A. K. GANGULY, J. ( 1 ) THIS appeal has been filed challenging a Judgment and order dated 9th July, 2004 passed by a learned Judge of the Writ court dismissing therein a writ petition which challenged an acquisition proceeding. The short facts of the case are that on or about 18th September, 1987 an order was passed under section 3 (1} of West bengal Land (Requisition and Acquisition) Act, 1948 (hereinafter called the said Act of 1948 ). An area of 1. 42 acres in plot Nos. 518 and 546/ 2456 in Mouja Kamgachi has been requisitioned by the appropriate authority. This was requisitioned for the purpose of maintaining supplies and services essential to the community, namely water supply scheme of Kamgachi. Thereafter the said requisition proceeding was converted into an acquisition proceeding under the provisions of the said Act of 1948. The appellant/petitioner claims to be the owner of a portion of the said land which was acquircd in the aforesaid proceeding. ( 2 ) ADMITTEDLY, the possession pursuant to the initial requisition proceeding was taken in September, 1987 and in 1991 the appellant/ petitioner filed a suit for declaration and mandatory injunction in Title suit No. 160 of 1991. In the said suit an ex pane decree was passed declaring that the acquisition proceeding being L. A. Case No. l (g)/85-86 was void, illegal and not binding upon the plaintiff and the defendants were directed by an order of mandatory injunction to dismantle the structure on the suit land within two months. In the writ petition, which has been filed prayers have virtually been made for execution of the said decree. The learned Judge in the Judgment under appeal, has set out various prayers, made in the writ petition and held that prayers a (iv) and (vi) cannot be granted and various other prayers also cannot be granted as the Writ Court cannot execute a decree passed by a Civil Court. ( 3 ) WHEN the matter was heard before us, the learned counsel for the appellant/petitioner argued that the instant case was initially started as a requisition proceeding under the said Act of 1948. ( 3 ) WHEN the matter was heard before us, the learned counsel for the appellant/petitioner argued that the instant case was initially started as a requisition proceeding under the said Act of 1948. lie further submitted that in all cases of requisition under section 3 (2) of the said Act, service of the order of requisition is a must and the learned counsel also submitted that no service has been effected on him and the order of requisition on the basis of which possession was taken in 1987 is illegal. In support of his cotention the learned counsel relied on two Judgments of Calcutta High Court in the ease of Tarak Nath Sen v. First Land Acquisition Collector and Ors. and also on another Judgment rendered in the case of Syed Faieyab Ali Meerza v. The Union of India and ors. Relying on these two Judgments the learned counsel submitted that in both the Judgments it has been held that service is a mandatory statutory requirement under section 3 (2) of the Act and in this case, service having not been effected the entire requisition proceeding is bad. Since the initial proceeding for requisition is bad. the subsequent acquisition cannot be sustained. This Court finds that the said case was a new case which was sought to be made out for the first time before this Court. This Court wanted the learned counsel for the writ petitioner to point out whether any such case was made out in the writ petition. The learned counsel did not succeed in showing before the Court that any such averment was at all made in the writ petition which was filed and out of which the present appeal arises. On the other hand, from the averment made in paragraphs 2 and 3 of the writ petition this Court finds that the averment made therein are totally vague. In those paragraphs there is no averment about non-service of the notice of requisition. Nor was it disclosed when the petitioner purchased the property. There is also no averment whether the name of the petitioner has been muttated or not. ( 4 ) THIS Court is of the opinion that service of notice is always a question of fact. In those paragraphs there is no averment about non-service of the notice of requisition. Nor was it disclosed when the petitioner purchased the property. There is also no averment whether the name of the petitioner has been muttated or not. ( 4 ) THIS Court is of the opinion that service of notice is always a question of fact. Therefore, unless proper factual averments have been made alleging non-service, this Court does not feel inclined to investigate that aspect of the matter and admittedly on the question of service no grievance was placed before the First Court. Therefore, the ratio in the two cases referred to above is hardly applicable to the facts of the present case. ( 5 ) NOW the question arises whether a suit is at all maintainable challenging an acquisition proceeding In our view, there is a clear bar under section 11 of the said Act of 1948 for filing of such a suit. The provisions of section 11 are set out below. "save as otherwise expressly provided in this Act, no decision or order made in exercise of any power conferred by or under this Act shall be called in question in any Court. " ( 6 ) THE expression "court" has been has defined under section 2 (b)of the said Act as the principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction. ( 7 ) WHEN the learned counsel for the appellant was confronted with these questions, the learned counsel cited two Judgments on section 9 of the Civil Procedure Code about exclusion of jurisdiction of the Civil court. Those Judgments are: (1) Dhulabhai v. State of Madhya Pradesh and Ann, reported in AIR 1969 SC 78 and (2) Sree Raja Anndregala Srinivasa jagannadharao Panthulu Bahadur Guru (dead) v. The State of Andhra pradesh and Ors. , AIR 1971 SC 71 . In both the Judgments it has been held that exclusion of jurisdiction of the Civil Court is not to be readily inferred. There can be no dispute about the aforesaid proposition. But when section 11 of the said Act cleanly states that, but for the matters provided in the said Act, the jurisdiction of the Court will be barred, in the context of such statutory provision, the principles referred to in the aforesaid two Judgments are not attracted. There can be no dispute about the aforesaid proposition. But when section 11 of the said Act cleanly states that, but for the matters provided in the said Act, the jurisdiction of the Court will be barred, in the context of such statutory provision, the principles referred to in the aforesaid two Judgments are not attracted. The learned counsel for the appellant has also relied on another Judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of H. D. Vora v. State of Maharashtra and Ors. , reported in AIR 1984 SC 866 . In the said Judgment the Supreme Court has clearly differentiated between the two concepts of requisition and acquisition. The Apex Court has held that acquisition means acquiring the entire title, but requisition means taking over a possession for a limited period. The distinction between the ;aforesaid two modes of exercise of power, one for acquisition and the other for requisition, is well known. But those concepts are not attracted in the acts of the present case. Therefore, the ratio in the case of Vora is not at all applicable here. ( 8 ) THE learned counsel appearing for the State/respondent has, on the other hand, relied on 3 Judgments of the Supreme Court in order to contend that acquisition proceeding cannot be challenged by a Civil court. Those three Judgments are (1) AIR 1995 SC 1955 , (2) AIR 1995 sc 2076 and (3) AIR 1990 SC 523. ( 9 ) IN view of the consistent finding of the Supreme Court that an acquisition proceeding cannot be challenged before a Civil Court, this court is of the opinion that the decree which has been passed by the civil Court is a nullity and is completely barred under section 9 of the civil Procedure Code and is of no legal effect. Therefore, apart from the question that a Writ Court will not normally execute a decree, in the facts of this case no such question arises as this Court is of the opinion that the decree of the Civil Court having been rendered in clear violation of section 11 of the said Act of 1918, cannot be enforced. ( 10 ) A requisition proceeding which was initiated in 1987 and pursuant to which possession was taken in 1987 cannot be challenged by filing a writ petition in 2002. ( 10 ) A requisition proceeding which was initiated in 1987 and pursuant to which possession was taken in 1987 cannot be challenged by filing a writ petition in 2002. There is gross delay in the filing of the writ petition. There is hardly any scope for challenging the proceeding since in the representation, made by the appellant/petitioner, on 15. 03. 95 to the Executive Engineer, Nadia Division, Public Health engineering, it was claimed by him that he wanted this case to be considered sympathetically for providing a job to his eldest son, sukumar Shill. Apart from that he had also made a prayer for adequate compensation. It is therefore clear that there is hardly any merit in the writ petition out of which the present appeal arises. ( 11 ) THIS Court, therefore, does not find any merit in the writ petition. Nor is there any merit in this appeal. This Court does not find any reason to interfere with the Judgment passed by the learned Judge of the Writ Court. ( 12 ) THIS appeal therefore is dismissed. But the dismissal of this appeal will not, in any way, affect the appellant's right, if any, to get compensation in accordance with law and in connection with the aforesaid land cquisition proceeding. The appeal therefore fails and is dismissed. There will be no order is to costs. Urgent xerox certified copy ot" this Judgment, if applied for, be given to the parties after completion of all the formalities. Appeal fails and dismissed