JUDGMENT Per V. RAMASUBRAMANIAN, J. The appellants, who are husband and wife respectively, have filed the present appeal challenging the order of dismissal of their writ petition. 2. The case of the appellants in the writ petition was as follows: - a) The first appellant was a tenant under the second respondent in respect of the land of an extent of about 52 grounds out of the total extent of about 3.27 acres in Survey Nos.411/2 and 411/3 in Zamin Pallavaram Village at No.110, GST Road, Chrompet, Chennai-44. b) The appellants entered into written agreements of sale dated 15.7.1996 with the second respondent, for purchasing the said land for a consideration of Rs.2 lakhs per ground and also paid an advance of Rs. 6 lakhs to the second respondent. c) The second respondent executed 9 sale deeds on various dates in favour of the appellants, but before all the agreements of sale were enforced fully, the Government initiated proposals for acquisition of a portion of the land, for the purpose of forming an ‘InnerRing Road’ and a ‘Flyover’. d) Instead of following the circuitous route of issuing notices, calling for objections and passing orders, the acquiring authorities negotiated with the second respondent for determining the amount of compensation payable. e) On coming to know of the same, the appellants filed W.P.No.5723 of 2003 praying for the issue of a Writ of Mandamus directing the respondents 1 and 3 herein (who were also respondents 1 and 3 in the said writ petition) not to interfere with the appellants’ possession of the aforesaid property otherwise than in accordance with law. f) when the said writ petition was taken up for hearing, it was agreed that a direction to the first respondent herein to consider the representation of the appellants dated 1.2.2003 and to pass appropriate orders within a time frame would be sufficient. Accordingly, by an order dated 22.8.2003, the said writ petition was disposed of with a direction to the first respondent herein to consider the representation of the appellants dated 1.2.2003 and pass appropriate orders within six weeks. g) In pursuance of the said order, the first respondent conducted an enquiry and passed an order dated 22.10.2003, holding (a) that the claim of the appellants for the entire extent of land in Survey Nos. g) In pursuance of the said order, the first respondent conducted an enquiry and passed an order dated 22.10.2003, holding (a) that the claim of the appellants for the entire extent of land in Survey Nos. 411/2 and 411/3 was unsustainable; (b) that apart from the lands sold to the appellants under the registered sale deeds, the remaining lands are in possession of the second respondent as seen from the revenue records; (c) that the lands acquired through negotiation by the Special Tahsildar (LA) Highways, Chennai-25 under the sale deeds dated 6.11.2001 and 15.3.2002 from the second respondent, do not form part of the lands purchased by the appellants from the second respondent; and (d) that therefore the claim of the appellants for the apportionment of compensation was unsustainable. h) Aggrieved by the said order dated 22.10.2003 of the first respondent herein, the appellants filed W.P.No.35967 of 2003 praying for quashing the order dated 22.10.2003 and for a direction to the third respondent to proceed with the land acquisition in accordance with law. i) The learned Judge dismissed the writ petition on the ground that the appellants were not entitled to challenge the order of the first respondent inasmuch as they themselves invited such an order from the first respondent by seeking a direction in their earlier writ petition to direct the first respondent to consider their representation and to pass orders. It is against the said order that the appellants have filed the above appeal. 3. We have heard Mr.AR.L. Sundaresan, learned senior counsel appearing for the appellants and Mr.A.Arumugham, learned Additional Government Pleader appearing for the first and third respondents and Mr.N. Damodaran, learned counsel appearing for the second respondent. 4. It is seen from the pleadings of the contesting parties that the second respondent was the original owner of the entire extent of land in question and that one ‘Jaya Timber Depot’, of which the appellants are partners, was a tenant. The said partnership firm ‘Jaya Timber Depot’ along with others, entered into several agreements on 15.7.1996 with the second respondent herein for the purchase of a portion of the larger extent of land and in pursuance of the said agreements of sale, 9 sale deeds were also executed by the second respondent herein. 5. The said partnership firm ‘Jaya Timber Depot’ along with others, entered into several agreements on 15.7.1996 with the second respondent herein for the purchase of a portion of the larger extent of land and in pursuance of the said agreements of sale, 9 sale deeds were also executed by the second respondent herein. 5. Admittedly, a portion of the larger extent of land was sought to be acquired by the Government under the Tamil Nadu Highways Act, 2001 (Tamil Nadu Act 34 of 2002), for the purpose of formation of an ‘Inner-Ring Road’ and the construction of a ‘Flyover’ in GST Road, Chrompet, Chennai-44. The Special Tahsildar (LA) Highways, Chennai-25, appears to have negotiated with the second respondent for the fixation of compensation and it is at this stage that the appellants came to this Court, not really opposing the acquisition but actually claiming a right to receive part of the compensation. 6. In the process, three disputed questions of fact arose viz., (a) whether the appellants are tenants in respect of the portion of the land sought to be acquired? (b) whether the appellants are agreement holders in respect of the portion of the land sought to be acquired? and (c) whether the appellants are in possession of the land sought to be acquired? An answer to these three basic questions became necessary, in order to find out whether the appellants have a right to seek apportionment of the compensation. 7. It is true that in pursuance of the order passed in the earlier writ petition, the first respondent decided the above three questions of fact in favour of the second respondent. This is why the learned Judge dismissed the writ petition on the ground that the appellants are not entitled to assail the order of the first respondent, as the said order was passed in accordance with the directions issued by this Court at the instance of the appellants. 8. But in our considered view, the appellants cannot be non-suited on the said ground. In the earlier writ petition in W.P.No. 5723 of 2003, the appellants merely restricted their prayer to a direction to the first respondent to consider their representation and pass orders. It was not conceded by the appellants that the first respondent could decide the above three disputed questions of fact by himself. In the earlier writ petition in W.P.No. 5723 of 2003, the appellants merely restricted their prayer to a direction to the first respondent to consider their representation and pass orders. It was not conceded by the appellants that the first respondent could decide the above three disputed questions of fact by himself. What was actually expected of the first respondent was to act in accordance with the provisions of the Tamil Nadu Highways Act, 2001, Section 21 of which reads as follows: ""21. Apportionment.-(1) Where several persons claim to be interested in the amount determined, the Collector shall determine the persons, who, in his opinion, are entitled to receive the amount and the amount payable to each of them. (2) When the amount has been determined under Section 19, if any dispute arises as to the apportionment of the same or any part thereof, or as to the persons to whom the same or any part thereof is payable, the Collector may refer such dispute for the decision of the Court.‘‘ 9. If the first respondent had chosen to refer the dispute between the appellants and the second respondent for the decision of the Court, as contemplated under Section 21 (2) of the said Act, in pursuance of the order passed in the earlier writ petition, then the appellants would not have had any grievance. But instead of adopting such a course prescribed by the Statute, the first respondent chose to decide the disputed questions of fact by himself and hence, it cannot be said that the appellants are not entitled to assail the order of the first respondent. 10. Mr.N. Damodaran, learned counsel appearing for the second respondent, invited our attention to Section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 and contended that a mere agreement of sale will not create any interest in immovable property in favour of the agreement holder and that therefore on the basis of a mere agreement of sale, the appellants are not entitled to have their dispute referred to the Court. The learned counsel relied upon the decisions of this Court in M. P. Kanoi and 4 Others v. Mr. Palani, Proprietor, M. P. Builders 2001 (3) CTC 452 , Ramani U. Krishnan v. Dr.Ammini Praveen Joshua @ Veena 2005 (4) CTC 165 and Govindaswami Pillai v. Manoranjitham Ammal and another 1998 (3) CTC 200 . 11. The learned counsel relied upon the decisions of this Court in M. P. Kanoi and 4 Others v. Mr. Palani, Proprietor, M. P. Builders 2001 (3) CTC 452 , Ramani U. Krishnan v. Dr.Ammini Praveen Joshua @ Veena 2005 (4) CTC 165 and Govindaswami Pillai v. Manoranjitham Ammal and another 1998 (3) CTC 200 . 11. There is no quarrel with the proposition that a mere agreement holder cannot claim any interest in the property covered by the agreement, as the agreement does not create any interest or charge on such property. 12. But the appellants herein do not claim to be mere agreement holders. They claim to be tenants in possession of the property, who have subsequently entered into agreements for the purpose of the property. They also claim that they have effected improvements to the property. These claims may or may not be true, but nevertheless the appellants have made such claims. Under such circumstances, Section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act will not come to the rescue of the second respondent. 13. Moreover, Section 21 (2) of the Tamil Nadu Highways Act, 2001 does not prescribe as to who would be entitled to a claim for compensation and who would not be entitled for compensation. All that Section 21 (2) requires is that if there was any dispute as to the apportionment of the compensation or any part thereof or as to the persons to whom the same or any part thereof is payable, the Collector may refer such dispute for the decision of the Court. Therefore, in our considered view, the District Collector is not obliged to go into the niceties of the rights conferred by the Transfer of Property Act, merely to refer a dispute for the decision of the Court. 14. Mr.N.Damodaran, learned counsel appearing for the second respondent also contended that in any case, it is a partnership firm by name “Jaya Timber Depot”, who was admittedly the tenant and that since the said firm has not approached either the Collector or this Court, the appellants are not entitled to seek any relief on the basis of the tenancy rights. Though we find some force in the said contention, we are unable to reject the claim of the appellants on that basis, since the appellants are admittedly the partners of the said firm. Though we find some force in the said contention, we are unable to reject the claim of the appellants on that basis, since the appellants are admittedly the partners of the said firm. Unlike a body corporate having common seal and perpetual succession, a partnership firm is not distinct from the persons constituting the firm. Therefore, the appellants in our view are entitled at least to seek a reference of the dispute under Section 21 (2) of the said Act. 15. Lastly, it was brought to our notice that by an order dated 18.10.2004 passed in WAMP No.6830 of 2004, 60% of the compensation amount as determined by the Acquiring Authorities, was disbursed to the second respondent and the remaining 40% was deposited with the Indian Bank, High Court Extension Counter. By a further order dated 13.6.2005 passed in WAMP No.6830 of 2004, the Indian Bank, High Court Extension Counter, was directed to keep the fixed deposit initially for a period of two years and directed to renew the same periodically till the disposal of the writ appeal. 16. Under such circumstances, we are of the view that the proper course of action to be followed in this case is to direct the first respondent to refer the dispute relating to apportionment of compensation to the appropriate Court under Section 21(2) of the Tamil Nadu Highways Act, 2001 and to keep the fixed deposit renewed from time to time till a final decision is rendered by the appropriate Court. 17. Accordingly, the writ appeal is disposed of with the following directions: a) The first respondent is directed to refer the dispute between the appellants and the second respondent to the appropriate Court under Section 21(2) of the Tamil Nadu Highways Act, 2001, within a period of four weeks from the date of receipt/production of a copy of this order. b) The reference so made by the first respondent shall also include the very basic question viz., whether the appellants are entitled to any such apportionment at all? c) Upon such reference by the first respondent, the appropriate Court may decide the dispute as expeditiously as possible, preferably within a period of six months from the date of reference, after affording all opportunities to the appellants and the second respondent to adduce oral and documentary evidence. c) Upon such reference by the first respondent, the appropriate Court may decide the dispute as expeditiously as possible, preferably within a period of six months from the date of reference, after affording all opportunities to the appellants and the second respondent to adduce oral and documentary evidence. d) The amount now lying in fixed deposit with the Indian Bank, High Court Extension Counter shall stand renewed from time to time till a final decision is arrived at by the Civil Court in the reference made to it by the first respondent and the said amount with the interest accrued thereon shall be disbursed in accordance with the final decision rendered by the Court. 18. The writ appeal is disposed of on the above terms. No costs. Consequently, connected WAMP is closed.