Judgment :- K. Chandru, J. The appellant in W.A.No.1070 of 2006 had filed W.P.No.18050 of 2005, challenging the order of the first respondent in G.O. Ms. No. 92, Highways (HW 1), dated 25.4.2005, published in Gazette No. II(2)/HW/(340e-2)/2005 under Section 15(1) of the Tamil Nadu Highways Act, 2001 in so far as it relates to ac­quisition of the property of the petitioner situate at Government Manavari Survey No. 277-5 (Part) now sub-divided as 277-5B, No. 44, Kottiwakkam Village, Tambaram Taluk, Kancheepuram District, beyond 23 feet from the existing western boundary of the peti­tioner's land as per the sanctioned plan and Master Plan of the second respondent. The other five land owners, viz., the appellants in W.A. No. 1071 of 2006 have filed writ petition in W.P. No. 18051 of 2005 for similar relief. This, according to the appellants/petitioners, is that the acquisition made in respect of the land in question, and was inconsistent with the petitioners' lawful right, which had become fi­nal under the provisions of the Tamil Nadu Town and Country Planning Act, 1971 (for short, ‘TNTCP Act') as per the planning permission issued by the second respondent. 2. It is seen from the records that the Dis­trict Collector, by the powers vested on him by the Government, by G.O. Ms. No. 206, Highways (HN2) Department, dated 29.9.2003, issued a Notification under Section 15(2) of the Tamil Nadu Highways Act, stating that the land found in Survey No. 277/5 to the extent of 383 Square Metres is required for the purpose of development of the Old Mahabalipuram Road (for short, 'OMR Road') into six way Traffic lane, which is rechristened as I.T.Cor­ridor. Against the said Notice, the appellants/petitioners in both the writ petitions filed an objection dated 20.12.2004. Their serious objections found in paragraphs 14 to 18 are ex­tracted below: "14. As per the Notification published on 10.12.2004, the acquisition in our land in S. No. 277/5 is to the extent of 383 sq.m. which implies that a strip of 13.78 M average width is proposed to be acquired from our land, meaning a width of 22.13 M from the centerline for the NOW proposed 41 M wide Highway (the width has arbitrarily been increased progressively from 30.5 M to 35.5 M to 38 M to 41M). This means, on the opposite side of existing centerline, the acquisition will be only to the distance of 18.87 M. This shows more land is proposed to be acquired on the eastern side than on the western side, damaging a legally constructed recently approved building in preference to the opposite side which smacks of mala fide intentions. 15. The constant varying of Highway boundary and road width was also not fol­lowed by a required Notification under Sec­tion 8 of the Act, taking into consideration the volume of the traffic in the road and other relevant factors required to change the width of the road three times within a period of six months'. 16. We also bring to Notice, when the Highways Act provides for even permission of' encroachment under Section 26, we do not know how it is justifiable on the part of the Highways Authority to unilaterally change the Highway boundary and acquire more land than the one provided for the Highways acquisition as per the sanctioned plan dated 27.5.2003. 17. We, therefore, state in the light of giving respect to another Statutory Authority namely CMDA and the law regulating development, it is just and fair that the acquisi­tion can be made only to the extent of 23 feet from our land as per the sanctioned plan in conformity of which our development was made. 18. Any additional acquisition other than the one provided for on the date of the sanctioned plan (27.5.2003) will he a clear case of violation of rule of law and principles of harmonious construction of statutes." They have also requested the Government to drop the plan to acquire the land. 3. However, the Government of Tamil Nadu issued a Notification under Section 15(1) of the Tamil Nadu Highways Act, 2001 vide G.O. Ms. No. 91, Highways (HW1), dated 25.4.2005, which was published in the Tamil Nadu Government Gazette Extraordinary, Part II — Section 2, and the same is extracted below: "The Governor of Tamil Nadu having been satisfied that the lands specified in the Schedule below are required for the purpose of formation of I.T. Corridor Expressway (i.e.) to extend to six lanes of Old Mahabalipuram Road and it having already been decided that the entire amount of com­pensation to be awarded to the lands is to be paid out of the funds controlled or managed by the Chief Engineer (General). Highways Department and after having considered the cause shown by the owners or other persons having interest in the said lands, as the case may be, do hereby publish the following Notice under sub-section (1) of Section 15 of the Tamil Nadu Highways Act, 2001 (Tamil Nadu Act 34 of 2002). NOTICE Under sub-section (1) of Section 15 of the Tamil Nadu Highways Act, 2001 (Tamil Nadu Act 34 of 2002), the Governor of' Tamil Nadu hereby acquires the lands spec­ified in the Schedule below admeasuring 13637 Square Metres, to be same, a little more or less are required for the purpose of the formation of I.T. Corridor Expressway to extend to six lanes of Old Mahabalipuram Road. The plan of the lands is kept in the office of the Special Tahsildar, Land Acquisition, Redial Road Scheme, Tambaram, and may be inspected at any time during office hours." 4. In that Notification, appellants/petitioners land is also mentioned at page 8 of the Schedule appended to the said Notification re­lating to Kottivakkam Village. The total land that was sought to be acquired was 41,350 Square Metres out of which, the petitioners' land is only 383 Square Metres. Aggrieved against the said Notification, the petitioners filed the writ petitions challenging the said Notification issued under Section 15(1) of the Tamil Nadu Highways Act, 2001. 5. A clarification petition with an affidavit was filed by the respondents. 6. The learned Judge, who heard the argu­ments of both the parties, by a common order dated 9.8.2006 dismissed the writ petitions af­ter holding that there was no infirmity in the impugned Notice issued by the State. 7. Before the learned Judge, an argument was advanced that the road alignment was sought to be altered with a view to favour a building on the opposite side, owned by one Vijay Shanthi Builders and though care was taken for doing optimisation in favour of the Vijay Shanthi Builders, the similar care was not extended to the writ petitioners and hence, it amounted to hostile discrimination. The learned Judge specifically recorded a finding that Vijay Shanthi Builders themselves have tiled separate writ petitions before this Court, questioning the acquisition of their lands, and the same were dismissed on 23.2.2006 and when the matter was taken on appeal, the Divi­sion Bench of this Court also dismissed the writ appeals by judgment dated 30.6.2006. The learned Judge specifically recorded a finding that Vijay Shanthi Builders themselves have tiled separate writ petitions before this Court, questioning the acquisition of their lands, and the same were dismissed on 23.2.2006 and when the matter was taken on appeal, the Divi­sion Bench of this Court also dismissed the writ appeals by judgment dated 30.6.2006. This argument was rightly given up before us. 8. Further, before the learned Judge, the ap­pellants also pleaded that they were willing to surrender the entire stretch of land measuring 100' x 38', which was originally left as per the Master Plan costing more than Rs. 80 lakhs free of cost to the Government, provided the State gives a space to an extent of 3 to 4 feet in front of the existing building. By this method, the Government will be the beneficiary and that will be the correct optimisation and this will not materially alter the plan approved by the technical authorities. These suggestions made by the appellants were considered by the Government and it was held that such an alter­ation of plan cannot be made and it will destroy the very concept of the Highway and the State was not willing to accede to the request. Recording the above findings, the learned Judge dismissed both the petitions and hence, the present appeals. 9. We have heard the arguments of Mr. K.M. Vijayan, learned senior counsel appear­ing for LA LAW, counsel for the appellants, and also Mr.P.S.Raman, learned Additional Advocate-General leading the Additional Government Pleader for the respondents and have perused the records tiled in support of the appeals. 10. Mr. K.M. Vijayan, learned senior coun­sel appearing for the appellants stated that the State will be benefited with the offer of free gift of land to the extent of 100' x 38' (for which the present market value is Rs. 80 lakhs) and this Court may direct the respondents to sym­pathetically consider the said offer. When this offer was once again put to the learned Addi­tional Advocate-General, he submitted that he had a complete discussion with all the officials concerned and that sincere efforts were made by them to consider the offer made by the ap­pellants. 80 lakhs) and this Court may direct the respondents to sym­pathetically consider the said offer. When this offer was once again put to the learned Addi­tional Advocate-General, he submitted that he had a complete discussion with all the officials concerned and that sincere efforts were made by them to consider the offer made by the ap­pellants. The authorities involved in the exe­cution of the project had emphatically rejected the offer and stated that this cannot he accepted as it will affect the laying down the entire stretch of the road which runs into more than 23 Kms., and only for the sake of the appel­lants/landowners, an alteration cannot he made in the plan. Further, he stated that the State had also undertaken a complete exercise for optimisation of all lands in question before embarking on the project and the widening of the OMR Road had already begun. 11. The learned Additional Advo­cate-General also produced a field map show­ing the entire stretch of the project and also the field map relating to the area in question and tried to explain that any concession to the ap­pellants will have the effect of reducing the foot-path as per the original plan and, therefore, it may cause serious problems for road users in future. In the light of this, we directed the parties to address arguments on the ap­peals. 12. Mr. K.M. Vijayan, learned senior coun­sel, appearing for the appellants, reiterated the very same submissions made before the learned Judge and also filed a written brief. However, he did not seriously urge the issue relating to hostile discrimination, which point was taken before the learned Judge and con­cluded. 13. The first submission of Mr. K.M. Vijayan is that before a Highway is formed, it requires a Notification under Section 3 of the Tamil Nadu Highways Act. 2001 (Tamil Nadu Act 34 of 2002). The Act is stated to have come into force on 1.12.2002 and Section 3 of the Tamil Nadu Highways Act reads as follows: "Section 3. 13. The first submission of Mr. K.M. Vijayan is that before a Highway is formed, it requires a Notification under Section 3 of the Tamil Nadu Highways Act. 2001 (Tamil Nadu Act 34 of 2002). The Act is stated to have come into force on 1.12.2002 and Section 3 of the Tamil Nadu Highways Act reads as follows: "Section 3. Declaration of roads, ways or lands as Highways- On the recommenda­tion made by the State Highways Authority, the Government may, by Notification, de­clare any road, way or land to be Highway and classify it as any of the following, namely: (i) a State Highway; (ii) a major District road; (iii) other District road; or (iv) a Village road; Provided that where such road, way or land, whether in whole or in part is owned by any Local Authority, such Notification shall be issued with the concurrence of that Local Authority by a resolution passed by it in this behalf" He, therefore, submitted that without notify­ing under Section 3 of the Highways Act, the respondents cannot invoke Section 15 of the Act and, therefore, the impugned Notification issued under Section 15(1) of the Tamil Nadu Highways Act is invalid. 14. This argument was countered by the learned Additional Advocate-General stating that the Act comprises of three different por­tions. While Chapter II deals with Declaration of Highways, Highways Authorities and their powers and functions, Chapter III deals with Restriction of Ribbon Development and gives Highways Authorities the power to fix Highway boundary, building line, control line, etc. According to the Additional Advocate-Gen­eral, the acquisition of property is dealt with in Chapter IV, which is an independent Chapter, and once a decision is taken either to form a Highway or to widen the existing Highway, then the Government can acquire lands under Section 15 of the Tamil Nadu Highways Act and all the landowners, whose lands are taken over, are entitled to compensation in accor­dance with law. In the present case, once the public purpose is not challenged and the acqui­sition proceedings by the State is covered by a concept of Ribbon Development, the writ peti­tioners cannot challenge the acquisition pro­ceedings by addressing argument, which are not valid under law. 15. The learned Additional Advocate-General also submitted that a by a Notification issued under G.O. Ms. In the present case, once the public purpose is not challenged and the acqui­sition proceedings by the State is covered by a concept of Ribbon Development, the writ peti­tioners cannot challenge the acquisition pro­ceedings by addressing argument, which are not valid under law. 15. The learned Additional Advocate-General also submitted that a by a Notification issued under G.O. Ms. No. 210, Highways (HN2), dated 6.10.2003, published in the Gov­ernment Gazette, dated 22.10.2003, the OMR Road has already been declared as the State Highways and Serial No. 5 to Part B of Annex­ure shows that Chennai-Mahabalipuram Road is starting from 13/330 Kms., and ending at 27/200 Kms., having a total length of 13.870 Kms. It is also submitted that in the present case, the authorities are only trying to widen the road with new technology so that there will be a six-lane traffic, providing access to vari­ous I.T. industries, which have come up along the either side of the road. 16. Mr. K.M. Vijayan, learned senior coun­sel stated that he was not really on the ground of any public purpose being involved in the project but his submission was that his clients have approached the authorities under the TNTCP Act and Section 47 of the TNTCP Act clearly states that the development of the land should be in conformity with the development plan. Under the said Act, Section 2(19) of the TNTCP Act deals with "Highway", which is having the same meaning as Section 4 of the National Highways Act and the term "devel­opment" as found in Section 2(13) of the TNTCP Act means carrying out of all or any of the works contemplated in a regional plan, Master Plan, detailed development plan or a new town development prepared under this Act and shall include the carrying out of build­ing, engineering, mining or other operations in, or over or under land, or the making of any material change in the use of any building. 17. According to the learned senior coun­sel, under Section 17 of the TNTCP Act when a Master Plan is prepared, the second respon­dent, who is the Competent Authority, is to fix the Highway/Major Road, boundary, etc. 17. According to the learned senior coun­sel, under Section 17 of the TNTCP Act when a Master Plan is prepared, the second respon­dent, who is the Competent Authority, is to fix the Highway/Major Road, boundary, etc. Therefore, when the appellants got planning permission on 27.5.2003, the said road was not declared as Highway or major road under Sec­tion 3 of the Tamil Nadu Highways Act and no revision of boundaries has been made under Section 8 of the Tamil Nadu Highways Act. According to the learned senior counsel, the power to fix the width of the road even today vests with the Authority under the TNTCP Act. 18. Learned senior counsel appearing for the appellants also drew the attention of this Court to Section 111, which contains a non-obstante clause, which reads as follows: "Section 111: Effect of other laws.-(1) The provisions of this Act shall be read subject to the provisions of the (Chennai) Metropol­itan Water Supply and Sewerage Act, 1978 (Tamil Nadu Act 28 of 1978): (2) Save as otherwise provided in this Act, the provisions of this Act and the rules and regulations made thereunder shall have ef­fect, notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith contained in any other law, (cus­tom, usage or contract); (3) (Subject to the provisions of sub-section (1) but notwithstanding) anything con­tained in any other law- (a) When permission for development in re­spect of any land or building has been obtained under this Act, such development shall not be deemed to be unlawfully under taken or carried out by reason only of the fact that permission, approval or sanction required under such other law for such de­velopment, has not been obtained; (b) When permission for such development has not been obtained under this Act, such development shall not be deemed to be lawfully undertaken or carried out by reason only of the fact that permission, approval or sanction required under such other law for such development has been obtained." Learned senior counsel appearing for the appellants also stated that he is not questioning the existence of power in the hands of the au­thorities but only the exercise of the very power under a statute. 19. The learned Additional Advocate-General, countering the said argument, drew our attention to Section 69 of the Tamil Nadu Highways Act, 1988, which has an overriding effect over other laws and the same is repro­duced below: "Section 69. 19. The learned Additional Advocate-General, countering the said argument, drew our attention to Section 69 of the Tamil Nadu Highways Act, 1988, which has an overriding effect over other laws and the same is repro­duced below: "Section 69. Act to override contract and other laws, etc. - Save as otherwise provided in this Act, the provisions of this Act shall have effect, notwithstanding anything in-consistent therewith contained in any other law, custom, usage or contract or decree or order of a Court or other Authority." 20. Since both the enactments are made by the State Legislature and both contain a similar provisions, one has to find out as to which is the special law occupying the field. It is undoubtedly clear that with reference to the Highways, it is Highways Act, which holds the field. It is also a later enactment. Therefore, the argument of the learned senior counsel press­ing Section 111 of the TNTCP Act, to have overriding effect over the Highways Act, does not merit any attention by this Court. 21. Regarding the other argument that it requires a declaration to be made as Highways under Section 3 of the Tamil Nadu Highways Act, the said exercise has already been done by the State vide its Notification dated 6.10.2003 (stated supra). 22. The further argument that the Authority under TNTCP Act will have to decide the road boundaries and also the road width does not merit any acceptance. We hold that the present road in question, viz., OMR Road, presently called as I.T. Corridor, completely comes within the jurisdiction of the authorities under the Tamil Nadu Highways Act and any development of the said road including the fixation of the boundary and the width of the road have to be decided by the authorities under this Act. In this context, we may refer to Section 8(4)(a) of the Highways Act, which reads as follows: "(4) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-sections (1), (2) and (3), the Government may, in consultation with the State Highways Authority, having regard to the situation or the requirements of any Highway or the condition of the area through which such Highway passes,- (a) fix different building line and control line for such Highway" Hence, we hold that once it is a Highway, Highways authorities can fix different build­ing line and control line for such highway. 23. Mr. 23. Mr. Y.S. Raman, Additional Advo­cate-General, appearing for the respondents, drew our attention to the judgment of the Su­preme Court in Aflatoon v. Lt. Governor of Delhi, AIR 1974 SC 2077 : (1975) 4 SCC 285 particularly, to paragraph 23 of the said judg­ment, which is extracted below: "23. The planned development of Delhi had been decided upon by the Government be-fore 1959, viz., even before the Delhi Devel­opment Act came into force. It is true that there could be no planned development of Delhi except in accordance with the provi­sions of Delhi Development Act after that Act came into force, but there was no inhibi­tion in acquiring land for planned develop­ment of Delhi under the Act before the Master Plan was ready (See the decision in Patna Improvement Trust v. Smt. Lakshmi Devi AIR 1963 SC 1077 : (1963) Supp (2) SCR 812. In other words, the fact that actual development is permissible in an area other than a development area with the approval of sanction of the Local Authority did not preclude the Central Government from acquiring the land for planned devel­opment under the Act. Section 12 is con­cerned only with the planned development. It has nothing to do with the acquisition of property; acquisition generally precedes development. For planned development in an area other than a development area, it is only necessary to obtain the sanction or ap­proval of the Local Authority as provided in Section 12(3). The Central Government could acquire any property under the Act and develop it after obtaining the approval of the Local Authority. We do not think it necessary to go into the question whether the power to acquire the land under Section 15 was delegated by the Central Govern­ment to the Chief Commissioner of Delhi." (emphasis added) 24. It is seen from the above judgment that even though for a planned development of Delhi, Delhi Development Act came into force, but there was no inhibition for acquiring the land for planned development under the Act before the Master Plan was ready. As seen above, the fact that actual development is per­missible in an area other than developed area with the approval or sanction from the Local Authority did not prejudice the Central Gov­ernment in acquiring the land for planned de­velopment under the Act. As seen above, the fact that actual development is per­missible in an area other than developed area with the approval or sanction from the Local Authority did not prejudice the Central Gov­ernment in acquiring the land for planned de­velopment under the Act. The Master Plan provided under the TNTCP Act is only con­cerned with the planned development and has nothing to do with the acquisition of the prop­erty. Further, Section 47 of the TNTCP Act ex­empts the State Government. Central Government and local authorities. 25. Thereafter, the learned Additional Ad­vocate-General took our attention to the judgment of the Supreme Court in Bhagat Singh v. State of U.P. AIR 1999 SC 436 : (1999) 2 SCC 384 and particularly to paragraph 22 of the said judgment: "22. As pointed out in the above judgments, there is no need that the land proposed to be acquired by the Government for a particular public purpose should be for the same purpose or use mentioned in the Master Plan or Zeal Plan for the said area. Nor will the acquisition be invalid, merely because the land proposed to be acquired is for a purpose other than the one permitted by the Master Plan or Zonal Plan applicable to that local­ity. Acquisition will be valid if it is for a pub­lic purpose even if it is not for the type of use permitted by the Master Plan or Zonal Plan in force at the time the acquisition is made. It will be for the beneficiary of the acquisition to move the Competent Authority under the Development Act and obtain the sanction of the said Authority for suitable modification of the Master Plan so as to permit the use of the land for the public purpose for which the land is acquired. In fact, it maybe difficult for the beneficiary of the acquisition to move the competent authority under the Development Act seeking permission to change of land use even before the land is acquired or before possession is given to the beneficiary. On the principle stated in Aflatoon's case AIR 1974 SC 2077 , it is clear that acquisition for a public purpose and obtaining permission from Competent Authority under the concerned Development Act for change of land use are different from one another and the former is not dependent upon the latter." (emphasis added) 26. On the principle stated in Aflatoon's case AIR 1974 SC 2077 , it is clear that acquisition for a public purpose and obtaining permission from Competent Authority under the concerned Development Act for change of land use are different from one another and the former is not dependent upon the latter." (emphasis added) 26. Therefore, in the light of the above, we hold that the impugned acquisition would not amount to variation of the declared Master Plan of the TNTCP Act and the development of Highways will not amount to an activity un­der Section 58 of the TNTCP Act requiring in­timation to the planning authorities and approving the proposal only after getting their views/objections of the Planning Authority. 27. Mr. K.M. Vijayan, learned senior coun­sel appearing for the appellants, thereafter sub­mitted that de hors all the above illegalities allegedly done by the first respondent that the writ petitioners have not been shown equity and equal protection of law and they have taken sufficient steps to prevent the demoli­tion of the building of the writ petitioners which had come into existence strictly in ac­cordance with law and as per the road bound­ary statutorily fixed by the authorities and enforceable even today and they should have accommodated 3 to 4 feet in the existing build­ing. This exercise as to whether the writ peti­tioners' building should be allowed to stand by providing 3 to 4 feet in front of the said build­ing, has already been done by the authorities more than once which was recorded by the learned Judge. In any event, as per the sketch shown by the State, it is not the appellants' building alone that had come under the acqui­sition. But hindrance of all the buildings are sought to be removed either partially or fully for the purpose of widening the OMR Road. 28. In a matter of this magnitude, where the State has undertaken a mega project in provid­ing a Express Highway comprising of six lanes with a view to make infrastructure development to IT companies, public interest requires that such an activity should be allowed to pro­ceed and cannot be stultified by the litigation indulged by the appellants, who have expressed their private interest in these appeals. The learned Senior Counsel appearing for the appellants fairly conceded that the power to acquire any land for public purpose is always available to the authorities and once the com­pensation is given, the power is complete and that is the correct legal position. In the present case, there is no deviation or violation of any procedure established by law and the appel­lants/writ petitioners cannot have any legal grievance. 29. We find there are no substance in the ar­guments addressed on behalf of the appellants and hence, both the writ appeals fail and ac­cordingly, they shall stand dismissed. However, the parties are directed to bear their own costs. Writ appeals dismissed. 25. As observed in the Judgment reported in Syed Khalid Rizvi’s case (cited supra), if laxity has been given legitimacy and deemed relaxation is extended it would not only upset the smooth working of the rules but also undo the prescribed ratio between promotee officers and direct recruits. It would also produce adverse effect at the all India level. Moreover, the concept of all India Services introduced to effectuate national integration by drawing persons from different regions by direct recruitment into concerned States Cadres would be defeated by manipulation. National integration would be disturbed and frustrated. Smooth implementation of the rules would be deflected and distortions in service would gain legitimacy and acceptability. In view of the same, it is clear that seniority plays a vital role in All India Services especially Indian Police Service and that no flexibility could be shown in favour of anyone to defeat the claim of the persons legitimately entitled to promotion. 26. Apart from G.O.Ms.No.11, dated 05.01.1984, which states that “the personal files should be written promptly by the Reporting Officer”, G.O.Ms. NO.373, P& AR (PER-R) dated 20.10.1993 prescribes the time limit for the submission of the Annual Confidential Report. It further specifies that the report should be sent in triplicate. The form introduced in G.O.Ms. No.2933, Public (Special-A) Department, dated 13th November, 1973, should be used for writing the confidential report on IPS officers of the rank of Superintendent of Police and pro-forma prescribed by the Government should be used in respect of non-Indian Police Service Officer. By the same date, the Director-General of Police will obtain confidentially from each Collector in triplicate his remarks on the Superintendent of Police of his district. By the same date, the Director-General of Police will obtain confidentially from each Collector in triplicate his remarks on the Superintendent of Police of his district. Two copies of each report including that of the Collector will be forwarded by the Director-General of Police with his own remarks on each officer so as to reach the Government by the 1st May, the other copy (with the report of the Collector) being filed in the officer’s personal file. The above provisions, prescribing the time limit with respect to ACRs, are mandatory in nature. However, it is the claim of the learned Senior Counsels for the petitioner that inasmuch as there is no statutory rules prescribing time limit for writing of ACR, those instructions are regulatory and not mandatory. In support of their claim, they also relied on, a. 1983 (1) SLR 119 D.R.Chauhan vs. The Vice-Chancellor (Himachal Pradesh High Court) b. 1995 (1) SLR Page 531 - Shri Shailendra Kumar Agnihotri v. Union of India & others (C.A.T. Guwahati Bench). In addition to the same, learned Senior Counsels heavily relied on a Division Bench decision of the Karnataka High Court reported in WP Nos.2288/05 etc. Batch, dated 06.10.2005. The Division Bench held that there is no time limit in writing the ACR and the belated writing of the ACR will have no consequences whatsoever and the same would have to be taken into account for the purpose of consideration for promotion. Learned Senior Counsels for the petitioner pointed out that where the time limit is specified and no consequences flow from non-adhering to the time limit such instructions should be taken as directory and not mandatory. In support of their stand, they also relied on, a. 2003 (8) SCC 498 (cited supra) b. 1991 Supp (2) SCC 151 (cited supra) c. 1989 (4) SCC 671 (cited supra) On the other hand, learned Advocate General submitted that the time limit within which the ACRs are to be submitted is to be treated as mandatory. In support of his contention, he relied on, a. 2005 (5) SCC 598 (Ashok Lanka v. Rishi Dixit) b. 2003 (8) SCC 498 (cited supra) c. 2003 (6) SCC 401 (Rai Vimal Krishna vs. State of Bihar) d. AIR 1987 SC 1201 (State of Haryana v. P.C.Wadhwa). 27. In support of his contention, he relied on, a. 2005 (5) SCC 598 (Ashok Lanka v. Rishi Dixit) b. 2003 (8) SCC 498 (cited supra) c. 2003 (6) SCC 401 (Rai Vimal Krishna vs. State of Bihar) d. AIR 1987 SC 1201 (State of Haryana v. P.C.Wadhwa). 27. Having gone through the Case Laws relied on by the respective counsel in support of their contentions, we deem it useful to refer the decisions relevant to the issue involved. A. In 2005 (5) SCC 598, para No.53 is relevant, which reads as under:- “53. The question as to whether a statute is mandatory or directory would depend upon the statutory scheme. It is now well known that use of the expression “shall” or “may” by itself is not decisive. The court while construing a statute must consider all relevant factors including the purpose and object the statute seeks to achieve. (see P.T. Rajan v. T.P.M.Sahir and U.P.SEB v. Shiv Mohan Singh).” B. In 2003 (8) SCC 498 , the following conclusions are relevant, “45. A statute as is well known must be read in the text and context thereof. Whether a statute is directory or mandatory would not be dependant on the user of the words “shall” or “may”. Such a question must be posed and answered having regard to the purpose and object it seeks to achieve. 46. .. 47. The construction of a statute will depend on the purport and object for which the same had been used. ... 48. .. 49. Furthermore, a provision in a statute which is procedural in nature although employs the word “shall” may not be held to be mandatory if thereby no prejudice is caused.” C. Para No.27 in 2003 (6) SCC 401 is relevant, which reads thus:- "27. Nobody disputes that publication and the giving of notice to persons likely to be affected by the assessment list is a must. The appellants have admitted publication of the assessment lists in three newspapers. It is not their case that such publication did not serve the purpose of notifying those who might be affected by the assessment lists, of their existence. Indeed it appears to us that the requirement to notify people by beat of drum is an anachronism which appears to be inappropriate in the present day and age in a large city like Patna. Indeed it appears to us that the requirement to notify people by beat of drum is an anachronism which appears to be inappropriate in the present day and age in a large city like Patna. The High Court's apprehension that "holding this provision as directory is likely to cause confusion and mischief in future and it is not for this Court to substitute the wisdom of the legislature with its own by holding that notice by newspaper will be sufficient in place of notice of the spot by beat of drum and placards." Is unfounded both in law and in fact. It is an elementary principle of interpretation that words in statutory provisions take their colour from their context and object, keeping pace with the time when the word is being construed. When or where no other means of effective publication is available, no doubt, announcing the assessment list by beat of drum and by displaying placards would have to be complied with. Where equally efficacious, if not better, modes of publication are available, it would be ridiculous to insist on an obsolete form of publication as if it were a ritual. Had the High Court found that publication by newspapers was not effective enough to notify the public, the assessment list could not be given effect to unless publication was properly made. There is no such finding. On the other hand, publication through newspapers, is now an accepted form of giving general notice. Therefore, we have no hesitation in holding that the portion of Section 149(1) which deals with the manner of publication, as opposed to the requirement for publication per se, is directory. Since there has been sufficient compliance in effecting the intention of the legislature to give notice to the public at large in the city of Patna, we cannot hold that the assessment lists prepared on the basis of the 1993 Rules are required to be set aside." D. The conclusion arrived at by the Supreme Court in AIR 1987 SC 1201 is of much relevance, which reads thus:- “ 4. The whole object of the making and communication of adverse remarks is to give to the officer concerned an opportunity to improve his performances, conduct or character, as the case may be. The whole object of the making and communication of adverse remarks is to give to the officer concerned an opportunity to improve his performances, conduct or character, as the case may be. The adverse remarks should not be understood in terms of punishment, but really it should be taken as an advice to the officer concerned, so that he can act in accordance with the advice and improve his service career. The whole object of the making of adverse remarks would be lost if they are communicated to the officer concerned after an inordinate delay. In the instant case, it was communicated to the respondent after twenty seven months. It is true that the provisions of rules 5, 6, 6A and 7 are directory and not mandatory, but that does not mean that the directory provisions need not be complied with even substantially. Such provisions may not be complied with strictly, and substantial compliance will be sufficient. But, where compliance after an inordinate delay would be against the spirit and object of the directory provision, such compliance would not be substantial compliance. In the instant case, while the provisions of Rules 5, 6, 6A and 7 require that everything including the communication of the adverse remarks should be completed within a period of seven months, this period cannot be stretched to twenty seven months, simply because these Rules are directory, without serving any purpose consistent with the spirit and objectives of these Rules. We need not, however, dilate upon the question any more and consider whether on the ground of inordinate and unreasonable delay, the adverse remarks against the respondent should be struck down or not, and suffice it to say that we do not approve of the inordinate delay made in communicating the adverse remarks to the respondent.” The above case laws would make it clear that the provision in a statute, which is procedural in nature and employs the word “shall”, if it is not prejudicial to any one, may not be held to be mandatory. It implies that if the delay causes prejudice to others, it has to be construed as mandatory. It implies that if the delay causes prejudice to others, it has to be construed as mandatory. On behalf of the respondents, it is specifically contended that consideration of delayed ACRs resulted in prejudice to the 1st respondent in the Writ Petitions as the writ petitioner has gone above the entire 1993 and 1992 batch of IPS officers all over India and got into 1991 Batch. It is also clear that even if the instructions are directory and not mandatory, that does not mean that the directory provisions need not be complied with even substantially. As observed by the Apex Court in AIR 1987 SC 1201 (cited supra), where compliance after an inordinate delay would be against the spirit and object of the directory provision, such compliance would not be substantial compliance. In view of the above mentioned legal principles, we do not approve the inordinate and unexplained delay in reviewing, accepting and making the ACR of the petitioner. Even if the provision is directory in nature, substantial compliance of the provision is necessary. In the present case for the period 01.04.1993 to 15.07.1993, the ACR was written only on 14.11.1994, reviewed on 19.01.1996 and accepted on 27.01.1996. 28. As rightly argued by the learned Additional Solicitor General and the Advocate General, the above ACR, though written for a period marginally longer than three months, was written after considerable lapse of time, viz., one year and few months. Thus, we are of the view that this is clearly contrary to the instructions issued by the Government. The ACR that was written belatedly or beyond the prescribed period would not be valid in the eye of law though it related to the said period, if it prejudicially alters the seniority of others. Though learned Senior Counsels appearing for the petitioner highlighted that because of the lapse on the part of the Senior Officers, the service career of the petitioner should not be affected, as rightly demonstrated by the learned Senior Counsel for the first respondent, inordinate delay in reviewing the ACR and forwarding the same for decision undoubtedly affected the seniority of R-1 and others. As observed earlier, the very object of writing of the ACRs is to apprise a police officer’s performance either positively or negatively; in the former case, it aims at rewarding him and in the latter case, it is to enable him to improve his performance. As observed earlier, the very object of writing of the ACRs is to apprise a police officer’s performance either positively or negatively; in the former case, it aims at rewarding him and in the latter case, it is to enable him to improve his performance. Courts have, on various occasions, held that ACRs must be written at the earliest every year. It is well established that writing the confidential reports objectively and constructively at the earliest would pave the way for improving efficiency and attaining excellence in service. In this regard, the following conclusions of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in para No.4 of the decision reported in 1997 (4) SCC 7 (State of U.P. v. Yamuna Shanker Misra), are relevant, “4. ... It is needless to emphasise that the career prospects of a subordinate officer/employee largely depends upon the work and character assessment by the reporting officer. The latter should adopt fair, objective, dispassionate and constructive commends/comments in estimating or assessing the character, ability, integrity and responsibility displayed by the officer/employee concerned during the relevant period for the above objectives if not strictly adhered to in making an honest assessment, the prospect and career of the subordinate officer would be put to great jeopardy. The reporting officer is bound to lose his credibility in the eyes of his subordinates and fail to command respect and work from them. The constitutional and statutory safeguards given to the government employees largely became responsible to display callousness and disregard of the discharge of their duties and make it impossible for the superior or controlling officers to extract legitimate work from them. The writing of the confidentials is contributing to make the subordinates work at least to some extent. Therefore, writing the confidential reports objectively and constructively and communication thereof at the earliest would pave way for amends by erring subordinate officers or to improve the efficiency in service. At the same time, the subordinate employee/ officer should dedicate to do hard work and duty; assiduity in the discharge of the duty, honesty with integrity in performance thereof which alone would earn his usefulness in retention of his service. Both would contribute to improve excellence in service. ..” The following conclusion arrived at by the Supreme Court in the decision reported in 1997 (9) SCC 287 (Union of India v. N.R. Banerjee) is also relevant, “9. Both would contribute to improve excellence in service. ..” The following conclusion arrived at by the Supreme Court in the decision reported in 1997 (9) SCC 287 (Union of India v. N.R. Banerjee) is also relevant, “9. It would, thus, be seen that the authorities are required to anticipate in advance the vacancies for promotion on regular basis including long-term deputation posts and additional posts created and then to take the action plan in finalizing the ACRs, preparation of the select list and place necessary material before the DPC for consideration of the candidates within the zone of consideration, as are found eligible for the relevant year/years. 10. The DPC in the present case was directed to consider the cases of all the eligible candidates within the zone of consideration so that there will not be any heart-burning among the eligible persons whose claims have been withheld for consideration for promotion to the higher post. In Syed Khalid Rizvi vs. Union of India the mandatory duty of the preparation of the select list of the officers for promotion to the All India Services has been indicated in para 35 of the judgment at p. 605 thus: “We, therefore, hold that preparation of the select list every year is mandatory. It would subserve the object of the Act and the rules and afford an equal opportunity to the promotee officers to reach higher echelons of the service. The dereliction of the statutory duty must satisfactorily be accounted for by the State Government concerned and this Court takes serious note of wanton infraction.” Though learned Senior Counsels appearing for the petitioner heavily relied on the Division Bench decision of the Karnataka High Court in W.P. Nos.2288 of 2005 etc., dated 06.10.2005, as rightly pointed out by the learned Additional Solicitor General and the Advocate General, in the said Judgment, the Court has categorically held that if for any period, the confidential report of an officer is not available for any reason whatsoever, the DPC should consider the CRs of the year preceding the period in question to complete the number of CRs required to be considered. In the instant case, as rightly pointed out, the Select Committee erroneously considered the ACR of the petitioner for the period 01.04.1993 to 15.07.1993 as the said ACR was written reviewed and accepted belatedly in violation of the prescribed time-limit. 29. In the instant case, as rightly pointed out, the Select Committee erroneously considered the ACR of the petitioner for the period 01.04.1993 to 15.07.1993 as the said ACR was written reviewed and accepted belatedly in violation of the prescribed time-limit. 29. Learned Advocate General, by referring to various case laws of the Supreme Court as well as the High Court, viz., A. 2005 (3) CTC 4 (The State of Tamil Nadu v. R.Karuppiah) B. 1998 (4) SCC 154 (State of A.P. vs. Radhakishan) C. 2005 (5) CTC 380 (Obaidhullah, A. vs. State of Tamil Nadu) D. 2005 (4) CTC 403 (Mahadevan, P.V. vs. M.D., Tamil Nadu Housing Board) Pointed out that just as delay vitiates inquiry, it also defeats the purpose of ACRs. In those cases, the Supreme Court as well as the High Court after finding that the delay in departmental enquiry vitiates the enquiry, quashed the entire disciplinary proceedings. If we apply the same analogy, in view of the fact that undue and unexplained delay defeats the purpose of ACRS and also affects the interest of other officers including his seniors, consideration of material, extraneous in nature, and the result arising therefrom shall be held to be invalid. 30. With regard to the submission pertaining to the remarks written for the period between 01.04.1993 and 15.07.1993, it is relevant to point out that ACR of the petitioner relating to certain period within the five year relevant period of 1989-94 was not made available during the select committee meeting held on 07.03.1995, consequent to which, the ACR for the period 1988-89 was taken into account leading to the overall grading for the petitioner to be as “good”, however, for the Select Committee meeting held on 24.03.1999 the ACR for the missing period, which was not available in the year 1995, was made available leading to the different grading to be given as a result of which, the overall grading of the petitioner in the Select Committee Meeting held on 24.03.1999 has been “very good”. The Tribunal, while agreeing with the UPSC that the Select Committee Meeting in 1999 was to be a fresh one, held that from the assessment sheets submitted by the UPSC, it is seen that the Select Committee considered the ACRs ending for the period March 1994, which included the ACR for the period 01.04.1993 to 15.07.1993, written on 14.11.1994, but reviewed only on 19.01.1996 and accepted on 27.1.1996, being belated and contrary to the instructions issued by the Government and therefore ought not to have been considered by the Committee or the UPSC. The Tribunal further held that this additional ACR had the effect of changing the overall grading of the petitioner (who was respondent No.6 before the Tribunal) and that the same amounted to the UPSC having decided on the basis of impermissible documents to improve the grading given to him, though it may relate to the reckonable period. On the basis of the above conclusions, the Tribunal quashed the Select List. 31. Assailing the above conclusions of the Tribunal, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the UPSC has argued that such conclusions are baseless and contrary to the facts on record. He pointed out that even when ACR for the said period viz., 01.04.1993 to 15.07.1993 was made available for the Select Committee held on 24.03.1999, the Committee did not change the grading for the year 1993-94. In other words, according to him, although the ACR for the above period was made available for the Select Committee held on 24.03.1999, the Committee and the UPSC had graded the petitioner only as “good” for the year 1993-94, which was the same grading given to the petitioner for the year 1993-94 in the meeting held on 07.03.1995. By pointing out the same, it is contended by the learned Senior Counsel for the UPSC that the Tribunal erroneously assumed that this ACR for the period 01.04.1993 to 15.07.1993 had the effect of changing the overall grading of the petitioner in the meeting held on 24.03.1999. 32. In view of the above submissions, we verified the original records submitted to this Court in a sealed cover, particularly the grading sheet. It is true that the grading for the petitioner for the year 1993-94 remains the same in respect of the meeting held on 07.03.1995 and 24.03.1999. 32. In view of the above submissions, we verified the original records submitted to this Court in a sealed cover, particularly the grading sheet. It is true that the grading for the petitioner for the year 1993-94 remains the same in respect of the meeting held on 07.03.1995 and 24.03.1999. Even if we accept the ACR for the period in question referred to above, it did not bring about any change either in the grading for the year 1993-94 or for the overall grading of the petitioner. A perusal of the original file shows that in the Select Committee meeting held on 07.03.1995, the grading “good” was awarded for 1992-93 and in the meeting held on 24.03.1999, the rating was “very good” for the said period namely 1992-1993. In spite of our best efforts, we are not able to understand as to how the grading “good” was changed to “very good” in the Select Committee Meeting held on 24.03.1999 without any additional material. Even if we accept that some additional material was furnished by the State Government in the meeting held on 24.03.1999, admittedly, it relates to the period 01.04.1993 to 15.07.1993. The remarks offered for the said period admittedly are not applicable to 1992-93. Though learned Senior Counsel for the UPSC has argued that the change in the grading given by the UPSC for the year 1992-93 as “very good” as against the grading “good” given by the Committee in the meeting held on 07.03.1995 was on account of the fact that the missing ACR for part of the year 1992-93 had been made available in 1999, no supportive material is either available or brought to our notice except the assessment for limited period 01.04.1993 to 15.07.1993. In such circumstances, though we are conscious of the fact that neither the Tribunal nor this Court is supposed to review the decision of the Select Committee as appellate authority, in the absence of any material and proper explanation, we hold that the said decision of the Union Public Service Commission cannot be accepted. We find substance in argument of the learned counsel for the respondents and justification in the conclusion arrived at by the Tribunal. 33. It is not in dispute that the Select Committee is expected to consider the ACRs for five years starting from 01.04.1989 to 31.03.1994. We find substance in argument of the learned counsel for the respondents and justification in the conclusion arrived at by the Tribunal. 33. It is not in dispute that the Select Committee is expected to consider the ACRs for five years starting from 01.04.1989 to 31.03.1994. The additional material, viz., ACRs for the period 01.04.1993 to 15.07.1993, which falls within the prescribed period, as pointed out earlier, written by the reporting officer only on 14.11.1994, reviewed by the Higher Officer on 19.01.1996 and accepted by the DGP on 27.01.1996 and, thereafter, the same was said to have been forwarded to the UPSC. The Tribunal came to the conclusion that any document which came into existence subsequent to the cut off date for the select year 1994-95, i.e., after 31.3.1994, cannot be accepted. Learned Additional Solicitor General, while pointing out that the said conclusion is correct in law, relied on a decision of the Apex Court reported in 1993 Supplement 4 SCC 441 (Air Vice Marshal S.L. Chhabra v. Union of India). In that case, the adverse remarks of the year 1986 came to be expunged sometime in January-February 1989, but, because of the said adverse remarks, he was denied promotion by the Selection Board of 1988 but the High Court as well as the Supreme Court negatived the contention that when once the adverse remarks were subsequently set aside, his promotion should relate back to the date on which he ought to have been promoted. This fortifies the legal position that any qualification which came into existence subsequently and which was not available at the time when the Select Committee considered the claim of the persons cannot be taken into account as that would tantamount to giving promotion with retrospective effect and also to improve the chances of promotion by taking into account subsequent qualifications. Again, the Supreme Court held in the decision reported in 1993 Supp. 3 SCC 168 (Rekha Chaturvedi vs. University of Rajasthan) that the crucial date for consideration of the qualifications would be last date for receipt of applications and not the date of selection. Any decision to the contrary need not be countenanced in law for the reason that the date of selection is invariably uncertain. 34. 3 SCC 168 (Rekha Chaturvedi vs. University of Rajasthan) that the crucial date for consideration of the qualifications would be last date for receipt of applications and not the date of selection. Any decision to the contrary need not be countenanced in law for the reason that the date of selection is invariably uncertain. 34. Apart from the factual and legal position as highlighted above, one another vital feature is that though the UPSC vehemently attacked the order of the Tribunal, the fact remains, it has not challenged the same by way of filing a Writ Petition. It is true that, as an independent authority, they are entitled to place the records and ultimately it is for the Court to decide the issue. As rightly pointed out by the Additional Solicitor General, neither the Central Government nor the UPSC chose to challenge the impugned order of the Tribunal dated 05.05.2006. The stand of the Central Government cannot be subjected to any criticism of being inconsistent since as rightly pointed out by the learned Additional Solicitor General, on reappraisal of the facts, a party to the litigation is entitled to take a different stand on the question of law arising out of the said facts and, as such, the stand of the central Government cannot be frowned at. In this regard, it is useful to refer to para No.7 in the Judgment of the Supreme Court reported in 1996 (6) SCC 559 (P. Nallammal v. State), which reads as follows:- "7. The Union of India was made a respondent before the Madras High Court and one Under-Secretary to the Government of India had filed a counter-affidavit therein on 1.12.1998 conceding to the legal position espoused by the appellants. But Shri V.R. Reddy, learned Senior Counsel now appearing for the Union of India strongly supported the stand adopted by the State of Tamil Nadu. The volte-face of the Union of India cannot be frowned at, for, it is open to the State or Union of India or even a private party to retrace or even resile from a concession once made in the court on a legal proposition. Firstly, because the party concerned, on a reconsideration of the proposition could comprehend a different construction as more appropriate. Secondly, the construction of statutory provision cannot rest entirely on the stand adopted by any party in the lis. Firstly, because the party concerned, on a reconsideration of the proposition could comprehend a different construction as more appropriate. Secondly, the construction of statutory provision cannot rest entirely on the stand adopted by any party in the lis. Thirdly, the parties must be left free to aid the court in reaching the correct construction to be placed on a statutory provision. They cannot be nailed to a position on the legal interpretation which they adopted at a particular point of time because saner thoughts can throw more light on the same subject at a later stage." Aforetiarari UPSC also cannot be permitted to defend their action once again before Court since they also, by not agitating the matter by filing writ petition against the impugned order of the Tribunal, deemed to have submitted to the said order. No doubt, they are entitled to place the records and point out the factual and legal position. 35. Finally, now let us consider the assessment made during the period between 01.04.1993 and 15.07.1993. It is not in dispute that the petitioner was on “compulsory wait” during the said period and, for this period, he was rated as “outstanding”. Learned counsel for the respondents heavily commented that the said fact raises serious doubt about the authenticity of the ACR. When the Writ petitioner was on compulsory wait, as ordered by the Government, he was not performing duties during this period. As we observed in the earlier part of our order, the objective of the ACR is to assess the performance of the Officer and when in law there was no performance of any official duty from 01.04.1993 to 15.07.1993 by the Writ petitioner there would no question of any ACR and it was therefore noted on the earlier occasion that it was not available. In this regard, it is brought to our notice by the learned Senior Counsels appearing for the petitioner that a person on compulsory wait is deemed to be on duty and in this case, according to them, he was assisting his senior officer. It is also brought to our notice that the period of compulsory wait was regularised as duty vide G.O.Rt. No.2994 Home (Police II) Department, dated 14.10.1993. It is also brought to our notice that the period of compulsory wait was regularised as duty vide G.O.Rt. No.2994 Home (Police II) Department, dated 14.10.1993. In such circumstances, according to them, the said document viz., ACR for the period 01.04.1993 and 15.07.1993, is not a questionable document, and the Tribunal eschewed the same only on the ground that it was belated. It is also highlighted by the learned Senior Counsels that the petitioner was on compulsory wait in the then Dindigul Anna District from 08.04.1993 to 07.07.1993 as per the orders of the DGP, vide proceedings dated 05.07.1993. It is also submitted that, pursuant to the same, the petitioner was directed to remain at Dindigul for further postings where he had to wait for more than 3 = months. The officers, who are on compulsory wait, have to carry out the instructions of their immediate seniors. According to the learned Senior Counsels, the Superintendent of Police, Dindigul, utilized the services of the petitioner and assessed his performance as outstanding for the good work alone. It is further pointed out that since that period was considered as duty as per G.O.Rt. No.2994, dated 14.10.1993, communicated in C.O.Endt.Rc 6663/GBII (1) 93, dated 04.11.1993, an assessment is necessary for a period more than three months and hence the reporting officer rightly initiated the ACR, in such circumstances, it is pointed out that it is not correct to say that the same is against the Rules. 36. On the other hand, it is pointed out on the side of the respondents that an Officer on compulsory wait cannot be drafted to any duty by way of assistance to the superior officer since the reporting authority (Mr. Shailendara Babu, IPS) formerly Superintendent of Police, Dindigul, had stated that the writ petitioner assisted him in his work. It is further pointed out that according to the orders of compulsory wait, the officer is not assigned any duty and he has to remain in the headquarters and should not leave without prior permission. Shailendara Babu, IPS) formerly Superintendent of Police, Dindigul, had stated that the writ petitioner assisted him in his work. It is further pointed out that according to the orders of compulsory wait, the officer is not assigned any duty and he has to remain in the headquarters and should not leave without prior permission. It is also brought to our notice that the petitioner was placed under the charge of a different officer i.e., DIG (Admn.), in such circumstances, it was pointed out that the so called ACR of the writ petitioner for this period can only be said to be a suspicious document which was brought into existence for the first time to boost up the claim of the writ petitioner when the matter had to be considered afresh pursuant to the orders of the Tribunal, confirmed by the Supreme Court. As rightly pointed out, the Select Committee did not indicate as to the nature of the ACR and as to how the said ACR for a limited period and which was stated to be not available for certain reasons came into existence subsequently. Though it is stated that only during the period between 01.04.1993 and 15.07.1993, the petitioner was rated as “outstanding”, as rightly pointed out by the Additional Solicitor General and the Advocate General, when he was placed on compulsory wait, it is not understandable as to how he was rated as “outstanding” for the said period. 37. In addition to the same, even this assessment was written by the Reporting Officer only on 14.11.1994, reviewed by the Higher Officer on 19.01.1996 and accepted by the DGP on 27.01.1996. All the above factual details support the stand of the respondents that the ACR of the writ petitioner for the said period can only be said to be 'suspicious document' which was brought into existence for the first time for the purpose of boosting up the claim of the petitioner. 38. Learned Senior Counsels appearing for the petitioner commented the conduct of the Government of India in withdrawing the counter affidavit filed by them. It is also pointed out that on behalf of Government of India, counter affidavit was filed on 15.06.2006 in USR No.3978 of 2006. 38. Learned Senior Counsels appearing for the petitioner commented the conduct of the Government of India in withdrawing the counter affidavit filed by them. It is also pointed out that on behalf of Government of India, counter affidavit was filed on 15.06.2006 in USR No.3978 of 2006. According to them, the said counter which was served on the counsel for the petitioner is substantially the same as that was filed before the Tribunal and it supports the case of the petitioner and the same cannot be withdrawn without the leave of the Court. Learned Additional Solicitor General pointed out that the said counter affidavit was filed by the previous standing counsel without proper authority and that, immediately after realizing the mistake, the said counsel wrote a letter to the Registry and, on the basis of his request, the Registry returned the counter and the fact remains that, at the time of hearing of the writ petitions, no counter of the Union of India was pressed into service. Learned Additional Solicitor General made oral submissions on the basis of the materials supplied to him. In view of the fact that there is no counter affidavit of the Union of India before this Court and relied on by the Additional Solicitor General, we find no merit in the contention relating to the same. 39. Before winding up, it is relevant to point out that claims of candidates for promotion have to be considered objectively and dispassionately. The committee is duty bound to proceed on an impartial manner with a high sense of responsibility and should not leave any room for an allegation of inclination in favour of an individual unjustly and deviation from the procedure and obligation imposed upon it to follow. If the same trend as could be seen in the present cases is let to continue, it would emasculate the operation of Rules and Regulations and fraught with grave imbalances and chain reaction. It is not in dispute that, in the earlier round of litigation, the entire order of the Central Administrative Tribunal came to be confirmed by the Supreme Court. It is the specific finding of the Tribunal in O.A. Nos.595/05 etc. that any document which came into existence subsequent to the cut off date viz., 31.3.1994. It is not in dispute that, in the earlier round of litigation, the entire order of the Central Administrative Tribunal came to be confirmed by the Supreme Court. It is the specific finding of the Tribunal in O.A. Nos.595/05 etc. that any document which came into existence subsequent to the cut off date viz., 31.3.1994. shall not be taken into consideration, making it clear that the select list shall be prepared strictly by considering only the records that ought to have been considered at the first meeting held in 1995. When such was the direction given, the UPSC should not have taken into consideration any additional material as any deviation would on the one hand upset the order of seniority at all India Level and on the other hand go in flagrant violation of the order of the Tribunal. Further, the rating given to the petitioner, on the basis of the assistance rendered by him to his superior officer during the period he was placed on 'compulsory wait' cannot be taken as a relevant factor in making a positive entry that too as 'outstanding' in the ACR, and such entry cannot be permitted to stand as a base to push back other Officers, whose entries and ratings do not stem from such root and who are standing ahead in the row by way of seniority and other relevant aspects. Even by applying simple logic, it can be inferred that it is a clear case of boosting up the cause of the petitioner as otherwise there would not have been such denials and rebuttals, in that, the State Government denies the forwarding of additional material while the UPSC struggles to confirm the receipt of the same from the Government. A person put on compulsory wait and not assigned with works involving his independent opinion and action, cannot be equated with others, and the grading given to him for such period as outstanding cannot be allowed to be used as a source to overtake others and to deprive them of their legitimate expectation and right regarding promotion. Had the committee made its own assessment and awarded appropriate grading on the basis of all relevant aspects relating to the petitioner independent of the so called additional/extraneous documents, our view would have differed. Had the committee made its own assessment and awarded appropriate grading on the basis of all relevant aspects relating to the petitioner independent of the so called additional/extraneous documents, our view would have differed. However, we cannot have a soft approach, because, in matters of promotion relating to Indian Police Service, there should be strict adherence to rules and procedure, particularly when the matter went to adjudication and a direction was given regarding the course to be set in motion. Any deviation would lead to distortion and land up in imbalance in the ratio and upset the smooth functioning of the scheme, defeating the very object of the All India Police Service. It is well known that the State Government is enjoined to send the select-list to the UPSC, which after considering the objections, if any, of the Central Government and the State Government and the views of the Committee, would approve the list with such modifications as it may be deemed just and proper. When the State Government emphatically denies having sent the Additional ACR, thereby, the authenticity of the said document lurks in suspicion, such extraneous material can never be permitted to be used to favour the petitioner that too defeating the rights of others, hence, we see no ground to interfere with the well considered order of the Tribunal, accordingly, the same has to be upheld. In this view of the matter, we are unable to accept the contentions raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner. Consequently, all the writ petitions fail and they are dismissed. No costs. Connected Miscellaneous Petitions are closed.