JUDGMENT By the Court—These two appeals from the order of an Hon’ble Single Judge dated 5.7.2006 are taken up and disposed of summarily along with the additional pleadings filed before us. 2. Two writs filed by the appellant were disposed of by the said judgment, one of which was filed in or about the month of February, 2006 and the other in or about the month of April, 2006. The facts are set out in the judgment, which is impugned before us, and these facts are generally correct (said with respect) although some modification is called for. 3. We shall set out in brief some of the facts given and the arguments made in the Court below and before us. Since we propose to pass an interim order, which will most likely hold the field until the two writs are disposed of once again before the first Court, and since we are proposing to pass an order of remand, the recounting of some facts, and the setting out of some of our prima facie views are necessary. Without these, the interim order cannot be supported in law, as a prima facie arguable case has to be seen to be present. 4. When in February, 2006, the first writ was filed, it was a complaint against the appointment of the respondent No. 4 Ms. Shalini Kaul, as Principal in the School in question, which is in the Air Force Cantonment Area in Bamrauli, Allahabad. As we gathered, she has not yet been served, but if not already served, she has to be. She had been appointed as Principal two years before the writ was filed, (and this is a factor against the appellant) sometime on or about the 20th of June, 2004. The writ petitioner urged that her appointment was made mala fide. She was given a discriminatorily preferential treatment because she is the sister of one Air Vice Marshal Brown, who is said to be in vigilance and is also said to be a contender for the post of Air Marshal in future. 5. Apart from this relationship, certain other facts were pointed out to support the case of mala fides. The appellant stated that pursuant to an advertisement issued on the 4th of May, 2003, an interview was held on the 20th of June, 2003, wherein he was selected as Principal of the School and started functioning as such. 5. Apart from this relationship, certain other facts were pointed out to support the case of mala fides. The appellant stated that pursuant to an advertisement issued on the 4th of May, 2003, an interview was held on the 20th of June, 2003, wherein he was selected as Principal of the School and started functioning as such. According to him, there is an internal note in a departmental file made by one P.K. Nigam accepting him as Principal. Although the selection process was over, the matter was unsettled only for the purpose of accommodating Ms. Kaul. A second advertisement was issued on the 9th of January, 2004; the salary and perquisites were higher this time. 6. The second interview was held on the 1st of March, 2004. Prior to that on the 17th of January, 2004, the writ petitioner had applied again for the post of Principal and the aforesaid Nigam issued a call letter to him on or about 17.2.2004. In the impugned judgment, the facts proceeded upon seem to be different. 7. In the second process of selection, the writ petitioner was not in the list, perhaps because he was already functioning as Principal. Ms. Kaul was in position No. 3, one Ms. Neerja Singh was placed as No. 1, and one Mr. D.N. Thomas as No. 2. Apparently, Ms. Neerja Singh two months after applying, wrote a letter saying that she did not want the post as it would unsettle her family matters. 8. The appellant alleges that he was threatened by Ms. Kaul not to attend the interview; allegedly similar threats were held out to Ms. Neerja Singh and Mr. Thomas, all for accommodating Ms. Kaul. Why Ms. Neerja Singh should be suddenly troubled with her family after she had applied for the job just two months before might be a not irrelevant question. 9. The further allegation is that Ms. Kaul did not have the necessary experience of five years in administration and also had not experience in teaching Intermediate classes. A new and important allegation made before us is that she was overage, being 50 years 7 months and 9 days old on 9.1.2004, although the maximum age pre set was 50 years. 10. These facts are said to spell out bias and unreasonable behaviour, when examined in the light of Article 14 equality. A new and important allegation made before us is that she was overage, being 50 years 7 months and 9 days old on 9.1.2004, although the maximum age pre set was 50 years. 10. These facts are said to spell out bias and unreasonable behaviour, when examined in the light of Article 14 equality. It seems that the present test of common law bias is that if on a conspectus of all the facts and circumstances of the case, an insider would form a view that there was a possibility of bias in reaching the decision in question, then the case of bias in common law is made out. Since we are remanding this matter, if thought it fit by the Hon’ble Single Judge, his Lordship might examine the current law on the matter. 11. One of the points strongly pressed on behalf of the respondents is that the writ was not maintainable, as the School is not Article 12 authority. It was said that the School is run by a Society registered on 25.9.1980, and that the funding is basically by the fees paid and the contributions of Air Force personnel, and allegedly not one rupee comes by way of State aid. 12. The Education Code handed up to us, which has been framed by the Chairman of the Board of Governors of the Indian Air Force Education and Cultural Society, bears the emblem of the Indian Air Force on its top cover. Chapter 8 Rule 9 of the said book deals with how the finances are received; grant-in-aid as well as interconnection with other service institution funds, is mentioned. 13. Mr. Vijay Bahadur Singh, learned Senior Advocate relied on several Supreme Court cases in this regard. It is well known that the three important factors for considering whether the authority is an Article 12 authority or not, are (i) finance, (ii) control and (iii) purpose of the Institution. State financing tends to make the Institution come within Article 12; so does State control; so does public purpose, say, education as opposed to golfing activity. 14. One of the other possible ways of looking at it would be to imagine a hypothetical removal in one’s mind of all State activity, and see whether the Institution would survive such removal. As an example, I.T.C. would certainly survive and it is certainly not an Article 12 authority. 14. One of the other possible ways of looking at it would be to imagine a hypothetical removal in one’s mind of all State activity, and see whether the Institution would survive such removal. As an example, I.T.C. would certainly survive and it is certainly not an Article 12 authority. But cases which come to Court are not so simple, and all facts and circumstances have to be examined in each case. This is also well settled law. Would this School survive if all ‘State and Government’ were removed from India? That is the question to look the answer for. 15. Yet another aid in deciding whether the authority is an Article 12 or not, is to ask oneself the question whether it is reasonable to treat the authority as at par with the State. Not identical, but a similar question is whether it would be unreasonable to exclude the authority from being treated as a State. 16. If the School is not an Article 12 authority subject to a writ scrutiny, then and in that event, a prospective employee, like the appellant would have no recourse against the School, or the Board, if he were simply kept out of the run without assigning any reason or justification at all; if even no advertisement is issued; if out of reasons of personal choice, say, the twentieth in the list were preferred to the first. He would not be able to file a suit as he has no contractual or other relationship and he is not a member of the Society either. He would have no recourse, just as he would have no recourse, if somebody were selected as a Manager in one of the small departments of I.T.C. It is for the Court to examine whether this is the reasonable view to take in the facts and circumstances of this case. 17. On a balance of convenience, it is manifestly clear to us that the appellant has an arguable case in both the appeals. Although the show cause was made a subject of the writ two months after it was issued, yet one cannot exclude from consideration the fact that it takes time for a layman to get prepared with a law case and to file it in Court. Before anything could be done, the removal order also came. Although the show cause was made a subject of the writ two months after it was issued, yet one cannot exclude from consideration the fact that it takes time for a layman to get prepared with a law case and to file it in Court. Before anything could be done, the removal order also came. It was at first thought that the writ against the removal had become infructuous, but later on it appeared, may be on queries made by the Court itself that if the show cause is inextricably connected with the appointment order of Ms. Kaul, and further, if the ground of mala fides is good, then everything resting upon the show cause has to be quashed alongwith it. 18. The matters are remanded to the first Court. Parties will be entitled to pray for amending and filing fresh pleadings. Until further orders of Court, the removal order passed against the appellant and all the proceedings and orders consequent upon the impugned charge-sheet dated 23.2.2006 (including the said removal order), shall remain stayed. On and from date, the appellant shall be permitted to join the service in the Institution as P.G.T. (Commerce) and be entitled to all payments and benefits of service and emoluments in regard thereto. If the respondents are not willing to let the appellant perform the actual service, then and in that event, they shall continue to pay to the appellant all such pay, benefits of service and emoluments, as if he is regularly and faithfully rendering service in the Institution as above. The payment made during the pendency of the litigation will be subject to the final order of the Court. 19. The reason why we permit this alternative is that the inquiry had been started against the appellant, inter alia, on the allegation that on or about 30.11.2004, ten girl students had been indecently treated by the appellant. The appellant alleges that the students themselves withdrew the charge and there is also a statement by them that they were asked to put the charge in at the instance of Ms. Kaul. The other charges against the appellant were, writing directly to the Chief of Air Staff, forcing the boys to take tuition, leaking news to media in breach of discipline, and manipulation in marking numbers. 20. Kaul. The other charges against the appellant were, writing directly to the Chief of Air Staff, forcing the boys to take tuition, leaking news to media in breach of discipline, and manipulation in marking numbers. 20. Since the matter is being remanded and since we have to strike a reasonable balance, we cannot force the respondent-authorities compulsorily to take the appellant into the Institution actually; on the other hand there is a lot to be said about, the appellant being really not in breach of any principle of propriety or rule at all. 21. The impugned order dated 5.7.2006 is set aside. The Hon’ble Single Judge will decide the matter entirely uninfluenced by our orders and observations, however worded. Those are all without prejudice and made for the purpose of supporting the interim order only. 22. In case the appellant succeeds, the appellant will be entitled to all arrears from the date of removal, just as the respondents will be entitled to recover monies paid on the basis of this interim order, if they succeed in the litigation ultimately. 23. Both the appeals are finally disposed of. 24. No order as to costs at this stage. Order Accordingly. ———