ORDER : 1. Leave granted. 2. In this appeal, the landlord has challenged the order of the High Court whereby, setting aside the order of eviction passed by the Rent Control Court upheld in the appeal by the District Judge, the eviction petition has been remitted to the Rent Control Court to examine whether the sale deed in favour of the Appellant is a sham transaction. 3. The Appellant sought eviction of the Respondents/tenants under Section 11(3) of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965 (for short, "the Act") on the ground of his bona fide need for own occupation. The premises in question were purchased by the Appellant from its erstwhile owner Ranjith under a registered sale deed dated 30-9-1995. The premises, a shop was let out to one B.K. Muhammed in the year 1958 on a monthly rent of Rs. 25, which was increased to Rs. 45 from 1985. The said tenant (B.K. Muhammed) expired in 1994 and the eviction petition was filed against his legal representatives, (that is Respondents herein and ten others). Only the Respondents herein (one of the two widows and two of the eleven children) contested the eviction petition. The others remained ex parte. It is not in dispute that the Respondents attorned in favour of the Appellant and paid rents to him. 4. The eviction was sought on the ground that the Appellant has no business of his own and had purchased the premises for the purpose of conducting his own business of Fast Food and cool drinks. The Respondents resisted the eviction petition, by denying the need put forth by the Appellant. They also contended that the sale deed dated 30-9-1995 (Ext. A-1), was a sham document, created with the intention of evicting them. The Rent Control Court allowed the eviction petition by order dated 18-11-2000. It recorded a finding of fact negating the plea of the sale deed being a sham document executed for the purpose of evicting the Respondents. The need of the landlord was held to be bona fide and, accordingly, an order of eviction was made. The Respondents challenged the order of eviction, in an appeal filed under Section 18 of the Act. The Appellate Court, by Judgment dated 4-7-2001, affirmed the order of the Rent Control Court. The need of the landlord was held to be bona fide and, accordingly, an order of eviction was made. The Respondents challenged the order of eviction, in an appeal filed under Section 18 of the Act. The Appellate Court, by Judgment dated 4-7-2001, affirmed the order of the Rent Control Court. It held that no tangible evidence was placed by the tenants to show that the Appellant was a friend of the former owner or that there was any collusion between them in an attempt to evict them. The plea of transaction being sham, was rejected by the appellate court as well. 5. The tenants filed a revision petition filed in the High Court under Section 20 of the Act. The High Court, by the impugned order dated 5-11 -2002 set aside the orders of the courts below on two grounds: (i) the courts below failed to attach sufficient importance to the contention of the Respondents that the sale in favour of the Appellant was a sham transaction: and (ii) the landlord had failed to explain how he could purchase a shop measuring about 300 sq. ft. situated in a commercial area in Cochin City at a low price of Rs. 11,000 and therefore, the matter required a further probe. Consequently, it remitted the matter to the Rent Control Court to examine whether the sale in favour of the Appellant was a sham transaction. The High Court placed considerable reliance on the decision of this Court in Devi Dass v. Mohanlal, 1982 (1) S.C.C. 495 , In that case the tenant contended that the sale by the original owner in favour of the landlord was sham and had been made with the ulterior motive of evicting the tenant. The appellate authority rejected the tenant's case on the ground that he could not challenge the validity of the sale deed executed in favour of the landlord, not being a party to the deed. The High Court did not advert to the contention at all. In the circumstances, this Court observed: "An allegation had been made that in reality there was no sale and the sale deed was a paper transaction. The court had to record a finding on this point. The appellate authority however did not permit counsel for the tenant to refer to the evidence adduced on this aspect of the matter. In the circumstances, this Court observed: "An allegation had been made that in reality there was no sale and the sale deed was a paper transaction. The court had to record a finding on this point. The appellate authority however did not permit counsel for the tenant to refer to the evidence adduced on this aspect of the matter. The High Court also did not advert to it. We, therefore, allow this appeal, set aside the decree for eviction and remit the case to the trial court to record a finding on the question whether the sale of die building to Respondent Mohan Lal was a bona fide transaction upon the evidence on record." 6. Having heard the learned Counsel for the parties and on perusal of the record we are unable to sustain the impugned order of the High Court. We find that on appreciation of evidence and consideration of all relevant facts, the Rent Control Court as also the appellate court have recorded a finding of fact rejecting the plea of sale transaction being a sham one. There was no material to demonstrate any link, connection, relationship or friendship between the erstwhile owner and the Appellant. The area of the shop, the rent for the shop, the locality in which it was situated and the sale consideration which were put forth by the tenants as the relevant factors, were taken into consideration for recording a finding, that the transaction was not sham. 7. One of the recognised methods of valuation of an immovable property is the capitalisation method. Under this method, the market value is determined by assessing the annual income from the property and multiplying it by an appropriate multiplier selected with reference to the situation of the property, the age of the building, the income therefrom and other surrounding circumstances. 15 to 20 years purchase (that is annual income) is generally considered to be reasonable market value. In this case, the annual income from the suit premises was Rs. 540 per annum. The sale price of Rs. 11,000 is more than 20 years income. Therefore, the price cannot be said to be absurdly low. We have referred to this aspect, not to record any finding on the correctness of the sale price, but merely to point out that there was nothing unreasonable in the price itself to lead to an inference that the transaction was sham. 11,000 is more than 20 years income. Therefore, the price cannot be said to be absurdly low. We have referred to this aspect, not to record any finding on the correctness of the sale price, but merely to point out that there was nothing unreasonable in the price itself to lead to an inference that the transaction was sham. 8. A document will be 'sham' if it ostensibly creates rights/obligations, which are not intended to be acted upon by the parties to the deed, and is executed in pursuance of a secret arrangement, with the ulterior motive of securing an undisclosed advantage to the owner (or executant as the case may be). It involves collusion between the parties to the document to achieve an illegal objective. Therefore, if anyone wants to establish that a sale transaction was sham and collusive, he ought to plead and prove a secret arrangement between the vendor and the purchaser, that the sale was nominal and that no right, title or interest passed or intended to pass to the purchaser under the sale, and the deed was executed with the sole intention of securing the eviction of the tenants or securing some other benefit to the vendor. Where direct evidence of such secret arrangement is not available, it may be possible to establish the sham nature of a document by some clinching circumstantial evidence. This may be done by showing that no sale consideration was paid to the vendor though shown to have been paid and that the expenses relating to stamp duty and registration of the sale-deed were incurred by the vendor himself. It may also be established by proving that even after the sale, the vendor himself was recovering the rents and paying the property taxes and exercising all rights of an owner. No such evidence has been led in this case. On the other hand, the Respondents merely relied on the following three circumstances in support of their contention that the transaction was sham and collusive: (a) the premises sold is a portion of a larger building; (b) that the price was meagre; and (c) the previous owner had earlier failed in his attempt to evict the Respondents. On the other hand, the Respondents merely relied on the following three circumstances in support of their contention that the transaction was sham and collusive: (a) the premises sold is a portion of a larger building; (b) that the price was meagre; and (c) the previous owner had earlier failed in his attempt to evict the Respondents. They pointed out that the first proviso to Section 11(3) of the Act mandates the Rent Control Court not to direct eviction on the ground of landlord's bona fide need for own occupation, if the landlord has another building of his own in his possession in the same city, except for special reasons. The contention of the Respondents was that since the erstwhile owner could not evict the Respondents, he having other buildings in the city, the shop was shown as sold to the Appellant, who did not own any other building, under a sham document, so as to evict the Respondents, for the benefit of the previous owner Ranjith. But the very circumstances mentioned by the Respondents to contend that the transaction is sham, can actually be valid reasons for an owner to sell the premises. If the rental income from a property is very low, and the owner is not in a position either to get vacant possession or increase the rents, he may out of frustration or absence of an alternative, decide to dispose of such property at whatever price it may fetch, and use the sale price for some other useful purpose. Therefore, if an owner sells a property for a modest price as in this case, on account of the meagre returns therefrom and inability to either evict the tenant or increase the income therefrom, that by itself cannot lead to a presumption that the sale transaction is sham. 9. We may next consider the decision in Devi Dass's case (supra) relied on by the Respondents. In Devi Dass, the case was remanded, as the Appellate Authority and the High Court had not considered at all the contention of the tenant that the sale was sham. 9. We may next consider the decision in Devi Dass's case (supra) relied on by the Respondents. In Devi Dass, the case was remanded, as the Appellate Authority and the High Court had not considered at all the contention of the tenant that the sale was sham. But in this case, the trial court and the appellate court have considered the evidence on the question whether the transaction was sham and recorded a finding there a Further, the decision in Devi Dass's case was rendered on facts, where apparently the tenant had not accepted the purchaser as his landlord by attornment. In this case the Respondents/tenants attorned to the new landlord (Appellant) and were paying the rents to him. It is now well-settled that where on being informed of the sale of the premises by the vendor/purchaser, the tenant acknowledges the purchaser as his landlord, and pays the rents to him, he cannot thereafter be heard to say that the sale in favour of his landlord is sham. The only exception to this principle, is where the derivative title of the purchaser-landlord is challenged by the tenant by pleading and proving that when he attorned, he was labouring under a mistake or ignorance as to material facts affecting title of the new landlord [See: Tej Bhan Madan v. II Addl. District Judge 1989 (3) S.C.C. 137, and Subhash Chandra v. Mohammad Sharif, 1990 (1) S.C.C. 252], We may refer to the classic statement from Spencer Bower and Turner on Estoppel by Representation (Third Edition) on this issue: "Where a tenant, with full knowledge of the facts, either expressly in writing, or impliedly by acts, such as the payment of rent, attorns tenant to a person other than his original landlord or one who is claiming the estate or interest of such original landlord by assignment, succession, or otherwise, he is ordinarily estopped from questioning the title of the person to whom he has so attorned. But, here too, it is open to the party sought to be estopped to explain away the attornment, and so escape the estopped to which he would otherwise be subject, by proof that, when he so attorned, he was labouring under mistake or ignorance as to material facts affecting the title of the person to whom he attorned, particularly if such error or ignorance was due to the fraud of that person." The following obsevation of this Court in Lingala Kondala Rao v. Vootukuri Narayana Rao, 2003 (1) S.C.C. 672 , is also apposite: "In an eviction suit between the landlord and the tenant the motive behind execution of the document conferring title on the landlord cannot be allowed to be gone into so long as the document has been executed and registered in accordance with law and the transaction is otherwise legal." In this case, there was no pleading or proof by tenants to bring themselves within the exception to the general principle of Estoppel. 10. The finding of fact recorded by the trial court and the appellate co m i that the sale was not a sham transaction therefore did not call for interference. We, therefore, find that the High Court was not justified, in exercise of revisional power, in remitting the matter to the Rent Control Court for fresh consideration as to whether the sale under the deed (Ext. A-1) was a sham transaction or not. In regard to other issues, the High Court did not find any reason to upset the findings of the courts below. In fact, it has specifically held that if the sale deed is not sham, the eviction order would stand. Under the aforesaid circumstances, we set aside the impugned order of the High Court and restore the order of eviction passed by the courts below. This appeal is, accordingly, allowed with costs. 11. The Respondents are granted three month's time to vacate the premises in question on their filing usual undertaking in this Court within two weeks.