Judgment : Per M. CHOCKALINGAM, J. 1. Seeking to quash an order of the first respondent passed on 19.6.2006 terming the detenu Kesavan as a “Black-Marketeer”, the petitioner the wife on the detenu, has brought forth this petition for a writ of habeas corpus. 2. The Court heard the learned Counsel for the petitioner who elaborately put forth the contentions. The order under challenge is also looked into. 3. As could be seen from the order, the detenu is a license holder for the distribution of kerosene supplied at 50 litres per day; but, on 18.3.2006, he was found in possession of 700 litres of Public Distribution System Kerosene. Then, a case came to be registered against him. Within a short span of three months, he was found in possession of 1840 litres of PDS kerosene on 13.6.2006, and the second case came to be registered. On the recommendation made by the sponsoring authority, the first respondent, the District Collector and District Magistrate, Tuticorin District, passed an order of detention terming him as a Black Marketeer. 4. The order under challenge is assailed by the petitioner on the following grounds : (i) There was a delay noticed. A representation was made by the detenu on 4.7.2006. The remarks were called for on 7.7.2006, and they were received only on 13.7.2006. Thus, there was a delay of 5 intervening days. Subsequently, it has reached the Under Secretary on 14.7.2006, and it reached the hands of the Deputy Secretary on 17.7.2006, and in between this, there was a delay of 3 days noticed. Thus, the delay of five days at the first spell and three days at the second spell remained unexplained. Hence, it is fatal to the order impugned. (ii) The remand report which was made before the Judicial Magistrate concerned, was not placed by the sponsoring authority before the detaining authority. Had it been placed, a copy of the same would have been served on the detenu, enabling him to make the representation effectively, but not done so. (iii) On 19.6.2006, the impugned order was passed by the detaining authority, the first respondent. From the perusal of the papers, it could be seen that an amended order was passed by the authority on 26.6.2006. (iii) On 19.6.2006, the impugned order was passed by the detaining authority, the first respondent. From the perusal of the papers, it could be seen that an amended order was passed by the authority on 26.6.2006. A perusal of the amended order would clearly show that it was not a mistake that has crept in, and at four points, the amendments of the Sections have been made. Thus, it would be indicative of the fact that when the order came to be passed by the detaining authority on 19.6.2006, there was no application of mind. Had he applied his mind, such an order could not have been passed on 19.6.2006. (iv) Apart from the above, so far as the amended order is concerned, the same was not placed before the Government at all. An order approving the detention order, is passed by the Government on 29.6.2006. A perusal of the same does not indicate that the amended order dated 26.6.2006 was placed before the Government. Thus, what was approved by the Government was the original order; but, the amended order did not reach the Government at all. Under the circumstances, it has got to be set aside. 5. The Court heard the learned Additional Public Prosecutor on the above contentions. 6. After careful consideration of the rival submissions made, this Court is of the considered opinion that it is a fit case where the order of the detaining authority has got to be set aside. So far as the first contention that there was a delay, the Court is unable to agree with the petitioners case. Between 7.7.2006 and 13.7.2006, there were intervening holidays on 8.7.2006 and 9.7.2006, and thus, there was a delay of 3 days. On the second spell also, there was a delay of 3 days This, in the opinion of the Court, was not a delay. 7. Insofar as the second contention that the remand report was not placed by the sponsoring authority before the detaining authority, and had it been placed, a copy of the same would have been served on the detenu, and effective representation could have been made, the same cannot be a ground to set aside the order since the remand report was placed before the Judicial Magistrate for the purpose of passing the judicial remand. Under the circumstances, this Court is of the opinion that it cannot be a ground in favour of the petitioner. 8. As regards as other two contentions, the Court has to necessarily agree with the petitioners Counsel. As could be seen from the available materials, originally an order was passed on 19.6.2006, which was served on the detenu. He made a representation, and it was pending consideration with the Government. The order of detention was approved by the Government on 29.6.2006. Pending consideration of the first order passed on 19.6.2006, an amended order came to be passed on 26.6.2006. It is a matter of shock and surprise to note that the amended order passed on 26.6.2006, was never paled before the Government by the detaining authority. So far as the amended order is concerned, it is pertinent to point out that the approval of the first order dated 19.6.2006 was made by the Government on 29.6.2006. Thus, what has been now approved by the State is the order dated 19.6.2006 and not the amended order. That apart, whenever an order is passed by the detaining authority like this, time stipulation will be available for making the representation, and the detenu must be put on notice that he is having 12 days time, within which he could make the representation, if he so desires. In the instance case, it is available in the order dated 19.6.2006, but not in the amended order. Thus, it was not made known to the detenu that after amending the order, he is also having sufficient time to make his representation. Thus, the order lacks legally in all respects as mentioned above. In such circumstances, the Court has no hesitation to set aside the order. 9. In the result, this habeas corpus petition is allowed setting aside the order of the first respondent. The detenu is directed to be set at liberty forthwith unless his presence is required in any other case.