Judgment :- This writ petition has been filed challenging the, order passed by the Principal Labour Court, Chennai dated 19.8.1996 in C.P.No.816 of 1994. 2. The case of the petitioner is that the first respondent was appointed as a senior marketing executive on probation, for 6 months on a basic pay of Rs.1200 and was later promoted as area coordinator (Marketing) from 7.4.1991 and later as assistant manager-marketing from 1.4.1992 on a basic pay of Rs.1650. On 20.9.1993, the first respondent tendered his resignation stating as follows: "As I got a better offer, I hereby submit my resignation: from the post of assistant manager marketing. I am ready to serve the notice period of thirty days and kindly relieve me on 19th of October 1993 and settle my dues at the earliest.” However, the first respondent did not attend office after 20.9.1993. Therefore, on the next day i.e., on 21.9.1993, the resignation of the first respondent was accepted and was relieved of his duty by letter dated 21.9.1993. Thereafter, in November 1994, the first respondent filed C.P.No.816 of 1994 under Sec.33(c)(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 stating that he is a workman doing clerical work and that he has resigned and that his wages for August and September 1993 together with other benefits were not paid to him inspire of repeated personal-requests to the petitioner. Therefore, in the claim petition, a sum of Rs.33,833 was claimed, by the first respondent. 3. The writ petitioner/management filed a counter statement denying the claim of the first respondent. It was contended that since the first respondent was working as an assistant marketing manager, he falls under the mana­gerial category and therefore, he cannot be treated as a workman as contemplated under Sec.2(s) of the Industrial Disputes Act. Before the Labour Court, the writ petitioner has denied all the claims made in the claim petition, including the computation of wages, bonus, etc. No notice was served on the writ petitioner before the claim petition was filed. The monetary benefits claimed in the petition were disputed as being illegal, wrong and fabricated with an intention to make wrongful gain against the writ petitioner. 4. No notice was served on the writ petitioner before the claim petition was filed. The monetary benefits claimed in the petition were disputed as being illegal, wrong and fabricated with an intention to make wrongful gain against the writ petitioner. 4. The Labour Court proceeded to adjudicate the case based on the oral and documentary evidence available before it, in particular, the evidence of the first respondent and the representative of the writ petitioner "and came to conclusion that the first respondent did not have the power to grant leave, operate the bank account, take disciplinary action or participate in board meetings and take policy decisions as per the evidence of the respondent in the claim petition. The Labour Court concluded that though the first respondent was appointed as a senior marketing executive, he did not work as a senior marketing, executive. The Labour Court rejected the writ petitioner's contention that the petition under Sec.33(c)(2) is not maintainable. The Labour Court, therefore, proceeded to determine the amount payable as claimed by the first respondent at Rs.4000 as wages for the month of August and Rs.3000 from 1st of September to 21st of September. The Labour Court also proceeded to grant other reliefs claimed in the petition towards earned leave, bonus, and conveyance allowance. In all, a sum of Rs.31,133 has been determined as due and payable to the first respondent and the petitioner was directed to deposit the said amount. As against the order, the writ petition has been filed. 5. The contention of the counsel for the petitioner is that the second respondent/Labour Court failed to take into consideration that it had no jurisdiction to entertain the petition un­der Sec.33(c)(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act without there being an adjudication of the dis­pute relating to the first respondent's claim. Ac­cording to the learned counsel, the petition filed under Sec.33(c)(2) is not maintainable in law and is without jurisdiction. The counsel for the petitioner would also contend that appointment order of first respondent will show that he does not fall under the definition of 'workmen' as contemplated under Sec.2(s) of the Act. Learned counsel for the petitioner would draw the attention of the Court to the appointment order dated 30.3.1991, where first respondent has been clearly designated as senior marketing executive (II) (a) grade with basic salary Rs.1180 together with house rent allowance and medical benefits. Learned counsel for the petitioner would draw the attention of the Court to the appointment order dated 30.3.1991, where first respondent has been clearly designated as senior marketing executive (II) (a) grade with basic salary Rs.1180 together with house rent allowance and medical benefits. From 1.4.1991, first respondent's salary was revised and his basic was fixed at Rs.1260 H.R.A. at Rs.375 L.T.A. at Rs.105 Conveyance at Rs.540, Telephone once again, on 5th September 1991, of the first respondent has been revised to Rs.2060 consolidated. Further, in the petition filed by the first respondent, before the Labour Court, he has claimed a sum of Rs.4000 as wages for the month of August and a sum of Rs.3000 for the month of September 1993. Therefore, the counsel for the petitioner would contend that in terms of the definition under Sec. 2(s) of the Act, the first respondent cannot claim to be a workmen. In any event, by nature of his duties and reason of his managerial nature of occupation, he cannot be termed as a workmen. 6. The counsel for the petitioner submitted the following judgments in support of the contention that unless and until the claim of the workmen is adjudicated as provided under the Act, the application under Sec.33 (c)(2) will not be maintainable. Learned counsel relied on the Following judgments in support of her case: State of U.P and another v. Brijpal Singh, (2005) 5 C.T.C. 45; Union of India v. Babu Lal (1998) 1 L.L.J 787 ; Municipal Corporation v. Ganesh Razak and another, (1995) 1 L.L.J.395 (S.C.); Laxmikant Pranshanker Shukla v. Chief Executive, Lalbhai Group, Rural Development Fund, Ahmedabad, (1999) 2 L.L.J.55; Searsole Chemicals Limited v. H.C.Shah, Indian Inhabitant of Bombay and others, (1995) 3 L.L.J (Suppl.) 584. 7. In Union of India v. Babu Lal, (1998) 1 L.L.J 787 , it has been held as follows: “It is alleged in these petitions that the Pre­siding Officers have very limited jurisdiction under Sec.33(c)(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act. The Presiding Officers could not have arrogated to themselves the functions of the Industrial Tribunal in a reference under Sec. 10 by the proceeding to determine the workmen's right instead of computing the claims under the valid order of the compe­tent authority. The Presiding Officers could not have arrogated to themselves the functions of the Industrial Tribunal in a reference under Sec. 10 by the proceeding to determine the workmen's right instead of computing the claims under the valid order of the compe­tent authority. It was argued that there has been no adjudication or recognition of the claims of the workmen, therefore, the Labour Court in these proceedings under Sec.33(c)(2) of the Act, could not have de­ creed their claims. (ii) In Central Bank of India Limited v. PS. Rajagopalan, (1963) 2 L.L.J 89 , the Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court clearly pointed out that the sole purpose of Sec.33(c)(2) is the implementation or execution of the award and that the power of the Labour Court in a proceeding under Sec.33(c)(2) being akin to that of the Executing Court, the Labour Court would be within its rights to interpret the award or settlement on which a workman bases his claim under Sec.33(c)(2) like the power of the Executing Court to interpret the decree for the purpose of execution, To the same effect is the judgment of the Supreme Court in Bombay Gas Company Limited v. Gopal Bhiva, (1963) 2 L.L.J 608 . That the right to the, benefit which is sought to be computed under Sec.33(c)(2) must be one al­ ready adjudicated upon or provided for and that, while acting under the provision, the Labour Court cannot arrogate itself the func­tions of adjudication of the dispute relating to the claim, was made further clear by, the Apex Court in Chief Mining Engineer, East India Coal Company Limited v. Rameshwar, A.I.R. 1968 S.C. 218 and Central Inland Water Transport Corpo­ration Limited v. Workmen, (1974) 3 S.C.C. 696. (iii) Admittedly, in these petitions the claims of the workmen, who were daily rated/casual workmen, to be paid wages at the same rate as the regular workers had not been earlier settled by adjudication or recognized by the employers and the claims were disputed. Since the claims in these petitions were disputed, therefore, there could be no occasion for computation of the benefit under Sec.33(c)(2) and consequently the applications preferred by the workman under Sec.33(c)(2) of the Act were not maintainable." 8. Since the claims in these petitions were disputed, therefore, there could be no occasion for computation of the benefit under Sec.33(c)(2) and consequently the applications preferred by the workman under Sec.33(c)(2) of the Act were not maintainable." 8. In Laxmikant Pranshanker Shukla v. Chief Executive, Lalbhai Group Rural De­velopment Fund, Ahmedabad, (1999) 2 L.L.J 55, it has been held as follows: 'Unless the rights of the parties are crystallized in the form of an award or or­der, no application under Sec.33(c)(2) would lie as they are in the nature of execution proceedings. For the, reliance was placed on decisions of M/s. Punjab Beverages Private Limited, Chandigarh v. Suresh Chand and another, (1978) 2 L.L.J.1 (S.C.) and Full Bench decision of this Court in Nizammuddin Suleman v. New Shorrock Spinning and Manufacturing Mills Company Limited, Nadiad, 20 G.L.R. 290. In the above cases it was held that an application under Sec.33(c)(2) would lie only after the rights of the parties are crystallized. In the instant case, an action was taken against the appellant but the said action was not challenged by taking any pro­ceeding and the said action was not declared illegal or bad in law and directly an applica­tion under Sec.33(c)(2) was filed. Such ap­plication was, therefore, not maintainable." 9. In the instant case, the Labour Court has proceed to adjudicate the petition filed under Sec.33 (c) (2) in spite of the fact that the management has disputed the fact that the first respondent is not a workmen, but a senior marketing executive and would no fall under the definition of Sec.2(s) of the Act. When the petitioner has categorically disputed this fact, the Labour Court ought not to have proceeded to adjudicate the petition under Sec.33(c)(2). Even as per the claim petition and the letter of appointment, it is clear that the first respondent cannot claim to be a workmen as contemplated under Sec.2(s) of the Act. The order of the Labour Court passed under Sec.33(c)(2) is without jurisdiction as no award has been passed in favour of the first respondent is not crystallized and therefore, the claim petition under Sec.33(c)(2) is premature and not sustainable in law. The writ petitioner has also challenged this issue in the counter filed be fore the Labour Court, which has been casually rejected. 10. The writ petitioner has also challenged this issue in the counter filed be fore the Labour Court, which has been casually rejected. 10. In view of the fact, that the claim petition has been filed under Sec.33(c)(2) even before adjudication of the issue as to whether the first respondent is a workmen or not and whether by the nature of his appointment, the first re­spondent will be entitled to claim the right as workmen as-defined under Sec.2(s), the order of the second respondent has to be set aside as without jurisdiction. In the result the order impugned is set aside. The writ petition is allowed. No costs.