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2006 DIGILAW 2184 (MAD)

Melo Leather, by its Proprietor, S. Gunasekaran v. P. L. N. Natarajan

2006-08-29

S.K.KRISHNAN

body2006
Judgment :- 1. Aggrieved by the judgment and decree passed by the learned Subordinate Judge, Poonamallee in O.S. No. 34 of I989, dated 16.8.1990, the defendant has filed the above Appeal. 2. The averments made in the plaint are as follows: (i) The plaintiff is the owner of the `A' schedule property measuring to an extent of 25 cents in survey number 312/A/1, which is situated in Thiruneermalai Village, Saidapet Taluk. The plaintiff leased out a portion of the said property to the defendant under Ex.A-2 lease deed, dated 5.6.1986 for rent for a period of five years. The condition laid down in the deed for payment of rent is that the defendant has to pay Rs.2,000 p.m. and for the next two years Rs.2.500 p.m. and for the last one year Rs.3,000 p.m. Then condition laid down in para 3 of the said lease deed is that if the rent is not paid by the defendant for a continuous period of three months, the lessor is entitled to take the possession of the property from the defendant determining the tenancy and in such event, no notice of termination is necessary. Since, the defendant has to paid the agreed rent to the plaintiff for nearly 10 months, the plaintiff issued a notice under Ex. A-3 on 10.6.1988 stating that the defendant was in arrears for ten months and that the plaintiff as per the conditions laid down in para 3 of the lease deed determined the tenancy asking the defendant to vacate the premises and deliver the possession of the same. Thereafter, the defendant paid a sum of Rs.20,000 by way of cheques, however, all the cheques except one were dishonoured and hence the plaintiff insisted the defendant to pay the balance amount. Thereafter, the defendant paid the amount. Further, the defendant committed default in payment of rent to the plaintiff for the period from 1.8.1988 to 31.11.1988 and hence, the plaintiff again issued a rejoinder notice dated 20.12.1988 under Ex.A-5 asking the defendant to deliver the possession after vacating the same. Since the plaintiff determined the tenancy of the defendant by issuing a notice under Ex.A-3, dated 10.6.1988, the defendant is liable to pay damages of Rs.12,500 at the rate of Rs.2,500 p.m. from 1.7.1988 to 30.11.1988 and he is also liable to pay Rs.8,700 as damages for use and occupation from 1.12.1988 to 27.1.1989. Since the plaintiff determined the tenancy of the defendant by issuing a notice under Ex.A-3, dated 10.6.1988, the defendant is liable to pay damages of Rs.12,500 at the rate of Rs.2,500 p.m. from 1.7.1988 to 30.11.1988 and he is also liable to pay Rs.8,700 as damages for use and occupation from 1.12.1988 to 27.1.1989. Hence, the plaintiff filed the said Suit for the following relief’s: a. To direct the defendant to deliver vacant possession of the ‘B' schedule mentioned property. b. To direct the defendant to pay a sum of Rs.21,000 as past damages for use and occupation of the ‘B' schedule property. c. To pass a direction for an enquiry into the question of future mesne profits from the date of plaint till the date of recovery of possession of ‘B' schedule property. 3. Denying the averments made in the plaint, the defendant has filed the written statement, wherein, it is stated that the defendant never committed default in payment of rent in violation of the conditions laid down in Ex.A-2 lease deed, dated 5.6.1986. 4. After the conclusion of the trial, the learned Subordinate Judge on the basis of oral and documentary evidence decreed the suit in favour of the plaintiff. 5. Heard both sides. 6. The point that arises for deciding this Appeal is that whether the notice dated 20.12.1988 issued by the plaintiff to the defendant determining the tenancy is a valid one or not. 7. Whether the defendant is liable to deliver the property to the plaintiff on the basis of the determination of the tenancy. 8. It is an admitted fact that the plaintiff has executed a lease deed dated 5.6.1986 under Ex.A-2 agreeing to lease out the schedule mentioned property to the defendant for five years. 9. As per the conditions laid down in the said lease dead, the defendant has to pay a sum of Rs.48,000 for the period from 1.6.1986 to 31.5.1988. 10. It is an admitted fact that the defendant has not paid the rent for 10 months. On the date of issuance of notice under Ex.A-3, dated 10.6.1988, the defendant was in arrears of Rs.20,000/-. Since the defendant violated the conditions laid down in the lease deed, the plaintiff finding no other alternative issued a legal notice under Ex.A-3, dated 10.6.1988, wherein, the plaintiff determined the tenancy of the defendant. 11. On the date of issuance of notice under Ex.A-3, dated 10.6.1988, the defendant was in arrears of Rs.20,000/-. Since the defendant violated the conditions laid down in the lease deed, the plaintiff finding no other alternative issued a legal notice under Ex.A-3, dated 10.6.1988, wherein, the plaintiff determined the tenancy of the defendant. 11. A perusal of the notice issued by the plaintiff would clearly reveal that the plaintiff determined the tenancy of the defendant since the defendant committed default in payment of rent. 12. In the said notice it is stated as follows: "Therefore, my client has represented me to verify the 1st of you that my client had determined your tenancy by forfeiture and re-enter into the property and 1st of you are hereby called upon to deliver vacant possession of the demised premises forthwith and pay all arrears of rent for the said period failing which please take notice that my client will be come to forward to file a Suit for evicting you from the premises and for arrears of rent holding you liable for all the costs and consequence." 13. The above stated averments would clinchingly reveal the intention of the plaintiff that by way of issuing this notice, the plaintiff determined the tenancy as per the provision under Section 111(g) of the Transfer of Property Act. 14. It is also an admitted fact that after the said notice issued by the plaintiff, the defendant has come forward to issue two cheques to the plaintiff The cheques issued for Rs.15,000 were dishonoured. When the matter was informed, the defendant paid the amount. 15. The case of the defendant, as per the additional written statement filed by him, is that the said amount of Rs.15,000 was paid by him to the plaintiff to meet out the expenses towards putting up of new doors and windows in the existing suit shed. 16. In addition to that the defendant also claims that he has paid a sum of Rs.10,000 exclusively. 17. It is contended by the defendant that the said cheque for a sum of Rs.15,000 given by him has no relevancy or no connection with respect to arrears of the rent as alleged by the plaintiff out it was given to meet out the expenses in respect of putting up doors and windows in the existing suit shed. 18. 17. It is contended by the defendant that the said cheque for a sum of Rs.15,000 given by him has no relevancy or no connection with respect to arrears of the rent as alleged by the plaintiff out it was given to meet out the expenses in respect of putting up doors and windows in the existing suit shed. 18. As per the evidence adduced by the plaintiff that even after committing default in payment of arrears of rent, the defendant again committed default in payment of rent to the plaintiff. Therefore, the plaintiff issued another notice under Ex.A-5, dated 20.12.1988. 19. The learned counsel appearing for the appellant would submit that the notice issued by the plaintiff dated 20.12.1988 is not a valid one under law and therefore, the respondent/plaintiff cannot enforce any right asking the defendant to vacate from the demised premises. 20. In this regard, the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the respondent/plaintiff would vehemently contend that Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act is not at all relevant to the facts of the case for the reason that as the written agreement was executed between the parties, the provision under Section 106 of Transfer of Property Act is not at all relevant. 21. At this juncture, the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the respondent/plaintiff would submit that the very ingredients of Section 111(g) of the Transfer of Property Act referred to in Ex.A-2 lease deed and the same was referred to in the notice issued by the plaintiff to the defendants under Exs.A-3 and A-5. 22. In such circumstances, whatever the ingredients referred to in Section 106 of the T.P. Act is not at all applicable to the facts of this case and therefore, the learned counsel would submit that whatever the arguments advanced by the learned counsel for the appellant have to be rejected. 23. Further, the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the respondent/ plaintiff would submit that the filing of the Suit itself, after the expiry of the six months from the date of issuing of notice for termination, the respondent/plaintiff has exercised the provisions contained in Section 111(g) of the T.P. Act. Apart from this, it is pointed out that the period under Ex.A-2 was already over. Therefore, the appellant/defendant cannot exercise any right of holding over on the basis of Ex.A-2. 24. Apart from this, it is pointed out that the period under Ex.A-2 was already over. Therefore, the appellant/defendant cannot exercise any right of holding over on the basis of Ex.A-2. 24. At this juncture, it is pointed out that even though the respondent/ plaintiff accepted the arrears of rent paid subsequently, after the issuance of the said notice that acceptance would not create any new right to the appellant/defendant for holding over the tenancy. 25. In support of his contention, the learned counsel appearing for the appellant/defendant relied on the decisions: (a) Raghuram Rao and others v. Eric P. Mathias and others, AIR 2002 SC 797 . (b) S. Karuppan v. Rangaswami Naidu, 1974 TLNJ 197. 26. The decisions relied on by the appellant/defendant are not applicable to the case on hand for the reason that as alleged by the respondent/plaintiff that the case on hand is governed by the provisions under Section 111(g) of the Transfer of Property Act. 27. The learned Senior Counsel appeasing for the respondent/plaintiff would submit that mere acceptance of the rent for the subsequent months after the expiry of the lease would not give any right to the defendant to claim as a lessee within the meaning of Section 116 of the Transfer of the Property Act. 28. In support of his contention, the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the respondent/plaintiff relied on the following decisions: (a) Shanti Prasad and another v. Shankar Mahto and others, 2005 (3) CTC 550 : 2005 (5) SCC 543 . (b) Bhuneshwar Prasad and another v. United Commercial Bank and others, 2000 (7) SCC 232 . 29. As already discussed above, the learned counsel appearing for the appellant/defendant would submit that since the notices were issued by the plaintiff to the defendant under Exs.A-3 and A-5 were not legally sustainable and therefore, in such circumstances, the defendant is not liable to be evicted from the premises. 30. To sustain the case of the defendant, the learned counsel appearing for the appellant/defendant has not produced any valid materials. 31. As already discussed above, since the facts of the case is squarely governed by the provision under Section 111(g) of the T.P. Act the notice under Section 106 of the T.P. Act is unnecessary. Therefore, the contention raised by the learned counsel appearing for the appellant/defendant is not convincing and the same is not considered. 32. 31. As already discussed above, since the facts of the case is squarely governed by the provision under Section 111(g) of the T.P. Act the notice under Section 106 of the T.P. Act is unnecessary. Therefore, the contention raised by the learned counsel appearing for the appellant/defendant is not convincing and the same is not considered. 32. As far as the case stated by the respondent/plaintiff is concerned the said case is squarely coming under Section 111(g) of the T.P. Act and on that basis, the respondent/plaintiff issued legal notice determining the tenancy. 33. As already stated above, even in the lease deed the said provision is referred to and in such circumstances, the decision of the learned Subordinate Judge has to be confirmed. In such circumstances, no interference is warranted in this Appeal to decide the case against the respondent/plaintiff. 34. In result, the Appeal is dismissed confirming the judgment and decree of the learned Subordinate Judge. No costs.