing forged purchase certificate and fitness certificates of the cattle thereby abused the office held by him and was negligent in discharge of his duties. Facts as stated in the statements of charge are that in a Camp organised at Village Chhota Diwda mid term loan of Rs. 2,65,100/- was sanctioned to 56 members of the society. Although the petitioner was not Member of the Purchase Committee but he signed purchase certificates and has also given fitness certificates of all the cattles and was responsible for their tagging and tattooing. Loan amount was in fact disbursed to nineteen persons only which was given to sellers instead of being given to buyers. In the circumstances, therefore, was no basis for the petitioner to sign purchase certificates and issue fitness certificates of the animals and showing their tagging and tattooing. 2. The petitioner filed reply to the charge sheet on 23.10.86 in which he denied the charges. In reply, he stated that he was no member of the Purchase Committee, therefore, there was no question of his making signature on any purchase certificate and he did not commit any forgery. There were only three members in the committee which were, B.D.O., representatives of Bank and the beneficiary member. Fitness certificates were issued by him in normal discharge of his duties, after satisfying himself about fitness of cattle. Such certificates were issued after deal was finalised by the Purchase Committee. He, therefore, stated that if as against 59 fitness certificates, loan amount was disbursed to only 19 persons; he cannot be held responsible for the same because disbursement of the loan was function of the purchase committee and it depended on the agreement arrived at between buyer and seller. He, therefore, stated that if as against 59 fitness certificates, loan amount was disbursed to only 19 persons; he cannot be held responsible for the same because disbursement of the loan was function of the purchase committee and it depended on the agreement arrived at between buyer and seller. This was within discretion of the Purchase Committee to sanction loan and if so, up to what extent and to distribute the same to sellers. If there had been any irregularity in disbursement of the loan, only Purchase Committee or its members could be held responsible for the same. 3. Apart from the petitioner, charge under Rule 16 of the CCA Rules was also issued to Shri Prem Sukh Somani who at the relevant time was working as BDO Panchayat Samiti, Sagwada and was member of the Purchase Committee. A similar charge against him was also framed. Joint enquiry was held against both the petitioner and Mr. P.S. Somani. As many as five witnesses were examined by the department in support of charges. The department also produced seven exhibits before the enquiry officer. Both the delinquent officers got examined themselves as witnesses in their defence but none of them produced any documents. 4. The enquiry officer submitted his report on 28.8.1990 in which lie recorded categorical finding that no purchase or sale of animals took place and entire exercise in getting fitness certificates issued and preparing other documents with regard to sale or purchase of the cattle was taken. He found charges proved against both the delinquent and particularly against : he petitioner and held that when no fair/camp was organised for sale or purchase of animals, papers prepared in relation thereto were forged. No seller would allow tagging or tattooing of his cattle without receiving any sale consideration. He therefore, concluded that whole exercise was made by the delinquent in connivance with the Manager of the Bank, who misappropriated money instead of disbursing the same amongst members. 5. On receipt of the enquiry report, the Government took a tentative decision to impose penalty of removal upon the petitioner from service. However, as per the requirement of proviso to Rule 16(10) of the Rajasthan Civil Services (C.C.A.) Rules, 1958 (for short "the CCA Rules"), the disciplinary authority vide its letter dated 17.1.1991 forwarded the record to Rajasthan Public Service Commission (for short "the R.P.S.C.) for their consultation. However, as per the requirement of proviso to Rule 16(10) of the Rajasthan Civil Services (C.C.A.) Rules, 1958 (for short "the CCA Rules"), the disciplinary authority vide its letter dated 17.1.1991 forwarded the record to Rajasthan Public Service Commission (for short "the R.P.S.C.) for their consultation. The RPSC after going through the facts and circumstances of the case, vide their letter dated 23.4.1991 advised removal of the petitioner from service. Meanwhile, the Hon'ble Supreme Court on 20.11.1990 delivered judgment in the case of U.O.I. v. Mohd. Ramzan Khan, 1991(1) SCC 588 wherein their Lordships while construing proviso (1) to Article 311 of the Constitution declared employee entitled to obtain a copy of the report submitted by the enquiry officer and to make a representation against it. It was held that non-furnishing of report to the delinquent officer would render the final order invalid. This rule however was held prospective. 6. The disciplinary authority vide its letter dated 10.7.1991 furnished a copy of enquiry report to the delinquent officers and gave them an opportunity to submit their representation. The petitioner submitted his representation on 12.8.1991. On receipt of representation, the disciplinary authority took a tentative decision to impose penalty of reduction to the lowest grade and forwarded the record again to the RPSC for their consultation. The RPSC upon reconsideration of the record and the facts of the case again vide order dated 19.2.1992 conveyed its advise to the Government that the RPSC does not consider it necessary to revise its well considered advise earlier given on 3.4.97 and reiterated the same: 7. Mr. R.N. Mathur, the learned counsel for the petitioner has argued that the evidence available on record especially statements of Shri Shiv Lal Divedi (PW 3), Shri Sunder Lal Ahlawat (PW 4) and Shri K.L. Kamal (PW 5) clearly show that the veterinary surgeon was not responsible to ensure whether sale of animal had actually taken place or not. As a matter of practice, the veterinary surgeon was required to examine the cattle either on sale or if a request is made by the parties at any stage even before. The petitioner issued certificate of such cattle when the cattle were brought before him and were actually subjected to medical examination. As a matter of practice, the veterinary surgeon was required to examine the cattle either on sale or if a request is made by the parties at any stage even before. The petitioner issued certificate of such cattle when the cattle were brought before him and were actually subjected to medical examination. Shri Mathur also argued that mere issuance of fitness certificate cannot be treated as recommendation for grant of loan, which decision was independently taken by the purchase committee. Since the petitioner was not member of such committee, the committee alone was responsible for verification of the factum of sale, examination of documents, sanction and disbursement of loan. Shri Mathur also argued that the petitioner cannot be held responsible for sanction of loan and no charge of misconduct has been proved against him. He argued that findings recorded by the Disciplinary Authority are at variance with those of the enquiry officer. The enquiry officer has held that fake fitness certificates were prepared for sale and/or purchase since no sale or purchase of cattle took place whereas the Disciplinary Authority in the impugned order has recorded a different finding in the impugned order has recorded a different finding to the effect that the petitioner was responsible for disbursement of loan as no camp for purchase or a sale of cattle was organised and that issuance of health certificate was a grave irregularity and further that if both the delinquent officers had acted carefully, the wrong could be avoided. Mr. Mathur also argued that there was no evidence on record to suggest that the petitioner had connived with the members of the Purchase Committee. He further argued that findings recorded by the Disciplinary Authority are based on no evidence and no reasonable person of ordinary prudence could arrive at such conclusion on the basis of material available on record. Lastly, Mr. Mathur, argued that the penalty of removal of service imposed upon the petitioner is certainly disproportionate to the gravity of alleged charge particularly when the disciplinary authority itself. Tentatively decided to impose penalty of reduction to lowest of pay scale and sent it to the RPSC for their consultation. The RPSC however, suggested removal of the petitioner from service. The Disciplinary Authority was not bound by the advise of the RPSC and could still impose lesser penalty it has suggested. Impugned order is, therefore, liable to be set aside. 8. The RPSC however, suggested removal of the petitioner from service. The Disciplinary Authority was not bound by the advise of the RPSC and could still impose lesser penalty it has suggested. Impugned order is, therefore, liable to be set aside. 8. In support of his arguments, Mr. R.N. Mathur relied upon the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Principal Secretary, Government of A.P. and Ann, v. M. Adinarayan, (2004) 12 SCC 579 wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as under : "The order of the Administrative Tribunal interfering with the well-considered order of TDP is unwarranted. APAT cannot sit as a court of appeal over a decision based on the finding of the enquiry authority in disciplinary proceedings. Where there is some relevant material which the disciplinary authority has accepted and which material reasonably supported the conclusion reached by the disciplinary authority, it is not the function of APAT to review the same and reach a different conclusion. So it is well settled that if the findings recorded by the tribunal or of the disciplinary authorities, are found to be perverse, which are not based on the legal evidence, then the Administrative Tribunal or the Court is empowered to treat such flaw as a legal flaw and quash the impugned action. In the instant case, the fact finding authority has based its findings on legally permissible substantive evidence. And, therefore, such a finding on fact based on substantive evidence is not permissible to be interfered with. In our opinion, the Administrative Tribunal cannot ignore the findings of the disciplinary authority or the tribunals. The truth or otherwise of the charge is a matter for the disciplinary authority to go into. The finding of the court or tribunal under judicial review which, in our opinion, cannot extend to the re-examination of all evidence to decide the correctness of the charge. In our view, the Administrative Tribunal cannot sit as a court of appeal over a decision based on the finding of the enquiry authority in disciplinary proceedings. This Court, time and again, categorically stated that court should not interfere with the quantum of punishment where there is some relevant which the disciplinary authority has accepted by the Disciplinary Tribunal. It is not the function of the Administrative Tribunal to review the same and reach a different finding than that of the disciplinary authority. 9. Mr. This Court, time and again, categorically stated that court should not interfere with the quantum of punishment where there is some relevant which the disciplinary authority has accepted by the Disciplinary Tribunal. It is not the function of the Administrative Tribunal to review the same and reach a different finding than that of the disciplinary authority. 9. Mr. Mathur, the learned counsel for the petitioner relied upon another judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Yoginath D. Bagde v. State of Maharashtra and Another, (1999) 7 SCC 739 wherein the Supreme Court in para 51 of the Judgment held as under:- "The law is well settled that if the findings are perverse and are not supported by evidence on record or the findings recorded at the domestic trial are such to which no reasonable person would have reached, it would be open to the High Court as also to this Court to interfere in the matter. In Kuldeep Singh v. Commr. of Police, this court relying upon the earlier decisions in Nand Kishore Prasad v. State of Bihar, State of Andhra Pradesh v. Rama Rao , Central Bank of India Ltd. v. Prakash Chand Jain , Bharat Iron Works v. Bhagubhai Balubhai Patel as also Rajinder Kumar Kindra v. Delhi Admn. laid down that although the court cannot sit in appeal over the findings recorded by the disciplinary authority or the enquiry officer in a departmental enquiry, it does not mean that in no circumstances officer can the court interfere. It was observed that the power of judicial review available to a High Court as also to this Court under the Constitution takes in its stride the domestic enquiry as well as the courts can interfere with the conclusions reached therein if there was no evidence to support the findings or the findings recorded were such as could not have been reached by an ordinary prudent man or the findings were perverse." 10. By citing these judgments, Mr. Mathur, argued that this Court in exercise of its power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, can interfere even in disciplinary matter if the findings recorded as perverse and not supported by any evidence or if the findings are such to which no reasonable person could have reached. 11. Mr. By citing these judgments, Mr. Mathur, argued that this Court in exercise of its power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, can interfere even in disciplinary matter if the findings recorded as perverse and not supported by any evidence or if the findings are such to which no reasonable person could have reached. 11. Mr. R.N. Mathur, learned counsel for the petitioner also cited the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Om Kumar and Ors. v. Union of India, (2001)2 SCC 386 wherein their Lordships while considering the question of quantum of punishment being disproportionate to the gravity of the charge held that proportionately of punishment can be examined on the well known Wednesbury's principle. Mr. Mathur, then cited the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of U.P. State Road Transport Corporation & Ors. v. Mahesh Kumar Mishra and Ors. (2000)3 SCC 450 wherein the respondent Mahesh Kumar was found guilty of carrying 11 passengers without ticket and the High Court held the punishment of dismissal awarded to him to be disproportionate to gravity of charge and substituted the same with reinstatement with 1/4th back wages for dismissal. The Supreme Court upheld the judgment of the High Court. He also placed reliance upon the judgment in the case of M.V. Bijlani v. Union of India, reported in J.T. 2006(4) page 469 wherein it was held that the finding of guilt against the delinquent in the disciplinary enquiry cannot be based on presumption, surmises and conjectures and a definite finding was required to be recorded. Mr. Mathur has further argued that the enquiry officer also relied upon statements of witnesses examined during preliminary enquiry even though neither the copy of such preliminary enquiry report nor copies of statement of these witnesses were supplied to the petitioner. Lastly, on the question of consultation with the R.P.S.C., Mr. Mathur relied upon the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Nagraj Shivarao Karjagi v. Syndicate Bank, Head Office, Manipal and anr., (1991)3 SCC 219 ] wherein on the question of consultation with Central Vigilance Commission in all matters having vigilance angle, it was held that advice tendered by the Commission was not binding on the Bank or punishing authority. 12. Per contra, Mr. 12. Per contra, Mr. H.V. Nandwana, the learned Deputy Government Advocate opposed the writ petition and argued that while the petitioner was posted as Veterinary Surgeon at Sagwada, he committed misconduct of issuance of purchase certificate and health certificate in respect of cattle which were never purchased and sold in the alleged camp and also in the records shown tagging and tattooing of such cattle done although in fact no cattle fair or camp was organized. He further argued that in the inquiry, it was found that on record a sum of Rs. 2,65,100/- was shown to have been disbursed as loan to as many as 52 members but in fact only a sum of Rs. 86,050/- was disbursed among only 19 members. He argued that entire transaction was fake and all the documents were forged and, therefore, charge sheet under Rule 16 of CCA Rules was served upon the petitioner. Report of the preliminary inquiry conducted by the Joint Registrar was made available to the petitioner and the same is the part of the record of inquiry and is marked as Exhibit P-7. The petitioner was provided with full opportunity of hearing to defend himself. The petitioner neither examined himself nor produced any other witness in support of his case, nor did he produce any other documentary evidence. Mr. Nandwana also argued that while the petitioner has filed copies of the statements of PW-4 and PW-5, there were three more witnesses PW-1, PW-2 and PW-3 and all these five witnesses were allowed to be cross-examined by the petitioner. The petitioner was also allowed to inspect relevant documents and lie himself gave in writing on 18.10.1986 that he did not require any further document for inspection, copy of which has been marked as Annexure R-3. 13. Mr. Nandwana also argued that penalty of removal from service was justified and commensurate to the gravity of misconduct committed by the petitioner. Findings recorded by the Inquiry Officer and the disciplinary authority are based on uncontroverted oral and documentary evidence. This being finding of fact, cannot be gone into by this Court in exercise of its power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The Inquiry Officer has rightly recorded the finding that the petitioner could not issue purchase certificate and health certificate in relation to non-existing tattles. This being finding of fact, cannot be gone into by this Court in exercise of its power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The Inquiry Officer has rightly recorded the finding that the petitioner could not issue purchase certificate and health certificate in relation to non-existing tattles. On the question of consultation with the R.P.S.C., he argued that the Government had taken a decision to consult the Commission before imposing penalty of removal from service and no fault can be found with such decision. He argued that penalty of removal was the only appropriate punishment commensurate with the gravity of charge proved. Mr. Nandwana also relied upon the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Damoh Parma Sagar Rural Regional Bank and Ann v. Munna Lai Jain, [(2005) 10 SCC 841 and argued on the basis of this authority that this court can interfere with the punishment only when it is so disproportionate as to shock its judicial conscience. Mr. Nandwana also relied upon the judgment in the case of State of Rajasthan and Anr. v. Mohd. Auub Naz, [ (2006)1 SCC 589 ] wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court has reiterated its view of the case of Om Kumar v. Union of India (supra) and held that in determining the quantum of punishment, role of administrative authority is primary and that of court is secondary only confined to see if discretion exercised by the administrative authority caused excessive infringement of rights. Mr. Nandwana placed reliance on the judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of High Court of Judicature at Bombay v. Shashi Kant S. Patil and Anr, AIR 2000 SC 22 wherein Hon'ble Supreme court held that if there is some legal evidence on which the findings can be based then adequacy and reliability of that evidence is not a matter for the High Court to examine. The High Court cannot hear the writ petition as though it were an appeal against the order of disciplinary authority. The High Court cannot hear the writ petition as though it were an appeal against the order of disciplinary authority. The relevant portion is extracted as under : "The Division Bench of the High Court seems to have approached the case as though it was an appeal against the order of administrative/ disciplinary authority of the High Court interference with the decision of departmental authorities can be permitted, while exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution if such authority had held proceedings in violation of the principles of natural justice or in violation of statutory regulations prescribing the mode of such inquiry or if the decision of the authority is vitiated by considerations extraneous to the evidence and merits of the case, or if the conclusion made by the authority, on the very face of it, is wholly arbitrary or capricious that no reasonable persons could have arrived at such a conclusion, or grounds very similar to the above. But we cannot overlook that the departmental authority (in this case the Disciplinary Committee of the High Court) is the sole judge of the facts, if the inquiry has been properly conducted. The settled legal position is that if there is some legal evidence on which the findings can be based, then adequacy or even reliability of that evidence is not a matter for canvassing before the High Court in a writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution. 14. I have given my thoughtful consideration to arguments advanced by both the learned counsel and perused the record of the case. Present one is a case where the charges against the petitioner are quite serious in nature and have been found to be substantiated on the basis of evidence by the Inquiry Officer. Charges against the petitioner are that he issued purchase certificates and health certificates in relation to the cattle and also on record showed tagging and tattooing of such cattle. Inquiry Officer has found that no such sale and purchase ever took place. Inquiry Officer also found that in fact, the alleged fair or camp wherein the sale or purchase allegedly took place was never organized. Inquiry Officer also recorded the finding that it was not conceivable that any seller would allow tagging and tattooing of his cattle even without receiving sale consideration. Inquiry Officer also found that in fact, the alleged fair or camp wherein the sale or purchase allegedly took place was never organized. Inquiry Officer also recorded the finding that it was not conceivable that any seller would allow tagging and tattooing of his cattle even without receiving sale consideration. Inquiry Officer also found that in the normal course, the buyer should have put his signatures in lieu of receipt of loan amount but an abnormal method was adopted in these transactions where sellers were made to sign or pour their thumb impressions on such receipts. On analyses of entire evidence, the Inquiry Officer found charges against the petitioner proved to the extent that when sale and purchase of cattle did not take place, issuance of health certificates in relation to such cattle, was fake and alleged tagging and tattooing of the cattle also never took place. When the camp or fair for sale or purchase of cattle was not organized, all subsequent proceedings in the name of such camp or fair were forged. In the case of overwhelming evidence on record, I am not persuaded to accept the argument made on behalf of the petitioner that evidence of prosecution witnesses did not bring home guilt of the petitioner or that it was a case of no evidence. 15. On the grievance raised by the petitioner regarding non-supply of copy of preliminary inquiry report and statement of witnesses examined during such inquiry, Mr. H.V. Nandwana argued that copy of preliminary inquiry report Ex. P/7 was given to the petitioner and that petitioner did not ask for any other document as would be evidence from his application dated 18.10.1986 (Annex. R/2) wherein he admitted that he had inspected all the documents and did not want to inspect any other record. In order to satisfy myself that the petitioner was afforded full opportunity to defend himself, I called for the original record of the proceedings of inquiry. Apart from the fact that vide Annexure R-2, the petitioner gave in writing to the Disciplinary Authority that he did not want to inspect any document, the proceedings of the inquiry dated 7.1.1988 also categorical state that list of documents was filed on that day and a copy of the same was delivered to each of the delinquent officers and they were also allowed to inspect the record. On the question of admission and denial of documents, the delinquent officers denied the documents and were allowed ten days time to file their list of documents. Neither record shows that the petitioner ever demanded and was not supplied copies of any other documents including those of the statements referred to in the preliminary inquiry report nor has the petitioner even now alleged before this Court in the writ petition that he ever asked for copies of any such documents and was denied the same. 16. In the facts of the present case, when apart from the statements of five witnesses, various documents have been exhibited by the prosecution to prove their case, it cannot be accepted that the findings recorded by the inquiry officer are solely based on the statements recorded in the preliminary inquiry report. Further argument advanced on behalf of the petitioner that he was not the member of the purchase committee and, therefore, had no role in disbursing amount of loan and further that he in his capacity as Veterinary Surgeon was duty bound to have medically examined the cattle brought before him and issue the health certificate also does not lend support to his case because the charge against the petitioner is not that he disbursed the loan. But the charge against the petitioner is not that he disbursed the loan. But the charge against the petitioner is that he in connivance with the Manager of the Bank and other employees issued fake purchase certificates and health certificates and this charge has been found proved against the petitioner. In the facts and circumstances of the case, the argument that he was not provided with the opportunity to properly defend himself also cannot be accepted. It is trite law that when there is some legal evidence which may reasonably support the findings recorded by the Inquiry Officer, then adequacy or reliability of evidence cannot be subject matter of examination by this Court. This court in exercise of its power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India cannot act as an appellate forum against the order of penalty. This court in exercise of its power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India cannot act as an appellate forum against the order of penalty. It can interfere with the decision of the disciplinary authority only if it finds that such authority has failed to observe the principle of natural justice or any statutory provisions prescribing the mode of such inquiry has been violated or the decision of the authority is vitiated by considerations extraneous to the evidence or the conclusions arrived at by such authority are so arbitrary that no reasonable person could have reached such conclusions. 17. Arguments with regard to non-supply of preliminary inquiry report and the statements recorded therein not only cannot be accepted on the ground that no such demand was ever made by the petitioner before the disciplinary authority or the inquiry officer nor has such assertion been made before this Court, but also for another reason, namely that no real prejudice was caused to the petitioner for non-supply of these documents. Reference in this connection may be made to the principles of law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Managing Director,. Food Corporation, Electronic Corporation of India v. B. Karunakar, 1992(1) SCC 709 , which have been reiterated by the Hon'ble Supreme Court also in subsequent other cases recent one being N.C.T. Limited v. Anjan K. Shah, 2004(7) SCC 588 and also in the case of Oriental Insurance Company v. S.S. Balakrishnan, 2003(2) SCC 734 . Even the non supply of the copy of the final inquiry report could not by itself afford the basis for quashing the dismissal order and directing reinstatement of dismissed employee. It has been held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Managing Director, Food Corporation, Electronic Corporation of India v. B. Karunakar (supra) whether or not any real prejudice was caused to the delinquent by non-supply of the inquiry report would have to be examined in each case on its own merits. In the absence of any real prejudice having been caused to the delinquent mere non-supply of inquiry report inflicting punishment was held to be non-fatal to the disciplinary proceedings. In the absence of any real prejudice having been caused to the delinquent mere non-supply of inquiry report inflicting punishment was held to be non-fatal to the disciplinary proceedings. In the present case, mere non-supply of the copy of the preliminary inquiry report and the statements referred therein, in my view, cannot be held to have caused any prejudice to the petitioner because the findings recorded by the inquiry officer and as adopted by the disciplinary authority are reasonably supported by other evidence available on record. 18. Argument of the petitioner that the penalty of removal is disproportionate to the gravity of the charges proved against him also cannot be sustained. The charge against petitioner is grave enough to in fact justify the penalty of removal. In the facts and circumstances of the present case, the penalty of removal inflicted upon the petitioner cannot be said to be so disproportionate as to shock the conscious of this Court. In this connection, I may usefully refer to the observations made by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Damoh Panna Sagar Rural Regional Bank & Ann v. Munna Lal Jain (supra) wherein it has been held that the Court would not go into the correctness of the choice made by the Administrator open to him and the Court should not substitute its decision for that of the Administrator. The scope of the judicial review is limited to the defect in decision making process and not the decision itself. The Court should not interfere with the Administrator's decision unless it is illogical or suffers from some procedural illegality or is shocking to the conscious of the Court in the sense that it is in defiance of logic or moral standards. 19. The last limb of the arguments made on behalf of the petitioner is that when the Government had proposed lesser punishment of reduction to lowest of grade, the R.P.S.C. was not justified in advising for imposition of penalty of removal from service and the Government was not bound to accept such advise rendered by the R.P.S.C. Therefore, the order of removal from service is liable to be quashed. I am not persuaded to accept this argument advanced on behalf of the petitioner either. I am not persuaded to accept this argument advanced on behalf of the petitioner either. Originally, when the record was forwarded by the Government to the R.P.S.C. for their advise it had taken a tentative decision to impose penalty of removal from service upon the petitioner and the R.P.S.C. had in their advise concurred with such penalty proposed by the Government. However, when the petitioner was supplied with the copy of inquiry report and made representation to the disciplinary authority, the matter was again sent to the R.P.S.C. This time, however, proposing the penalty of reduction to the lowest of the grade, the R.P.S.C. while rendering advice did not deem it appropriate to deviate from its earlier view and again advised to inflict penalty of removal from service upon the petitioner. It has in the letter of consultation dated 19.9.1992 categorically stated that "Commission does not feel any necessity to revise its earlier well considered advise tendered in the matter on 23.4.1991 and will reiterate the same." On the question of consultation with the R.P.S.C. Proviso to Rule 16(1) of the C.C.A. Rules categorically required the disciplinary authority that while passing the order imposing the penalty, it would take into consideration the advise given by the R.P.S.C. It cannot be said that under no circumstances, the Government would accept the advise given by the R.P.S.C. if it has in its advise a different penalty than the one proposed by the Government. In appropriate cases, it is always open to the disciplinary authority to accept the advise given by the R.P.S.C. even though the R.P.S.C. may advise to impose a higher penalty then the one suggested by it. In the present case, while earlier consulting the R.P.S.C., the Government itself had proposed the penalty of removal of the petitioner from service, which was concurred by the R.P.S.C. Upon re-examination of the matter, the R.P.S.C. reiterated the same view. The order of removal, therefore, does not suffer from any legal infirmity on account of any error in the process of consultation as required by proviso to Rule 16(10) of the C.C.A. Rules. 20. For the reasons aforesaid, the writ petition filed by the petitioner fails and the same is dismissed. 21. There is no order as to costs.Petition dismissed. *******