ORDER The petitioner has challenged the rejection of the reference by the Labour Court, Chickmagalur (hereinafter referred to as 'the Labour Court' for brevity) on several grounds. 2. The facts are as follows.- The petitioner was appointed as a driver by the respondent on a temporary basis with effect from 10-5-1985 and his services were continued on the same status without interruption upto 31-5-1990. Without there being any justifying reasons, it is the petitioner's case, that he was terminated from service with effect from 1-6-1990. It is contended by him that he has put in a continuous service of four years and therefore the petitioner satisfied the concept of Section 25-B of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act' for brevity) and the act of the respondent was in violation of Section 25-F of the Act in having illegality terminated his services without notice, and it amounts to illegal retrenchment under Section 2(oo) of the Act. The petitioner being aggrieved by the said action of the respondent, had raised an industrial dispute. The dispute was adjudicated and the Labour Court has passed an award on 24-7-1999, setting aside the order of termination and directing reinstatement of the petitioner with 50% back wages. The legality of that award came to be challenged by the respondent in W.P. No. 8016 of 2000 and the petitioner had also filed a writ petition in W.P. No. 3995 of 2000 seeking a direction for implementation of the award. These two petitions were disposed of by this Court by a common order on 20-7-2000, whereby the award was quashed and the matter was remanded to the Labour Court with a direction to dispose of the matter afresh, after giving opportunity to both the parties to adduce evidence. On remand, the Labour Court held that the petitioner has continuously worked from 10-5-1985 to 24-7-1989. However, the Labour Court has rejected the reference by an order dated 20-11-2000 on the ground that the respondent had no authority to appoint the petitioner on daily wage basis under the provisions of the Karnataka Urban Development Authorities Act, 1987 (hereinafter referred to as the 'the KUDA Act' for brevity) and further, that the claim of the workman was a stale claim and in view of two Division Bench judgments of this Court, a stale claim could not have been entertained. It is this which is under challenge. It is this which is under challenge. 3. Sri S.B. Mukkannappa, appearing for the petitioner, would contend, that there is a finding of fact that the petitioner had worked from 10-5-1985 to 24-7-1989 and this having been found, the petitioner could not have been denied the benefit of reinstatement, as the action of the respondent was in violation of Section 25-F of the Act and in the face of it, the award has to be set aside on this ground. Insofar as the Labour Court having held that the appointment made by the Chairman of the City Improvement Trust Board, Hassan ('CITB' for short) being in violation of Section 52 of the KUDA Act is concerned, he would submit that the adjudication under Section 10(1)(c) of the Act was in respect of matters enumerated in the Second Schedule to the Act and the Labour Court would have jurisdiction in respect of such subject-matters falling within the items enumerated therein and the question whether the validity of the appointment order said to have been issued by the Chairman of the CITB being in violation of the provisions of Section 52 of the KUDA Act, was without the jurisdiction of the Labour Court and in any event, the order of appointment, which is marked as Ex. M. 5 before the Labour Court and the order of termination, which is marked as Ex. W. 4, that it would be outside the jurisdiction of the Labour Court. Secondly, he would submit that insofar as the question of delay is concerned, the Labour Court having rejected the reference on the ground that a stale claim could not be entertained, the Supreme Court in the case of Uttar Pradesh State Electricity Board v. Rajesh Kumar, has laid down that there is no period of limitation prescribed for the purposes of making reference. The facts and circumstances of each case has to be considered in dealing with stale claims and in respect of the relief sought to be granted and the question of delay is not raised for the first time before the Labour Court at a point when reference is made. It would be futile to raise this contention at a later point of time and even if there was such a delay, it would be open for the Labour Court to mould the relief to meet the contention as regards the delay. It would be futile to raise this contention at a later point of time and even if there was such a delay, it would be open for the Labour Court to mould the relief to meet the contention as regards the delay. Further, he would point out that by virtue of the remand of the matter to the Labour Court by this Court by its order dated 20-7-2000, the scope of the order of remand was limited as could be seen from the body of that order and the question of delay was not one of the issues on which the matter was remanded and hence, the award requires to be interfered with in the writ jurisdiction of this Court. 4. Per contra, Sri S. Rangaswamy, appearing for M/s. Rangaswamy and Associates, would submit, that on the face of it, the order of appointment is issued by the Chairman of the CITB. The order does not indicate that there is approval by the Board in the Chairman issuing the order of appointment. The Chairman would not have the power to issue such an order of appointment and by virtue of Section 52 of the KUDA Act, there is no scheme approved by the Government in making appointment on daily wage or temporary basis and hence, the order of appointment is a nullity on the face of it and this has been found by the Labour Court without entering upon an adjudication in this regard as the statutory provisions would override the unilateral acts of any statutory' authorities and the Labour Court was well-within its jurisdiction in considering whether the order of appointment was a nullity and the Labour Court having found as a fact that the order of appointment was in violation of Section 52 of the KUDA Act, there was no illegality in the award. Secondly, that the reference has been made after a lapse of nine years, is not in serious dispute and having regard to the law laid down by the judgments of the Division Bench of this Court cited by the Labour Court, the claim has to be held as a stale claim and could not have the entertained. Secondly, that the reference has been made after a lapse of nine years, is not in serious dispute and having regard to the law laid down by the judgments of the Division Bench of this Court cited by the Labour Court, the claim has to be held as a stale claim and could not have the entertained. In this regard, the contention as regards the delay was raised by the respondent in the first instance in the earlier round of litigation and the same having been rejected as being barred by delay and laches, the respondent was not precluded from raising the ground of delay and laches. Hence, on these two contentions, the award of the Labour Court was valid and proper. Insofar as the question whether the workman had worked continuously for 240 days is concerned, the onus of establishing this fact was on the workman as held by the Supreme Court in the case of Manager, Reserve Bank of India, Bangalore v. S. Mani and Others, wherein the Supreme Court has laid down that initially the burden would be on the workman to establish that he has worked continuously for 240 days and in the instant case, there is no other material produced by the petitioner before the Labour Court and even if the contentions on which the reference has been rejected has• to be held invalid, in the absence of material on record to indicate that the petitioner, had worked continuously for 240 days, it would be a futile exercise to permit the petitioner to urge the fact that he had worked continuously for 240 days. 5. On these rival contentions, the finding of the Labour Court that the reference was bad on account of reference being filed, as being opposed to Section 52 of the KUDA Act is concerned, as pointed out by the Counsel for the petitioner, the jurisdiction of the Labour Court would be restricted to the subject-matters enumerated in the Second Schedule to the Industrial Disputes Act. Insofar as the document at Ex. M. 5 which is said to be their appointment order is concerned, the same being silent as to the same not having been approved by the Board is concerned is an internal affair as between the Board and its members and the Chairman. Insofar as the document at Ex. M. 5 which is said to be their appointment order is concerned, the same being silent as to the same not having been approved by the Board is concerned is an internal affair as between the Board and its members and the Chairman. If the Chairman had purportedly acted on his own without the authority of the Board, it is a matter between the Board and the Chairman and the same cannot be held against the petitioner nor would the Labour Court have the jurisdiction to decide as to the validity of the said document being opposed to Section 52 of the KUDA Act. Further, the order of termination, which has been produced at the time of hearing of this petition, makes reference to the order of appointment by the former CITB vide its order No. CIB/CR.18/85-86, dated 12-6-1985, which presupposes that the order of appointment is by the CITB. Therefore, the Labour Court was without jurisdiction in having found that the order of appointment was invalid for being in violation of Section 52 of the KUDA Act. It is a matter which ought to be adjudicated before the appropriate forum insofar as the appointment order being an invalidity. The second presumption that would arise, notwithstanding that the said order of appointment is invalid and illegal is that, the order of appointment is dated 10-5-1985 and the order of termination is dated 1-6-1990, which by itself forecloses the contention that the petitioner had been working continuously for 240 days. These documents, read together, would straightaway give rise to a presumption that the petitioner had worked during the said period between the dates of the respective documents and therefore, on the first issue, the Labour Court was without jurisdiction in propounding on the validity or otherwise of the order of appointment and therefore holding that the order of reference was incompetent. Insofar as the second contention as regards the claim being a stale claim is concerned, in my opinion, the claim becoming a stale claim, would depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case. The reference having been made at a particular point of time, was not to be held against the petitioner. Insofar as the second contention as regards the claim being a stale claim is concerned, in my opinion, the claim becoming a stale claim, would depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case. The reference having been made at a particular point of time, was not to be held against the petitioner. The reference is made by the Government and any delay in making such a reference ought to be objected to by the management in the first instance before the Labour Court and it was for the Labour Court to then consider the same as to the propriety of entertaining such a claim. In the present case on hand, it is seen that the earlier petition to this Court was without reference to any such contention as regards the delay, which presupposes that there was no serious protest as regards the claim having become a stale claim and therefore, having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case, the Labour Court was in error in holding that the claim was a stale claim and therefore, could not be entertained, by reference to the decided cases referred to, which were rendered in different facts and circumstances. As regards delay, Sri S.B. Mukkannappa, has relied upon the case of Uttar Pradesh Electricity Board, wherein it has been held that when the order of reference has not been challenged by a party, the question of delay and laches could not be raised before a higher forum. In any event, he would further submit, that the provisions of the Limitation Act, 1963 would not apply to the proceedings under the Industrial Disputes Act. The question of delay and laches will have to be considered only with regard to the question whether the dispute survives for consideration or whether it is liable for rejection, due to laches by efflux of time. Therefore, it could not be said that there was any delay in prosecuting the claim on the part of the petitioner. The delay, if any, was on the part of the Government in making the reference. 6. Therefore, I have no hesitation in holding that the• Labour Court was in error in rejecting the reference. 7. Hence, the petition is allowed. The impugned award is quashed. The respondent is directed to reinstate the workman without any back wages.